Bifrost/docs/research/customer-onboarding-prior-art.md

Customer-member onboarding: prior art

Served: eureka-body:ruling:customers-get-voting-power-onboarding-owed (2026-10-30), the forks on customer estate, weight, decay, related parties and join flow. Eyes pass, facts only; [U] marks unverified.

Eyes facts: customer onboarding and voice in multi-stakeholder / platform co-ops (2026-10-30)

Method: web search result summaries plus two WebFetch attempts. Most facts come from search-result summaries, not full-page reads. "[V]" means the source was returned by search and the claim is stated there; "[U]" means unverified, conflicting, or not found. No primary statutory text was retrieved (both wetten.overheid.nl fetches returned only tables of contents / metadata).

Q1. Admission and classes in multi-stakeholder and platform co-ops

• Stocksy United [V]: three classes. A = advisors on board, capped at 5, may buy up to 200 shares (one support page). B = staff, may buy one extra B share a year. C = contributing artists, max one $1 share. Class C cap of 1,000 was removed by member resolution (support docs date it 2018). Patronage for A and C is not tied to share count. Members can submit resolutions. Sources: https://stocksy.com/legal/rules ; https://support.stocksy.com/hc/en-us/articles/201658696 ; https://support.stocksy.com/hc/en-us/articles/201659716-Is-there-a-limit-on-the-number-of-Co-op-members ; https://geo.coop/content/stocksy-united-removes-its-membership-cap ; https://support.stocksy.com/hc/en-us/articles/201808247-Can-members-purchase-more-shares-in-the-Co-op
• Stocksy: the 1,000 cap led to regular review and removal of inactive members (company announcement via https://gdusa.com/stocksy-member-owners-open-door-to-new-contributors/) [V, secondary].
• Fairbnb [V, partly planned]: intends to admit hosts, guests, local businesses, neighbours; per a 2020-era description workers and advisors are members, local partners/users/hosts "in the foreseeable future"; funders' voting power is statutorily limited to one third of assembly votes. Another source says it currently operates as a worker co-op without hosts. Italian and Spanish co-op law reportedly makes multi-stakeholder creation from scratch hard. Sources: https://www.thenews.coop/can-fairbnb-become-a-platform-for-community-powered-tourism/ ; https://wiki.p2pfoundation.net/FairBnB . Current composition [U]; one source is a promotional travel blog.
• Resonate [V, one interview, other figures conflict]: three voting classes, Music-Makers 45%, Fans 35%, Collaborators 20% (Peter Harris interview), plus a Founder class with early board-appointment say. Listener membership 5 EUR/yr (Billboard). Source: https://www.resilience.org/stories/2018-06-15/resonation-an-interview-with-peter-harris/ ; https://geo.coop/content/own-music-you-stream-resonate . Whether percentages are voting or profit share is conflated across sources [U]; check resonate.is.
• Eva (Montreal) [V, self-reported]: three categories, driver members, rider members, worker members. Fees and requirements not found. Sources: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eva_(coop%C3%A9rative) ; https://wiki.p2pfoundation.net/Eva_Coop . Up & Go: described as worker-owned cleaners' co-op in NYC; no membership-class details found [U].
• Open Food Network [V]: governance as collective of affiliates under a "global pledge"; Open Food Foundation oversees governance and finance; UK arm "co-op of co-ops" with food hubs, farmers, shoppers as members, sociocratic circles. Sources: https://www.openfoodnetwork.org/about-us/ ; https://www.uk.coop/blog/open-food-network-making-food-systems-fair-and-sustainable-unfound . No customer admission steps found [U].
• Eroski/Mondragon [V]: worker-members and consumer-members; General Assembly of 500 delegates, 250 worker and 250 consumer; 1.3M+ consumer members (2022). Surplus: 40% to worker-members, 50% reserves, 10% COFIP (2026 assembly). Consumer-member fee (~$75/yr) from older source [U]; per-member consumer vote weight not found [U]. Sources: https://corporativo.eroski.es/wp-content/uploads/20260528_PR_General-Assembly-2026.pdf ; https://archive.grocer.coop/node/7142 ; https://eurocoop.coop/news/184-Eroskis-growing-membership-putting-members-at-the-heart-of-co-op.html
• REI [V, secondary]: lifetime membership $30 one-time (older $15/$20); dividend now "Co-op Member Reward" (patronage dividend and/or promotional reward, decided annually); historically ~10% of regular-price spend; ballot for board election sent with dividend notice. Older rule: active member = paid fee and bought >= $10 in a calendar year [U for current]. Sources: https://www.rei.com/membership ; https://www.rei.com/membership/join ; https://www.nbcnews.com/select/amp/rcna172651
• Quebec solidarity co-ops [V]: classes user members, worker members, supporting members (1997 amendment). Required share count may differ by class; rebates to users by business done, to workers by work volume; supporting members get no rebate. Voting formula not found; set in by-laws [U]. Sources: https://www.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/Fichiers_client/lois_et_reglements/LoisAnnuelles/en/1997/1997C17A.PDF ; https://cdn-contenu.quebec.ca/cdn-contenu/adm/min/economie/contenu/cooperatives/modeles_reglement/MO_reglements_generaux_solidarite.pdf (model by-laws, not opened) ; https://www.co-oplaw.org/?p=8947
• Italian social co-ops, Law 381/1991 [V]: volunteer members (soci volontari) unpaid, capped at 50% of membership (art. 2); user members (soci fruitori) are service beneficiaries or relatives, reimbursed documented expenses only; investor members (soci sovventori) permitted; type B requires >= 30% disadvantaged workers, who should become members where possible. Voting caps for sovventori not retrieved; civil code art. 2526 not read [U]. Sources: https://www.bosettiegatti.eu/info/norme/statali/1991_0381.htm ; https://base.socioeco.org/docs/l_381_91.pdf ; https://www.fpcu.it/App_Common/Files/FilesEventi/346348/Slide%20videoconferenza%2014_12_2018.pdf
• Platform Cooperativism Consortium / Exit to Community [V, thin]: E2C (Schneider, Mannan; "Exit to Community: Strategies for Multi-Stakeholder Ownership in the Platform Economy") describes transfer of ownership to users, workers, stakeholders. No findings on customer admission mechanics [U]. Source: https://wiki.p2pfoundation.net/Nathan_Schneider_on_Exit_to_Community_and_Community_Ownership_Through_Platform_Coops
• Not found: Fairbnb/Resonate/Eva application-and-approval steps and member agreement text [U].

Q2. Purchase-based voice, plutocracy, dominant customer, related parties

• Ag co-ops (US) [V, 1990s-2003 sources]: 93% of direct-membership co-ops used one-member-one-vote, 7% proportional (patronage-based extra votes) per a 1997 USDA report. Capper-Volstead exemption described as conditioned on one-vote-per-member or an 8% dividend cap (secondary summary; Texas AG opinion reads its state version as flat one-vote). State statutes largely determine which is allowed. Arguments: proportional voting for those with more equity at risk; one-member-one-vote as cooperative democratic principle, which IRS has generally endorsed. Statute text not retrieved [U]. Sources: https://www.rd.usda.gov/sites/default/files/rr156.pdf ; https://aglawjournal.wp.drake.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/66/2016/09/agVol01No2-Matthews.pdf ; https://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/bibarticles/royer_principles.pdf ; https://le.utah.gov/~2003/bills/sbillenr/SB0142.htm
• Patronage dividends vs voice: Stocksy A/C and REI/Quebec rebates tie money to patronage while voting stays per-member or per-class (see Q1 entries). Quebec supporting members get no rebate.
• Multi-stakeholder co-ops [V]: typically one-member-one-vote within a class, fixed board seats per class; minimum and maximum vote shares per class suggested to harmonise interests; allocation of governance rights between classes is a key drafting decision; a customer member may have less "skin in the game"; boards should adopt conflict-of-interest policies. Sources: https://www.co-oplaw.org/?p=8947 ; https://ccednet-rcdec.ca/resource/multi-stakeholder-co-ops/ ; https://resources.uwcc.wisc.edu/CaseStudies/MSC-Training-Needs.pdf
• Fairbnb's funder cap (one third of assembly votes) is a class-level vote ceiling (Q1 source).
• Concave weighting and plutocracy [V, preprints]: arXiv 2605.18990 "Concave is the New Linear: The Impossibility of Anti-Plutocratic DAO Governance" argues quadratic or any concave mechanism cannot withstand a Sybil adversary on permissionless chains (power grows at least linearly in holdings). Not fully read, from snippet. https://arxiv.org/pdf/2605.18990 ; https://arxiv.org/pdf/2602.09608
• Related parties / family member as customer: no source found addressing related-party voting in co-ops [U]. Only the generic conflict-of-interest policy recommendation above.
• Dominant single customer in a class: no source found [U], other than class-level caps above.

Q3. Digital governance tooling

• Decidim [V]: census authorization by admin CSV import; participants self-initiate verification from profile; authorization handlers are pluggable (SMS code, postal-letter code); CVE-2026-45415 let a limited participant-manager alter census records (fixed in 0.30.9 / 0.31.5 / 0.32.0). Sources: https://docs.decidim.org/en/admin/participants/authorizations/census ; https://docs.decidim.org/en/admin/participants/authorizations/code_postal_letter ; https://www.wiz.io/ja-jp/vulnerability-database/cve/cve-2026-45415 . Ephemeral verifications page exists (https://docs.decidim.org/en/v0.31/admin/participants/authorizations/ephemeral_verifications), not read. Revocation behaviour not retrieved [U].
• Loomio [V]: email invite with single-use link; join requests need coordinator approval depending on privacy; reusable link bypasses approval. Source: https://help.loomio.com/en/user_manual/groups/inviting_people/index.html . No weighted voting or expiry found [U].
• Snapshot / token DAOs [V]: quadratic voting relies on proof-of-personhood; whales split across wallets; fewer than 20 delegates reportedly hold >50% of power in major DAOs; vote-escrow aligns long-term incentives but is illiquid. Sources: https://blog.tally.xyz/a-simple-guide-to-quadratic-voting ; https://www.spark.money/glossary/quadratic-voting ; https://blockeden.xyz/forum/t/1-of-token-holders-control-90-of-voting-power-across-major-daos-quadratic-voting-delegation-incentives-and-conviction-voting-havent-fixed-the-plutocracy-problem/541 (forum, low rigor).
• Decay / expiry [V]: EIP-7787 draft proposes token voting-power decay over a fixed 90-day period (draft, not deployed). Colony described as decaying reputation unless members keep contributing. Sources: https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7787 ; https://blog.colony.io/8-essential-voting-mechanisms-in-daos/ . A forum post describes log-decayed power for large holdings (10x holdings ~ 4x power).
• DAOstack [V]: non-transferable reputation earned by contribution; peer-reviewed retrospective "The rise and fall of DAOstack": https://peerj.com/articles/cs-3320 . Decay specifics unconfirmed [U]. Aragon: non-transferable reputation templates; claims about Aragon dissolution and ANT voting removal from a single low-quality source [U].
• Open Collective: nothing retrieved on backer voting rights or governance [U].

Q4. Contract-funded versus donation-funded voice

• No literature found distinguishing a paying client class from a patron/donor class [U].
• Adjacent facts: Dutch sample statutes with donors (donateurs) lacking general-meeting votes (Q5); Quebec supporting members as a non-voting-benefit, no-rebate class (Q1); investor/funder classes as non-user classes with separate caps (Fairbnb, UK rulebook example: https://files.uniteddiversity.coop/Cooperatives/Multi-Stakeholder_Co-ops/go!_rules_v3.0.pdf , from search listing, not opened); Stocksy and REI tie money flows to patronage not votes; Resonate has listener class at 5 EUR/yr.

Q5. EU / Netherlands legal and consent points

• BW 2:53: coöperatie is an association founded by notarial deed, at least two members at founding, no max (https://wetboekplus.nl/burgerlijk-wetboek-boek-2-artikel-53-oprichting-cooperatie-en-onderlinge-waarborgmaatschappij/ , https://www.viajuridica.nl/informatiesoorten/wetstoelichtingen/oprichting-cooperatie-art-2-53-2-54-bw) [V]. Articles on voting (2:38 etc.), 2:53a, member rights: text not retrieved; official page fetches gave metadata only [U].
• Admission in sample statutes [V]: board decides unless statutes assign it to the general meeting; general meeting can override a refusal; one set requires unanimity of a fully present meeting; one gives board six weeks to answer in writing. Register of members kept by the board, inspectable by members; board may record additional data beyond the list. Voting: one set denies donors votes; another lets non-qualifying members vote on certain proposals. Sources: https://www.glastuinbouwnederland.nl/content/user_upload/Komkommer_Concept_statuten_gewasco%C3%B6peratie_komkommerUA__3_.pdf ; https://rhoon.herenboeren.nl/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Huishoudelijk-Reglement-Herenboeren-Rhoon.pdf ; https://www.kennisnetgeboortezorg.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Statuten-coo%CC%88peratie-IGO-Geboortehart.pdf ; https://raad.ridderkerk.nl/Documenten/bijlage/Bijlage-8-ledenovereenkomst.pdf (ledenovereenkomst example, not opened).
• GDPR/AVG for member registers [V, secondary]: common lawful basis cited is Art. 6(1)(b) (performance of membership agreement), sometimes plus consent for extra data; GDPR sets no fixed retention (AP position quoted), Dutch practice often keeps accounting data 7 years, rest deleted after termination; processing register practically required. Sources: https://www.kvk.nl/wetten-en-regels/ga-als-vereniging-goed-om-met-privacy-en-avg/ ; https://www.legiscope.com/blog/avg-verenigingen-stichtingen.html ; https://www.moore-drv.nl/avg-hoe-lang-mag-u-persoonsgegevens-bewaren/ . Direct Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens guidance not retrieved [U].
• Not found: coöperatie U.A. member-agreement requirements beyond statutes; relationship between customer contract and membership [U].

Gaps (not retrieved)

Open Collective governance; Up & Go structure; Eva/Fairbnb/Resonate application steps; Capper-Volstead statute text; Italian civil code art. 2526; Quebec voting formula; Dutch BW 2:38/2:53a text; AP guidance; any source on related-party or dominant-customer voting; paid-client vs donor estates.