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30 changed files with 787 additions and 16554 deletions

1
Cargo.lock generated
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@ -482,7 +482,6 @@ dependencies = [
"libc",
"rmp-serde",
"serde",
"serde_json",
"sha2",
"tempfile",
"toml",

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@ -18,10 +18,6 @@ path = "src/bin/idunn-provision.rs"
name = "idunn-host"
path = "src/bin/idunn-host.rs"
[[bin]]
name = "idunn-launch"
path = "src/bin/idunn-launch.rs"
[lib]
name = "idunn_daemon"
path = "src/lib.rs"
@ -38,7 +34,6 @@ serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
ed25519-dalek = "2.2"
toml = "0.8"
uuid = { version = "1", features = ["v4"] }
serde_json = "1"
[dev-dependencies]
tempfile = "3"

131
README.md
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@ -58,64 +58,6 @@ idunn status --command <id>
the bindings, so `idunn up profile:full-gamecult` brings up everything bound
into that profile.
### Steward orders
A second root unit from the same binary, `idunn-orders` (`idunn orders serve`),
takes typed orders from one steward Mind over `/run/idunn-orders/steward.sock`.
It has its own store, `orders.cc`, and its own binding, `steward.toml`; the
survival daemon takes no order. There is still no command string:
```bash
idunn order package-install <pkg>[=version]... --reason TEXT # apt-get update, install named packages, check them
idunn order unit <start|stop|restart|reload> <unit> --reason TEXT
idunn order deploy <service|profile:name> --reason TEXT # the same commit as `idunn up`
idunn order show <id> # status and output tails
idunn order list
```
A unit order submits exactly one job, for the unit it names: every verb runs
`systemctl <verb> --job-mode=ignore-requirements -- <unit>`, so systemd builds a
transaction of one job. It does not start what the unit requires or restart what
is part of it: order the dependency first, and order `postgresql@16-main.service`
rather than the `postgresql.service` wrapper. Targets are not orderable. The job is one; what the unit does afterwards is
not: systemd still runs full transactions of its own for `Restart=` after a
failure, for a `StopWhenUnneeded=` dependency left without a user, and for a
`Conflicts=` partner of a unit that fails, so an ordered stop of a unit
that something restarts does not last, and a start of a `Restart=always`
unit can report failure and be active seconds later. A unit
order may act on any unit except Idunn's own (`idunn-*`) and the minds' own
(`mind-self@*`, `mind-persona@*`), and the units that end or take the host
(`systemd-suspend`, `systemd-hibernate`, `systemd-hybrid-sleep`,
`systemd-suspend-then-hibernate`, `rescue`, `emergency`). That set is compiled
into the binary and read from no configuration. An order is refused, recorded
and posted when the ordered unit, or an alias it resolves from, is one of them;
when it has an emergency action (`SuccessAction=`, `FailureAction=`,
`StartLimitAction=`, `JobTimeoutAction=`) other than `none` or an `OnFailure=`
or `OnSuccess=` unit (not for a reload); or, for a stop or restart, when another
unit is `BoundBy=` it, because systemd stops that unit with it whatever the job
mode; for a start or restart, when it has an `Upholds=` unit, which systemd
starts in a full transaction whatever the job mode; or, for a stop, restart or
reload, when it has a `ConsistsOf=` member, a wrapper such as
`postgresql.service` whose verbs would exit 0 and touch nothing. A unit
`systemctl show` cannot resolve fails the order. Slices, scopes,
targets and globs are not units an order can name.
A package order installs the packages it names and nothing else: apt runs with
`--no-remove`, each name is passed as an exact-name pattern so `.` and `+`
match themselves, and a last step fails the order unless every named package
is installed.
An order runs once, after the steward's uid is checked and the instance's
brake check (`mind-control --instance <principal> check`) exits 0. The check
that the order's principal and uid are the bound steward's runs again at every
execution, so an order accepted before `steward.toml` changed is refused and
recorded, not run. The socket belongs to the steward user alone (mode 0600);
root may `show` and `list` orders but never issue one. An order that had
started when the service died is recorded as lost and never run again. No order releases a brake. Acceptance and result are posted to
`#operator` as a retried projection of `orders.cc`: a chat outage delays the
posts and not the orders. A refusal names the field and a code, never the value
it refused.
## Authority
**Owner.** Deployment admission, and the continuity of installed bodies.
@ -208,79 +150,6 @@ omits one. Unknown fields are rejected on both sides. A repository that gets
compromised can therefore change what is built, but not what it is allowed to
touch on the host.
An upstream daemon that does not speak Idunn's runtime contract is deployed
with `idunn-launch` as its executable artifact and the upstream tree as a
required adjacent artifact; the launcher finds the child inside the release that
holds it. The launcher is the unit's process: it binds the
candidate endpoint and answers Idunn's challenge there, renders the child's
config, starts a stateful child only once it holds the write lease, and signs
presence. Members never pass through it: the binding's `[route.member]` makes
Idunn route a second listener straight to the child, which binds the address
Idunn gives it in `GAMECULT_IDUNN_MEMBER_BIND`.
```toml
# recipe fragment — the upstream tree is built or fetched as an artifact
[service]
executable_artifact = "idunn-launch"
arguments = [
{ kind = "literal", value = "--child" },
{ kind = "literal", value = "upstream/bin/daemon" },
{ kind = "literal", value = "--template" },
{ kind = "literal", value = "config.tmpl" },
{ kind = "literal", value = "--health-path" },
{ kind = "literal", value = "/health" },
{ kind = "literal", value = "--health-contract" },
{ kind = "literal", value = "example.presence-launcher.v1" },
]
required_environment = [
"GAMECULT_IDUNN_RUNTIME_BUNDLE",
"GAMECULT_IDUNN_CANDIDATE_BIND",
"GAMECULT_IDUNN_MEMBER_BIND",
]
```
A directory artifact is sealed read-only: its files are 0444 and its
directories 0555, whatever mode the build or git gave them. A file the tree
must run, such as the launcher's `upstream/bin/daemon` child, is declared in
`executable_members` and sealed 0555. The members are part of the sealed release
address, so changing the list makes a new release. Idunn refuses the release if a
member is absolute, climbs with `..`, is missing, is a symlink or sits behind
one, or is not a regular file; `executable = true` on a directory output and
`executable_members` on a file output are refused too.
A tree may hold relative symlinks whose `..` steps all come first and climb no
higher than the artifact's top (`share/terminfo/4/4025ex -> ../t/tek4025ex` is
kept). An absolute link, a `..` after a name, or a climb out of the artifact
refuses the release when it is sealed. Host targets (Windows) record
`executable` and `executable_members` in the receipt and do not apply them.
```toml
# recipe fragment — the upstream artifact declares the child it launches
[[artifacts]]
id = "upstream"
source_kind = "runner-output"
runner = "build"
source = "dist/upstream"
destination = "upstream"
executable_members = ["bin/daemon"]
```
```toml
# binding fragment — members connect to the member endpoint, which Idunn
# forwards to the private port derived from the candidate: member
# private_port_start + (candidate port - route private_port_start)
[route]
stable_endpoint = "tcp://10.77.0.1:8008"
private_port_start = 18831
private_port_end = 18839
# ...
[route.member]
stable_endpoint = "tcp://10.77.0.1:8448"
private_port_start = 18841
# max_connections = 128 # nginx limit_conn on the member listener (1-65535)
```
## Contracts
Idunn's typed contracts are published by

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@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
[Unit]
Description=Idunn steward orders: typed package, unit and deploy orders from the steward
# Deliberately no After= or Requires= on any managed target, Synapse or
# idunn-yggdrasil: orders are how an operator repairs those, so none of them
# may be a condition of this unit starting. Posts are a retried projection and
# wait for Synapse on their own.
[Service]
Type=simple
# Root, from the same binary as idunn-yggdrasil, with its own store and socket.
# idunn-yggdrasil keeps its no-imperative-input invariant and its write set:
# no order code runs in `idunn serve`.
#
# The unit name matches idunn-*, which is in the always-refused set, so no
# order can stop or restart this service.
User=root
# No Group= and no UMask=: the service gives its socket to the steward user
# (mode 0600) itself and sets Idunn's own umask for the files it writes, so
# nothing here reaches control.cc. The steward user is the only peer the
# service answers: it checks SO_PEERCRED on every connection.
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/idunn orders serve \
--store /var/lib/gamecult/idunn-orders \
--state-store /var/lib/gamecult/idunn/control.cc \
--steward-binding /etc/gamecult/idunn/steward.toml \
--socket /run/idunn-orders/steward.sock
Restart=always
RestartSec=5
TimeoutStopSec=20
RuntimeDirectory=idunn-orders
RuntimeDirectoryMode=0755
# The Synapse access token of @idunn, copied from a root-only file, and read
# through $CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY; the service names it in steward.toml.
LoadCredential=idunn-matrix-token:/etc/gamecult/idunn/matrix-token
PrivateTmp=yes
ProtectHome=yes
ProtectSystem=strict
# Its own order store, and the control store a deploy order commits a command
# to. Transient units started with systemd-run run in the manager's namespace,
# so packages and units are not limited by this list.
ReadWritePaths=/var/lib/gamecult/idunn-orders /var/lib/gamecult/idunn
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target

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@ -104,11 +104,6 @@ ReadWritePaths=/etc/gamecult/ghostlight/runtime /var/lib/gamecult/ghostlight-wor
ReadWritePaths=/etc/gamecult/streampixels-service/runtime /var/lib/gamecult/streampixels-service /srv/streampixels-idunn/releases/service
# StreamPixels web is stateless; it needs only its runtime bundle and releases.
ReadWritePaths=/etc/gamecult/streampixels-web/runtime /srv/streampixels-idunn/releases/web
# Vili (motion worker): runtime bundle, state, and releases. Prefixed "-" so a
# target whose roots are not created yet cannot stop Idunn itself from starting
# (Idunn startup never depends on a managed target). A root created after Idunn
# starts is writable only from Idunn's next restart.
ReadWritePaths=-/etc/gamecult/vili/runtime -/var/lib/gamecult/vili -/srv/vili-idunn/releases
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target

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@ -55,10 +55,7 @@ A deployable repository publishes one strict declaration, normally
- immutable artifact outputs, optionally pinned to an expected SHA-256;
- a constrained launch contract;
- one health-contract identity;
- an optional typed state contract with state schema generation and slots
(kinds `cultcache-file`, `external-file` and `external-directory`; the
external kinds are process-owned state an external runtime imposes, which
Idunn preserves and fences but never interprets);
- an optional typed state contract with state schema generation and slots;
- provided capabilities, dependency kinds, startup requirements, capacity, and
conflicts.
@ -70,52 +67,6 @@ recipe fields.
Stateless services declare no state block. Their operator binding therefore has
no state root, state-transition policy, or process write-lease record.
## Foreign workloads: idunn-launch
An upstream daemon that cannot speak Idunn's runtime contract (Synapse, MAS)
runs under `idunn-launch`, the unit's own process. Idunn's two-witness rule is
unchanged: Idunn observes the unit, and the launcher, inside the unit and
supervising the child, signs presence with the provider identity and the
activation key.
- **Owner:** the launcher owns presence, config rendering and the child's
lifetime inside the unit, and the route answers it signs for that child.
Idunn owns admission, lease, route and continuity, as before.
- **Inputs:** the runtime bundle, the activation credential and provider
identity descriptors, the process write lease, the systemd credentials the
binding names, and the child's health over TCP at the member bind.
- **Outputs:** signed `gamecult.runtime_presence_health.v2` (Warming, Active
and failed to Odin; route observations on the candidate endpoint), one child
process, and a rendered config in the unit's private tmp that is never read
back.
- **Route:** Idunn owns both listeners of the route: the Expected route's
stable endpoint (presence) and, when the binding has `[route.member]`, the
member endpoint, rendered as a second server block in the one nginx fragment
with a `limit_conn` on one per-route zone (`max_connections`, default 128), so
members cannot exhaust the connections the presence block shares with them.
The launcher binds the candidate endpoint and answers Idunn's challenge there,
one connection at a time within a one-second deadline; any other first byte
closes the connection. The answer never waits on the child: it reports the
lifecycle's last probe, and a failed, missing or stale probe reads `degraded`.
The child binds the member bind Idunn sets in
`GAMECULT_IDUNN_MEMBER_BIND`, derived from the candidate port. Member bytes
never touch the launcher.
- **Lease:** with `write_lease_required` the launcher starts the child only
after it holds the lease (bound to this Expected, this activation and one of
its own Warming proofs) and keeps the lease store share-locked while the
child lives. Losing the lease stops the child.
- **Config:** one template from the release is rendered with the closed
placeholder set `{{child.listen}}`, `{{child.listen_host}}`,
`{{child.listen_port}}` (all three the member bind), `{{credential:NAME}}`,
`{{credential_path:NAME}}` and `{{state_root}}`. Any other placeholder
refuses to start.
- **Forbidden:** member traffic through the launcher; the child binding the
candidate endpoint; a child of a lease-requiring target running without a held lease; any presence not signed
by both keys.
- **State kind `external-directory`:** a process-owned directory imposed by an
external runtime contract. Same writer, recovery and startup rules as
`external-file`: it is lease-gated, preserved and fenced, never interpreted.
## Operator binding
The root-admitted operator binding supplies the physical policy a repository
@ -222,40 +173,24 @@ health plus Ready correlation. It changes and observes route membership only
afterward. Only after the proxy has adopted the candidate may Idunn clear the
promotion fence and drain the incumbent.
A target has two slots: the incumbent (the admitted generation) and a
transaction's candidate. Continuity owns the incumbent slot and keeps the
admitted generation alive; it never stops. A live `DeploymentTransaction` owns
its private candidate before Fencing and takes the target itself at Fencing (a
stop-then-start rollout, at Starting) through one `take_target` CAS, so of two
transactions entering from one view exactly one succeeds. A continuity
restart is itself a transaction and takes the target the same way.
Phases from Warming through Committing carry deadlines, as do aborts and
drains; an expired deadline never waits silently. A stateless deployment
aborts to its incumbent. A deployment whose candidate was issued a write lease
is left to the operator (`operator-required` incident, the second incident
condition beside `continuity-exhausted`; its subject is the transaction id and
it closes when the record ends or its step goes on). A continuity after
Fencing retries its phase forward on a capped backoff and never stops its live
candidate, since that is the only running copy of the admitted body; the
deadline opens the same incident. The one exception is yielding: a continuity
whose route proof has not succeeded gives way, through its own post-fencing
abort, to a deployment the deployment brake has released and that awaits the
handover; a continuity that has proven its route never yields. The
`ContinuityExhausted` incident (six charged attempts in an hour,
`restarts_page`) pages and gates nothing. When continuity next acts is derived
only from its own record in `TargetSupervision` (schema v2): the attempt
streak, the backoff anchor (written by the dead-and-free pass, the only
writer), and the once-per-admission re-materialization bound. The workload
driver alone answers whether a lost unit was a host reboot
(`WorkloadPort::lost_to_host_reboot`). Operator-facing incidents and
`idunn status` are projections that decide nothing. A boot lift returns a
continuity abort left by an older Idunn, one that had not stopped its running
candidate, to forward retry; if it cannot decide, every continuity abort is
held until a lift succeeds. It is a migration with a deletion line (follow-up
`c2c-delete-boot-lift`). Cut line: cuts 3 and 4 of `reincarnation-map.md`
still owe dependency failures not growing the streak and the dead-generation
route refresh.
Ownership of a target is exclusive at each instant. A live
`DeploymentTransaction` owns it from Fencing on (a stop-first rollout, from
Starting); before Fencing a deployment owns only its private candidate and
continuity owns the incumbent slot. Continuity owns the admitted generation's
survival and never stops. There is no stopped state: six charged attempts in
an hour (`restarts_page`) open the ContinuityExhausted incident and gate
nothing, and no deployment path yields to continuity. When continuity next acts
is derived only from its own record in `TargetSupervision` (schema v2, a v1
record lifts at store open): the attempt streak, the backoff anchor (written
by the dead-and-free pass, the only writer), and the once-per-admission
re-materialization bound. The workload driver alone answers whether a lost unit
was a host reboot (`WorkloadPort::lost_to_host_reboot`). Crash restart, restart
after a sustained run and reboot re-materialization all mint through one CAS;
continuity supervision never aborts a transaction. Operator-facing incidents
and `idunn status` are projections that decide nothing. Cut line: cuts 2 to 4
of `reincarnation-map.md` still owe continuity restarting alongside a
pre-fencing build, dependency failures not growing the streak, and the
dead-generation route refresh.
The deployment brake gates changes to source, release, configuration, schema,
unit, or authority binding. The lifecycle brake separately gates restart of an

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@ -1,394 +0,0 @@
# Deployment provenance: map
Status: map, Imagination, 2026-10-23 (campaign `idunn-deploy-provenance`,
session `self-2026-10-23-eureka-b`). The ends are in
[`deploy-provenance-target.md`](deploy-provenance-target.md). Questions,
rulings, cut specs and follow-ups live in Eureka's mind; this page holds what
has no kind: body facts, rationale and sequencing. Line numbers in T1-T12 are
at `d74ac8d` (origin/main on 2026-10-23); T4, T9 and T13-T16 are at `fd040f0`,
the head of Hands attempt 1, which revision 2 of the spec builds on.
## Cut `tree-executable-members`
Spec `idunn-deploy-provenance:cut_spec:cut-tree-executable-members.r2`
(revision 2, after Soul pass 1 found the real interpreter tree refused). It
serves `motion-pipeline:follow_up:idunn-tree-executable-members` (Vili's
admission waits on it) and will serve gamecult-chat C3 too: the presence
launcher runs a child such as `upstream/bin/daemon` from inside a tree artifact
(README, launcher fragment), and Synapse needs a Python interpreter there.
### Body facts
- T1. `ArtifactOutput` (`src/deployment.rs:106-117`) carries one `executable`
bool. `ArtifactReceipt` (`src/deployment_plan.rs:731-737`) copies it and
`validate` (`:740-760`) requires it to equal the declaration.
- T2. `harden_installed_release` (`src/drivers.rs:6848-6855`) builds its
executable set from `root.join(receipt.destination)` only. `harden_root_tree`
(`:6858-6892`) seals every directory 0555 and every file 0444 unless that
exact path is in the set. A directory artifact with `executable = true` is
therefore silently meaningless today: its files are all 0444. Nothing refuses
it. No live recipe declares one (CodexConnector, Ghostlight, Heimdall, Odin,
StreamPixels service and web surveyed): `executable = true` is on files only.
- T3. A tree output is copied by `copy_artifact`/`copy_tree`
(`src/drivers.rs:8053-8126`), which recreate symlinks verbatim. The digest
(`digest_tree`, `:8142-8175`) covers names, file bytes and link targets, not
mode bits. So runner or git exec bits never reach the release: harden is the
only mode authority.
- T4. `validate_release_symlink` (`src/drivers.rs:6897-6916`) keeps a symlink
only if its target is relative with no `..`. It runs only inside
`harden_root_tree`, at install, so a tree with a `..` or absolute link copies,
digests and seals, then fails at `install_release` (Soul s1: copying and
digesting the real tree twice took 160 s before harden refused it). The rule
is sound but too narrow: it refuses the real interpreter tree (T13). The
frozen-source path has a physical resolver (`resolve_frozen_source_symlink`,
`:6617`) that walks the filesystem with a 40-link budget and a memo. Its
first version was exponential (Soul S4-1, recorded in `d562a12`), and it needs
the tree on disk to answer. Revision 2 does not reuse it (T14).
- T5. The sealed release id hashes `(schema, plan_id, artifacts,
external_inputs)` (`src/deployment_plan.rs:1000-1011`), and `plan_id` hashes
the whole plan including `recipe_blob`. A changed member list is therefore
already a new plan and a new release. The receipt must still carry the list,
because `harden_installed_release` reads receipts only; its two callers
(`install_release` `:2788`, `validate_installed_release` `:2822`) re-harden
every installed release on each observation.
- T6. Encoding is `rmp_serde::to_vec`, positional. A trailing field with
`#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "BTreeSet::is_empty")]` keeps every
existing receipt's bytes and release id: the plan's `deadlines` field
(`:574-577`) is the precedent.
- T7. `digest_artifact` and `digest_tree` (`:8128-8175`) `fs::read` each file
whole. A torch CPU tree's largest file (`libtorch_cpu.so`, hundreds of MB)
is held in Idunn's memory three times per install (seal, install, every
validate). `hash_frozen_source_tree` (`:6788-6840`) already streams in 64 KiB
chunks (S9). The cut collapses both onto one streaming helper.
- T8. `require_leaf_path` (`src/deployment.rs:1951-1958`) only keeps the
artifact destination a single filename. Members are paths inside that
destination, so it does not change. `require_relative_path` (`:1936-1949`)
with `allow_current = false` already refuses absolute, `..`, root and prefix
components.
- T9. The host actuator re-spells the seal (`src/host.rs:1050-1086`): copy,
mode check, digest, pinned-digest check and receipt, the same steps as
`collect_artifact` (`src/drivers.rs:2305-2326`). Soul s1: deleting its mode
check survives every test. Revision 2 collapses both onto one `seal_artifact`
in `drivers.rs`. Each caller keeps only how it finds the source path.
- T10. The transient unit runs with `ProtectSystem=strict` and the release in
`ReadOnlyPaths` (`src/drivers.rs:3675-3698`), `/tmp` mounted `noexec`, and no
`MemoryDenyWriteExecute`. Executing a 0555 file from the release works.
Shared libraries need no exec bit.
- T11. Live body on Yggdrasil: `/usr/local/bin/idunn` sha256 `44cf8a14...`,
installed 2026-10-20 02:34 CEST, before `6e2a31c` (02:40 CEST). `src/` is
identical between `8760a4f` and `6e2a31c`, so the live code is the
reincarnation c2 merge. `origin/main` is 26 commits ahead (+4194/-112 in
`src/`: the presence launcher and member route). Installing this cut ships all
of them. Idunn's own body changes only through gamecult-ops
`scripts/install-idunn-yggdrasil-release.sh` (staged binaries, unit,
bindings). The stage at `/home/gamecultadmin/idunn-stage` is stale (2026-09-11).
- T13. Link census of the real interpreter tree (Yggdrasil probe of
`cpython-3.12.15+20261021-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu-install_only.tar.gz`,
sha256 `5ff9f060...77191124`; torch adds no links, as Soul s1 counted 1,049
after pip): 1,049 links. 0 are absolute, 749 have no `..`, and 300 have all
their `..` components before the first name (every one is
`share/terminfo/<c>/<name> -> ../<c2>/<name2>`, one `..` each). 0 have a `..`
after a name, 0 climb above the tree, 0 dangle and 0 resolve outside it.
Blender 5.2.2 has 79 links, none absolute or with `..` (Soul s1).
- T14. Lexically normalising `<link's directory>/<target>` does not check
containment. The kernel resolves a target one component at a time, so a `..`
after a symlinked name climbs from where that link points, not from where its
name sits. Probe on Yggdrasil: `root/a/s -> ..` and `root/a/L -> s/../x`
normalise to `root` and `root/a/x`, both inside, yet `L` reads the file `x`
beside `root`. `root/a/d -> .` with `root/a/M -> d/../../x` escapes the same
way. Idunn has met this before: verify-transaction-cut F5 (`D -> .`,
`L -> D/D/../../../etc/passwd` passed a lexical check).
The sound lexical rule constrains the target's shape: all its `..` components
come before its first name, and they number no more than the link's depth
below the artifact's top. The climb then starts from the link's own
directory, which the walk reached through real directories only (copy and
digest never descend through a link), so it lands on a real ancestor inside
the artifact. After that the target only descends, and any link it passes
through obeys the same rule. By induction on the kernel's hops (capped at 40,
then ELOOP), every hop stays inside. The check is one pass over the target's
components with no filesystem reads, so its cost is linear in the tree and no
resolver is needed. The shapes it refuses (`s/../x`) occur in neither real
tree (T13).
Prior art, from documentation as known to Imagination (high confidence for Go
and securejoin, medium for the tar details):
- Go `path/filepath.IsLocal` (1.20) is lexical and says so: it does not account
for symlinks. It would admit `s/../x`. Used alone, it is the T14 bug.
- Go `os.Root` (1.24) and `cyphar/filepath-securejoin` (used by runc,
containerd and umoci) resolve each component inside the root when a path is
opened, refusing or clamping an escape. They guard one later access, need
the tree on disk, and check again on every open. Idunn instead certifies a
sealed tree once, so that the kernel's own resolution stays inside on every
later access.
- Zip-slip defences and archive extractors check entry names lexically and
protect against link targets by refusing to write through links
(libarchive's `ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS`, and `SECURE_NODOTDOT` for
names; GNU tar creates such links last). They protect the extraction, not
what a kept link points at afterwards.
- OCI layer extraction keeps link targets verbatim, absolute ones included,
because the runtime resolves them inside the container's root. Idunn runs a
release in the host's mount namespace, so absolute targets stay refused.
- Nix keeps link targets verbatim and tracks dependencies by scanning for
references. The whole store is its root, so it has no per-artifact
containment to compare with.
None of these is a static per-link rule for a tree that runs unconfined. The
T14 shape rule fits that case.
- T15. Host targets: `idunn-host` observes, starts and stops processes on
Windows only (the non-Windows `platform` module in `src/host.rs` bails), and
`host.rs` sets no file modes. On Windows a file runs by its type, not by a
mode bit, so `executable` and `executable_members` have nothing to set there.
The file `executable` flag has always been carried and never applied on host
targets. A recipe does not know which workload kind its binding will choose.
- T16. The release root holds only artifact destinations. Runner workspaces,
where external inputs land, are removed before `SealedRelease::new`
(`src/drivers.rs:2421-2423`). `install_release` (`:2781-2788`) and
`validate_installed_release` (`:2815-2822`) digest every receipt's
destination before calling harden. So a rule in the digest walk runs at seal,
at install and at every validate, over every link harden would see.
- T12. Disk: `/` on Yggdrasil has 1.3 TB free. A tree release costs about three
copies (runner workspace, staging, installed). Nothing collects old releases or
staging (`ghostlight-verse:follow_up:idunn-generation-retention`), so every
Vili deploy leaves about 7 GiB behind.
### Contract, corrected against the body
- Any directory artifact may declare `executable_members` (a set of relative
paths). The follow-up limited it to runner-output; that limit protects no
invariant, and the launcher's worktree or fetched trees need the same feature.
- `executable = true` names a file artifact. On a directory output the release
is refused, and `executable_members` on a file output is refused (T2).
- A member is refused at recipe parse if it is empty, absolute, or holds `.`,
`..`, a root or a prefix. At seal it is refused if it is missing, is a
symlink, passes through a symlink or non-directory, or is not a regular file.
Refusal happens before `SealedRelease::new`, so no sealed release can name a
member it cannot seal.
- Harden seals each member 0555 and fails if any declared executable path was
not visited as a regular file. "Every declared executable is sealed 0555, or
the install fails" holds structurally, not by a lookup that can miss.
- Symlinks: a link in a tree artifact is kept when its target is relative, its
`..` components all come before its first name, and they number no more than
the link's depth below the artifact's top (T14). One function,
`check_release_link`, decides this. Only the digest walk calls it, so a bad
link refuses the release at seal, before `SealedRelease::new`, and again at
install and validate (T16). Harden no longer judges links. The climb is
bounded by the artifact's top, not the release root: no live release has a
`..` link (the old rule refused them all), so nothing installed is newly
refused, and each artifact's digest describes a closed tree.
- Host targets carry `executable` and `executable_members` in the receipt,
shape-checked at seal by the shared `seal_artifact`, and do not apply them
(T15). Refusing members there would make a recipe's validity depend on its
binding.
- Vili's trees must
not come from `python -m venv`: its `bin/python` is an absolute link and its
`pyvenv.cfg` names the build workspace. Install packages into the relocatable
interpreter tree instead (`motion-pipeline:follow_up:vili-relocatable-python-tree`).
### Authority
Owner: the seal (`seal_artifact`, called by `collect_artifact` for systemd
targets and by `materialize` in `host.rs` for host targets) decides
membership from the recipe and writes it into the receipt. Harden enforces the
receipt and decides nothing. Runner exec bits and git `100755` modes are dead
inputs for release modes. Link containment belongs to `check_release_link`,
which only `digest_tree` calls. `validate_release_symlink` is deleted, and
harden's symlink arm leaves links as they are.
### Acceptance sizing
The big-tree job (spec `verification.operator`) needs about 12 GiB of scratch
on Yggdrasil: a 3.5 GiB tree, its staging copy, downloads and pip cache. It
removes it at the end. Revision 2 runs it on the trees as shipped, with the 300
terminfo links (T13). If a tree holds a link the T14 rule refuses, the job
prints it and stops, and the link is reported to Self, not deleted.
## Cut `isolation-credential-evidence`
Spec `idunn-deploy-provenance:cut_spec:cut-cut-isolation-credential-evidence.r1`,
at `112a7a5` (origin/main, live on Yggdrasil since 2026-10-24 11:29 UTC). It
serves Vili's admission (`motion-pipeline:cut_report:cut-vili-admission.h4`,
first deviation): every `idunn up vili` is refused before fencing.
### Body facts (probed read-only on Yggdrasil, 2026-10-24)
- I1. `idunn up vili` runs 6 and 7 failed with
`systemd workload isolation properties differ from the Idunn contract`, the
message of `observe_unit` (`src/drivers.rs:2975-3005`). Of its conjuncts,
only one differs on the failed Vili unit: `LoadCredential`. Idunn expects
`""` because Vili has no service credential besides the presence identity
(`service_credential_names` empty); systemd shows `[unprintable]`. Every
other conjunct matches, InaccessiblePaths included (one value across all
five idunn-vili/odin units).
- I2. systemd 257.13 `systemctl show -p LoadCredential` prints
`LoadCredential=[unprintable]` for every unit, whatever the credentials:
`ssh.service` and `systemd-journald.service` (not DynamicUser, zero
LoadCredential), the four failed `idunn-vili-*` units (zero), and the Odin
unit (one). The display form carries no information, so the conjunct was
vacuous whenever credentials existed and always false when none did. Odin
and StreamPixels passed only because each carries a regular credential.
- I3. The exact value is readable: D-Bus
`org.freedesktop.systemd1.Service.LoadCredential` (`busctl get-property`)
answers `a(ss) 0` for the Vili units and ssh, `a(ss) 1
"ODIN_TOPOLOGY_IDENTITY" "<path>"` for Odin.
- I4. What the workload can actually read is the delivered directory. On the
host, `/run/credentials/` holds a directory only for units with credentials
(getty, journald, Odin, StreamPixels service and web). Inside Odin's MainPID
root, `/run/credentials/<unit>/` holds exactly `ODIN_TOPOLOGY_IDENTITY`
(`-r--r-----+ root root`). The presence identity is a parent-only `OpenFile`
descriptor, never a credential.
- I5. The rule arrived whole in `1fc0dad` (2026-09-03, "Rebuild Idunn
deployment transaction authority"), with its twin clause in
`validate_launch_observation` (`:3468-3472`, `:3513-3516`); no later commit
touched it. No ruling or finding in any campaign concerns workload isolation
verification; gamecult-chat's foreign-workloads cut touched
`CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY` reservation, not this check.
- I6. `SystemdWorkloadObservation` is persisted by previous Idunns in both
MessagePack encodings, compact (positional) included
(`persisted_systemd_observations_decode_as_the_systemd_variant`,
`:9915-9930`), so deleting the `load_credential` field shifts every later
slot of a live incumbent's record. The field is also in the drift list
(`:2462`) that `stop` (`:4064-4070`) uses to refuse stopping a changed
workload: changing what the field holds without leaving that list would make
the next Idunn refuse to stop the live Odin and StreamPixels incumbents.
- I7. Fixtures: the verbatim 257.13 `systemctl show` output of base's 27
properties for a Vili unit (presence identity only) and the Odin unit
(presence identity plus one service credential), captured 2026-10-24 into
this Imagination's scratchpad `fixtures/`.
- I8. The new rule holds for every live systemd incumbent: inside each
MainPID root the delivered entries equal its binding's `secret_files` keys
minus `GAMECULT_RUNTIME_PRESENCE_IDENTITY` (Odin 1, StreamPixels service 11,
StreamPixels web 1; key names compared, no values read). An Idunn restart onto
this cut re-observes them (`:3955-3970`) and passes.
### Decision
A property systemd cannot display does not belong in the comparison. The
invariant it reached for, that the workload holds exactly the credentials Idunn
delivered, is observed where it is decided: the entries of
`/run/credentials/<unit>` in the MainPID's root equal Idunn's service
credential names, absent directory equal to none. That covers
`LoadCredential`, `SetCredential`, `ImportCredential` and drop-ins alike, and
needs no new program. The D-Bus read (I3) is exact but sees only one of those
properties and adds a second systemd client and parser; rejected.
### Authority
Owner: `observe_unit` decides the credential rule, from the delivered
directory. `LoadCredential`'s display form is no longer read or compared; the
`load_credential` field is a retired wire slot, written empty, out of the drift
list, kept only so persisted records decode. Forbidden writers: the
`observe_unit` conjunct and the `validate_launch_observation` clause. Dropping
the slot waits on the next schema revision of the observation.
### Deploy
Idunn's body changes only through gamecult-ops
`scripts/install-idunn-yggdrasil-release.sh` (stage `idunn` only; unit and
bindings unchanged). After it, Vili's Hands reruns from step 4 of
`motion-pipeline:cut_report:cut-vili-admission.h4`'s undone list.
## Cut `runner-failure-evidence`
Spec `idunn-deploy-provenance:cut_spec:cut-runner-failure-evidence.r1`, at
`804ed75` (origin/main, live on Yggdrasil). It serves the StreamPixels-area
Self: `idunn up vili` (command `up-4866467c-ee98-4a2b-b4a9-a008d7c44acd`,
transaction `tx-a04b68c7-c742-4d7d-8220-8aa08b9febae`, 2026-10-25 00:50-00:55
UTC) failed in Sealing with `Docker runner exited with exit status: 1: ` and
nobody could tell which recipe step failed.
### Body facts (source read at `804ed75`; host read-only, 2026-10-25)
- R1. The runner is `docker run --rm` (`src/drivers.rs:2088-2090`), launched by
`DockerRunnerDriver::docker` (`:2173-2195`) with stdin null and
`Command::output()`: stdout and stderr are each buffered whole in the
daemon's memory, unbounded. On a non-zero exit the error is
`"Docker runner exited with {status}: {stderr}"`; stdout is dropped. The
container is gone the moment it exits, so `docker ps -a` and `docker logs`
hold nothing.
- R2. The empty message: the failing process wrote nothing to stderr, and
stdout, the only stream that carried its report, is discarded at
`:2182-2193`. The same interpolation echoes whatever a step does write to
stderr into `last_error`, `pre_fencing_abort.error` and
`completion.error` (`bounded_detail`, 2048 bytes), and from there into
`idunn up`'s `deployment failed:` line and `idunn status`.
- R3. No step identity reaches the error. `materialize` (`:2368-2391`) loops
over `declaration.steps` and calls `run_in_workspace` with argv only;
`step.id` is used only in the environment precondition. External inputs
(`curl` in the runner, `:2247-2258`) fail through the same helper with the
same anonymous message.
- R4. Which step failed on 2026-10-25, inferred from the failed transaction's
staging root, which survives (926 MiB,
`/var/lib/gamecult/idunn/staging/tx-a04b68c7-.../`): in `.runner-node-build`,
`node_modules/.package-lock.json` was written at 00:51:24 (so
`install-vili-dependencies`, `npm ci`, finished), nothing outside
`node_modules` is newer, and `release/vili` (the next step's output) is
absent; the python workspace holds only fetched inputs. The failing step was
`test-daemon` (`node --test ... scripts/test-vili-daemon.mjs`), whose test
reporter writes to stdout: exactly the stream R1 discards. Inference from
residue, not from output.
- R5. The failure path: `resume_one_transaction` (`src/control_plane.rs:6291-6320`)
sends a pre-fence error to `begin_pre_fencing_abort` (`:9916-9935`), which
persists `bounded_detail(format!("{error:#}"))`. Nothing reaches the journal
on this path: the idunn-yggdrasil journal for 00:45-01:10 holds only
provider-exclusion lines.
- R6. Stores. `control.cc` (root 0640) holds commands, transactions
(`idunn.deployment_transaction.v4`, keys 0-36), generations, supervision and
expiry requests; `ControlSnapshot::read` refuses any other type
(`:3420`). Records must re-encode byte-exactly (`decode_record`,
`:3717-3727`), so a new transaction field is a schema bump and a v4 lift
(`:4100-4110`). Terminal transactions move verbatim to `history.cc`
(`:4366-4396`; 39.8 MB on the host), which status reads for `--command`.
`incidents.cc` lives in the published projection directory and by its own
doc (`src/incident.rs:1-11`) carries no free text and is never `control.cc`,
because a type added there stops continuity for every target on a rollback.
- R7. The daemon runs as root (`User=root`). Runner secrets reach the
container as read-only file mounts named by env (`:2041-2047`), so any text
a step derives from them can land in its output.
- R8. Staging residue: 475 transaction roots, 55 GiB under
`/var/lib/gamecult/idunn/staging`; a failed Sealing leaves its workspaces
because `materialize` returns before `remove_tree_inside`.
### Decision
The failure becomes a typed value at the runner, `RunnerStepFailure`: the
subject (recipe step or external input, by id), the runner id, the exit code or
signal, and the last 8 KiB of stdout and of stderr with each stream's total
byte count. Its `Display` carries the subject and status, never output.
Capture streams both pipes through bounded tails, so a verbose build no longer
buffers whole in the daemon.
The tail lives in a new private store, `runner-evidence.cc`, beside
`control.cc` (mode 0600), one record per transaction
(`idunn.runner_failure.v1`), newest 32 kept by the writer. Not in the
transaction record: that is a v5 bump whose rollback makes every older Idunn
refuse its control store (R6), the scar `incident.rs` already names. Not in
`incidents.cc`: published, and free text is barred there. Not in the journal:
journal readers are a wider set than root, so the journal line names the
transaction, the subject, the status and the store, and no output.
No redaction. Matching secret bytes would make the daemon read every secret,
and still misses any encoding, prefix or transform of one; a claimed redaction
that leaks is worse than a stated rule. The rule instead is the reader set: the
store's only readers (root) can already read every secret the runner was
given.
Keeping the failed container (dropping `--rm`) is worse: its output then lives
in Docker's json-file log, unbounded, untyped, outside Idunn's state and
readable by the docker group; containers accumulate with no owner to reap them;
`docker system prune` erases the evidence; and nothing ties a container to the
transaction in `idunn status`.
### Authority
Owner: the runner decides what failed and keeps the bounded tail; the engine's
pre-fence failure path is the one writer of `runner-evidence.cc`.
`last_error`, `pre_fencing_abort.error` and `completion.error` keep only the
failure's `Display`. Forbidden writers: the `stderr` interpolation in
`DockerRunnerDriver::docker`. Retention is by count inside the writer, so the
store needs no external owner; staging roots (R8) stay with
`ghostlight-verse:follow_up:idunn-generation-retention`.
### Deploy
Idunn's body changes only through gamecult-ops
`scripts/install-idunn-yggdrasil-release.sh` (stage `idunn` only; unit and
bindings unchanged). The next failed Sealing then shows its step and tail on
`sudo idunn status --command <id>`.

View file

@ -313,36 +313,10 @@ written when the pass first finds the admitted generation dead and the target
free, and a capped doubling wait from that anchor (5 s base, 300 s cap). A run
of 600 s or more by the admitted body resets the streak. A generation lost to a
host reboot (the workload driver's evidence, `lost_to_host_reboot`) is
re-materialized once per admission without charge or wait.
Each target has two slots, the incumbent and a transaction's candidate. The
incumbent is continuity's until a transaction takes the target, at Fencing (at
Starting for a stop-then-start rollout), through one `take_target` CAS; of two
transactions entering from one view exactly one succeeds. Before that, a
deployment owns only its private candidate and the target is free for it
between continuity attempts.
Phases Warming through Committing, post-fencing aborts and drains all carry
deadlines (the plan's frozen `PhaseDeadlines`; `WARMING_DEADLINE_SECONDS`, and
`PRE_FENCING_ABORT_DEADLINE_SECONDS` for a pre-fencing abort). What an expired
post-fencing deadline does depends on the owner. A deployment whose candidate
was never issued a write lease aborts to the incumbent. One whose candidate was
issued a lease may have written under a new state contract and is left to the
operator. A continuity retries its phase forward on a capped backoff and never
stops its live candidate, because that candidate is the only running copy of
the admitted body. Both operator cases open an `operator-required` incident
(subject: the transaction id) that closes when the record ends or its step goes
on.
The one yield: a continuity whose route proof has not succeeded gives way to a
deployment the deployment brake has released that awaits the handover of the
target. It begins its own post-fencing abort and the deployment fences what is
admitted. A continuity that has proven its route is serving never yields.
At boot, a lift returns to forward retry any continuity abort an older Idunn
left over a running candidate. If the lift errs or cannot observe the
candidate, the abort is held, not run. The lift is a migration with a deletion
line (follow-up `c2c-delete-boot-lift`).
re-materialized once per admission without charge or wait. The target is free
for a deployment's candidate between attempts, and a deployment never yields to
continuity before Fencing; from Fencing on (or from Starting for a stop-first
rollout) the live transaction alone owns the target.
An admitted generation keeps its Ready and latest Odin receipts as durable
proof of the exact activation at their recorded admission times. Dependency

View file

@ -97,8 +97,7 @@ Each of these was found by running the pipe against Raven, not by reading.
bind time. `rollout.strategy = "stop-then-start"` exists for exactly a
route-less host-actuator workload: the admitted incumbent is stopped at
Starting, before the candidate starts, and supervision leaves the target
alone from Starting on: the transaction takes the target there (one
`take_target` CAS) rather than at Fencing. A systemd-transient workload may not declare it.
alone from Starting on. A systemd-transient workload may not declare it.
- **An unobservable host is silence.** The hub returns a typed
`HostUnobservable` for not-attached, detached, reconnected and unanswered.
Supervision skips that tick and logs it. Before this, an Idunn restart

View file

@ -575,26 +575,3 @@ its stores and `idunn.running` together, because the cb60965 binary cannot read
"migrated 5 control record(s) … idunn.target_supervision.v2". streampixels-service
kept running through the restart (unit 73ca40ba, PID 968752, NRestarts 0). The
catalog returned 200, and 4443/udp was listening.
## Installed: cut 2
Cuts c2-phase-split, c2b-owner-deadlines, c2c-post-fence-forward and
c2d-continuity-yields (branch tip `8760a4f`) were installed on Yggdrasil on
2026-10-20 at 00:34:06 UTC, with the operator's OK.
- **The hotfix before it.** `ec45906` (`bounded_detail`) was installed on its
own on 2026-10-19 at 17:32 UTC. It unwedged tx-f978ab86.
- **Build.** `/srv/build/idunn-8760a4f`; `cargo test --lib` passed 471.
- **Backup.** `/root/idunn-store-backup-*-pre-reincarnation-c2` holds the
stores, `incidents.cc` and the binaries. A rollback must restore them
together: older binaries refuse two live transactions on one target, and
they refuse the `operator-required` incident condition.
- **First boot.** The boot lift returned exactly tx-039b91e9 (ghostlight) and
tx-4eaed669 (odin) to forward retry, as the Soul install gate predicted.
Odin's continuity, wedged in Routing since the 2026-10-18 reboot, committed
4 s later. Generation tx-4eaed669 is admitted, its route is healthy, and the
same PID 2571 still runs. Ghostlight's continuity is retrying forward in
AwaitingReady. Its daemon's readiness is a ghostlight-side fault
(`Permission denied` reading its session-wrapping key).
- **Live processes.** Every live MainPID was the same before and after the
install. The streampixels catalog returned 200, and 4443/udp was listening.

View file

@ -52,18 +52,12 @@ web app and service through Idunn v2. The live evidence is on Yggdrasil:
the admitted incarnation. The proof answers an Idunn challenge and is signed
with the credential Idunn issued to that launch. Invariant 3 changes where the
proof travels, not what it proves.
5. **Every post-fencing phase has a deadline and is never a silent wait.** A
deployment's stateless phase that passes its deadline aborts to its
incumbent. A continuity past its deadline is left to the operator
(operator-required incident) and retries its phase forward on a capped
backoff, because aborting it would stop the only running copy of the admitted
body (ruling post-fence-forward-retry), until a deployment that the
deployment brake has released awaits the handover of its target and the
continuity's route proof has not succeeded: then it yields through its own
post-fencing abort, and the deployment fences what is admitted (rulings
continuity-yields-to-deploy, c2d-yield-only-unproven-to-movable). A
continuity that has proven its route is serving and never yields. A
stateful deployment is left to the operator.
5. **Every post-fencing phase ends.** Each phase after fencing has an admitted
deadline. When a deadline expires, Idunn resolves it: stateless targets abort
to the incumbent. Stateful targets get an explicit terminal record with a
named recovery. A granted lease that the process does not pick up within its
window is a named failure with an Idunn-owned recovery. It is never a silent
wait. Resumable-forever is gone.
6. **The admitted receipt describes the running incarnation.** Continuity
commits update the admitted generation atomically, so the rollback path never
meets drift between the receipt and the projection. Rollback demotes the exact

View file

@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ probes ran on Yggdrasil over `ssh ygg`, read-only, 2026-09-30 13:51-13:55 UTC
| I2 | Continuity exhaustion (since `idunn-reincarnation` cut 1: `restarts_page`, a paging threshold only; nothing stops, and the line numbers below are pre-cut) | `:68-71` (6 restarts / 3,600,000 ms, 5 s doubling), `:1066-1072` (`restarts_used`, `restarts_exhausted`), decided `:5709-5722` under key `continuity:<target>` (`:5678`) | Exhaustion is **derived** from `TargetSupervision.continuity_restarts` (newest 6 times, sliding window). No write marks it. The fault clears (`:5723`) as soon as one entry leaves the window, so a permanently dead target leaves and re-enters exhaustion several times each hour. |
| I3 | Route degradation | `RouteSupervisionState` `:890-942`; `record_failed_challenge` sets `degraded_since_unix_millis` on the **first** failed challenge, `record_proved_challenge` clears it; reported at `:5975` under `route:<target>` | Durable per incarnation (inside `admitted_generation.v4`); a new generation starts from `default()`. Backoff doubles from the topology max age to a cap. |
| I4 | Other operator-facing faults | `:5645-5651` (`generation-down:<target>`, "holds a dead admitted generation down"), `:6016` (`route-record:<target>`), `note_fault` per transaction | Also stderr plus `last_error`. Not named by the target; listed so the paging-set question sees them. |
| I5 | `OperatorRequired` on main (pre-cut-2 reading; since `idunn-reincarnation` cut 2 `resolve` reaches it in production through `PhaseEnd::OperatorRequired` and `PhaseEnd::RetryForward`, both calling `leave_to_operator`, which opens the `operator-required` incident `IncidentCondition::OperatorRequired`, subject the transaction id; `close_spent_operator_incidents` closes it when the record no longer `leaves_to_operator`) | `TerminalRecovery::OperatorRequired` `:878-885`, validated `:1954`; constructed only in tests (`:12525`, `:12535`) | No production path produces it on main. |
| I6 | `OperatorRequired` on B5 (superseded by cut 2: B5's deadlines merged as `PhaseDeadline`, and a continuity past its deadline now also lands here) | `hands/b5` `resolve_phase_deadline` (diff hunk at `control_plane.rs` ~8560-8625 on the branch), `PhaseEnd::OperatorRequired` | Deadline passed on a stateful deploy with an issued lease: `report_once("deadline:<transaction_id>")`, returns `Ok(None)`, the transaction stays live. No terminal transition and no operator action that ends it were found on the branch (`idunn expire` writes `idunn.expiry_request.v1`, which re-enters the same arm). |
| I5 | `OperatorRequired` on main | `TerminalRecovery::OperatorRequired` `:878-885`, validated `:1954`; constructed only in tests (`:12525`, `:12535`) | No production path produces it on main. |
| I6 | `OperatorRequired` on B5 | `hands/b5` `resolve_phase_deadline` (diff hunk at `control_plane.rs` ~8560-8625 on the branch), `PhaseEnd::OperatorRequired` | Deadline passed on a stateful deploy with an issued lease: `report_once("deadline:<transaction_id>")`, returns `Ok(None)`, the transaction stays live. No terminal transition and no operator action that ends it were found on the branch (`idunn expire` writes `idunn.expiry_request.v1`, which re-enters the same arm). |
| I7 | Store kinds | `:55-61`, `:936-966`; B5 adds `idunn.expiry_request.v1` | `control.cc`: `idunn.deployment_command`, `idunn.deployment_transaction`, `idunn.admitted_generation.v4`, `idunn.target_supervision.v1`. `history.cc` beside it holds terminal transactions (`:3653`), retired one per tick (`:5068-5091`). |
| I8 | Single-writer precedent inside `control.cc` | B5 `ExpiryRequest` doc comment | "The CLI only writes this record. The daemon's deadline resolver reads it ... No CLI writes a transaction field." One writer per kind. |
| I9 | Serve loop | `:5041-5058`, `run_scheduler_tick` `:5098-5110` | 500 ms poll. A tick error is logged, never propagated. |
@ -166,10 +166,9 @@ cut spec fixes them.
Empty cells, stated plainly:
- `operator-required` closure: the incident closes when the transaction ends or
its step goes on (`close_spent_operator_incidents`). A stateful deployment
left to the operator still has no Idunn-owned terminal action; the operator's
`idunn expire` re-enters the same arm.
- `operator-required` closure: no path on `hands/b5` ends a transaction left to
the operator (I6). The incident can open and never close until B5 names that
action.
- Delivery-failure visibility: no owner.
- Discord `enforce_nonce` window: not verified against Discord's current docs
in this pass.

View file

@ -30,12 +30,9 @@ journald (`report_once`, `control_plane.rs:4599`):
- An admitted route is degraded. It fails its stable-route challenge
(`supervise_admitted_route`, ~5973). The degraded mark is durable, but no
one is told.
- A post-fencing phase deadline leaves a transaction to the operator: a
stateful deployment whose candidate was issued a lease, or a continuity
retrying forward past its deadline. Since `idunn-reincarnation` cut 2 it is
the second incident condition, `operator-required` (subject: the transaction
id), beside `continuity-exhausted`; it closes when the record ends or its
step goes on.
- A post-fencing phase deadline expires into `OperatorRequired`. This lives on
B5, which is unmerged on `hands/b5`. The failure record is durable and the
notice is a log line.
Odin's own store condition (`odin.store_condition.v1`, `contested`) is mapped
but not built. Idunn reads nothing about Odin's store health today.
@ -88,8 +85,8 @@ the machine has a detector with no record, and a deliverer that nothing feeds.
- Odin's store-recovery cuts, O2 included. They produce `odin.store_condition`
and are Odin's campaign, still in prose. This campaign consumes the record
once it exists.
- Idunn's phase deadlines. They landed in `idunn-reincarnation` cut 2, which
also owns the `operator-required` incident condition.
- Idunn's B5 phase deadlines. B5 is in prose on `hands/b5`. This campaign
reports its `OperatorRequired` outcome once B5 merges.
- VoidBot's `notify_owner` MCP tool and its separate DM code.
- Bifrost's Persona delivery crossing.
- Eve/TUI lowering of incidents.

View file

@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
//! The unit's process for an upstream daemon: parse the recipe's argv, read
//! what Idunn set, run the launcher, and map the outcome to an exit code.
#[cfg(unix)]
fn main() -> std::process::ExitCode {
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
use anyhow::Context;
use idunn_daemon::deployment::{
IDUNN_PROCESS_WRITE_LEASE_ENVIRONMENT, IDUNN_RUNTIME_BUNDLE_ENVIRONMENT,
IDUNN_RUNTIME_CANDIDATE_BIND_ENVIRONMENT, IDUNN_RUNTIME_MEMBER_BIND_ENVIRONMENT,
};
use idunn_daemon::launcher::{self, *};
static STOP: AtomicBool = AtomicBool::new(false);
extern "C" fn on_signal(_: libc::c_int) {
STOP.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
}
fn launch() -> anyhow::Result<Outcome> {
let release_root = std::env::current_exe()?
.parent()
.context("the launcher is not inside a release")?
.to_owned();
let contract = LaunchContract::parse(release_root, std::env::args().skip(1))?;
let bundle = std::env::var_os(IDUNN_RUNTIME_BUNDLE_ENVIRONMENT)
.context("the Idunn runtime bundle is not set")?;
let bind = std::env::var(IDUNN_RUNTIME_CANDIDATE_BIND_ENVIRONMENT)
.context("the Idunn candidate bind is not set")?;
let member = launcher::parse_member_bind(
&std::env::var(IDUNN_RUNTIME_MEMBER_BIND_ENVIRONMENT)
.context("the Idunn member bind is not set")?,
&bind,
)?;
let (activation, provider) = launcher::inherited_authority_files()?;
let authority = RuntimeAuthority::open(bundle.as_ref(), activation, provider)?;
authority.require_candidate_bind(&bind)?;
let lease_path = std::env::var_os(IDUNN_PROCESS_WRITE_LEASE_ENVIRONMENT);
anyhow::ensure!(
lease_path.is_some() == authority.expected().write_lease_required,
"the process write lease binding differs from Expected"
);
let route = std::net::TcpListener::bind(&bind).context("binding the candidate endpoint")?;
let sink = OdinRudpSink::from_expected(authority.expected())?;
let lease = DriverLeaseReader::new(
&authority.expected().target,
lease_path.as_deref().unwrap_or_default().as_ref(),
);
let health_path = contract.health_path.clone();
let ports = Ports {
credentials: std::sync::Arc::new(CredentialsDirectory::from_environment()),
clock: std::sync::Arc::new(SystemClock),
sink: std::sync::Arc::new(sink),
lease: std::sync::Arc::new(lease),
spawner: Box::new(ProcessSpawner),
health: Box::new(move |member| {
std::sync::Arc::new(HttpHealthProbe {
member,
path: health_path.clone(),
})
}),
};
// SAFETY: the handler only stores to an atomic.
unsafe {
libc::signal(libc::SIGTERM, on_signal as *const () as libc::sighandler_t);
libc::signal(libc::SIGINT, on_signal as *const () as libc::sighandler_t);
}
Ok(launcher::run(
&contract,
authority,
route,
member,
&std::env::temp_dir(),
ports,
&STOP,
))
}
match launch() {
Ok(outcome) => {
if let Outcome::Failed(code) = &outcome {
eprintln!("idunn-launch ended: {code}");
}
std::process::ExitCode::from(outcome.exit_code() as u8)
}
Err(error) => {
eprintln!("idunn-launch refused: {error}");
std::process::ExitCode::from(2)
}
}
}
#[cfg(not(unix))]
fn main() {
eprintln!("idunn-launch runs only on Unix");
std::process::exit(2);
}

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

View file

@ -9,27 +9,12 @@ pub const TARGET_DECLARATION_SCHEMA: &str = "gamecult.idunn.target_declaration.v
pub const OPERATOR_BINDING_SCHEMA: &str = "gamecult.idunn.operator_binding.v2";
pub const IDUNN_RUNTIME_BUNDLE_ENVIRONMENT: &str = "GAMECULT_IDUNN_RUNTIME_BUNDLE";
pub const IDUNN_RUNTIME_CANDIDATE_BIND_ENVIRONMENT: &str = "GAMECULT_IDUNN_CANDIDATE_BIND";
pub const IDUNN_RUNTIME_MEMBER_BIND_ENVIRONMENT: &str = "GAMECULT_IDUNN_MEMBER_BIND";
pub const IDUNN_PROCESS_WRITE_LEASE_ENVIRONMENT: &str = "GAMECULT_IDUNN_PROCESS_WRITE_LEASE";
pub const RUNTIME_PRESENCE_IDENTITY_BINDING: &str = "GAMECULT_RUNTIME_PRESENCE_IDENTITY";
/// A host actuator hands the workload its activation credential as a file
/// named by this variable; on the Idunn host it arrives as a parent-only
/// descriptor instead and this name is never set.
pub const IDUNN_ACTIVATION_CREDENTIAL_ENVIRONMENT: &str = "GAMECULT_IDUNN_ACTIVATION_CREDENTIAL";
/// systemd hands a unit its credential directory under this name; Idunn owns
/// the directory, so no binding may set it.
pub const SYSTEMD_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY_ENVIRONMENT: &str = "CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY";
/// Every launch-environment name Idunn sets or reserves. A binding may name
/// none of them; this is the one list both the binding check and the
/// launch-input check read.
pub(crate) const IDUNN_OWNED_LAUNCH_ENVIRONMENT: [&str; 6] = [
IDUNN_RUNTIME_BUNDLE_ENVIRONMENT,
IDUNN_RUNTIME_CANDIDATE_BIND_ENVIRONMENT,
IDUNN_RUNTIME_MEMBER_BIND_ENVIRONMENT,
IDUNN_PROCESS_WRITE_LEASE_ENVIRONMENT,
IDUNN_ACTIVATION_CREDENTIAL_ENVIRONMENT,
SYSTEMD_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY_ENVIRONMENT,
];
pub const RUNTIME_PRESENCE_IDENTITY_FD_NAME: &str = "gamecult-runtime-presence-identity";
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@ -113,10 +98,6 @@ pub struct ArtifactOutput {
pub expected_sha256: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
pub executable: bool,
/// Regular files inside a directory artifact that are sealed executable
/// (0555); every other file in the tree is sealed 0444.
#[serde(default)]
pub executable_members: BTreeSet<PathBuf>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@ -203,11 +184,6 @@ pub enum StateKind {
/// Process-owned state imposed by an external runtime contract. Idunn
/// preserves and fences the file but never interprets its payload.
ExternalFile,
/// A process-owned directory imposed by an external runtime contract (for
/// example Synapse's media store). Idunn preserves and fences it and never
/// interprets its contents. Same writer, recovery and startup rules as
/// `ExternalFile`.
ExternalDirectory,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@ -528,7 +504,8 @@ impl WorkloadBinding {
{
require_environment_name(name)?;
ensure!(
!IDUNN_OWNED_LAUNCH_ENVIRONMENT.contains(&name.as_str()),
name != IDUNN_RUNTIME_BUNDLE_ENVIRONMENT
&& name != IDUNN_RUNTIME_CANDIDATE_BIND_ENVIRONMENT,
"operator binding attempts to replace Idunn-owned workload environment"
);
}
@ -661,7 +638,9 @@ pub struct ProcessWriteLeaseBinding {
impl ProcessWriteLeaseBinding {
pub fn lock_path(&self) -> PathBuf {
crate::drivers::authority_lock_path(&self.record_path)
let mut lock_path = self.record_path.as_os_str().to_os_string();
lock_path.push(".lock");
PathBuf::from(lock_path)
}
}
@ -683,101 +662,42 @@ pub struct RouteBinding {
pub private_port_end: u16,
pub config_path: PathBuf,
pub reload_unit: String,
/// A second listener for the route's members. When set, members reach the
/// workload straight through a second nginx server block, and the
/// workload's launcher answers presence only.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub member: Option<MemberListenerBinding>,
}
/// The member listener of a route: where members connect, and the first of the
/// private ports the workload binds for them. The private range is as wide as
/// the route's own.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct MemberListenerBinding {
pub stable_endpoint: String,
pub private_port_start: u16,
/// Most member connections nginx holds open at once for this route. Each
/// costs nginx two connections (client and upstream) from the pool the
/// route's presence block shares, so this limit is what keeps members from
/// exhausting it.
#[serde(default = "default_member_max_connections")]
pub max_connections: u16,
}
const DEFAULT_MEMBER_MAX_CONNECTIONS: u16 = 128;
fn default_member_max_connections() -> u16 {
DEFAULT_MEMBER_MAX_CONNECTIONS
}
impl RouteBinding {
pub(crate) fn stable_socket(&self) -> Result<(IpAddr, u16)> {
parse_stable_socket(self.driver, &self.stable_endpoint, "stable endpoint")
}
/// The member listener's stable socket, when the route has one.
pub(crate) fn member_stable_socket(&self) -> Result<Option<(IpAddr, u16)>> {
self.member
.as_ref()
.map(|member| {
parse_stable_socket(self.driver, &member.stable_endpoint, "member endpoint")
})
.transpose()
}
/// The private port the workload binds for members when its presence
/// candidate is `candidate_port`. Derived, never stored: the member range
/// is the private range shifted to the member start.
pub(crate) fn member_candidate_port(&self, candidate_port: u16) -> Result<Option<u16>> {
let Some(member) = self.member.as_ref() else {
return Ok(None);
};
let authority = match self.driver {
RouteDriver::NginxStreamTcp => self
.stable_endpoint
.strip_prefix("http://")
.or_else(|| self.stable_endpoint.strip_prefix("tcp://")),
RouteDriver::NginxStreamUdp => self.stable_endpoint.strip_prefix("rudp://"),
}
.context("stable endpoint transport does not match its route driver")?;
ensure!(
(self.private_port_start..=self.private_port_end).contains(&candidate_port),
"candidate port is outside the route binding"
!authority
.chars()
.any(|character| matches!(character, '/' | '?' | '#' | '@' | '[' | ']')),
"stable endpoint is not a plain IP address and port"
);
let offset = candidate_port - self.private_port_start;
let port = member
.private_port_start
.checked_add(offset)
.context("member private port overflows")?;
Ok(Some(port))
let (host, port) = authority
.rsplit_once(':')
.context("stable endpoint has no port")?;
let host = host
.parse::<IpAddr>()
.context("stable endpoint host is not an IP address")?;
ensure!(
matches!(host, IpAddr::V4(_)),
"route binding v2 stable endpoints use explicit IPv4 addresses"
);
let port = port
.parse::<u16>()
.context("stable endpoint port is not a u16")?;
ensure!(port > 0, "stable endpoint port is zero");
Ok((host, port))
}
}
fn parse_stable_socket(driver: RouteDriver, endpoint: &str, what: &str) -> Result<(IpAddr, u16)> {
let authority = match driver {
RouteDriver::NginxStreamTcp => endpoint
.strip_prefix("http://")
.or_else(|| endpoint.strip_prefix("tcp://")),
RouteDriver::NginxStreamUdp => endpoint.strip_prefix("rudp://"),
}
.with_context(|| format!("{what} transport does not match its route driver"))?;
ensure!(
!authority
.chars()
.any(|character| matches!(character, '/' | '?' | '#' | '@' | '[' | ']')),
"{what} is not a plain IP address and port"
);
let (host, port) = authority
.rsplit_once(':')
.with_context(|| format!("{what} has no port"))?;
let host = host
.parse::<IpAddr>()
.with_context(|| format!("{what} host is not an IP address"))?;
ensure!(
matches!(host, IpAddr::V4(_)),
"route binding v2 endpoints use explicit IPv4 addresses"
);
let port = port
.parse::<u16>()
.with_context(|| format!("{what} port is not a u16"))?;
ensure!(port > 0, "{what} port is zero");
Ok((host, port))
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum RouteDriver {
@ -916,14 +836,6 @@ impl TargetDeclaration {
if let Some(expected_sha256) = &artifact.expected_sha256 {
require_sha256(expected_sha256, "expected artifact sha256")?;
}
ensure!(
!(artifact.executable && !artifact.executable_members.is_empty()),
"artifact {} declares both executable and executable_members",
artifact.id
);
for member in &artifact.executable_members {
require_relative_path(member, "executable member", false)?;
}
ensure!(
destinations.insert(artifact.destination.as_path()),
"artifact destination {} is declared twice",
@ -1007,14 +919,6 @@ impl TargetDeclaration {
== self.service.route_required,
"routed services must require exactly one Idunn-owned candidate bind"
);
ensure!(
!self
.service
.required_environment
.contains(IDUNN_RUNTIME_MEMBER_BIND_ENVIRONMENT)
|| self.service.route_required,
"only routed services may require the Idunn-owned member bind"
);
ensure!(
self.service
.required_environment
@ -1472,39 +1376,7 @@ impl OperatorBinding {
route.private_port_start < route.private_port_end,
"candidate rollout requires at least two private ports"
);
let stable = route.stable_socket()?;
if let Some(member) = route.member.as_ref() {
ensure!(
route.driver == RouteDriver::NginxStreamTcp,
"only a TCP route may carry a member listener"
);
require_value(&member.stable_endpoint, "member endpoint")?;
let member_stable = route
.member_stable_socket()?
.context("route has no member listener")?;
ensure!(
member_stable != stable,
"member endpoint equals the route's stable endpoint"
);
ensure!(
member.private_port_start > 0,
"member private port range starts at zero"
);
ensure!(
member.max_connections > 0,
"member connection limit is zero"
);
let width = route.private_port_end - route.private_port_start;
let member_end = member
.private_port_start
.checked_add(width)
.context("member private port range overflows")?;
ensure!(
member_end < route.private_port_start
|| member.private_port_start > route.private_port_end,
"member private port range overlaps the route's private range"
);
}
route.stable_socket()?;
require_absolute_path(&route.config_path, "route config")?;
require_unit(&route.reload_unit, "route reload unit")?;
}
@ -1682,7 +1554,12 @@ impl OperatorBinding {
.keys()
.chain(self.workload.secret_environment_names())
.collect();
for owned in IDUNN_OWNED_LAUNCH_ENVIRONMENT {
for owned in [
IDUNN_RUNTIME_BUNDLE_ENVIRONMENT,
IDUNN_RUNTIME_CANDIDATE_BIND_ENVIRONMENT,
IDUNN_PROCESS_WRITE_LEASE_ENVIRONMENT,
IDUNN_ACTIVATION_CREDENTIAL_ENVIRONMENT,
] {
ensure!(
!workload_names.contains(&owned.to_string()),
"operator binding cannot replace Idunn-owned launch environment {owned}"
@ -1704,9 +1581,6 @@ impl OperatorBinding {
}
if declaration.service.route_required {
available_environment.insert(IDUNN_RUNTIME_CANDIDATE_BIND_ENVIRONMENT.into());
if self.route.as_ref().is_some_and(|route| route.member.is_some()) {
available_environment.insert(IDUNN_RUNTIME_MEMBER_BIND_ENVIRONMENT.into());
}
}
if declaration.write_lease_required() {
available_environment.insert(IDUNN_PROCESS_WRITE_LEASE_ENVIRONMENT.into());
@ -2054,10 +1928,10 @@ fn require_host(value: &str) -> Result<()> {
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) mod tests {
mod tests {
use super::*;
pub(crate) const RECIPE: &str = r#"
const RECIPE: &str = r#"
schema = "gamecult.idunn.target_declaration.v1"
target = "test-service"
source_stamp_environment = "TEST_SERVICE_BUILD_COMMIT"
@ -2129,7 +2003,7 @@ compatibility = "v1"
startup = "before-promotion"
"#;
pub(crate) const BINDING: &str = r#"
const BINDING: &str = r#"
schema = "gamecult.idunn.operator_binding.v2"
target = "test-service"
profiles = ["aetheria", "full-gamecult"]
@ -2223,76 +2097,6 @@ nodes = ["yggdrasil"]
assert!(TargetDeclaration::parse(&input).is_err());
}
const MEMBER_CANARY: &str = "zzcanary";
fn recipe_with_members(members: &str) -> String {
let input = RECIPE.replace("executable = true", &format!("executable_members = [{members}]"));
assert_ne!(input, RECIPE, "the fixture lost its executable line");
input
}
/// A refused member list is refused by name of the field, never by echoing
/// the member.
fn assert_members_refused(members: &[&str]) {
let control = TargetDeclaration::parse(&recipe_with_members("\"bin/daemon\"")).unwrap();
assert!(control.artifacts[0].executable_members.contains(Path::new("bin/daemon")));
for member in members {
let error = TargetDeclaration::parse(&recipe_with_members(&format!("\"{member}\"")))
.expect_err(member);
assert!(
!format!("{error:#}").contains(MEMBER_CANARY),
"the refusal echoed a member path"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn recipe_executable_member_refuses_parent_traversal() {
assert_members_refused(&[
"zzcanary/../b",
"../zzcanary",
"bin/zzcanary/..",
"bin/../../zzcanary",
]);
}
#[test]
fn recipe_executable_member_refuses_absolute_path() {
assert_members_refused(&["/zzcanary/sh", "/zzcanary"]);
}
#[test]
fn recipe_executable_member_refuses_empty_and_current_dir() {
assert_members_refused(&["", ".", "./", "zzcanary/.."]);
}
#[test]
fn recipe_refuses_executable_flag_with_members() {
let input = RECIPE.replace(
"executable = true",
"executable = true\nexecutable_members = [\"bin/daemon\"]",
);
let error = TargetDeclaration::parse(&input).unwrap_err();
assert!(format!("{error:#}").contains("executable_members"));
assert!(!format!("{error:#}").contains("bin/daemon"));
// executable = true alone, and members alone, both stay admitted.
assert!(TargetDeclaration::parse(RECIPE).is_ok());
assert!(TargetDeclaration::parse(&recipe_with_members("\"bin/daemon\"")).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn recipe_admits_members_on_both_source_kinds() {
let runner_output = TargetDeclaration::parse(&recipe_with_members("\"a/b\", \"c\"")).unwrap();
assert_eq!(runner_output.artifacts[0].source_kind, ArtifactSource::RunnerOutput);
assert_eq!(runner_output.artifacts[0].executable_members.len(), 2);
let worktree = recipe_with_members("\"a/b\", \"c\"")
.replace("source_kind = \"runner-output\"\nrunner = \"rust\"\n", "source_kind = \"worktree-tree\"\n")
.replace("expected_sha256 = \"cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc\"\n", "");
let worktree = TargetDeclaration::parse(&worktree).unwrap();
assert_eq!(worktree.artifacts[0].source_kind, ArtifactSource::WorktreeTree);
assert_eq!(worktree.artifacts[0].executable_members.len(), 2);
}
#[test]
fn operator_cannot_omit_an_affordance_derived_from_the_recipe() {
let recipe = TargetDeclaration::parse(RECIPE).unwrap();
@ -2426,203 +2230,6 @@ nodes = ["yggdrasil"]
}
}
/// The recipe and binding of a routed service whose members connect to a
/// listener of their own.
pub(crate) fn member_listener_pair() -> (String, String) {
let recipe = RECIPE.replace(
"required_environment = [",
"required_environment = [\"GAMECULT_IDUNN_MEMBER_BIND\", ",
);
let binding = BINDING.replace(
"reload_unit = \"nginx.service\"\n",
"reload_unit = \"nginx.service\"\n\n[route.member]\nstable_endpoint = \"http://127.0.0.1:18840\"\nprivate_port_start = 18841\n",
);
(recipe, binding)
}
fn member_binding_with(replacement: (&str, &str)) -> Result<OperatorBinding> {
let (recipe, binding) = member_listener_pair();
let recipe = TargetDeclaration::parse(&recipe)?;
let binding = OperatorBinding::parse(&binding.replace(replacement.0, replacement.1))?;
binding.admit(&recipe)?;
Ok(binding)
}
#[test]
fn a_member_listener_admits_with_a_recipe_that_requires_the_member_bind() {
let binding = member_binding_with(("never-matches", "")).unwrap();
let route = binding.route.unwrap();
assert_eq!(route.member_stable_socket().unwrap().unwrap().1, 18840);
assert_eq!(route.member_candidate_port(18831).unwrap(), Some(18841));
assert_eq!(route.member_candidate_port(18839).unwrap(), Some(18849));
assert!(route.member_candidate_port(18840).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn a_binding_without_a_member_listener_has_no_member_ports() {
let binding = OperatorBinding::parse(BINDING).unwrap();
let route = binding.route.unwrap();
assert_eq!(route.member_stable_socket().unwrap(), None);
assert_eq!(route.member_candidate_port(18831).unwrap(), None);
}
#[test]
fn a_member_listener_needs_a_recipe_that_requires_the_member_bind() {
let (recipe, binding) = member_listener_pair();
// Bound but not required: the recipe never asked for the variable.
let plain_recipe = TargetDeclaration::parse(RECIPE).unwrap();
assert!(
OperatorBinding::parse(&binding)
.unwrap()
.admit(&plain_recipe)
.is_err()
);
// Required but not bound: the variable would never be set.
let recipe = TargetDeclaration::parse(&recipe).unwrap();
assert!(
OperatorBinding::parse(BINDING)
.unwrap()
.admit(&recipe)
.is_err()
);
}
#[test]
fn only_a_routed_recipe_may_require_the_member_bind() {
let recipe = RECIPE
.replace("route_required = true", "route_required = false")
.replace(
"required_environment = [\"GAMECULT_IDUNN_CANDIDATE_BIND\", ",
"required_environment = [\"GAMECULT_IDUNN_MEMBER_BIND\", ",
);
assert!(recipe.contains("GAMECULT_IDUNN_MEMBER_BIND"));
assert!(TargetDeclaration::parse(&recipe).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn member_listener_bindings_are_validated() {
let start = |value: &str| {
member_binding_with((
"private_port_start = 18841",
&format!("private_port_start = {value}"),
))
};
// Overlapping the route's own private range, in either direction.
assert!(start("18835").is_err());
assert!(start("18825").is_err());
// Adjacent but disjoint is fine, above the route's range or below it.
assert!(start("18840").is_ok());
assert!(start("18822").is_ok());
assert!(start("18823").is_err());
// The connection limit defaults, and zero is refused.
let limit = |value: &str| {
member_binding_with((
"private_port_start = 18841",
&format!("private_port_start = 18841
max_connections = {value}"),
))
};
assert_eq!(
member_binding_with(("never-matches", "")).unwrap().route.unwrap().member.unwrap().max_connections,
128
);
assert_eq!(limit("7").unwrap().route.unwrap().member.unwrap().max_connections, 7);
assert!(limit("0").is_err());
assert!(limit("65535").is_ok());
assert!(limit("65536").is_err());
// Zero, and a width that overflows u16.
assert!(start("0").is_err());
assert!(start("65530").is_err());
// The member endpoint may not be the route's stable endpoint.
assert!(member_binding_with(("http://127.0.0.1:18840", "http://127.0.0.1:18830")).is_err());
// The same transport and address rules as the stable endpoint.
assert!(member_binding_with(("http://127.0.0.1:18840", "rudp://127.0.0.1:18840")).is_err());
assert!(member_binding_with(("http://127.0.0.1:18840", "http://example.test:18840")).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn a_udp_route_cannot_carry_a_member_listener() {
let (recipe, binding) = member_listener_pair();
let binding = binding
.replace("nginx-stream-tcp", "nginx-stream-udp")
.replace("http://127.0.0.1:18830", "rudp://127.0.0.1:18830")
.replace("http://127.0.0.1:18840", "rudp://127.0.0.1:18840");
let recipe = TargetDeclaration::parse(&recipe).unwrap();
assert!(
OperatorBinding::parse(&binding)
.and_then(|binding| binding.admit(&recipe))
.is_err()
);
}
#[test]
fn idunn_owned_names_are_reserved_in_one_list() {
let recipe = TargetDeclaration::parse(RECIPE).unwrap();
let owned = [
"GAMECULT_IDUNN_RUNTIME_BUNDLE",
"GAMECULT_IDUNN_CANDIDATE_BIND",
"GAMECULT_IDUNN_MEMBER_BIND",
"GAMECULT_IDUNN_PROCESS_WRITE_LEASE",
"GAMECULT_IDUNN_ACTIVATION_CREDENTIAL",
"CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY",
];
let mut listed = IDUNN_OWNED_LAUNCH_ENVIRONMENT.to_vec();
listed.sort_unstable();
let mut expected = owned.to_vec();
expected.sort_unstable();
assert_eq!(listed, expected);
let as_environment = |name: &str| {
BINDING.replace(
"[workload.argument_bindings]",
&format!("[workload.environment]\n{name} = \"value\"\n\n[workload.argument_bindings]"),
)
};
let as_secret = |name: &str| {
BINDING.replace(
"[workload.secret_files]",
&format!("[workload.secret_files]\n{name} = \"/etc/gamecult/test-service/other.cc\""),
)
};
// The fixtures are well formed: an unowned name parses in both
// shapes, so the refusals below are about the name.
assert!(OperatorBinding::parse(&as_environment("UNOWNED_NAME")).is_ok());
assert!(OperatorBinding::parse(&as_secret("UNOWNED_NAME")).is_ok());
for name in owned {
// Refused when the binding is parsed...
assert!(
OperatorBinding::parse(&as_environment(name)).is_err(),
"{name} accepted as environment at parse"
);
assert!(
OperatorBinding::parse(&as_secret(name)).is_err(),
"{name} accepted as a secret file at parse"
);
// ...and again at admission, for a binding that did not come
// through parse. Each site reads the one list.
for secret in [false, true] {
let mut binding = OperatorBinding::parse(BINDING).unwrap();
let WorkloadBinding::SystemdTransient(workload) = &mut binding.workload else {
panic!("the fixture is a systemd workload");
};
if secret {
workload.secret_files.insert(name.into(), "/etc/gamecult/test-service/other.cc".into());
} else {
workload.environment.insert(name.into(), "forged".into());
}
assert!(
binding.workload.validate_launch_environment().is_err(),
"{name} (secret: {secret}) accepted by the binding check"
);
let error = binding.admit(&recipe).unwrap_err().to_string();
assert!(
error.contains("Idunn-owned launch environment"),
"{name} (secret: {secret}) accepted by the launch-input check: {error}"
);
}
}
}
#[test]
fn state_slot_path_cannot_escape_the_operator_owned_root() {
let input = RECIPE.replace(
@ -2654,17 +2261,6 @@ max_connections = {value}"),
assert!(declaration.write_lease_required());
}
#[test]
fn external_directory_state_is_lease_gated_like_external_file() {
let input = RECIPE.replace("kind = \"cultcache-file\"", "kind = \"external-directory\"");
let declaration = TargetDeclaration::parse(&input).unwrap();
let slot = &declaration.state.as_ref().unwrap().slots[0];
assert_eq!(slot.kind, StateKind::ExternalDirectory);
assert_eq!(slot.writer, StateWriter::ProcessBoundSingleWriter);
assert_eq!(slot.startup, StateStartup::CreateOrOpenAfterWriteLease);
assert!(declaration.write_lease_required());
}
#[test]
fn state_slots_cannot_claim_overlapping_paths() {
let input = RECIPE.replace(

View file

@ -475,13 +475,6 @@ pub const DEFAULT_AWAITING_READY_DEADLINE_SECONDS: u32 = 300;
pub const DEFAULT_ROUTING_DEADLINE_SECONDS: u32 = 120;
pub const DEFAULT_COMMITTING_DEADLINE_SECONDS: u32 = 120;
/// Idunn's own deadlines, not binding-declared: a new `PhaseDeadlines` field
/// would change every v3 plan id (`recomputed_plan_id` re-encodes the plan).
/// Warming is timed for every transaction, owner or not.
pub const WARMING_DEADLINE_SECONDS: u32 = 600;
/// A pre-fencing abort is timed from its beginning.
pub const PRE_FENCING_ABORT_DEADLINE_SECONDS: u32 = 300;
/// The resolved per-phase deadline durations a plan carries. Entering a
/// post-fencing phase stamps its deadline from them, and the deadline
/// resolver ends the phase once it passes.
@ -734,11 +727,6 @@ pub struct ArtifactReceipt {
pub sha256: String,
pub size_bytes: u64,
pub executable: bool,
/// Files sealed executable inside a directory artifact. Skipped when empty
/// so a receipt with no members keeps its original encoding, and so its
/// sealed release id.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "BTreeSet::is_empty")]
pub executable_members: BTreeSet<PathBuf>,
}
impl ArtifactReceipt {
@ -752,9 +740,7 @@ impl ArtifactReceipt {
.find(|artifact| artifact.id == self.artifact_id)
.with_context(|| format!("plan declares no artifact {}", self.artifact_id))?;
ensure!(
self.destination == declared.destination
&& self.executable == declared.executable
&& self.executable_members == declared.executable_members,
self.destination == declared.destination && self.executable == declared.executable,
"artifact receipt differs from declared output"
);
if let Some(expected_sha256) = &declared.expected_sha256 {
@ -1432,7 +1418,6 @@ nodes = ["yggdrasil"]
sha256: digest(b'c'),
size_bytes: 42,
executable: true,
executable_members: BTreeSet::new(),
}
}
@ -1799,113 +1784,6 @@ nodes = ["yggdrasil"]
assert!(changed.validate_against(&plan).is_err());
}
fn hex(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
bytes.iter().map(|byte| format!("{byte:02x}")).collect()
}
#[test]
fn receipt_without_members_encodes_as_before() {
// Both values were computed outside this code, from the five-field
// msgpack array the receipt encoded to at base d74ac8d.
const BASE_RECEIPT: &str = "95a66461656d6f6ea773657276696365d9477368613235362d636363636363636363636363636363636363636363636363636363636363636363636363636363636363636363636363636363636363636363636363636363632ac3";
const BASE_RELEASE_ID: &str =
"sha256-b9143d8f546ad71c493c70037813547aaec10fd87994a6f3bdc77ac3a8b3495e";
let receipt = artifact_receipt();
let encoded = rmp_serde::to_vec(&receipt).unwrap();
assert_eq!(hex(&encoded), BASE_RECEIPT);
let bytes = (0..BASE_RECEIPT.len())
.step_by(2)
.map(|at| u8::from_str_radix(&BASE_RECEIPT[at..at + 2], 16).unwrap())
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
assert_eq!(rmp_serde::from_slice::<ArtifactReceipt>(&bytes).unwrap(), receipt);
let release = SealedRelease {
schema: SEALED_RELEASE_SCHEMA.into(),
sealed_release_id: String::new(),
plan_id: digest(b'a'),
artifacts: vec![receipt],
external_inputs: vec![],
sealed_at_unix_millis: 0,
};
assert_eq!(release.recomputed_release_id().unwrap(), BASE_RELEASE_ID);
}
#[test]
fn sealed_release_address_covers_executable_members() {
let release_with = |members: &[&str]| SealedRelease {
schema: SEALED_RELEASE_SCHEMA.into(),
sealed_release_id: String::new(),
plan_id: digest(b'a'),
artifacts: vec![ArtifactReceipt {
executable: false,
executable_members: members.iter().map(PathBuf::from).collect(),
..artifact_receipt()
}],
external_inputs: vec![],
sealed_at_unix_millis: 0,
};
let none = release_with(&[]).recomputed_release_id().unwrap();
let one = release_with(&["bin/daemon"]).recomputed_release_id().unwrap();
let other = release_with(&["bin/other"]).recomputed_release_id().unwrap();
let two = release_with(&["bin/daemon", "bin/other"])
.recomputed_release_id()
.unwrap();
let all = [&none, &one, &other, &two];
for (index, left) in all.iter().enumerate() {
for right in &all[index + 1..] {
assert_ne!(left, right);
}
}
// The declaration is the other half: a receipt must carry exactly the
// declared list, in a plan that declares one and in one that does not.
let plain = plan();
let mut with_members = artifact_receipt();
with_members.executable_members = BTreeSet::from([PathBuf::from("bin/daemon")]);
assert!(
SealedRelease::new(&plain, vec![with_members], vec![external_input_receipt()], 120)
.is_err()
);
let recipe = RECIPE.replace("executable = true", "executable_members = [\"bin/daemon\", \"lib/tool\"]");
let declaring = compile_deployment_plan(
recipe.as_bytes(),
BINDING.as_bytes(),
source(&recipe),
"service-incarnation-1",
Some(18001),
110,
&[ready_odin_provider("odin", "odin-yggdrasil", 1)],
)
.unwrap();
let honest = ArtifactReceipt {
executable: false,
executable_members: BTreeSet::from([PathBuf::from("bin/daemon"), PathBuf::from("lib/tool")]),
..artifact_receipt()
};
let release = SealedRelease::new(
&declaring,
vec![honest.clone()],
vec![external_input_receipt()],
120,
)
.unwrap();
release.validate_against(&declaring).unwrap();
for drifted in [
BTreeSet::from([PathBuf::from("bin/daemon")]),
BTreeSet::from([PathBuf::from("bin/daemon"), PathBuf::from("lib/other")]),
BTreeSet::new(),
] {
let mut receipt = honest.clone();
receipt.executable_members = drifted;
assert!(
SealedRelease::new(&declaring, vec![receipt], vec![external_input_receipt()], 120)
.is_err()
);
}
let mut changed = release.clone();
changed.artifacts[0].executable_members.insert(PathBuf::from("lib/extra"));
assert!(changed.validate_against(&declaring).is_err());
}
fn binding_with_deadlines(table: &str) -> String {
BINDING.replace("[placement]", &format!("{table}\n[placement]"))
}

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

View file

@ -30,13 +30,13 @@ use serde::Deserialize;
use crate::control_plane::read_trust_anchor;
use crate::deployment::{
HostWorkloadBinding, IDUNN_ACTIVATION_CREDENTIAL_ENVIRONMENT,
ArtifactSource, HostWorkloadBinding, IDUNN_ACTIVATION_CREDENTIAL_ENVIRONMENT,
IDUNN_RUNTIME_BUNDLE_ENVIRONMENT, LaunchArgument, OperatorBinding, TargetDeclaration,
};
use crate::deployment_plan::{CompiledDeploymentPlan, SealedRelease};
use crate::deployment_plan::{ArtifactReceipt, CompiledDeploymentPlan, SealedRelease};
use crate::drivers::{
HostWorkloadObservation, InstalledReleaseObservation, copy_tree, digest_artifact,
release_artifact, remove_tree_inside, seal_artifact, sha256_id, write_runtime_bundle_records,
HostWorkloadObservation, InstalledReleaseObservation, copy_artifact, copy_tree,
digest_artifact, release_artifact, remove_tree_inside, sha256_id, write_runtime_bundle_records,
};
use crate::host_actuator::{
HOST_ACTUATOR_CHANNEL, HOST_ACTUATOR_CONNECTION_ID, HOST_ACTUATOR_PING_MS,
@ -1048,12 +1048,37 @@ fn materialize(
fs::create_dir_all(&staging)?;
let mut artifacts = Vec::new();
for artifact in &declaration.artifacts {
artifacts.push(seal_artifact(
artifact,
&source,
&source.join(&artifact.source),
&staging,
)?);
let source_path = match artifact.source_kind {
ArtifactSource::RunnerOutput | ArtifactSource::WorktreeTree => {
source.join(&artifact.source)
}
};
ensure!(
source_path.exists(),
"declared artifact output {} is absent",
artifact.id
);
let destination = staging.join(&artifact.destination);
ensure!(
destination.starts_with(&staging),
"artifact destination escaped its staging root"
);
copy_artifact(&source, &source_path, &destination)?;
let (sha256, size_bytes) = digest_artifact(&destination)?;
if let Some(expected) = &artifact.expected_sha256 {
ensure!(
&sha256 == expected,
"artifact {} differs from its recipe-pinned digest",
artifact.id
);
}
artifacts.push(ArtifactReceipt {
artifact_id: artifact.id.clone(),
destination: artifact.destination.clone(),
sha256: format!("sha256-{sha256}"),
size_bytes,
executable: artifact.executable,
});
}
let release = SealedRelease::new(plan, artifacts, Vec::new(), sealed_at_unix_millis)?;
Ok((release, staging))

View file

@ -1151,7 +1151,7 @@ mod tests {
let answerer = thread::spawn(move || -> Result<()> {
for _ in 0..500 {
client.poll_resends()?;
if let Some(frame) = client.receive_once()? {
while let Some(frame) = client.receive_once()? {
let envelope = HostActuatorEnvelope::decode(&frame.payload)?;
let request = envelope.open_request("raven", &idunn_anchor)?;
assert_eq!(envelope.session_nonce, nonce);

View file

@ -32,9 +32,6 @@ pub(crate) const INCIDENT_RETENTION_MILLIS: u64 = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub(crate) enum IncidentCondition {
ContinuityExhausted,
/// A transaction past its deadline in a state Idunn will not end by
/// itself. Subject: the transaction id.
OperatorRequired,
}
impl IncidentCondition {
@ -43,7 +40,6 @@ impl IncidentCondition {
pub(crate) const fn name(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
Self::ContinuityExhausted => "continuity-exhausted",
Self::OperatorRequired => "operator-required",
}
}
@ -53,7 +49,6 @@ impl IncidentCondition {
pub(crate) const fn ends_with_admission(self) -> bool {
match self {
Self::ContinuityExhausted => true,
Self::OperatorRequired => false,
}
}
}
@ -276,17 +271,6 @@ impl IncidentStore {
Ok(true)
}
/// The subjects of every open incident of `condition`.
pub(crate) fn open_subjects(&self, condition: IncidentCondition) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
Ok(self
.snapshot()?
.records
.into_iter()
.filter(|record| record.is_open() && record.condition == condition)
.map(|record| record.subject)
.collect())
}
/// Close the open incident for `(condition, subject)`, if there is one.
/// `Ok(true)` means this call wrote the closure.
pub(crate) fn close(
@ -484,12 +468,11 @@ pub(crate) mod tests {
);
// The wire spelling readers match on is the spelling the key and
// status use.
for condition in [IncidentCondition::ContinuityExhausted, IncidentCondition::OperatorRequired] {
let payload = rmp_serde::to_vec(&condition).unwrap();
assert_eq!(rmp_serde::from_slice::<String>(&payload).unwrap(), condition.name());
}
assert_eq!(IncidentCondition::OperatorRequired.name(), "operator-required");
assert!(!IncidentCondition::OperatorRequired.ends_with_admission());
let payload = rmp_serde::to_vec(&IncidentCondition::ContinuityExhausted).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
rmp_serde::from_slice::<String>(&payload).unwrap(),
IncidentCondition::ContinuityExhausted.name()
);
let payload = rmp_serde::to_vec(&CloseReason::NoLongerAdmitted).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
rmp_serde::from_slice::<String>(&payload).unwrap(),

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

View file

@ -4,10 +4,5 @@ pub mod deployment_plan;
pub mod drivers;
pub mod host;
pub mod host_actuator;
#[cfg(unix)]
pub mod launcher;
mod incident;
mod runner_evidence;
pub mod provisioning;
#[cfg(unix)]
mod steward_orders;

View file

@ -1,805 +0,0 @@
//! The output tail of a failed runner step.
//!
//! One file, `runner-evidence.cc`, beside `control.cc`, holds one type: the
//! last bytes of a failed runner container's stdout and stderr, one record per
//! transaction. The engine's pre-fence failure path is its only writer, and
//! `idunn status --command` its only reader. It is never `control.cc`, which
//! refuses any type it does not know, and never `incidents.cc`, which is
//! published and carries no free text.
//!
//! The tail is raw runner output. It is kept unredacted and readable by root
//! alone (mode 0600): root can already read every secret the runner was given.
//! It never enters an error, a transaction record or the journal. The status
//! reader is a terminal, so everything it prints from this store goes through
//! one allowlist sink (`emit`): printable ASCII passes, all else is escaped.
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use anyhow::{Context, Result, bail, ensure};
use cultcache_rs::{
CultCacheEnvelope, DatabaseEntry, SingleFileMessagePackBackingStore,
TryCompareExchangeSnapshotOutcome,
};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use crate::control_plane::{decode_record, require_id, typed_envelope};
use crate::drivers::{
LockContended, RUNNER_OUTPUT_TAIL_BYTES, RunnerStepFailure, RunnerSubject,
exchange_behind_private_lock, runner_status,
};
const RUNNER_FAILURE_SCHEMA: &str = "idunn.runner_failure.v1";
/// Records kept; the writer drops the oldest past this, so the store needs no
/// other owner.
pub(crate) const RUNNER_EVIDENCE_RECORDS: usize = 32;
/// `runner-evidence.cc`, beside the control store.
pub(crate) fn runner_evidence_store_path(state_store: &Path) -> PathBuf {
state_store.with_file_name("runner-evidence.cc")
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub(crate) enum SubjectKind {
Step,
ExternalInput,
}
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, DatabaseEntry)]
#[cultcache(type = "idunn.runner_failure", schema = "idunn.runner_failure.v1")]
pub(crate) struct RunnerFailureRecord {
#[cultcache(key = 0)]
pub(crate) schema_version: String,
#[cultcache(key = 1)]
pub(crate) transaction_id: String,
#[cultcache(key = 2)]
pub(crate) command_id: String,
#[cultcache(key = 3)]
pub(crate) target: String,
#[cultcache(key = 4)]
pub(crate) subject_kind: SubjectKind,
#[cultcache(key = 5)]
pub(crate) subject_id: String,
#[cultcache(key = 6)]
pub(crate) runner: String,
#[cultcache(key = 7)]
pub(crate) exit_code: Option<i32>,
#[cultcache(key = 8)]
pub(crate) signal: Option<i32>,
#[cultcache(key = 9)]
pub(crate) stdout_tail: Vec<u8>,
#[cultcache(key = 10)]
pub(crate) stdout_total_bytes: u64,
#[cultcache(key = 11)]
pub(crate) stderr_tail: Vec<u8>,
#[cultcache(key = 12)]
pub(crate) stderr_total_bytes: u64,
#[cultcache(key = 13)]
pub(crate) recorded_at_unix_millis: u64,
}
/// Tails stay out of `Debug`, so a failed assertion or a logged record never
/// prints runner output.
impl std::fmt::Debug for RunnerFailureRecord {
fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
formatter
.debug_struct("RunnerFailureRecord")
.field("transaction_id", &self.transaction_id)
.field("subject_id", &self.subject_id)
.finish_non_exhaustive()
}
}
impl RunnerFailureRecord {
pub(crate) fn from_failure(
transaction_id: &str,
command_id: &str,
target: &str,
failure: &RunnerStepFailure,
now: u64,
) -> Self {
let (subject_kind, subject_id) = match &failure.subject {
RunnerSubject::Step(id) => (SubjectKind::Step, id),
RunnerSubject::ExternalInput(id) => (SubjectKind::ExternalInput, id),
};
Self {
schema_version: RUNNER_FAILURE_SCHEMA.to_owned(),
transaction_id: transaction_id.to_owned(),
command_id: command_id.to_owned(),
target: target.to_owned(),
subject_kind,
subject_id: subject_id.clone(),
runner: failure.runner.clone(),
exit_code: failure.exit_code,
signal: failure.signal,
stdout_tail: failure.stdout_tail.clone(),
stdout_total_bytes: failure.stdout_total_bytes,
stderr_tail: failure.stderr_tail.clone(),
stderr_total_bytes: failure.stderr_total_bytes,
recorded_at_unix_millis: now,
}
}
pub(crate) fn validate(&self) -> Result<()> {
ensure!(
self.schema_version == RUNNER_FAILURE_SCHEMA,
"runner failure schema is unsupported"
);
require_id(&self.transaction_id, "runner failure transaction")?;
require_id(&self.command_id, "runner failure command")?;
require_id(&self.target, "runner failure target")?;
require_id(&self.subject_id, "runner failure subject")?;
require_id(&self.runner, "runner failure runner")?;
for (tail, total, stream) in [
(&self.stdout_tail, self.stdout_total_bytes, "stdout"),
(&self.stderr_tail, self.stderr_total_bytes, "stderr"),
] {
ensure!(
tail.len() <= RUNNER_OUTPUT_TAIL_BYTES,
"runner failure {stream} tail exceeds its bound"
);
ensure!(
tail.len() as u64 <= total,
"runner failure {stream} tail exceeds its stream"
);
}
Ok(())
}
fn envelope(&self) -> Result<CultCacheEnvelope> {
self.validate()?;
typed_envelope(
&self.transaction_id,
Self::TYPE,
RUNNER_FAILURE_SCHEMA,
self,
self.recorded_at_unix_millis,
)
}
}
/// One read of the store: the envelopes exactly as stored, and the records
/// decoded from them in the same order.
fn snapshot(path: &Path) -> Result<(Vec<CultCacheEnvelope>, Vec<RunnerFailureRecord>)> {
let envelopes = SingleFileMessagePackBackingStore::new(path)
.pull_all_read_only_snapshot()
.context("reading the runner evidence store")?;
let mut records = Vec::new();
for envelope in &envelopes {
ensure!(
envelope.r#type == RunnerFailureRecord::TYPE
&& envelope.schema_id.as_deref() == Some(RUNNER_FAILURE_SCHEMA),
"the runner evidence store holds a document that is not a runner failure"
);
let record: RunnerFailureRecord = decode_record(envelope)?;
record.validate()?;
ensure!(
envelope.key == record.transaction_id,
"runner evidence store key differs from the record's transaction"
);
records.push(record);
}
Ok((envelopes, records))
}
/// How a write left the store.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) enum Kept {
Stored,
/// The store held bytes that do not decode; it was moved to
/// `unreadable_store_path` and the record opened a fresh one. `replaced`
/// is the last-written time (unix milliseconds) of an earlier set-aside
/// store this one displaced, which is gone: one slot, and it says so.
SetAside { replaced: Option<u64> },
}
/// Where an undecodable store is kept. One slot: the next one replaces it, so
/// the damage a bad store can cost is one extra file.
pub(crate) fn unreadable_store_path(path: &Path) -> PathBuf {
path.with_file_name("runner-evidence.unreadable.cc")
}
/// Moves the store over the previous set-aside one, root-only, and reports
/// what it displaced. Nothing of the store's content is named: a decode error
/// can quote stored values, and none is carried here.
fn set_aside_unreadable(path: &Path) -> Result<Option<u64>> {
let aside = unreadable_store_path(path);
let replaced = std::fs::symlink_metadata(&aside).ok().map(|earlier| {
earlier
.modified()
.ok()
.and_then(|time| time.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH).ok())
.map_or(0, |since| since.as_millis() as u64)
});
std::fs::rename(path, &aside)
.context("the runner evidence store is undecodable and could not be set aside")?;
keep_private(&aside)?;
Ok(replaced)
}
/// How the writer reads the store's bytes; tests inject an I/O error here.
type ReadStore<'a> = &'a dyn Fn(&Path) -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>>;
fn unreadable_fault(error: &std::io::Error) -> anyhow::Error {
anyhow::anyhow!("the runner evidence store could not be read: {}", error.kind())
}
/// The one writer. Upsert by transaction id; past `RUNNER_EVIDENCE_RECORDS` the
/// oldest records go in the same exchange. The file ends at mode 0600.
///
/// A store is set aside only when bytes that were read do not decode. An I/O
/// error leaves the store in place, keeps no evidence for that failure, and
/// the error names its kind for the journal.
pub(crate) fn record(path: &Path, record: &RunnerFailureRecord) -> Result<Kept> {
record_reading(path, record, &|path| std::fs::read(path))
}
fn record_reading(path: &Path, record: &RunnerFailureRecord, read: ReadStore) -> Result<Kept> {
let first = match read(path) {
Ok(bytes) => Some(bytes),
Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => None,
Err(error) => return Err(unreadable_fault(&error)),
};
let (envelopes, records, how) = match snapshot(path) {
Ok((envelopes, records)) => (envelopes, records, Kept::Stored),
Err(_) => {
let Some(first) = first else {
bail!("the runner evidence store could not be decoded");
};
// Undecodable only if the same bytes are still there to read: a
// second read that fails, or finds other bytes, is not a verdict.
match read(path) {
Ok(second) if second == first => {}
Ok(_) => bail!("the runner evidence store changed while it was being read"),
Err(error) => return Err(unreadable_fault(&error)),
}
let replaced = set_aside_unreadable(path)?;
(Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Kept::SetAside { replaced })
}
};
let mut kept: Vec<(u64, CultCacheEnvelope)> = envelopes
.iter()
.zip(&records)
.filter(|(_, stored)| stored.transaction_id != record.transaction_id)
.map(|(envelope, stored)| (stored.recorded_at_unix_millis, envelope.clone()))
.collect();
kept.push((record.recorded_at_unix_millis, record.envelope()?));
// Stable: records of one instant keep their stored order, so the record
// being written survives a tie.
kept.sort_by_key(|(recorded_at, _)| *recorded_at);
let excess = kept.len().saturating_sub(RUNNER_EVIDENCE_RECORDS);
let replacements: Vec<_> = kept
.into_iter()
.skip(excess)
.map(|(_, envelope)| envelope)
.collect();
match exchange_behind_private_lock(path, &envelopes, &replacements)? {
TryCompareExchangeSnapshotOutcome::Exchanged => {}
TryCompareExchangeSnapshotOutcome::Mismatch => {
bail!("the runner evidence store changed while it was being written")
}
TryCompareExchangeSnapshotOutcome::LockContended => {
return Err(LockContended {
store: "runner evidence store",
}
.into());
}
}
keep_private(path)?;
Ok(how)
}
#[cfg(unix)]
fn keep_private(path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
std::fs::set_permissions(path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))
.context("making the runner evidence store private")
}
#[cfg(not(unix))]
fn keep_private(_path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
/// The one reader. An absent store holds nothing.
pub(crate) fn for_transaction(
path: &Path,
transaction_id: &str,
) -> Result<Option<RunnerFailureRecord>> {
Ok(snapshot(path)?
.1
.into_iter()
.find(|stored| stored.transaction_id == transaction_id))
}
/// The record as `idunn status --command` shows it, as raw lines. They are
/// not text yet: `show_status` is the only caller, and `emit` the only
/// writer.
fn render(record: &RunnerFailureRecord) -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
let noun = match record.subject_kind {
SubjectKind::Step => "step",
SubjectKind::ExternalInput => "external input",
};
let mut lines: Vec<Vec<u8>> = vec![
format!(" failed {noun} {}", record.subject_id).into_bytes(),
format!(" runner {}", record.runner).into_bytes(),
format!(" status {}", runner_status(record.exit_code, record.signal)).into_bytes(),
];
for (stream, tail, total) in [
("stdout", &record.stdout_tail, record.stdout_total_bytes),
("stderr", &record.stderr_tail, record.stderr_total_bytes),
] {
lines.push(format!(" {stream} (last {} of {total} bytes)", tail.len()).into_bytes());
let text = tail.strip_suffix(b"\n").unwrap_or(tail);
if !text.is_empty() {
lines.extend(text.split(|byte| *byte == b'\n').map(|line| {
let mut shown = b" | ".to_vec();
shown.extend_from_slice(line);
shown
}));
}
}
lines
}
/// What `idunn status --command` prints for a transaction's runner evidence:
/// its record, or one line naming why the store is unreadable. Nothing is
/// written when the transaction has no record.
pub(crate) fn show_status(
out: &mut impl std::io::Write,
store: &Path,
transaction_id: &str,
) -> std::io::Result<()> {
let lines = match for_transaction(store, transaction_id) {
Ok(Some(record)) => render(&record),
Ok(None) => return Ok(()),
Err(error) => {
vec![format!(" runner evidence unreadable: {}", error.root_cause()).into_bytes()]
}
};
emit(out, &lines)
}
/// The one sink: every byte the status read prints from the evidence store,
/// or from an error about it, is written here and nowhere else. An allowlist:
/// printable ASCII and tab pass; every other code point is a visible
/// `\u{..}` escape and every invalid UTF-8 byte a `\x..` escape. A newline
/// inside a line is escaped too: this function writes the only ones.
pub(crate) fn emit(out: &mut impl std::io::Write, lines: &[Vec<u8>]) -> std::io::Result<()> {
for line in lines {
out.write_all(escape(line).as_bytes())?;
out.write_all(b"\n")?;
}
Ok(())
}
pub(crate) fn escape(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
let mut shown = String::with_capacity(bytes.len());
for chunk in bytes.utf8_chunks() {
for character in chunk.valid().chars() {
match character {
' '..='~' | '\t' => shown.push(character),
_ => shown.push_str(&format!("\\u{{{:x}}}", u32::from(character))),
}
}
for byte in chunk.invalid() {
shown.push_str(&format!("\\x{byte:02x}"));
}
}
shown
}
#[cfg(all(test, unix))]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
fn failure(subject: RunnerSubject, stdout: &[u8], stderr: &[u8]) -> RunnerStepFailure {
RunnerStepFailure {
subject,
runner: "rust".into(),
exit_code: Some(3),
signal: None,
stdout_tail: stdout.to_vec(),
stdout_total_bytes: stdout.len() as u64,
stderr_tail: stderr.to_vec(),
stderr_total_bytes: stderr.len() as u64,
}
}
/// What status writes for a record, through the one sink.
fn shown(record: &RunnerFailureRecord) -> String {
let mut written = Vec::new();
emit(&mut written, &render(record)).expect("a Vec takes any write");
String::from_utf8(written).expect("the sink writes ASCII only")
}
fn shown_lines(record: &RunnerFailureRecord) -> Vec<String> {
shown(record).lines().map(str::to_owned).collect()
}
fn record_at(transaction: &str, now: u64) -> RunnerFailureRecord {
RunnerFailureRecord::from_failure(
transaction,
"up-service",
"service",
&failure(RunnerSubject::Step("build".into()), b"out\n", b"err\n"),
now,
)
}
#[test]
fn the_evidence_store_keeps_the_newest_32() -> Result<()> {
let temp = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let path = runner_evidence_store_path(&temp.path().join("control.cc"));
// The literal, not the constant: the spec's bound is 32.
for index in 0..=32 {
record(&path, &record_at(&format!("tx-{index:02}"), 1000 + index as u64))?;
}
let kept: Vec<_> = snapshot(&path)?.1.into_iter().map(|stored| stored.transaction_id).collect();
assert_eq!(kept.len(), 32);
assert!(!kept.contains(&"tx-00".to_owned()), "the oldest survived");
assert!(kept.contains(&"tx-32".to_owned()), "the newest was evicted");
assert!(kept.contains(&"tx-01".to_owned()), "the second oldest was evicted early");
// Rewriting a resident transaction replaces it and drops nothing.
let mut again = record_at("tx-05", 5000);
again.stdout_tail = b"rewritten\n".to_vec();
again.stdout_total_bytes = 10;
record(&path, &again)?;
let kept = snapshot(&path)?.1;
assert_eq!(kept.len(), 32);
assert!(kept.iter().any(|stored| stored.transaction_id == "tx-01"));
let stored = for_transaction(&path, "tx-05")?.context("rewritten record is gone")?;
assert_eq!(stored.stdout_tail, b"rewritten\n");
assert_eq!(for_transaction(&path, "tx-00")?, None);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn a_record_round_trips_byte_for_byte() -> Result<()> {
let temp = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let path = runner_evidence_store_path(&temp.path().join("control.cc"));
let written = RunnerFailureRecord::from_failure(
"tx-a",
"up-service",
"service",
&failure(RunnerSubject::ExternalInput("toolchain".into()), &[0, 1, 255, 10], b""),
77,
);
record(&path, &written)?;
assert_eq!(for_transaction(&path, "tx-a")?, Some(written));
assert_eq!(for_transaction(&path, "tx-b")?, None);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn the_evidence_store_is_private() -> Result<()> {
let temp = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let path = runner_evidence_store_path(&temp.path().join("control.cc"));
// Whatever the umask, the mode is the store's own rule, on every write.
for index in 0..2 {
record(&path, &record_at(&format!("tx-{index}"), 10 + index))?;
assert_eq!(std::fs::metadata(&path)?.permissions().mode() & 0o777, 0o600);
}
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn a_tail_over_its_bound_or_its_stream_is_refused() {
let mut oversize = record_at("tx-a", 1);
oversize.stdout_tail = vec![b'x'; RUNNER_OUTPUT_TAIL_BYTES + 1];
oversize.stdout_total_bytes = u64::MAX;
assert!(oversize.validate().is_err());
let mut impossible = record_at("tx-a", 1);
impossible.stderr_total_bytes = 1;
assert!(impossible.validate().is_err());
let mut exact = record_at("tx-a", 1);
exact.stdout_tail = vec![b'x'; RUNNER_OUTPUT_TAIL_BYTES];
exact.stdout_total_bytes = RUNNER_OUTPUT_TAIL_BYTES as u64;
assert!(exact.validate().is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn status_renders_the_tail_with_control_bytes_escaped() {
let mut stored = record_at("tx-a", 1);
stored.stdout_tail = b"first\n\x1b[2Jsecond\x00end\tTab\nlast\n".to_vec();
stored.stdout_total_bytes = 5000;
stored.stderr_tail = b"bad\r\x07".to_vec();
stored.stderr_total_bytes = 6;
let lines = shown_lines(&stored);
let text = lines.join("\n");
assert!(!text.contains('\u{1b}') && !text.contains('\0') && !text.contains('\r'));
assert!(!text.contains('\u{7}'));
assert_eq!(
lines,
vec![
" failed step build",
" runner rust",
" status exit status 3",
" stdout (last 30 of 5000 bytes)",
" | first",
" | \\u{1b}[2Jsecond\\u{0}end\tTab",
" | last",
" stderr (last 5 of 6 bytes)",
" | bad\\u{d}\\u{7}",
]
);
}
#[test]
fn debug_names_the_record_and_prints_no_tail() {
let mut stored = record_at("tx-a", 1);
stored.stdout_tail = b"SECRET-OUTPUT".to_vec();
stored.stdout_total_bytes = 13;
let debug = format!("{stored:?}");
assert!(debug.contains("tx-a") && !debug.contains("SECRET"), "{debug}");
}
#[test]
fn an_empty_tail_renders_only_its_header() {
let mut stored = record_at("tx-a", 1);
stored.stdout_tail = Vec::new();
stored.stdout_total_bytes = 0;
let lines = shown_lines(&stored);
assert!(lines.contains(&" stdout (last 0 of 0 bytes)".to_owned()));
assert!(!lines.iter().any(|line| line == " | "));
}
#[test]
fn the_reader_names_an_unreadable_store_as_an_error() -> Result<()> {
let temp = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let path = runner_evidence_store_path(&temp.path().join("control.cc"));
std::fs::write(&path, b"\xc1 not a store")?;
assert!(for_transaction(&path, "tx-a").is_err());
Ok(())
}
fn files_beside(path: &Path) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
let mut names: Vec<String> = std::fs::read_dir(path.parent().context("no parent")?)?
.map(|entry| Ok(entry?.file_name().to_string_lossy().into_owned()))
.collect::<Result<_>>()?;
names.retain(|name| name.starts_with("runner-evidence") && !name.contains("lock"));
names.sort();
Ok(names)
}
/// A store a newer Idunn wrote: well-formed, but a schema this one does not know.
fn write_future_store(path: &Path) -> Result<()> {
let mut future = record_at("tx-future", 1);
future.schema_version = "idunn.runner_failure.v2".into();
let envelope = typed_envelope(
&future.transaction_id,
RunnerFailureRecord::TYPE,
"idunn.runner_failure.v2",
&future,
1,
)?;
let outcome = exchange_behind_private_lock(path, &[], &[envelope])?;
ensure!(
matches!(outcome, TryCompareExchangeSnapshotOutcome::Exchanged),
"the future store was not written"
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn a_corrupt_store_is_set_aside_and_the_next_failure_keeps_its_evidence() -> Result<()> {
let temp = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let path = runner_evidence_store_path(&temp.path().join("control.cc"));
let damage = b"\xc1 not a store \x00 damage";
std::fs::write(&path, damage)?;
let kept = record(&path, &record_at("tx-a", 5))?;
assert_eq!(kept, Kept::SetAside { replaced: None });
// Kept, not deleted: the damage is where the journal says, root-only.
let aside = unreadable_store_path(&path);
assert_eq!(std::fs::read(&aside)?, damage);
assert_eq!(std::fs::metadata(&aside)?.permissions().mode() & 0o777, 0o600);
// The failure's evidence is in a fresh, private store.
assert_eq!(
for_transaction(&path, "tx-a")?.map(|stored| stored.transaction_id),
Some("tx-a".to_owned())
);
assert_eq!(std::fs::metadata(&path)?.permissions().mode() & 0o777, 0o600);
// A healthy store is not set aside again.
assert_eq!(record(&path, &record_at("tx-b", 6))?, Kept::Stored);
assert_eq!(std::fs::read(&aside)?, damage);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn a_future_version_store_is_set_aside_and_the_next_failure_keeps_its_evidence() -> Result<()> {
let temp = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let path = runner_evidence_store_path(&temp.path().join("control.cc"));
write_future_store(&path)?;
let before = std::fs::read(&path)?;
assert!(for_transaction(&path, "tx-future").is_err());
assert_eq!(
record(&path, &record_at("tx-a", 5))?,
Kept::SetAside { replaced: None }
);
assert_eq!(std::fs::read(unreadable_store_path(&path))?, before);
assert!(for_transaction(&path, "tx-a")?.is_some());
assert_eq!(for_transaction(&path, "tx-future")?, None);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn at_most_one_unreadable_store_is_kept() -> Result<()> {
let temp = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let path = runner_evidence_store_path(&temp.path().join("control.cc"));
let damages: [&[u8]; 3] = [b"\xc1 first", b"\xc1 second", b"\xc1 third"];
for (index, damage) in damages.into_iter().enumerate() {
std::fs::write(&path, damage)?;
record(&path, &record_at(&format!("tx-{index}"), 5 + index as u64))?;
assert_eq!(
std::fs::read(unreadable_store_path(&path))?,
damage,
"the newest damage is the one kept"
);
}
assert_eq!(
files_beside(&path)?,
vec![
"runner-evidence.cc".to_owned(),
"runner-evidence.unreadable.cc".to_owned()
]
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn a_store_that_cannot_be_read_is_left_in_place_and_the_write_fails() -> Result<()> {
let temp = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let path = runner_evidence_store_path(&temp.path().join("control.cc"));
// A directory where the store should be: unreadable, not undecodable.
std::fs::create_dir(&path)?;
assert!(record(&path, &record_at("tx-a", 1)).is_err());
assert!(path.is_dir());
assert!(!unreadable_store_path(&path).exists());
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn every_code_point_but_printable_ascii_is_a_visible_escape() {
// The allowlist, exhaustively: no class list decides anything.
for code in 0..=0x10ffffu32 {
let Some(character) = char::from_u32(code) else {
continue;
};
let text = character.to_string();
let shown = escape(text.as_bytes());
if matches!(character, ' '..='~' | '\t') {
assert_eq!(shown, text, "U+{code:04X} should pass");
} else {
assert_eq!(shown, format!("\\u{{{code:x}}}"), "U+{code:04X}");
}
}
// Invalid UTF-8 is escaped byte by byte; valid text round it passes.
assert_eq!(escape(b"a\xc1\xffb\xe2\x82"), "a\\xc1\\xffb\\xe2\\x82");
assert_eq!(escape(b"ok \xe2\x82\xac"), "ok \\u{20ac}");
}
#[test]
fn a_newline_inside_a_line_cannot_forge_a_line() {
let mut stored = record_at("tx-a", 1);
stored.subject_id = "build\n status exit status 0".into();
let lines = shown_lines(&stored);
assert_eq!(lines[0], " failed step build\\u{a} status exit status 0");
assert_eq!(
lines.iter().filter(|line| line.starts_with(" status ")).count(),
1
);
}
/// A store whose first record is well-formed except that its subject kind
/// holds `marker`: the decode error quotes it.
fn store_with_hostile_subject_kind(path: &Path, marker: &[u8; 4]) -> Result<()> {
record(path, &record_at("tx-a", 1))?;
let mut bytes = std::fs::read(path)?;
let at = bytes
.windows(4)
.position(|window| window == b"step")
.context("no step marker")?;
bytes[at..at + 4].copy_from_slice(marker);
std::fs::write(path, bytes)?;
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn the_unreadable_store_line_is_escaped_with_the_rest() -> Result<()> {
let temp = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let path = runner_evidence_store_path(&temp.path().join("control.cc"));
store_with_hostile_subject_kind(&path, b"\x1b[2J")?;
let mut written = Vec::new();
show_status(&mut written, &path, "tx-a")?;
assert!(!written.contains(&0x1b), "an escape byte reached the terminal");
assert!(written.iter().all(|byte| matches!(byte, b' '..=b'~' | b'\t' | b'\n')));
let text = String::from_utf8(written)?;
assert!(text.starts_with(" runner evidence unreadable: "), "{text}");
assert!(text.contains("\\u{1b}[2J"), "the quoted value was not shown escaped: {text}");
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn a_failed_set_aside_names_itself_keeps_the_store_and_echoes_nothing() -> Result<()> {
let temp = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let path = runner_evidence_store_path(&temp.path().join("control.cc"));
store_with_hostile_subject_kind(&path, b"CNRY")?;
let damage = std::fs::read(&path)?;
// Sanity: this damage decodes to an error that quotes the canary.
assert!(format!("{:#}", snapshot(&path).unwrap_err()).contains("CNRY"));
// A non-empty directory where the aside goes: rename fails even as root.
let aside = unreadable_store_path(&path);
std::fs::create_dir(&aside)?;
std::fs::write(aside.join("occupied"), b"x")?;
let error = record(&path, &record_at("tx-b", 2)).unwrap_err();
for text in [format!("{error:#}"), format!("{error:?}")] {
assert!(text.contains("could not be set aside"), "{text}");
assert!(!text.contains("CNRY"), "stored content reached the error: {text}");
}
// The failure cost nothing: the store is as it was, with no evidence
// written over it.
assert_eq!(std::fs::read(&path)?, damage);
assert!(aside.join("occupied").exists());
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn an_io_error_leaves_the_store_in_place_and_keeps_no_evidence() -> Result<()> {
let temp = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let path = runner_evidence_store_path(&temp.path().join("control.cc"));
record(&path, &record_at("tx-a", 1))?;
let before = std::fs::read(&path)?;
let denied = || std::io::Error::from(std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied);
// The first read fails on a healthy store.
let error = record_reading(&path, &record_at("tx-b", 2), &|_| Err(denied())).unwrap_err();
assert!(format!("{error:#}").contains("permission denied"), "{error:#}");
assert_eq!(std::fs::read(&path)?, before, "the store changed");
assert!(!unreadable_store_path(&path).exists());
assert!(for_transaction(&path, "tx-b")?.is_none());
// The second read, the one that confirms the bytes do not decode, fails.
std::fs::write(&path, b"\xc1 not a store")?;
let calls = std::cell::Cell::new(0usize);
let read = |path: &Path| {
calls.set(calls.get() + 1);
if calls.get() == 2 {
return Err(denied());
}
std::fs::read(path)
};
let error = record_reading(&path, &record_at("tx-b", 2), &read).unwrap_err();
assert!(format!("{error:#}").contains("permission denied"), "{error:#}");
assert_eq!(std::fs::read(&path)?, b"\xc1 not a store");
assert!(!unreadable_store_path(&path).exists());
// Bytes that changed between the reads are no verdict either.
let calls = std::cell::Cell::new(0usize);
let read = |path: &Path| -> std::io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
calls.set(calls.get() + 1);
let mut bytes = std::fs::read(path)?;
bytes.push(calls.get() as u8);
Ok(bytes)
};
assert!(record_reading(&path, &record_at("tx-b", 2), &read).is_err());
assert_eq!(std::fs::read(&path)?, b"\xc1 not a store");
assert!(!unreadable_store_path(&path).exists());
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn a_second_set_aside_says_it_replaced_the_first() -> Result<()> {
let temp = tempfile::tempdir()?;
let path = runner_evidence_store_path(&temp.path().join("control.cc"));
std::fs::write(&path, b"\xc1 first")?;
assert_eq!(
record(&path, &record_at("tx-a", 1))?,
Kept::SetAside { replaced: None }
);
std::fs::write(&path, b"\xc1 second")?;
let Kept::SetAside { replaced: Some(_) } = record(&path, &record_at("tx-b", 2))? else {
bail!("a displaced set-aside store went unreported");
};
assert_eq!(std::fs::read(unreadable_store_path(&path))?, b"\xc1 second");
Ok(())
}
}

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load diff

View file

@ -10,19 +10,3 @@ It is checked in because the TypeScript runtime emits a camelCase MessagePack
map while Rust `DatabaseEntry` derives tuple payloads. Idunn must prove it can
decode the producer's real wire shape rather than round-tripping a fixture it
serialized itself.
# systemd 257 `systemctl show` captures
`systemd-257/*.show` are the verbatim output of systemd 257.13 for the 27
properties `show_unit` requested at `112a7a5`, captured read-only on Yggdrasil
on 2026-10-24: `vili-presence-identity-only.show` (a failed idunn-vili unit whose
only credential is the presence identity) and
`odin-presence-and-one-service-credential.show` (the live Odin unit). systemd 257
prints `LoadCredential=[unprintable]` in both. Tests read these bytes; do not edit.
# Pre-cut systemd observation records
`pre-cut-systemd-observation.{compact,named}.hex` are the two MessagePack
encodings of a `SystemdWorkloadObservation` with `load_credential` set to
`[unprintable]`, produced by the code at `112a7a5` (the form live incumbents
persisted). They pin that later Idunns still decode such records.

View file

@ -1 +0,0 @@
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@ -1 +0,0 @@
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@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
Type=exec
Restart=no
MainPID=2571
OpenFile=/run/idunn/activation-credentials/sha256-7cfe5cd1e87839e029c7425eb1b586b6b0d94dd79d7376eed3b156386f2c7af8.credential:gamecult-idunn-runtime-activation-key:read-only
OpenFile=/etc/gamecult/odin/runtime-presence-identity.cc:gamecult-runtime-presence-identity:read-only
ExecMainStartTimestampMonotonic=20630000
ControlGroup=/system.slice/idunn-odin-7cfe5cd1e87839e029c7425eb1b586b6b0d94dd79d7376eed3b156386f2c7af8.service
UMask=0007
WorkingDirectory=/srv/odin/releases/sha256-e5c7d0b2b9c0a8ffba368aeb08abdbe37ae0d17484a785e60a66ec4a62b2f18c
CapabilityBoundingSet=
AmbientCapabilities=
User=_duc23369f1b8b167db
Group=odin
DynamicUser=yes
LoadCredential=[unprintable]
SupplementaryGroups=
InaccessiblePaths=/run/idunn/activation-credentials
PrivateMounts=yes
PrivatePIDs=yes
NoNewPrivileges=yes
ProtectProc=invisible
ProcSubset=all
KillMode=mixed
Description=Idunn odin sha256-7cfe5cd1e87839e029c7425eb1b586b6b0d94dd79d7376eed3b156386f2c7af8
LoadState=loaded
ActiveState=active
SubState=running
InvocationID=ada48921043449f39dacc87b14a1bf70

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@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
Type=exec
Restart=no
MainPID=0
OpenFile=/run/idunn/activation-credentials/sha256-b507e1705a70f8eee72f355e7db637acab8eb37880b5d25245fda68d80f63041.credential:gamecult-idunn-runtime-activation-key:read-only
OpenFile=/etc/gamecult/vili/runtime-presence-identity.cc:gamecult-runtime-presence-identity:read-only
ExecMainStartTimestampMonotonic=520083420000
ControlGroup=
UMask=0007
WorkingDirectory=/srv/vili-idunn/releases/sha256-aeaee4e1669742572c45a3f26bc86893c44b2a4149520975eb7d8a28aa931906
CapabilityBoundingSet=
AmbientCapabilities=
User=_du8c06c563aac6d205
Group=vili-state
DynamicUser=yes
LoadCredential=[unprintable]
SupplementaryGroups=
InaccessiblePaths=/run/idunn/activation-credentials
PrivateMounts=yes
PrivatePIDs=yes
NoNewPrivileges=yes
ProtectProc=invisible
ProcSubset=all
KillMode=mixed
Description=Idunn vili sha256-b507e1705a70f8eee72f355e7db637acab8eb37880b5d25245fda68d80f63041
LoadState=loaded
ActiveState=failed
SubState=failed
InvocationID=8f7a349f2f8f49fe87ac5d89239260b4