Shared prerequisite for every routed target, done on yggdrasil. Debian
ships ngx_stream_module as a separate dynamic package and it was absent:
nginx -V showed --with-stream=dynamic with no .so. Installed
libnginx-mod-stream at 1.26.3-3+deb13u7, matching the running nginx
exactly so nothing else moved, added a top-level stream block including
/etc/nginx/idunn-stream-routes/*.conf, and created that directory
root:idunn 0775. nginx -t passed before the reload; gamecult.org and
heimdall.gamecult.org/healthz both returned 200 after it. Backup at
/root/nginx.conf.bak-20260906-stream.
Worth recording how the module check nearly went wrong: the first
`nginx -V` ran without sudo, hit "command not found" because the binary is
not on the unprivileged PATH, and reported NO STREAM MODULE. That is the
estate's own trap -- a failed read presented as a negative result -- caught
only because the answer looked too convenient.
The larger correction: the unit I wrote yesterday ran User=idunn, and this
generation cannot work that way. There is no sudo anywhere in Idunn's
source; it calls systemctl, systemd-run, nginx and docker directly, so a
confined user actuates nothing. deployment-authority.md states the intended
model plainly -- freeze source as idunn, copy into a root-owned actuation
stage, the privileged driver never opens Git -- and --source-uid/--source-gid
are validated as non-zero, which only makes sense for a privileged daemon
dropping down for source work.
So the unit now runs as root with --source-uid 986 --source-gid 978, keeps
ProtectSystem=full and re-opens each actuated path individually, and adds
RuntimeDirectory=idunn for the route driver's preflight staging. The
comment block explains the tradeoff rather than leaving the next reader to
infer it: privilege separation is internal, and what makes it tolerable is
that Idunn accepts no imperative input.
That is a genuine increase in blast radius over a confined process, and
migration.md says so instead of selling it. The counter-argument is that
the old shape was confined in name only -- a sandboxed process whose sudo
grant pointed at an unaudited root shell with eleven hardcoded targets.
systemd-analyze verify passes on the rewritten unit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>