cultmesh-py/rs authority route verification #18

Merged
libby merged 4 commits from libby/cultmesh-route-verification into main 2026-11-07 12:25:15 +00:00
9 changed files with 1379 additions and 1 deletions

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@ -228,6 +228,17 @@ prediction = session.predict(note_doc, "input:python:move", {"body": "predicted
unsubscribe()
```
## Authority route verification
`cultmesh_py.authority` ports the C# reference
(`src/GameCult.Mesh/CultMeshAuthorityProof.cs`): `AuthorityTrustPolicy.validate`
judges an Odin-signed ECDSA P-256 route (channel protection, trusted root,
validity window, IEEE P1363 signature over the canonical bytes) and
`verify_session_proof` checks the provider nonce proof. Refusals raise
`AuthorityRouteRefusal` with the C# message text. It needs `cryptography`.
`tests/test_authority_route_vectors.py` judges
`contracts/cultmesh/authority-route-vectors*.json`.
## Verify
`cultmesh_py.verify` checks the public exports and `py.typed` markers of all

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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ classifiers = [
"Programming Language :: Python :: 3.11",
"Programming Language :: Python :: 3.12",
]
dependencies = ["cultcache-py>=0.2.0", "cultnet-py>=0.1.0"]
dependencies = ["cultcache-py>=0.2.0", "cultnet-py>=0.1.0", "cryptography>=41"]
[project.scripts]
cultmesh-py-daemon = "cultmesh_py.daemon:main"
cultmesh-py-verify = "cultmesh_py.verify:main"

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@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
"""CultMesh authority route verification.
Port of `src/GameCult.Mesh/CultMeshAuthorityProof.cs` (the reference) and of the
route constructors in `CultMeshVerse.cs`. Rule for rule, in the same order, the
same input yields the same refusal text as `CultMeshAuthorityTrustPolicy.Verify`:
unsigned, channel protection, root lookup, validity window, signature.
Shared vectors: `contracts/cultmesh/authority-route-vectors.json` (C# written).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import binascii
import re
import struct
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Iterable, Mapping, Sequence
from cryptography.exceptions import InvalidSignature
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.utils import encode_dss_signature
ROUTE_DOMAIN = "gamecult.cultmesh.route-certificate.v1"
SESSION_DOMAIN = "gamecult.cultmesh.session-proof.v1"
AUTHENTICATED_REMOTE = "authenticated-remote"
LOCAL_DEVELOPMENT = "local-development"
# .NET `char.IsWhiteSpace`: Unicode Zs, Zl, Zp, U+0009-U+000D and U+0085.
# `str.strip()` is a different set (it also strips U+001C-U+001F).
_CSHARP_WHITESPACE = (
"\u0009\u000a\u000b\u000c\u000d \u0085  "
"           "
"

   "
)
def trim_csharp(value: str) -> str:
return value.strip(_CSHARP_WHITESPACE)
def is_blank_csharp(value: str | None) -> bool:
return value is None or trim_csharp(value) == ""
def _require(value: str | None, name: str) -> str:
if is_blank_csharp(value):
raise ValueError(f"Value must be non-empty. (Parameter '{name}')")
return trim_csharp(value) # type: ignore[arg-type]
class AuthorityRouteRefusal(Exception):
"""A route or proof the consumer's trust policy refuses.
Mirrors `CultMeshSessionException` carrying a `CultMeshSessionFailure` with
reason `Authentication`: `reason` is always "authentication".
"""
reason = "authentication"
def __init__(self, message: str, endpoint: str = "") -> None:
super().__init__(message)
self.message = message
self.endpoint = endpoint
def _b64_strict(value: str) -> bytes:
# `Convert.FromBase64String`: standard alphabet, padded, whitespace ignored.
stripped = re.sub(r"[ \t\r\n]", "", value)
return base64.b64decode(stripped, validate=True)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class P256PublicKey:
key_id: str
x: str
y: str
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
object.__setattr__(self, "key_id", _require(self.key_id, "keyId"))
for name in ("x", "y"):
value = _require(getattr(self, name), name)
try:
_b64_strict(value)
except (binascii.Error, ValueError) as error:
raise ValueError(f"Coordinate must be base64. (Parameter '{name}')") from error
object.__setattr__(self, name, value)
def verify(self, payload: bytes, signature_base64: str) -> bool:
"""IEEE P1363 (r || s) ECDSA-SHA256 verification; False on any malformation."""
try:
x, y = _b64_strict(self.x), _b64_strict(self.y)
signature = _b64_strict(signature_base64)
if len(x) != 32 or len(y) != 32 or len(signature) != 64:
return False
key = ec.EllipticCurvePublicNumbers(
int.from_bytes(x, "big"), int.from_bytes(y, "big"), ec.SECP256R1()
).public_key()
der = encode_dss_signature(
int.from_bytes(signature[:32], "big"), int.from_bytes(signature[32:], "big")
)
key.verify(der, payload, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256()))
return True
except (InvalidSignature, ValueError, binascii.Error):
return False
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class RouteCertificate:
provider_key: P256PublicKey
odin_key_id: str
issued_at_unix_milliseconds: int
expires_at_unix_milliseconds: int
signature: str = ""
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
if is_blank_csharp(self.odin_key_id):
raise ValueError("Odin key identity is required. (Parameter 'odinKeyId')")
object.__setattr__(self, "odin_key_id", trim_csharp(self.odin_key_id))
if self.issued_at_unix_milliseconds < 0:
raise ValueError("issuedAtUnixMilliseconds must not be negative.")
if self.expires_at_unix_milliseconds <= self.issued_at_unix_milliseconds:
raise ValueError("expiresAtUnixMilliseconds must be after issuedAtUnixMilliseconds.")
object.__setattr__(self, "signature", trim_csharp(self.signature or ""))
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class AuthorityRoute:
"""`CultMeshAuthorityRoute`: construction cleans every field as the C# does."""
authority_runtime_id: str
endpoint: str
protocol_ids: Sequence[str] = ()
priority: int = 0
generation: str | None = None
certificate: RouteCertificate | None = None
def __post_init__(self) -> None:
runtime_id = _require(self.authority_runtime_id, "authorityRuntimeId")
endpoint = _require(self.endpoint, "endpoint")
if self.priority < 0:
raise ValueError("priority must not be negative.")
object.__setattr__(self, "authority_runtime_id", runtime_id)
object.__setattr__(self, "endpoint", endpoint)
object.__setattr__(
self,
"protocol_ids",
tuple(
sorted(
{trim_csharp(v) for v in self.protocol_ids if not is_blank_csharp(v)},
key=lambda v: v.encode("utf-16-be"), # StringComparer.Ordinal is UTF-16 code-unit order
)
),
)
object.__setattr__(
self,
"generation",
f"{runtime_id}@{endpoint}" if is_blank_csharp(self.generation) else trim_csharp(self.generation), # type: ignore[arg-type]
)
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class SessionOpen:
"""The fields of `CultMeshSessionOpenMessage` the session proof covers."""
client_nonce: str | None = None
message_id: str | None = None
source_runtime_id: str | None = None
verse_id: str | None = None
authority_runtime_id: str | None = None
protocol_id: str | None = None
route_generation: str | None = None
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class SessionAccepted:
client_nonce: str | None
provider_key_id: str | None
provider_signature: str | None
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class VerifiedRoute:
route: AuthorityRoute
provider_key: P256PublicKey | None
is_local_development: bool
def canonical_fields(*values: str | None) -> bytes:
out = bytearray()
for value in values:
encoded = (value or "").encode("utf-8")
out += struct.pack(">I", len(encoded)) + encoded
return bytes(out)
def canonical_route(verse_id: str, route: AuthorityRoute) -> bytes:
certificate = route.certificate
if certificate is None:
raise ValueError("Route certificate is required.")
return canonical_fields(
ROUTE_DOMAIN,
verse_id,
route.authority_runtime_id,
route.endpoint,
"\u001f".join(route.protocol_ids), # already ordinally sorted; Python sorts by code point
str(route.priority),
route.generation,
certificate.provider_key.key_id,
certificate.provider_key.x,
certificate.provider_key.y,
certificate.odin_key_id,
str(certificate.issued_at_unix_milliseconds),
str(certificate.expires_at_unix_milliseconds),
)
def canonical_session(request: SessionOpen, endpoint: str) -> bytes:
return canonical_fields(
SESSION_DOMAIN,
request.client_nonce,
request.message_id,
request.source_runtime_id,
request.verse_id,
request.authority_runtime_id,
request.protocol_id,
endpoint,
request.route_generation,
)
# `System.Uri` refuses spellings WHATWG parsers repair; a lenient parse could call
# a refused endpoint loopback or protected. Same shape rule as the TypeScript port.
_AUTHORITY = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+\-.]*://([^/?#]+)")
def _split_endpoint(value: str) -> tuple[str, str] | None:
"""Return (scheme, lowercase host) or None where System.Uri would refuse."""
raw = re.sub(r"^[\x00-\x20]+|[\x00-\x20]+$", "", value)
if "\\" in raw:
return None
shape = _AUTHORITY.match(raw)
if not shape:
return None
authority = shape.group(1)
after_user = authority[authority.rfind("@") + 1 :]
if after_user.startswith("["):
host = after_user[: after_user.find("]") + 1]
else:
host = after_user.split(":")[0]
if not host or re.search(r"[^!-~]", host) or host.endswith("."):
return None
return raw.split("://", 1)[0].lower(), host.strip("[]").lower()
def is_loopback_endpoint(endpoint: str) -> bool:
parts = _split_endpoint(endpoint)
if parts is None:
return False
host = parts[1]
return host in ("localhost", "loopback", "::1", "::ffff:127.0.0.1") or bool(
re.fullmatch(r"127\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}", host)
)
def is_protected_endpoint(endpoint: str) -> bool:
parts = _split_endpoint(endpoint)
return parts is not None and (parts[0] in ("wss", "https") or "quic" in parts[0])
class AuthorityTrustPolicy:
"""Consumer-owned policy. Fails closed unless a route is valid under it."""
def __init__(self, mode: str, odin_roots: Iterable[P256PublicKey] = ()) -> None:
if mode not in (AUTHENTICATED_REMOTE, LOCAL_DEVELOPMENT):
raise ValueError(f"Unknown trust mode '{mode}'.")
self.mode = mode
self._roots: dict[str, P256PublicKey] = {}
for root in odin_roots:
if root.key_id in self._roots:
raise ValueError(f"Odin root key id '{root.key_id}' is listed more than once in the trust policy.")
self._roots[root.key_id] = root
def validate(self, verse_id: str, route: AuthorityRoute, now_unix_milliseconds: int) -> None:
self.verify(verse_id, route, now_unix_milliseconds)
def verify(self, verse_id: str, route: AuthorityRoute, now_unix_milliseconds: int) -> VerifiedRoute:
local = self.mode == LOCAL_DEVELOPMENT and is_loopback_endpoint(route.endpoint)
def refuse(message: str) -> AuthorityRouteRefusal:
return AuthorityRouteRefusal(message, route.endpoint)
certificate = route.certificate
if certificate is None or is_blank_csharp(certificate.signature):
if local:
return VerifiedRoute(route, None, True)
raise refuse("Remote CultMesh routes require an Odin-signed authority certificate.")
if not is_protected_endpoint(route.endpoint) and not local:
raise refuse("Authenticated remote CultMesh routes require TLS or QUIC channel protection.")
root = self._roots.get(certificate.odin_key_id)
if root is None:
raise refuse(f"Odin key '{certificate.odin_key_id}' is not trusted by this consumer.")
if not (certificate.issued_at_unix_milliseconds <= now_unix_milliseconds < certificate.expires_at_unix_milliseconds):
raise refuse("The Odin route certificate is not currently valid.")
try:
signature = _b64_strict(certificate.signature)
except (binascii.Error, ValueError):
raise refuse("The Odin route signature is not base64.") from None
if len(signature) != 64:
raise refuse("The Odin route signature is not IEEE P1363 P-256.")
if not root.verify(canonical_route(verse_id, route), certificate.signature):
raise refuse("The Odin route certificate signature is invalid.")
return VerifiedRoute(route, certificate.provider_key, False)
def verify_session_proof(
request: SessionOpen,
response: SessionAccepted,
verse_id: str,
route: AuthorityRoute,
trust: AuthorityTrustPolicy,
now_unix_milliseconds: int,
) -> bool:
"""Verifies the Odin route certificate (raising) and the provider nonce proof."""
verified = trust.verify(verse_id, route, now_unix_milliseconds)
if verified.is_local_development:
return True
key = verified.provider_key
if (
key is None
or response.provider_key_id != key.key_id
or response.client_nonce != request.client_nonce
or is_blank_csharp(response.provider_signature)
):
return False
return key.verify(canonical_session(request, route.endpoint), response.provider_signature) # type: ignore[arg-type]

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@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
"""Judges `contracts/cultmesh/authority-route-vectors*.json` in Python.
`authority-route-vectors.json` is written by the C# reference (signatures are
captured C# bytes); the `.ts-signed.json` file is signed by TypeScript over awkward
inputs. Each negative case fails when the matching check is removed from
`cultmesh_py.authority`.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import json
import unittest
from dataclasses import replace
from pathlib import Path
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cultmesh_py.authority import (
AUTHENTICATED_REMOTE,
LOCAL_DEVELOPMENT,
AuthorityRoute,
AuthorityRouteRefusal,
AuthorityTrustPolicy,
P256PublicKey,
RouteCertificate,
SessionAccepted,
SessionOpen,
canonical_route,
verify_session_proof,
)
CONTRACTS = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[3] / "contracts" / "cultmesh"
def _key(element: dict) -> P256PublicKey:
return P256PublicKey(element["keyId"], element["x"], element["y"])
class Vector:
def __init__(self, name: str) -> None:
doc = json.loads((CONTRACTS / name).read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
self.now = doc["nowUnixMilliseconds"]
self.root = _key(doc["odinRoot"])
r = doc["route"]
self.verse_id = r["verseId"]
c = r["certificate"]
self.certificate = RouteCertificate(
_key(c["providerKey"]), c["odinKeyId"], c["issuedAtUnixMilliseconds"],
c["expiresAtUnixMilliseconds"], c["signature"],
)
self.route = AuthorityRoute(
r["authorityRuntimeId"], r["endpoint"], r["protocolIds"], r["priority"],
r["generation"], self.certificate,
)
p = doc["sessionProof"]
q = p["request"]
self.request = SessionOpen(
q["clientNonce"], q["messageId"], q["sourceRuntimeId"], q["verseId"],
q["authorityRuntimeId"], q["protocolId"], q["routeGeneration"],
)
self.accepted = SessionAccepted(q["clientNonce"], p["providerKeyId"], p["providerSignature"])
self.trust = AuthorityTrustPolicy(AUTHENTICATED_REMOTE, [self.root])
def with_certificate(self, **changes) -> AuthorityRoute:
return replace(self.route, certificate=replace(self.certificate, **changes))
def refusal(test: unittest.TestCase, fn) -> str:
with test.assertRaises(AuthorityRouteRefusal) as raised:
fn()
test.assertEqual("authentication", raised.exception.reason)
return raised.exception.message
class AuthorityRouteVectorTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_cs_written_vector_verifies_route_and_session_proof(self) -> None:
v = Vector("authority-route-vectors.json")
v.trust.validate(v.verse_id, v.route, v.now)
self.assertTrue(verify_session_proof(v.request, v.accepted, v.verse_id, v.route, v.trust, v.now))
def test_ts_signed_vector_verifies_and_tamper_is_refused(self) -> None:
v = Vector("authority-route-vectors.ts-signed.json")
v.trust.validate(v.verse_id, v.route, v.now)
self.assertTrue(verify_session_proof(v.request, v.accepted, v.verse_id, v.route, v.trust, v.now))
tampered = replace(v.route, priority=v.route.priority + 1)
self.assertEqual(
"The Odin route certificate signature is invalid.",
refusal(self, lambda: v.trust.validate(v.verse_id, tampered, v.now)),
)
def test_canonical_route_is_length_prefixed_and_sorted(self) -> None:
v = Vector("authority-route-vectors.json")
data = canonical_route(v.verse_id, v.route)
self.assertTrue(data.startswith(b"\x00\x00\x00\x26gamecult.cultmesh.route-certificate.v1\x00\x00\x00\x08aetheria"))
self.assertIn(b"cultmesh.content.v1\x1fcultmesh.documents.v1", data)
def test_tampered_payload_fields_are_refused(self) -> None:
v = Vector("authority-route-vectors.json")
invalid = "The Odin route certificate signature is invalid."
for tampered, verse in (
(replace(v.route, priority=8), v.verse_id),
(replace(v.route, endpoint="wss://evil.example/mesh"), v.verse_id),
(replace(v.route, protocol_ids=("cultmesh.documents.v1",)), v.verse_id),
(replace(v.route, generation="other"), v.verse_id),
(v.with_certificate(expires_at_unix_milliseconds=v.certificate.expires_at_unix_milliseconds + 1), v.verse_id),
(v.route, "other-verse"),
):
self.assertEqual(invalid, refusal(self, lambda: v.trust.validate(verse, tampered, v.now)))
def test_wrong_root_key_is_refused(self) -> None:
v = Vector("authority-route-vectors.json")
numbers = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1()).public_key().public_numbers()
impostor = P256PublicKey(
v.root.key_id,
base64.b64encode(numbers.x.to_bytes(32, "big")).decode(),
base64.b64encode(numbers.y.to_bytes(32, "big")).decode(),
)
trust = AuthorityTrustPolicy(AUTHENTICATED_REMOTE, [impostor])
self.assertEqual(
"The Odin route certificate signature is invalid.",
refusal(self, lambda: trust.validate(v.verse_id, v.route, v.now)),
)
def test_untrusted_odin_key_id_is_refused(self) -> None:
v = Vector("authority-route-vectors.json")
trust = AuthorityTrustPolicy(AUTHENTICATED_REMOTE, [replace(v.root, key_id="someone-else")])
self.assertEqual(
"Odin key 'odin-vector' is not trusted by this consumer.",
refusal(self, lambda: trust.validate(v.verse_id, v.route, v.now)),
)
def test_expired_and_not_yet_valid_are_refused(self) -> None:
v = Vector("authority-route-vectors.json")
window = "The Odin route certificate is not currently valid."
expires = v.certificate.expires_at_unix_milliseconds
issued = v.certificate.issued_at_unix_milliseconds
v.trust.validate(v.verse_id, v.route, expires - 1)
v.trust.validate(v.verse_id, v.route, issued)
self.assertEqual(window, refusal(self, lambda: v.trust.validate(v.verse_id, v.route, expires)))
self.assertEqual(window, refusal(self, lambda: v.trust.validate(v.verse_id, v.route, issued - 1)))
def test_unsigned_and_unprotected_routes_are_refused(self) -> None:
v = Vector("authority-route-vectors.json")
unsigned = replace(v.route, certificate=None)
self.assertEqual(
"Remote CultMesh routes require an Odin-signed authority certificate.",
refusal(self, lambda: v.trust.validate(v.verse_id, unsigned, v.now)),
)
blank = v.with_certificate(signature=" ")
self.assertEqual(
"Remote CultMesh routes require an Odin-signed authority certificate.",
refusal(self, lambda: v.trust.validate(v.verse_id, blank, v.now)),
)
plain = replace(v.route, endpoint="ws://provider.example/mesh")
self.assertEqual(
"Authenticated remote CultMesh routes require TLS or QUIC channel protection.",
refusal(self, lambda: v.trust.validate(v.verse_id, plain, v.now)),
)
def test_local_development_admits_only_unsigned_loopback(self) -> None:
v = Vector("authority-route-vectors.json")
dev = AuthorityTrustPolicy(LOCAL_DEVELOPMENT, [])
loop = AuthorityRoute("a", "ws://127.0.0.1:9/mesh")
dev.validate(v.verse_id, loop, v.now)
self.assertTrue(verify_session_proof(v.request, v.accepted, v.verse_id, loop, dev, v.now))
for endpoint in ("ws://provider.example/mesh", "ws://127.0.0.1./mesh", "ws:127.0.0.1"):
refusal(self, lambda e=endpoint: dev.validate(v.verse_id, AuthorityRoute("a", e), v.now))
authenticated = AuthorityTrustPolicy(AUTHENTICATED_REMOTE, [])
refusal(self, lambda: authenticated.validate(v.verse_id, loop, v.now))
def test_malformed_signatures_get_their_own_refusals(self) -> None:
v = Vector("authority-route-vectors.json")
not_base64 = v.with_certificate(signature="!!not base64!!")
self.assertEqual(
"The Odin route signature is not base64.",
refusal(self, lambda: v.trust.validate(v.verse_id, not_base64, v.now)),
)
short = v.with_certificate(signature=base64.b64encode(b"x" * 63).decode())
self.assertEqual(
"The Odin route signature is not IEEE P1363 P-256.",
refusal(self, lambda: v.trust.validate(v.verse_id, short, v.now)),
)
def test_high_s_signature_verifies_as_it_does_in_dotnet(self) -> None:
v = Vector("authority-route-vectors.json")
order = 0xFFFFFFFF00000000FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFBCE6FAADA7179E84F3B9CAC2FC632551
raw = base64.b64decode(v.certificate.signature)
s = int.from_bytes(raw[32:], "big")
flipped = raw[:32] + (order - s).to_bytes(32, "big")
high = v.with_certificate(signature=base64.b64encode(flipped).decode())
v.trust.validate(v.verse_id, high, v.now)
def test_session_proof_rejects_replay_wrong_key_and_forgery(self) -> None:
v = Vector("authority-route-vectors.json")
replayed = replace(v.request, client_nonce="replayed")
accepted = replace(v.accepted, client_nonce="replayed")
self.assertFalse(verify_session_proof(replayed, accepted, v.verse_id, v.route, v.trust, v.now))
self.assertFalse(verify_session_proof(
v.request, replace(v.accepted, provider_key_id="other"), v.verse_id, v.route, v.trust, v.now))
self.assertFalse(verify_session_proof(
v.request, replace(v.accepted, client_nonce="other"), v.verse_id, v.route, v.trust, v.now))
self.assertFalse(verify_session_proof(
v.request, replace(v.accepted, provider_signature=""), v.verse_id, v.route, v.trust, v.now))
raw = bytearray(base64.b64decode(v.accepted.provider_signature))
raw[0] ^= 1
forged = replace(v.accepted, provider_signature=base64.b64encode(bytes(raw)).decode())
self.assertFalse(verify_session_proof(v.request, forged, v.verse_id, v.route, v.trust, v.now))
moved = replace(v.request, protocol_id="cultmesh.content.v1")
self.assertFalse(verify_session_proof(moved, v.accepted, v.verse_id, v.route, v.trust, v.now))
# An expired route fails closed even with a good proof.
refusal(self, lambda: verify_session_proof(
v.request, v.accepted, v.verse_id, v.route, v.trust, v.certificate.expires_at_unix_milliseconds))
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()

View file

@ -67,6 +67,12 @@ version = "1.5.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "f2032f911046de80f0a198e0901378627c33f59ea0ac00e363d481118bd70a53"
[[package]]
name = "base16ct"
version = "0.2.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "4c7f02d4ea65f2c1853089ffd8d2787bdbc63de2f0d29dedbcf8ccdfa0ccd4cf"
[[package]]
name = "base64"
version = "0.22.1"
@ -161,6 +167,18 @@ dependencies = [
"libc",
]
[[package]]
name = "crypto-bigint"
version = "0.5.5"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "0dc92fb57ca44df6db8059111ab3af99a63d5d0f8375d9972e319a379c6bab76"
dependencies = [
"generic-array",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"subtle",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "crypto-common"
version = "0.1.7"
@ -214,11 +232,14 @@ name = "cultmesh-rs"
version = "0.2.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"base64",
"cultcache-rs",
"cultnet-rs",
"p256",
"pretty_assertions",
"rmp-serde",
"serde",
"serde_json",
"tempfile",
]
@ -298,10 +319,25 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "9ed9a281f7bc9b7576e61468ba615a66a5c8cfdff42420a70aa82701a3b1e292"
dependencies = [
"block-buffer",
"const-oid",
"crypto-common",
"subtle",
]
[[package]]
name = "ecdsa"
version = "0.16.9"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "ee27f32b5c5292967d2d4a9d7f1e0b0aed2c15daded5a60300e4abb9d8020bca"
dependencies = [
"der",
"digest",
"elliptic-curve",
"rfc6979",
"signature",
"spki",
]
[[package]]
name = "ed25519"
version = "2.2.3"
@ -326,6 +362,25 @@ dependencies = [
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "elliptic-curve"
version = "0.13.8"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b5e6043086bf7973472e0c7dff2142ea0b680d30e18d9cc40f267efbf222bd47"
dependencies = [
"base16ct",
"crypto-bigint",
"digest",
"ff",
"generic-array",
"group",
"pkcs8",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"sec1",
"subtle",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "errno"
version = "0.3.14"
@ -342,6 +397,16 @@ version = "2.5.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "da7c62ceae207dd37ea5b845da6a0696c799f85e97da1ab5b7910be3c1c80223"
[[package]]
name = "ff"
version = "0.13.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c0b50bfb653653f9ca9095b427bed08ab8d75a137839d9ad64eb11810d5b6393"
dependencies = [
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"subtle",
]
[[package]]
name = "fiat-crypto"
version = "0.2.9"
@ -396,6 +461,7 @@ checksum = "85649ca51fd72272d7821adaf274ad91c288277713d9c18820d8499a7ff69e9a"
dependencies = [
"typenum",
"version_check",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
@ -442,6 +508,17 @@ dependencies = [
"polyval",
]
[[package]]
name = "group"
version = "0.13.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "f0f9ef7462f7c099f518d754361858f86d8a07af53ba9af0fe635bbccb151a63"
dependencies = [
"ff",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
"subtle",
]
[[package]]
name = "hmac"
version = "0.12.1"
@ -555,6 +632,18 @@ version = "0.3.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c08d65885ee38876c4f86fa503fb49d7b507c2b62552df7c70b2fce627e06381"
[[package]]
name = "p256"
version = "0.13.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c9863ad85fa8f4460f9c48cb909d38a0d689dba1f6f6988a5e3e0d31071bcd4b"
dependencies = [
"ecdsa",
"elliptic-curve",
"primeorder",
"sha2",
]
[[package]]
name = "pin-project-lite"
version = "0.2.17"
@ -602,6 +691,15 @@ dependencies = [
"yansi",
]
[[package]]
name = "primeorder"
version = "0.13.6"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "353e1ca18966c16d9deb1c69278edbc5f194139612772bd9537af60ac231e1e6"
dependencies = [
"elliptic-curve",
]
[[package]]
name = "proc-macro2"
version = "1.0.107"
@ -689,6 +787,16 @@ dependencies = [
"libc",
]
[[package]]
name = "rfc6979"
version = "0.4.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "f8dd2a808d456c4a54e300a23e9f5a67e122c3024119acbfd73e3bf664491cb2"
dependencies = [
"hmac",
"subtle",
]
[[package]]
name = "rmp"
version = "0.8.15"
@ -747,6 +855,20 @@ version = "1.0.23"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "cf54715a573b99ac80df0bc206da022bcd442c974952c7b9720069370852e21f"
[[package]]
name = "sec1"
version = "0.7.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d3e97a565f76233a6003f9f5c54be1d9c5bdfa3eccfb189469f11ec4901c47dc"
dependencies = [
"base16ct",
"der",
"generic-array",
"pkcs8",
"subtle",
"zeroize",
]
[[package]]
name = "semver"
version = "1.0.28"
@ -840,6 +962,7 @@ version = "2.2.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "77549399552de45a898a580c1b41d445bf730df867cc44e6c0233bbc4b8329de"
dependencies = [
"digest",
"rand_core 0.6.4",
]

View file

@ -13,9 +13,12 @@ path = "src/lib.rs"
anyhow = "1"
cultcache-rs = { path = "../cultcache-rs" }
cultnet-rs = { path = "../cultnet-rs" }
base64 = "0.22"
p256 = { version = "0.13", default-features = false, features = ["ecdsa", "std"] }
serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
[dev-dependencies]
pretty_assertions = "1.4.1"
rmp-serde = "1"
serde_json = "1"
tempfile = "3"

View file

@ -0,0 +1,424 @@
//! CultMesh authority route verification.
//!
//! Port of `src/GameCult.Mesh/CultMeshAuthorityProof.cs` (the reference) and of
//! the route constructors in `CultMeshVerse.cs`. Rule for rule, in the same
//! order, the same input yields the same refusal text as
//! `CultMeshAuthorityTrustPolicy.Verify`: unsigned, channel protection, root
//! lookup, validity window, signature.
//!
//! Shared vectors: `contracts/cultmesh/authority-route-vectors.json` (C# written).
use base64::alphabet::STANDARD as STANDARD_ALPHABET;
use base64::engine::{DecodePaddingMode, GeneralPurpose, GeneralPurposeConfig};
use base64::Engine;
use p256::ecdsa::signature::Verifier;
use p256::ecdsa::{Signature, VerifyingKey};
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use std::fmt;
const ROUTE_DOMAIN: &str = "gamecult.cultmesh.route-certificate.v1";
const SESSION_DOMAIN: &str = "gamecult.cultmesh.session-proof.v1";
// `Convert.FromBase64String`: standard alphabet, padded, tolerant of trailing bits.
const DOTNET_BASE64: GeneralPurpose = GeneralPurpose::new(
&STANDARD_ALPHABET,
GeneralPurposeConfig::new()
.with_decode_padding_mode(DecodePaddingMode::RequireCanonical)
.with_decode_allow_trailing_bits(true),
);
fn base64_decode(value: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
let stripped: String = value.chars().filter(|c| !matches!(c, ' ' | '\t' | '\r' | '\n')).collect();
DOTNET_BASE64.decode(stripped).ok()
}
/// .NET `char.IsWhiteSpace` is the Unicode White_Space property, as is `char::is_whitespace`.
fn trim(value: &str) -> &str {
value.trim_matches(char::is_whitespace)
}
fn is_blank(value: &str) -> bool {
trim(value).is_empty()
}
fn require(value: &str, name: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
if is_blank(value) {
Err(format!("Value must be non-empty. (Parameter '{name}')"))
} else {
Ok(trim(value).to_owned())
}
}
/// A route or proof the consumer's trust policy refuses. Mirrors
/// `CultMeshSessionFailure` with reason `Authentication`.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AuthorityRouteRefusal {
pub message: String,
pub endpoint: String,
}
impl AuthorityRouteRefusal {
pub const REASON: &'static str = "authentication";
}
impl fmt::Display for AuthorityRouteRefusal {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
f.write_str(&self.message)
}
}
impl std::error::Error for AuthorityRouteRefusal {}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct P256PublicKey {
pub key_id: String,
pub x: String,
pub y: String,
}
impl P256PublicKey {
pub fn new(key_id: &str, x: &str, y: &str) -> Result<Self, String> {
let key = Self {
key_id: require(key_id, "keyId")?,
x: require(x, "x")?,
y: require(y, "y")?,
};
for (name, value) in [("x", &key.x), ("y", &key.y)] {
if base64_decode(value).is_none() {
return Err(format!("Coordinate must be base64. (Parameter '{name}')"));
}
}
Ok(key)
}
/// IEEE P1363 (r || s) ECDSA-SHA256 verification; false on any malformation.
pub fn verify(&self, payload: &[u8], signature_base64: &str) -> bool {
let (Some(x), Some(y), Some(signature)) = (
base64_decode(&self.x),
base64_decode(&self.y),
base64_decode(signature_base64),
) else {
return false;
};
if x.len() != 32 || y.len() != 32 || signature.len() != 64 {
return false;
}
let mut sec1 = Vec::with_capacity(65);
sec1.push(4);
sec1.extend_from_slice(&x);
sec1.extend_from_slice(&y);
let (Ok(key), Ok(signature)) = (
VerifyingKey::from_sec1_bytes(&sec1),
Signature::from_slice(&signature),
) else {
return false;
};
key.verify(payload, &signature).is_ok()
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RouteCertificate {
pub provider_key: P256PublicKey,
pub odin_key_id: String,
pub issued_at_unix_milliseconds: i64,
pub expires_at_unix_milliseconds: i64,
pub signature: String,
}
impl RouteCertificate {
pub fn new(
provider_key: P256PublicKey,
odin_key_id: &str,
issued_at_unix_milliseconds: i64,
expires_at_unix_milliseconds: i64,
signature: &str,
) -> Result<Self, String> {
if is_blank(odin_key_id) {
return Err("Odin key identity is required. (Parameter 'odinKeyId')".into());
}
if issued_at_unix_milliseconds < 0 {
return Err("issuedAtUnixMilliseconds must not be negative.".into());
}
if expires_at_unix_milliseconds <= issued_at_unix_milliseconds {
return Err("expiresAtUnixMilliseconds must be after issuedAtUnixMilliseconds.".into());
}
Ok(Self {
provider_key,
odin_key_id: trim(odin_key_id).to_owned(),
issued_at_unix_milliseconds,
expires_at_unix_milliseconds,
signature: trim(signature).to_owned(),
})
}
}
/// `CultMeshAuthorityRoute`: construction cleans every field as the C# does.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct AuthorityRoute {
pub authority_runtime_id: String,
pub endpoint: String,
pub protocol_ids: Vec<String>,
pub priority: i32,
pub generation: String,
pub certificate: Option<RouteCertificate>,
}
impl AuthorityRoute {
pub fn new(
authority_runtime_id: &str,
endpoint: &str,
protocol_ids: &[&str],
priority: i32,
generation: Option<&str>,
certificate: Option<RouteCertificate>,
) -> Result<Self, String> {
let authority_runtime_id = require(authority_runtime_id, "authorityRuntimeId")?;
let endpoint = require(endpoint, "endpoint")?;
if priority < 0 {
return Err("priority must not be negative.".into());
}
let mut protocols: Vec<String> = protocol_ids
.iter()
.filter(|value| !is_blank(value))
.map(|value| trim(value).to_owned())
.collect();
// StringComparer.Ordinal is UTF-16 code-unit order.
protocols.sort_by_key(|value| value.encode_utf16().collect::<Vec<u16>>());
protocols.dedup();
let generation = match generation {
Some(value) if !is_blank(value) => trim(value).to_owned(),
_ => format!("{authority_runtime_id}@{endpoint}"),
};
Ok(Self {
authority_runtime_id,
endpoint,
protocol_ids: protocols,
priority,
generation,
certificate,
})
}
}
/// The fields of `CultMeshSessionOpenMessage` the session proof covers.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct SessionOpen {
pub client_nonce: String,
pub message_id: String,
pub source_runtime_id: String,
pub verse_id: String,
pub authority_runtime_id: String,
pub protocol_id: String,
pub route_generation: String,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct SessionAccepted {
pub client_nonce: String,
pub provider_key_id: String,
pub provider_signature: String,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum TrustMode {
AuthenticatedRemote,
LocalDevelopment,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct VerifiedRoute {
pub route: AuthorityRoute,
pub provider_key: Option<P256PublicKey>,
pub is_local_development: bool,
}
pub fn canonical_fields(values: &[&str]) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut out = Vec::new();
for value in values {
out.extend_from_slice(&(value.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
out.extend_from_slice(value.as_bytes());
}
out
}
pub fn canonical_route(verse_id: &str, route: &AuthorityRoute) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
let certificate = route.certificate.as_ref().ok_or("Route certificate is required.")?;
let protocols = route.protocol_ids.join("\u{1f}");
let priority = route.priority.to_string();
let issued = certificate.issued_at_unix_milliseconds.to_string();
let expires = certificate.expires_at_unix_milliseconds.to_string();
Ok(canonical_fields(&[
ROUTE_DOMAIN,
verse_id,
&route.authority_runtime_id,
&route.endpoint,
&protocols,
&priority,
&route.generation,
&certificate.provider_key.key_id,
&certificate.provider_key.x,
&certificate.provider_key.y,
&certificate.odin_key_id,
&issued,
&expires,
]))
}
pub fn canonical_session(request: &SessionOpen, endpoint: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
canonical_fields(&[
SESSION_DOMAIN,
&request.client_nonce,
&request.message_id,
&request.source_runtime_id,
&request.verse_id,
&request.authority_runtime_id,
&request.protocol_id,
endpoint,
&request.route_generation,
])
}
/// `(scheme, lowercase host)`, or `None` where `System.Uri` refuses the spelling.
/// A lenient parse could call a refused endpoint loopback or protected, so the
/// shape rule is the same strict one the TypeScript port applies.
fn split_endpoint(value: &str) -> Option<(String, String)> {
let raw = value.trim_matches(|c: char| c <= ' ');
if raw.contains('\\') {
return None;
}
let (scheme, rest) = raw.split_once("://")?;
let mut scheme_chars = scheme.chars();
if !scheme_chars.next()?.is_ascii_alphabetic()
|| !scheme_chars.all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(c, '+' | '-' | '.'))
{
return None;
}
let authority = &rest[..rest.find(['/', '?', '#']).unwrap_or(rest.len())];
if authority.is_empty() {
return None;
}
let after_user = &authority[authority.rfind('@').map_or(0, |i| i + 1)..];
let host = if after_user.starts_with('[') {
&after_user[..after_user.find(']').map_or(after_user.len(), |i| i + 1)]
} else {
after_user.split(':').next().unwrap_or("")
};
if host.is_empty() || host.chars().any(|c| !('\u{21}'..='\u{7e}').contains(&c)) || host.ends_with('.') {
return None;
}
Some((
scheme.to_ascii_lowercase(),
host.trim_matches(['[', ']']).to_ascii_lowercase(),
))
}
pub fn is_loopback_endpoint(endpoint: &str) -> bool {
let Some((_, host)) = split_endpoint(endpoint) else {
return false;
};
let octets: Vec<&str> = host.split('.').collect();
matches!(host.as_str(), "localhost" | "loopback" | "::1" | "::ffff:127.0.0.1")
|| (octets.len() == 4
&& octets[0] == "127"
&& octets[1..].iter().all(|o| (1..=3).contains(&o.len()) && o.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit())))
}
pub fn is_protected_endpoint(endpoint: &str) -> bool {
split_endpoint(endpoint)
.is_some_and(|(scheme, _)| scheme == "wss" || scheme == "https" || scheme.contains("quic"))
}
/// Consumer-owned policy. Fails closed unless a route is valid under it.
pub struct AuthorityTrustPolicy {
mode: TrustMode,
roots: BTreeMap<String, P256PublicKey>,
}
impl AuthorityTrustPolicy {
pub fn new(mode: TrustMode, odin_roots: Vec<P256PublicKey>) -> Result<Self, String> {
let mut roots = BTreeMap::new();
for root in odin_roots {
let key_id = root.key_id.clone();
if roots.insert(key_id.clone(), root).is_some() {
return Err(format!(
"Odin root key id '{key_id}' is listed more than once in the trust policy."
));
}
}
Ok(Self { mode, roots })
}
pub fn validate(&self, verse_id: &str, route: &AuthorityRoute, now_unix_milliseconds: i64) -> Result<(), AuthorityRouteRefusal> {
self.verify(verse_id, route, now_unix_milliseconds).map(|_| ())
}
pub fn verify(&self, verse_id: &str, route: &AuthorityRoute, now_unix_milliseconds: i64) -> Result<VerifiedRoute, AuthorityRouteRefusal> {
let refuse = |message: &str| AuthorityRouteRefusal {
message: message.to_owned(),
endpoint: route.endpoint.clone(),
};
let local = self.mode == TrustMode::LocalDevelopment && is_loopback_endpoint(&route.endpoint);
let certificate = match &route.certificate {
Some(certificate) if !is_blank(&certificate.signature) => certificate,
_ if local => {
return Ok(VerifiedRoute { route: route.clone(), provider_key: None, is_local_development: true });
}
_ => return Err(refuse("Remote CultMesh routes require an Odin-signed authority certificate.")),
};
if !is_protected_endpoint(&route.endpoint) && !local {
return Err(refuse("Authenticated remote CultMesh routes require TLS or QUIC channel protection."));
}
let Some(root) = self.roots.get(&certificate.odin_key_id) else {
return Err(refuse(&format!(
"Odin key '{}' is not trusted by this consumer.",
certificate.odin_key_id
)));
};
if now_unix_milliseconds < certificate.issued_at_unix_milliseconds
|| now_unix_milliseconds >= certificate.expires_at_unix_milliseconds
{
return Err(refuse("The Odin route certificate is not currently valid."));
}
let Some(signature) = base64_decode(&certificate.signature) else {
return Err(refuse("The Odin route signature is not base64."));
};
if signature.len() != 64 {
return Err(refuse("The Odin route signature is not IEEE P1363 P-256."));
}
let canonical = canonical_route(verse_id, route).map_err(|message| refuse(&message))?;
if !root.verify(&canonical, &certificate.signature) {
return Err(refuse("The Odin route certificate signature is invalid."));
}
Ok(VerifiedRoute {
route: route.clone(),
provider_key: Some(certificate.provider_key.clone()),
is_local_development: false,
})
}
}
/// Verifies the Odin route certificate (refusing) and the provider nonce proof.
pub fn verify_session_proof(
request: &SessionOpen,
response: &SessionAccepted,
verse_id: &str,
route: &AuthorityRoute,
trust: &AuthorityTrustPolicy,
now_unix_milliseconds: i64,
) -> Result<bool, AuthorityRouteRefusal> {
let verified = trust.verify(verse_id, route, now_unix_milliseconds)?;
if verified.is_local_development {
return Ok(true);
}
let Some(key) = verified.provider_key else {
return Ok(false);
};
if response.provider_key_id != key.key_id
|| response.client_nonce != request.client_nonce
|| is_blank(&response.provider_signature)
{
return Ok(false);
}
Ok(key.verify(&canonical_session(request, &route.endpoint), &response.provider_signature))
}

View file

@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ use std::time::Duration;
use std::time::Instant;
mod rudp_document_server;
pub mod authority;
pub use rudp_document_server::*;

View file

@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
//! Judges `contracts/cultmesh/authority-route-vectors*.json` in Rust.
//!
//! `authority-route-vectors.json` is written by the C# reference (its signatures
//! are captured C# bytes); the `.ts-signed.json` file is signed by TypeScript
//! over awkward inputs. Each negative case fails when the matching check is
//! removed from `cultmesh_rs::authority`.
use base64::Engine;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD;
use cultmesh_rs::authority::*;
use p256::ecdsa::Signature;
use serde_json::Value;
use std::path::PathBuf;
struct Vector {
now: i64,
root: P256PublicKey,
verse_id: String,
route: AuthorityRoute,
request: SessionOpen,
accepted: SessionAccepted,
trust: AuthorityTrustPolicy,
}
fn s<'a>(value: &'a Value, key: &str) -> &'a str {
value[key].as_str().unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("missing string {key}"))
}
fn key(value: &Value) -> P256PublicKey {
P256PublicKey::new(s(value, "keyId"), s(value, "x"), s(value, "y")).unwrap()
}
fn load(name: &str) -> Vector {
let path = PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"))
.join("../../contracts/cultmesh")
.join(name);
let doc: Value = serde_json::from_str(&std::fs::read_to_string(path).unwrap()).unwrap();
let r = &doc["route"];
let c = &r["certificate"];
let certificate = RouteCertificate::new(
key(&c["providerKey"]),
s(c, "odinKeyId"),
c["issuedAtUnixMilliseconds"].as_i64().unwrap(),
c["expiresAtUnixMilliseconds"].as_i64().unwrap(),
s(c, "signature"),
)
.unwrap();
let protocols: Vec<&str> = r["protocolIds"].as_array().unwrap().iter().map(|v| v.as_str().unwrap()).collect();
let route = AuthorityRoute::new(
s(r, "authorityRuntimeId"),
s(r, "endpoint"),
&protocols,
r["priority"].as_i64().unwrap() as i32,
Some(s(r, "generation")),
Some(certificate),
)
.unwrap();
let p = &doc["sessionProof"];
let q = &p["request"];
let root = key(&doc["odinRoot"]);
Vector {
now: doc["nowUnixMilliseconds"].as_i64().unwrap(),
verse_id: s(r, "verseId").to_owned(),
route,
request: SessionOpen {
client_nonce: s(q, "clientNonce").into(),
message_id: s(q, "messageId").into(),
source_runtime_id: s(q, "sourceRuntimeId").into(),
verse_id: s(q, "verseId").into(),
authority_runtime_id: s(q, "authorityRuntimeId").into(),
protocol_id: s(q, "protocolId").into(),
route_generation: s(q, "routeGeneration").into(),
},
accepted: SessionAccepted {
client_nonce: s(q, "clientNonce").into(),
provider_key_id: s(p, "providerKeyId").into(),
provider_signature: s(p, "providerSignature").into(),
},
trust: AuthorityTrustPolicy::new(TrustMode::AuthenticatedRemote, vec![root.clone()]).unwrap(),
root,
}
}
impl Vector {
fn certificate(&self) -> &RouteCertificate {
self.route.certificate.as_ref().unwrap()
}
fn with_certificate(&self, edit: impl FnOnce(&mut RouteCertificate)) -> AuthorityRoute {
let mut route = self.route.clone();
edit(route.certificate.as_mut().unwrap());
route
}
fn refusal(&self, route: &AuthorityRoute, now: i64) -> String {
let error = self.trust.validate(&self.verse_id, route, now).expect_err("route must be refused");
assert_eq!(AuthorityRouteRefusal::REASON, "authentication");
assert_eq!(route.endpoint, error.endpoint);
error.message
}
fn proof(&self, request: &SessionOpen, accepted: &SessionAccepted) -> bool {
verify_session_proof(request, accepted, &self.verse_id, &self.route, &self.trust, self.now).unwrap()
}
}
const INVALID: &str = "The Odin route certificate signature is invalid.";
#[test]
fn cs_written_vector_verifies_route_and_session_proof() {
let v = load("authority-route-vectors.json");
v.trust.validate(&v.verse_id, &v.route, v.now).unwrap();
assert!(v.proof(&v.request, &v.accepted));
}
#[test]
fn ts_signed_vector_verifies_and_tamper_is_refused() {
let v = load("authority-route-vectors.ts-signed.json");
v.trust.validate(&v.verse_id, &v.route, v.now).unwrap();
assert!(v.proof(&v.request, &v.accepted));
let mut tampered = v.route.clone();
tampered.priority += 1;
assert_eq!(INVALID, v.refusal(&tampered, v.now));
}
#[test]
fn canonical_route_is_length_prefixed_and_sorted() {
let v = load("authority-route-vectors.json");
let bytes = canonical_route(&v.verse_id, &v.route).unwrap();
assert!(bytes.starts_with(b"\x00\x00\x00\x26gamecult.cultmesh.route-certificate.v1\x00\x00\x00\x08aetheria"));
let needle = b"cultmesh.content.v1\x1fcultmesh.documents.v1";
assert!(bytes.windows(needle.len()).any(|w| w == needle));
}
#[test]
fn tampered_payload_fields_are_refused() {
let v = load("authority-route-vectors.json");
let edits: Vec<Box<dyn Fn(&mut AuthorityRoute)>> = vec![
Box::new(|r| r.priority = 8),
Box::new(|r| r.endpoint = "wss://evil.example/mesh".into()),
Box::new(|r| r.protocol_ids = vec!["cultmesh.documents.v1".into()]),
Box::new(|r| r.generation = "other".into()),
Box::new(|r| r.certificate.as_mut().unwrap().expires_at_unix_milliseconds += 1),
];
for edit in edits {
let mut route = v.route.clone();
edit(&mut route);
assert_eq!(INVALID, v.refusal(&route, v.now));
}
let error = v.trust.validate("other-verse", &v.route, v.now).unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(INVALID, error.message);
}
#[test]
fn wrong_root_key_is_refused() {
let v = load("authority-route-vectors.json");
// The provider's key is a real P-256 key that did not sign this route.
let provider = &v.certificate().provider_key;
let impostor = P256PublicKey::new(&v.root.key_id, &provider.x, &provider.y).unwrap();
let trust = AuthorityTrustPolicy::new(TrustMode::AuthenticatedRemote, vec![impostor]).unwrap();
assert_eq!(INVALID, trust.validate(&v.verse_id, &v.route, v.now).unwrap_err().message);
}
#[test]
fn untrusted_odin_key_id_is_refused() {
let v = load("authority-route-vectors.json");
let other = P256PublicKey::new("someone-else", &v.root.x, &v.root.y).unwrap();
let trust = AuthorityTrustPolicy::new(TrustMode::AuthenticatedRemote, vec![other]).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
"Odin key 'odin-vector' is not trusted by this consumer.",
trust.validate(&v.verse_id, &v.route, v.now).unwrap_err().message
);
}
#[test]
fn expired_and_not_yet_valid_are_refused() {
let v = load("authority-route-vectors.json");
let window = "The Odin route certificate is not currently valid.";
let (issued, expires) = (v.certificate().issued_at_unix_milliseconds, v.certificate().expires_at_unix_milliseconds);
v.trust.validate(&v.verse_id, &v.route, expires - 1).unwrap();
v.trust.validate(&v.verse_id, &v.route, issued).unwrap();
assert_eq!(window, v.refusal(&v.route, expires));
assert_eq!(window, v.refusal(&v.route, issued - 1));
}
#[test]
fn unsigned_and_unprotected_routes_are_refused() {
let v = load("authority-route-vectors.json");
let unsigned_message = "Remote CultMesh routes require an Odin-signed authority certificate.";
let mut unsigned = v.route.clone();
unsigned.certificate = None;
assert_eq!(unsigned_message, v.refusal(&unsigned, v.now));
let blank = v.with_certificate(|c| c.signature = " ".into());
assert_eq!(unsigned_message, v.refusal(&blank, v.now));
let mut plain = v.route.clone();
plain.endpoint = "ws://provider.example/mesh".into();
assert_eq!(
"Authenticated remote CultMesh routes require TLS or QUIC channel protection.",
v.refusal(&plain, v.now)
);
}
#[test]
fn local_development_admits_only_unsigned_loopback() {
let v = load("authority-route-vectors.json");
let dev = AuthorityTrustPolicy::new(TrustMode::LocalDevelopment, vec![]).unwrap();
let route = |endpoint: &str| AuthorityRoute::new("a", endpoint, &[], 0, None, None).unwrap();
let loopback = route("ws://127.0.0.1:9/mesh");
dev.validate(&v.verse_id, &loopback, v.now).unwrap();
assert!(verify_session_proof(&v.request, &v.accepted, &v.verse_id, &loopback, &dev, v.now).unwrap());
for endpoint in ["ws://provider.example/mesh", "ws://127.0.0.1./mesh", "ws:127.0.0.1"] {
assert!(dev.validate(&v.verse_id, &route(endpoint), v.now).is_err(), "{endpoint}");
}
let remote = AuthorityTrustPolicy::new(TrustMode::AuthenticatedRemote, vec![]).unwrap();
assert!(remote.validate(&v.verse_id, &loopback, v.now).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn malformed_signatures_get_their_own_refusals() {
let v = load("authority-route-vectors.json");
let not_base64 = v.with_certificate(|c| c.signature = "!!not base64!!".into());
assert_eq!("The Odin route signature is not base64.", v.refusal(&not_base64, v.now));
let short = v.with_certificate(|c| c.signature = STANDARD.encode([b'x'; 63]));
assert_eq!("The Odin route signature is not IEEE P1363 P-256.", v.refusal(&short, v.now));
}
#[test]
fn high_s_signature_verifies_as_it_does_in_dotnet() {
let v = load("authority-route-vectors.json");
let raw = STANDARD.decode(&v.certificate().signature).unwrap();
let signature = Signature::from_slice(&raw).unwrap();
let flipped = Signature::from_scalars(*signature.r().as_ref(), -*signature.s().as_ref()).unwrap();
let high = v.with_certificate(|c| c.signature = STANDARD.encode(flipped.to_bytes()));
v.trust.validate(&v.verse_id, &high, v.now).unwrap();
}
#[test]
fn session_proof_rejects_replay_wrong_key_and_forgery() {
let v = load("authority-route-vectors.json");
let mut replayed = v.request.clone();
replayed.client_nonce = "replayed".into();
let mut accepted = v.accepted.clone();
accepted.client_nonce = "replayed".into();
assert!(!v.proof(&replayed, &accepted));
let mut wrong_id = v.accepted.clone();
wrong_id.provider_key_id = "other".into();
assert!(!v.proof(&v.request, &wrong_id));
let mut wrong_nonce = v.accepted.clone();
wrong_nonce.client_nonce = "other".into();
assert!(!v.proof(&v.request, &wrong_nonce));
let mut empty = v.accepted.clone();
empty.provider_signature = String::new();
assert!(!v.proof(&v.request, &empty));
let mut raw = STANDARD.decode(&v.accepted.provider_signature).unwrap();
raw[0] ^= 1;
let mut forged = v.accepted.clone();
forged.provider_signature = STANDARD.encode(raw);
assert!(!v.proof(&v.request, &forged));
let mut moved = v.request.clone();
moved.protocol_id = "cultmesh.content.v1".into();
assert!(!v.proof(&moved, &v.accepted));
let expires = v.certificate().expires_at_unix_milliseconds;
assert!(verify_session_proof(&v.request, &v.accepted, &v.verse_id, &v.route, &v.trust, expires).is_err());
}