Research: steward orders prior art (nix-daemon, Postfix pickup, Salt, AWX, deploy-rs, break-glass, two-person rule)

Serves eureka-body follow-up eureka-root-idunn-orders under ruling
eureka-root-idunn-orders-break-glass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/research/steward-orders-prior-art.md

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+# Steward orders prior art: privileged agents, break-glass, two-person rule
+
+Serves Eureka campaign `eureka-body`, follow-up `eureka-root-idunn-orders`, under
+ruling `eureka-root-idunn-orders-break-glass` (operator 2026-10-31: Eureka issues
+typed orders to Idunn, run as root and posted to #operator, plus an announced,
+brakeable break-glass order). Imagination pass, session eureka-self-2026-10-31.
+
+Written from recall of the systems' documentation, not re-fetched on
+2026-10-31; each claim names where to check it. Facts first, then what each one
+says about this design.
+
+## 1. Privileged agents that take requests from less privileged callers
+
+### nix-daemon (closest shape)
+
+- Unprivileged users never run as root: the Nix client talks to `nix-daemon`
+  over a Unix socket (`/nix/var/nix/daemon-socket/socket`), and the daemon reads
+  the caller's uid from the socket's peer credentials. `nix.conf`
+  `allowed-users` says who may connect at all; `trusted-users` says who may
+  pass privileged settings. (nix.conf manual, "allowed-users",
+  "trusted-users".)
+- The daemon accepts a closed set of typed operations (the worker protocol),
+  not shell strings.
+- Lesson: a local Unix socket plus `SO_PEERCRED` is the established way for a
+  root agent to know which local principal is asking. The principal is derived
+  from the kernel, never declared by the caller.
+
+### Postfix maildrop and pickup
+
+- Unprivileged `sendmail` writes into the `maildrop` queue through the setgid
+  `postdrop` helper; the privileged `pickup` daemon reads each file, checks it,
+  and copies it into its own queue before anything acts on it. (Postfix
+  architecture overview, `pickup(8)`, `postdrop(1)`.)
+- Lesson: the submitter's inbox is not the record. The privileged side copies
+  the request into a store only it can write, and only that copy is acted on.
+
+### SaltStack
+
+- The master publishes jobs to minions that run as root; each job gets a job
+  id (jid) from the master, not from the caller, and returns are kept in the
+  job cache (`salt-run jobs.lookup_jid`). (Salt docs, "Job management".)
+- `publisher_acl` and external auth (`external_auth`) grant a user named
+  functions only, for example `pkg.install` and `service.restart`, optionally
+  with argument patterns. (Salt docs, "Publisher ACL system", "External
+  Authentication System".)
+- CVE-2020-11651 and CVE-2020-11652: the master's request server exposed
+  methods that skipped authentication, which gave unauthenticated root on every
+  minion. (Salt advisory, April 2020.)
+- Lesson: grant typed functions with argument grammar, not a shell; ids belong
+  to the authority; and a root agent's intake is its attack surface, so keep it
+  local and small.
+
+### Ansible and AWX (Tower)
+
+- Modules (`ansible.builtin.apt`, `ansible.builtin.systemd_service`) take typed
+  parameters and report changed, ok or failed; `become` is per task.
+- AWX job templates with RBAC let a user launch only pre-approved templates,
+  with survey fields as typed, validated parameters; the activity stream and
+  job output are the audit. (AWX docs, "Job Templates", "Surveys", "Activity
+  Stream".)
+- Lesson: "a named operation with validated parameters, launched by a principal
+  who may launch only that" is the mature shape of a typed order.
+
+### NixOS deploy tools (deploy-rs, colmena, nixos-rebuild)
+
+- Activation switches a whole system closure; deploy-rs "magic rollback" rolls
+  the activation back unless the deployer confirms it within a timeout over a
+  fresh connection. (deploy-rs README, "Magic Rollback".)
+- Lesson: a change that can cut off its own operator wants a confirm-or-revert
+  window. For Idunn this already exists for releases (continuity, fencing); it
+  matters for any later host-level order (reboot, network) and for break-glass.
+
+### polkit and sudoers allowlists
+
+- polkit rules can grant a user `org.freedesktop.systemd1.manage-units` for
+  named units and verbs only (rules see `action.lookup("unit")` and `"verb"`).
+  (polkit(8), systemd's polkit actions.) The mind units already use a polkit
+  start grant.
+- sudoers `Cmnd_Alias` allowlists and `log_output` I/O logs are what the interim
+  root (`gamecult-ops deploy/eureka-root`) uses today.
+- Lesson: a unit allowlist is ordinary practice. polkit alone would give
+  restarts without a single order record, brake gate or #operator post, so it
+  is the smaller tool but not the ruled one.
+
+## 2. Break-glass access
+
+- The common pattern (healthcare "break the glass", cloud emergency accounts,
+  Teleport access requests, AWS's guidance on emergency access): the actor
+  states a justification; use raises a loud alert at once; access is
+  time-boxed; the session is recorded; every use is reviewed afterwards.
+  (Teleport docs, "Access Requests" and "Session Recording"; AWS Well-Architected
+  security pillar, emergency access.)
+- What these systems assume and Yggdrasil lacks: a human on call who sees the
+  alert in minutes. With the operator away, the review is done by Minds and
+  members in #operator, and the alert reaches them only if chat is up.
+- Lesson: break-glass is defended by visibility and review, not by its
+  intake. It must announce before it runs and keep a full record of what ran.
+
+## 3. Two-person rule and veto windows
+
+- Two-person integrity (military nuclear surety; banking dual control): no
+  single person can complete a critical action; a second must positively
+  approve. Software forms: required reviewers on protected branches; Google's
+  multi-party authorization for production changes; Teleport requests needing
+  N approvers.
+- A veto window is weaker and different: lazy consensus (Apache "lazy
+  consensus": silence means assent after a stated period). It protects only if
+  someone is watching during the window, and an attacker who controls the
+  timing picks the quiet hour.
+- The ruling in force (`brake-anyone-pulls-motion-releases`) is a veto shape:
+  anyone pulls at once, only a motion releases. Positive approval would need a
+  second principal who is awake; with the operator gone that is another Mind,
+  and Minds read the same chat an injection arrives through.
+- Lesson: for typed orders the type is the defence (closed operations,
+  validated arguments, an allowlist); for break-glass the window plus the
+  record is the defence, and its strength is the attention of whoever reads
+  #operator. Say so where the window is configured.
+
+## 4. What this gives the first cut
+
+- Authenticate by kernel peer credentials on a root-owned local socket; derive
+  the principal and the issuing unit, never accept a declared requester.
+- Idunn assigns the order id and keeps the only record in its own store;
+  the caller's request is not the record.
+- Orders are a closed set of typed operations with argument grammar and an
+  allowlist in root-owned configuration.
+- Every order and its result are posted; the store is the record and the post
+  is its projection.
+- Break-glass, when it lands, waits on an announcement and a window, and is
+  recorded in full.