Research: steward orders on Windows hosts (JEA, Ansible win_*, Intune Remediations and EPM, Windows OpenSSH, PIM, CyberArk, Teleport) and Starfire/Raven body facts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/research/steward-orders-prior-art.md

@@ -128,3 +128,158 @@ says about this design.
   is its projection.
 - Break-glass, when it lands, waits on an announcement and a window, and is
   recorded in full.
+
+## 5. Windows hosts: Starfire and Raven
+
+Serves follow-up `steward-orders-windows-hosts` under ruling
+`remote-admin-on-desktops` (operator 2026-10-31: "We'll need a way to do this
+kind of thing remotely"). The trigger: on 2026-10-31 she approved through UAC,
+sitting at Starfire, an elevated script that added an inbound firewall rule for
+Ollama on the WireGuard interface and registered a SYSTEM startup task. She is
+away from today, possibly for months; a hard reboot already needs a call.
+
+### Body, as read on 2026-10-31 (read-only)
+
+- Both hosts answer TCP 22 and 3389 from Yggdrasil over WireGuard: Starfire
+  10.77.0.2, Raven 10.77.0.4. WinRM is stopped (start type Manual) on both.
+  winget v1.29 is present; choco is not on Raven.
+- Yggdrasil holds no SSH client config and no private key for either host:
+  `gamecultadmin` has only `authorized_keys` and `known_hosts`, root has no
+  client key, and the mind users have no home. Nothing on Yggdrasil can reach a
+  Windows shell today.
+- Starfire: sshd runs, the stock `Match Group administrators` stanza is in
+  force, `C:\ProgramData\ssh\administrators_authorized_keys` does not exist and
+  the operator's user has no `authorized_keys`. Its admins are the operator's
+  user (`Meta`) and the built-in Administrator. No key reaches Starfire; RDP,
+  Sunshine/Moonlight and her own UAC click are the only privileged paths in.
+- Raven: `administrators_authorized_keys` holds one key, commented
+  `192.168.1.84 access key`, whose private half is on Starfire (the `raven`
+  host entry in the operator's `~/.ssh/config`). A session with it is
+  `BUILTIN\Administrators` at High Mandatory Level: Starfire already holds raw,
+  unaudited admin on Raven.
+- Raven already runs Idunn's host actuator (`idunn-host serve`, task
+  `GameCult-Idunn-Host`, at logon, interactive, Limited): it dials
+  `10.77.0.1:17890/udp` over CultNet RUDP, accepts only requests Idunn's
+  service identity signed, and signs its reports with its own host identity
+  (`docs/host-actuator.md`; runbook `gamecult-ops/runbooks/idunn-host-raven.md`).
+  It is unelevated by design: Muninn must live in the desktop session. Starfire
+  has no actuator.
+- Memory, not re-proven here: Starfire has frozen under load (PSU or GPU
+  suspected), and nothing that must survive may depend on Starfire or Raven
+  staying up (`workstation-load-budget.md`, 2026-10-29).
+
+### PowerShell JEA (Just Enough Administration)
+
+- A session configuration (`.pssc`, registered with
+  `Register-PSSessionConfiguration`) maps caller groups to role capabilities
+  (`.psrc`); a role lists `VisibleCmdlets` with per-parameter `ValidateSet` or
+  `ValidatePattern`, the session runs in `NoLanguage` mode and executes as a
+  temporary virtual account (`RunAsVirtualAccount`) or a gMSA, so the caller
+  holds no admin right. `TranscriptDirectory` records every session.
+  (Microsoft Learn: "JEA overview", "JEA role capabilities", "JEA session
+  configurations", "Auditing and reporting on JEA".)
+- JEA rides WinRM. SSH-based PowerShell remoting has not supported endpoint
+  configurations or JEA (Microsoft Learn, "PowerShell remoting over SSH",
+  limitations; the current page may have changed, check before relying on it).
+- Microsoft's own warning: a role that exposes a command able to run arbitrary
+  code (`Start-Process`, `Invoke-Expression`, `Register-ScheduledTask` with a
+  free action, `New-Service` with a free path) is an escape to the run-as
+  account ("JEA security considerations").
+- On a workgroup desktop, WinRM needs a listener (HTTPS for anything but
+  Kerberos), a local Windows account for the caller, and that account's
+  password or certificate mapping held by the caller.
+- Lesson: JEA is the platform's answer to "typed, parameter-validated admin
+  with a transcript", and its role file is the same shape as a typed order. It
+  brings WinRM (off today), a Windows credential that would live on Yggdrasil,
+  and no order id, brake or post: those would still be Idunn's, so the grammar
+  would live twice, once in PowerShell attributes on each host and once in the
+  order record.
+
+### Ansible `win_*` modules over WinRM or SSH
+
+- `ansible.windows.win_service` (state started, stopped, restarted; start
+  mode), `community.windows.win_firewall_rule` (name, direction, action,
+  protocol, localport, remoteip, profiles, interfacetypes),
+  `community.windows.win_scheduled_task` (actions, triggers, principal, run
+  level), `ansible.windows.win_package` and the community `win_chocolatey` and
+  winget modules. Each takes typed parameters, declares desired state, is
+  idempotent and reports changed, ok or failed. Transport is WinRM or OpenSSH
+  with `ansible_shell_type: powershell`; over OpenSSH an admin key already has
+  the elevated token, so no `become`. (Ansible docs: "Windows Remote
+  Management", "Windows SSH", module pages.)
+- Lesson: these modules are the order vocabulary to copy, with desired-state
+  semantics ("rule X exists with these fields") rather than imperative verbs.
+  Agentless push means the controller holds admin credentials for every host,
+  which is the shape the brief rules out.
+
+### Intune Remediations and Endpoint Privilege Management
+
+- The Intune Management Extension runs on the device as SYSTEM, polls the
+  service outbound over HTTPS, runs a detection script and, when it reports
+  non-compliant, the remediation script, and returns both outputs to the
+  console. No inbound port; the device authenticates by its enrolment
+  certificate. (Microsoft Learn: "Remediations", "Intune Management
+  Extension".)
+- Endpoint Privilege Management adds support-approved elevation: the user asks
+  to elevate one file, the request reaches the console, an admin approves
+  there, and the device elevates that file hash only, logged. (Microsoft
+  Learn: "Endpoint Privilege Management", "support approved elevation".)
+- Lesson: the mature Windows pattern for an absent administrator is a SYSTEM
+  agent that dials out, executes only what its authority signed and reports
+  back, and EPM is the nearest thing to "remote approval in place of a UAC
+  click". It is the shape `idunn-host` already has on Raven, minus elevation.
+
+### Windows OpenSSH and administrators
+
+- For a member of Administrators, sshd reads only
+  `%ProgramData%\ssh\administrators_authorized_keys` (ACL Administrators and
+  SYSTEM), and a key-authenticated session gets the full token: UAC does not
+  apply. Observed on Raven at High Mandatory Level. (Win32-OpenSSH wiki;
+  issue #1942 on the file's location.)
+- Forced commands: `ForceCommand` in a `Match` block is the documented route;
+  whether `command=` in an authorized_keys line is honoured on Windows has an
+  open report of it being ignored (Win32-OpenSSH issue #473). Unproven on
+  these hosts.
+- Lesson: an admin key is a remote UAC bypass with nothing but sshd's event log
+  for a record. As an order transport it needs a forced command that parses
+  the order on the host, and that parser is the whole boundary.
+
+### How remote approval replaces a local UAC click
+
+- Entra PIM: a user eligible for a role activates it for a bounded time with a
+  justification, optional MFA, and optional approval by a named approver who
+  is notified and approves in the portal or app; every activation is logged.
+  (Microsoft Learn, "Privileged Identity Management".)
+- CyberArk dual control: use of a privileged account needs an approver's
+  confirmation in the vault's web or mobile client; sessions run through a
+  recording proxy (PSM). (CyberArk docs: "Dual control", "Privileged Session
+  Manager".)
+- Teleport access requests: a role is requested with a reason; reviewers
+  approve or deny, thresholds can require N approvals, and plugins put the
+  request in Slack, Mattermost or PagerDuty with approve buttons; the grant is
+  time-boxed and sessions are recorded. (Teleport docs: "Access Requests",
+  "Access Request plugins".)
+- Shared shape: the approval arrives over an out-of-band channel authenticated
+  as the approver, is scoped to one request, expires, and is recorded beside
+  the request. A request nobody answers is denied, never run. Shared
+  assumption: an approver who answers in minutes.
+- Lesson for an operator away for months: positive approval is only as live as
+  her reachability. Where her approval is kept, the channel is her Matrix
+  account replying in #operator to one order id (Synapse authenticates the
+  sender; a Mind cannot forge her mxid without root on Yggdrasil), with an
+  expiry after which the order is refused. Where it is not, the order's type
+  is the defence, as for Linux (section 3).
+
+### What this gives the Windows design
+
+- A SYSTEM agent on each host dials out to an authority that signs every
+  request; no inbound port, no Windows credential and no admin key on
+  Yggdrasil (Intune, Salt minion, `idunn-host`).
+- The four Ansible modules become typed, desired-state orders, and JEA's
+  warning becomes the grammar rule: no order field names a free program,
+  script, or path to run outside a root the host binding declares.
+- A Windows host is often absent (a frozen Starfire, a reboot waiting on a
+  call): an order to an unattached host is refused at once, never queued to
+  fire days later.
+- Approval, where kept, is a Matrix reply from her account to one order id,
+  scoped and expiring; anything outside the grammar is break-glass.