receive() returns a reply only for a Ping, answered with a Pong, and a
Ping delivers no frame, so no rejection can follow an earlier send in the
same poll. The arm that carried such a failure into the rejection's end
was dead code; its mutant survived for that reason.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A reply sent earlier in the same poll could fail permanently and then be
dropped when a rejection returned first; and a refusal fragment that can
never be sent must end the session naming its error. Both now reach
end_session as the unsendable end. The test makes the refusal itself
unsendable: the peer's goodbye names the error, nothing is counted as a
lost datagram, and the other peer is served.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Send-failure semantics are Cut D's: a transient failure is counted and
never reported; a permanent one ends that peer's session.
Conflicts:
- cultmesh-ts index.ts: the two sendPackets. Cut D's
sendPacket(record, packet) is the one; the branch's reporting
sendPacket is deleted, and so is the options doc's "Every failed
datagram send reaches onError".
- cultmesh-py server.py: the rudp_send_failures doc is Cut D's. The
receive loop is Cut D's (handling guarded, permanent send errors
carried) with the branch's over_rudp=True. _send_rudp_schema_frame
sends in rudp_max_fragment_bytes fragments and returns Cut D's
permanent error from any fragment; a reply the queue cannot take no
longer vanishes into a count (below). _send_rudp_packet and the two
peer-ending helpers are Cut D's.
- cultmesh-py test imports: both create_rudp_schema_transport and
decode_rudp_packet.
Semantic resolution:
- cultmesh-rs: end_rejected_session and Cut D's end_refused_session and
end_unsendable_session collapse into one end_session(key, SessionEnd).
A refusal fragment that can never be sent is not dropped: the goodbye
names its error. The refusal stays unreliable, unordered, and
acknowledges nothing (its ack fields are built after the reset).
- cultmesh-rs: Cut D's "snapshot response could not be sent: {error}"
becomes CultMeshRudpRejectionReason::ResponseSendFailed(ErrorKind),
with a fixed REFUSAL_TEXTS entry. Its session ends as unsendable: the
peer gets the goodbye naming the error and no refusal.
- P3: a snapshot the reliable queue cannot take is answered.
cultmesh-py sends a small cultnet.error.v0 (response_unqueueable,
fixed text) unreliable and unordered, then the session ends as Cut D
ends any message the handling cannot serve. cultmesh-ts sends its
snapshot fallback error unreliable and unordered. cultmesh-rs already
answers through the refusal (ResponseQueueFailed); a test pins it.
- Tests follow: the branch's EMSGSIZE tests now expect Cut D's permanent
handling (the TS one is deleted, Cut D's own tests cover it), and the
Python queue test expects the answer instead of a count.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A peer's undecodable or unhandleable message ends only that peer's session and never
escapes Poll (the C# RUDP schema server's live crash). A send failure's goodbye belongs to
the generation that sent it. TS transient send failures are counted, not reported. The
interop harness finds the Rust peer through cargo metadata.
Soul passes 1-4; batch 5 closes pass 4's findings. Merged tree a892e117 verified on
Yggdrasil: GameCult.Networking 481, Mesh 264, cultnet-ts 198, interop 27/27 with
CARGO_TARGET_DIR set.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The harness assumed that the Rust interop peer builds under
packages/cultnet-rs/target. When CARGO_TARGET_DIR or a cargo config's
build.target-dir is set, cargo builds elsewhere, and every Rust lane
failed with a spawn ENOENT. The path now comes from `cargo metadata`'s
target_directory, read once on first use.
The TypeScript peer imports @gamecult/cultcache-ts, and the Python peers
import msgpack. When either was missing, the lanes died with import
errors in a child's stderr or with timeouts. The first use of each peer
now checks its prerequisite and fails with a message that names it and
the command that provides it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
With only 1 KiB fragments, a pre-check measuring a small multiple of a
fragment (Soul's min(payload, frag*2)) still passed a 70,000-byte send.
The fixture now also runs with 40,000-byte fragments. Any such multiple
of that is over the datagram limit, so the mutant dies.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The schema server's backstop ended every session with "session refused
a packet", including when the fault was the server's own: for example a
handler's response too large to send, or a refusal the handler did not
type. Decoding and handling are now two catches:
- A message that cannot be decoded is the peer's. The session ends with
the refusal reason.
- A handler fault ends the session with "server could not handle a
message".
The transport's EndRefusedPeer becomes EndPeerSession(peer, reason). It
reports whether it ended the session, so the log says when a response
that failed after its first fragment had already ended it over the send.
Before, the log reported that it ended a session that was already gone.
The comment said that ending the session matched cultmesh-py. It does
not: Python silently skips a malformed frame. The honest anchor is the
C# TCP schema server, whose ServePeerAsync ends the one peer whose
message fails to decode or handle. The comment now says so.
Pinned, each by a test that kills its mutant:
- a handler fault's goodbye carries the server's reason, not the refusal
(mutant: the refusal reason);
- the post-fragment-0 path logs that the session had already ended
(mutant: a constant outcome);
- EndPeerSession says no goodbye to a replaced peer's endpoint (mutant:
the Ended check dropped);
- a refused peer's frames still queued are never handled (mutant: the
queue purge dropped).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
3b9ffac2 claimed that the generation check subsumed the UnsendableReason
once-guard. It did not. A thread that reads the generation only after
the session has ended carries the ended session's own generation, and the
check lets it through. For example, the polling thread answers a Ping on a
session that a caller's send has just ended but that has not yet been
retired. When that Pong fails permanently, the thread says a second
goodbye and overwrites the first failure's reason (Soul pass 4, PR4).
EndUnsendableSession now also returns when the session has already ended.
Two tests:
- The polling thread answers a Ping on a session already ended, and the
Pong can never be sent. Exactly one goodbye goes out, and the first
failure's reason stands. The hook admits the Ping after the session
ended and before the peer is queued for retirement. The test kills the
mutant that drops the Ended check.
- A failed send's goodbye is sent under the gate. A polling thread
admitting a new Connect from the endpoint waits on the gate, so the old
generation's goodbye never follows the new session's Accept. The test
kills the mutant that sends the goodbye outside the gate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The refusal went reliable and ordered, but the session ends with it, so
it is never resent: a peer missing any earlier reliable packet from the
server held it behind that gap forever. It now goes unreliable and
unordered, so it is delivered on arrival whatever the peer is missing.
The test drops the server's snapshot reply before the refused put: the
refusal still arrives, followed by the goodbye.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The refusal sent to a rejected peer carried the rejection's Display
text, which for SinkRefused and SnapshotSourceFailed is the sink's or
source's own error. Odin's sink formats the peer-supplied document type
into its error, so a peer's input came back on the wire.
The refusal now carries fixed text per rejection variant
(REFUSAL_TEXTS). The rejection returned from poll_once still carries the
detail for the caller; the server itself logs nothing.
publish_cultnet_message_to_rudp_catalog no longer quotes a catalog's text
unfiltered: it reports "refused the put", quoting the text only when it
is one of the fixed refusals.
The test fixtures' sink and source errors carry a canary; the refused
peer's text is the fixed one and never contains it. A fake catalog that
refuses with a canary of its own shows the publisher's error stays
fixed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The RUDP option rules refused a TCP-only server (enable_rudp=False) for
RUDP limits it never uses. Rust checks those options only for the RUDP
server they configure, so Python now checks rudp_resend_delay_ms,
rudp_max_pending_reliable_packets, rudp_max_fragment_bytes and the empty
snapshot's fragment rule only when enable_rudp is true. The snapshot
limits still apply to every server.
The daemon turned --max-snapshot-documents 0 into a traceback. The server
still owns the rule; the daemon reports its refusal through
parser.error: exit status 2 and the rule named, no traceback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A well-formed put still killed the RUDP thread: _handle_raw_put called
apply_raw_put_message unguarded, and cache.put_envelope raises for a
blank recordKey, a payload that is not MessagePack or does not decode to
its schema, a global document under another key, or anything a
document's own decoder or validator raises. Over TCP it ended the
connection.
The apply site now refuses any put the store cannot take to the peer
that sent it, as malformed_document_put, over RUDP and TCP alike, and
logs the error's type. Neither the refusal nor the log quotes the error,
which can quote the put. No new shape checks: the store decides what it
can take.
The test sends each shape over RUDP and over TCP and shows the RUDP
thread alive, the TCP connection serving its next message, and other
peers served.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Admission has sized only the served reply since a1065cab; three comments
and one fixture assertion still described the receipt bound.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The registry method existed on this branch only to size a receipt at put
admission in cultmesh-ts, which no longer does. It never reached main.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Admission sized the larger of the snapshot reply and a receipt echoing
the put, so a put servable at the bound was refused, within 89-125 bytes
of it, for a receipt an application that sends none never sends. Whether
a receipt is sent is onDocumentPutRaw's to decide after it stores the
put, so admission cannot know it (ruling: Self, fork A option a).
Admission now sizes only the snapshot reply serving the document alone.
A receipt that cannot be sent takes the existing path: onError hears why
and the peer is told with a cultnet.error.v0 that it is not coming. This
removes the receipt bound of 9757ed54 and its test.
The new test pins the band at its boundary with puts whose echoed receipt
is over the limit: exactly at the limit is admitted and served, with no
receipt and with an echoed one, and one byte over is refused.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A refused peer now acknowledges its refusal, and that datagram reaches
the server after the session has ended. The test took the next poll to
be the second client's request and failed on the dropped acknowledgement
instead. It drains the server until idle after each refusal is read.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The daemon test ran with --max-snapshot-documents 0 to make every
snapshot a peer error. A limit of zero is now refused at startup, as the
Rust document server refuses it, so the test pins what the daemon does
with it: it exits non-zero naming the rule and never writes its ready
file. The limit's enforcement as a peer error stays pinned in process by
test_cultmesh_local_server_rejects_oversized_snapshot_responses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every application rejection, DocumentUnservable included, ended with
self.sessions.remove(&key): no refusal and no goodbye. The peer could not
tell a refusal from packet loss, and a publisher timed out and retried
the same put.
The session still ends, but the peer is now sent the refusal as a
cultnet.error.v0 carrying the reason's text (no code or details, as the
TypeScript server's refusals carry none), then the session's goodbye.
The refusal is built before the reset and carries the goodbye's emptied
acknowledgement fields, so it never acknowledges the refused message:
publish_cultnet_message_to_rudp_catalog reads that acknowledgement as
admission. A refusal that cannot be encoded or queued is not sent; the
goodbye still is.
publish_cultnet_message_to_rudp_catalog now returns a catalog's refusal
as an error naming it, instead of waiting out its flush deadline.
Tests read the refusal from the client side: the refusal text, the put
still pending after it, and the goodbye invalidating it; and a publisher
refused by a sink hears the sink's reason well inside its deadline.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
_unservable_put sized a put by building the envelope it would store, and
that read document["recordKey"] and document["payload"] directly: a put
over RUDP with no recordKey raised KeyError out of the RUDP loop and
ended the thread for every peer. A string payload raised TypeError the
same way.
_unservable_put now refuses a put whose document lacks a string recordKey
or a binary payload as malformed_document_put, the code the server
already uses for a put with no document map, before any sizing reads it
and before its early return, so the TCP path refuses it too instead of
raising in apply_raw_put_message.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
With one-byte fragments and a reliable queue of 16, even an empty snapshot
can never be queued: every reply vanished while rudp_send_failures
counted, and the peer timed out. Rust refuses such a configuration at
startup in validate_options; Python's __post_init__ accepted it.
__post_init__ now applies Rust's rules to every option the two servers
share, in Rust's order: max_snapshot_bytes, max_snapshot_documents,
rudp_resend_delay_ms, rudp_max_pending_reliable_packets and
rudp_max_fragment_bytes must be greater than zero (the first two when
set; zero was accepted before), max_snapshot_bytes must hold an empty
snapshot response, and an empty snapshot response in fragments of
rudp_max_fragment_bytes, counted rounding up, must fit the lesser of
65535 and the reliable queue. Rust's session, lifetime and payload-budget
rules have no Python option to apply to.
The test measures the empty snapshot the server actually sends, pins each
rule at its boundary, and shows the configuration at the bound does
answer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The EMSGSIZE pre-check measures a send's largest datagram, which is one
fragment when maxFragmentBytes is set. Nothing pinned that: a check that
compared the whole payload (Soul's S-TM2) would refuse every large
fragmented send, and large sends are live. A 70,000-byte send with
1,024-byte fragments must not throw and must arrive whole. The test
kills the mutant whose size check ignores maxFragmentBytes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
RudpCultNetSchemaServer decoded each schema frame outside its per-message
backstop, so a malformed payload (0xc1) or a well-formed message with an
unknown schemaVersion threw MessagePackSerializationException out of
PollAvailableAsync and PollOnceAsync. The drain aborted: a good peer's
request in the same drain went unserved, a consumer loop that did not
catch died, and the bad frame was already acknowledged while its peer
stayed connected.
Decoding now runs inside the backstop. A peer whose message cannot be
decoded or handled has its session ended: the transport's new
EndRefusedPeer sends the refusal goodbye under the gate, counts the drop
in PacketsDropped, drops that peer's frames still queued, forgets the
peer and raises PeerDisconnected. A session that already ended (replaced
by a new Connect, or ended by a send failure) gets no goodbye, since the
endpoint may belong to a new session. Other peers in the drain are still
served. Ending the session matches cultmesh-py's server, where one
peer's bad message ends that peer; runtime parity is the reason.
The log names the fault's type only and never its message, because the
decoder's message quotes the peer's input (the unknown schemaVersion).
The dispatch-backstop test now asserts that rule instead of the handler
message it used to require.
Tests, each failing on the pre-fix code: a malformed payload and an
unknown schemaVersion each leave the good peer served without Poll
throwing (also through PollOnceAsync); the bad peer's session ends,
counted and told; the log carries the type and not the canary value.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Send ended an unsendable session after releasing SessionGate, and the
goodbye was built under the gate but sent outside it. If the polling
thread admitted a new Connect from the same endpoint in that window, the
ended generation's goodbye reached the new client: it saw Data, Accept,
Disconnect and believed itself disconnected while the listener held it
connected.
Every path that finds a permanent send failure now reads the session's
generation under the gate at the send, and EndUnsendableSession builds
and sends the goodbye under the gate only while that generation is
unchanged. The generation check replaces the UnsendableReason once-guard:
a second failure in the same generation finds it already ended.
The test orders the new Connect inside the send, before the fragment
that can never be sent, and asserts the new client hears no Disconnect
and stays connected on both sides. It fails on the pre-fix code
(Data, Accept, Disconnect) and kills the mutant that drops the check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operator: "FEC: Please own the math." rs-gf256-v1 implemented in
media_fec.rs, wire-identical to the crate (1,795 geometries, independent
derivation, 6,520 cross-version recoveries, 60k hostile blocks identical).
lru and instant advisories gone; 13 fewer dependencies. combine uses one
product row per coefficient: encode ~1.0-1.4x, decode ~1.2-1.4x the crate.
Follow-up: k^3 inversion makes 255+1 recovery ~124 ms.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
NU1101 since 69bd45ff: pack-nuget.ps1 packed a hand list that missed
GameCult.Math; it now follows ProjectReferences from the public roots.
ubuntu timeout since 2dc7c122: the headless deadline started at connect.
Green on both OSes: run 36727267703 (ubuntu passed twice).
Follow-up (Eve): pack-dotnet-surface.ps1 ignores the version parameters
the verify script passes, so the local feed reuses published versions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The headless C# client armed a 45 s deadline as soon as its lease was up,
but the orchestrator then runs the whole browser scenario (Chromium launch,
two clicks, provider and Odin replacement, page reconnect) before it sends
INVOKE. On ubuntu runners that scenario alone takes most of the budget: the
last green run finished with little to spare, and since 2dc7c122 the ubuntu
onboarding job has timed out in the headless process either before the
receipt or during the post-receipt benchmark.
The orchestrator already bounds each step it waits on, and closing stdin
ends the headless wait for its command. The headless process now bounds only
its own work: the 45 s deadline covers the invoke, convergence and benchmark
after INVOKE arrives.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The test Source overrode served_record in both modes, so no test ran the
trait's default and a default that stripped provenance survived. Source
now keeps the default, which the at-bound fixture pins (the record as
received); a separate StrippingSource overrides it for the stripping and
failing-source tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Admission now sizes two replies built from the record the registry
would store: the snapshot reply serving it alone and the receipt
echoing its value under the put's message id with the server's default
provenance, through the one receipt builder the send path uses. A put
whose larger reply exceeds maxPayloadBytes, 65535 fragments or the
reliable queue is refused before onDocumentPutRaw, so a stored put
always gets its receipt when the application stores through the
registry and echoes that value. The existing fallback (a receipt that
cannot be sent all the same reaches onError, and the peer a
cultnet.error.v0) stays for handlers that acknowledge something larger.
The served-bound fixtures carry a long storedAt, which the served record
keeps and the receipt replaces, so they still pin the served bound; a
new test pins the receipt bound: one byte over is refused, exactly at
the limit is stored and receipted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CultNetDocumentRegistry.decodeRawDocumentPut returns the binding and
value applyRawDocumentPutMessage would store for a raw put, so a server
can build the receipt that would acknowledge a put before storing it.
It throws, as the put would, when no binding accepts the document.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Node reports an oversized datagram only to the send's callback, so the
caller's send used to succeed and the session ended later. The transport now
checks the largest datagram of the send against the socket family's UDP
limit (65,507 bytes for IPv4, 65,527 for IPv6) before the session builds
anything: the send throws, nothing is queued, and no sequence is taken, as
the Rust and C# listeners withdraw it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The document servers' refusal tests sent an unreliable fragment, whose
sequence the session never records, so dropping the reset before the goodbye
survived. They now refuse a reliable fragment and check the goodbye does not
acknowledge it.
C#: a BeforeSend seam orders a caller's failing send between the polling
thread's ack and its send, so both threads end the same session; the peer
hears one goodbye.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A permanent failure reported after that generation ended (the client
connected again from the same endpoint) ended the generation that replaced
it and said goodbye to the new client. The callback now acts only while the
generation that sent the datagram is live, which is the one in `sessions`.
That makes two guards unreachable, so they are deleted: `peer.unsendable`
before the goodbye (the first permanent failure ends the generation, so a
second callback from it is already ignored) and the conditional delete (a
live generation is the entry at its key). A refusal's goodbye is sent
best-effort, as the transport and the document server send theirs, instead
of through the failure handling meant for datagrams a session owes.
Tests: late failure after a reconnect, for the transport's generation check
and for the operation server.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CultMeshRudpSnapshotSource gains served_record: the record the source
would serve for a received put's document. Admission sizes that record,
so a source that serves another shape than it receives (dropping
provenance, or adding its own, as Odin's presence records do) keeps
admission exact by overriding it. The default serves the record as
received, so existing sources, closures included, are unchanged. A
source that fails to answer refuses the put as SnapshotSourceFailed.
Tests: a stripping source admits a put that is over the bound only as
received and serves it at exactly the bound; the existing at-bound
fixture stays as the default-method test; a failing served_record
refuses the put.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Merge 69bd45ff made GameCult.Caching.MessagePack reference CultMath
(PackageId GameCult.Math), so its nuspec depends on GameCult.Math 0.2.4.
The packer's hand-written project list never packed it, and GameCult.Math
is not on nuget.org, so every clean consumer of the local feed failed
restore with NU1101. That is the Eve surface consumer smoke in the
"one-command multiplayer onboarding" jobs, red on both OSes since then.
The packer now walks ProjectReference from the public roots (GameCult.Mesh,
GameCult.Networking.WebSockets) and packs the whole closure. The expected
package names come from MSBuild's PackageId and Version for each project,
since GameCult.Math carries its own identity.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The RUDP loop caught only ValueError, so a subscribe frame with
`schemaIds: 5` raised TypeError in _handle_connection_message and ended the
thread for every peer. Any exception from handling one peer's messages now
ends that peer's session with a goodbye, as a refused packet does, and is
logged by its type alone: the error's message can quote what the peer sent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When that generation ends while the handler runs (a goodbye, a refusal, a
timeout, a new Connect from the same endpoint), the response is not sent
and a failure sends no second goodbye: a client that connected again owns
the endpoint.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A caller still holding the replaced peer (a schema handler awaiting work for
it) could send into the endpoint the new session owns: a goodbye after a
partial failure disconnected the new client, a fixed initial sequence
delivered the stale frame in place of the real one, and a drawn one stalled
the new session. The replaced session now ends under the SessionGate every
Send takes, so a stale Send throws and nothing of it leaves.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Node reports a failed send only to the send's callback, never on the socket's
"error" event. Emitting it as "error" from the transport ended any process
with no listener (invokeCultNetOperation among them) once per resend tick.
The transport and the document server now count it in sendFailures, as the
operation server, Rust and Python already do. The tests send to
255.255.255.255 with no error listener.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The generation test reads each server packet as one message, so its
server now fragments only above 60000 bytes. The queue test's liveness
probe is an empty snapshot: a hello reply needs more fragments than its
eight-packet queue holds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
