A target whose tests enrol a service identity could not be built at all.
CultLib's Linux protector binds the seed to /etc/machine-id, the build image
carries none, and the runner is --read-only, so Odin's suite failed every
step with "Linux machine-id is unavailable".
Mounting the host's machine-id would let a build container protect a seed
that unwraps on the host, which is exactly the property the binding exists to
deny. So each frozen workspace now gets its own identity, derived from the
workspace path and mounted read-only: stable for the life of a build, and
useless anywhere else including this host.
Also moves Idunn's topology store to /var/lib/gamecult/idunn-projection. It
is Idunn's published surface -- every managed target must read it to verify
its own Expected incarnation -- and it was sitting inside Idunn's private
0750 root where no workload could traverse to it. Odin's own daemon already
named that directory in its tests.
Odin's three roots become writable for the same reason Heimdall's are: a
target Idunn cannot write is a target it cannot deploy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ProtectSystem=full makes /etc read-only, so Idunn could not create Heimdall's
runtime bundle under /etc/gamecult/heimdall/runtime. A target whose roots are
not in ReadWritePaths is a target Idunn cannot deploy. Every migration adds
exactly three paths -- runtime root, state root, release root -- which keeps
the write set enumerated and is the honest blast radius of running as root.
Also records the per-target preprovisioning Idunn requires rather than
creates, each discovered by a failed deployment: the state root must be
root:<state_group> mode 2770 so the workload's dynamic user inherits group
access through setgid; the runner cache must be 0700 owned by the runner's
container uid, not the source identity, with a root-owned parent (/srv/build
is idunn:idunn and fails); the frozen source stage must be root-owned,
because source is frozen as idunn and then copied into a root-owned
actuation stage; and the binding's docker network must exist.
None of these are Idunn being fussy. Each is a check that a binding cannot
widen access by naming a path someone else can write.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Shared prerequisite for every routed target, done on yggdrasil. Debian
ships ngx_stream_module as a separate dynamic package and it was absent:
nginx -V showed --with-stream=dynamic with no .so. Installed
libnginx-mod-stream at 1.26.3-3+deb13u7, matching the running nginx
exactly so nothing else moved, added a top-level stream block including
/etc/nginx/idunn-stream-routes/*.conf, and created that directory
root:idunn 0775. nginx -t passed before the reload; gamecult.org and
heimdall.gamecult.org/healthz both returned 200 after it. Backup at
/root/nginx.conf.bak-20260906-stream.
Worth recording how the module check nearly went wrong: the first
`nginx -V` ran without sudo, hit "command not found" because the binary is
not on the unprivileged PATH, and reported NO STREAM MODULE. That is the
estate's own trap -- a failed read presented as a negative result -- caught
only because the answer looked too convenient.
The larger correction: the unit I wrote yesterday ran User=idunn, and this
generation cannot work that way. There is no sudo anywhere in Idunn's
source; it calls systemctl, systemd-run, nginx and docker directly, so a
confined user actuates nothing. deployment-authority.md states the intended
model plainly -- freeze source as idunn, copy into a root-owned actuation
stage, the privileged driver never opens Git -- and --source-uid/--source-gid
are validated as non-zero, which only makes sense for a privileged daemon
dropping down for source work.
So the unit now runs as root with --source-uid 986 --source-gid 978, keeps
ProtectSystem=full and re-opens each actuated path individually, and adds
RuntimeDirectory=idunn for the route driver's preflight staging. The
comment block explains the tradeoff rather than leaving the next reader to
infer it: privilege separation is internal, and what makes it tolerable is
that Idunn accepts no imperative input.
That is a genuine increase in blast radius over a confined process, and
migration.md says so instead of selling it. The counter-argument is that
the old shape was confined in name only -- a sandboxed process whose sudo
grant pointed at an unaudited root shell with eleven hardcoded targets.
systemd-analyze verify passes on the rewritten unit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Gjallar had a brief useful life on Nightwing's framebuffer, broke, and was
never fixed. Its Yggdrasil incarnation ran --headless --refresh-hz 2 for
eleven days: a compositor with no display recomposing twice a second, 55
minutes of CPU and 125M resident producing frames nothing rendered. The
only reference to gjallar.overview in the estate is one Odin test file.
Stopped and disabled; 420M under /srv/gjallar is reclaimable.
Removed the codex-connector and gjallar sudo grants from the host and
synced deploy/legacy/idunn-yggdrasil.sudoers to match. Four grants gone,
verified by diffing the grant set against a backup, nothing else changed.
That diff caught a defect I introduced: removing the last entry of a
Cmnd_Alias leaves a dangling continuation, and my repair silently dropped
the wildcard from `deploy streampixels`, which would have failed every
streampixels deployment. The procedure now says validate with visudo -c -f
before installing and diff the grant set afterwards.
The larger finding: the installed generation CANNOT express that a target
is retired. Its target list is compiled in, it offers restart and redeploy
and no way to drop a daemon from supervision, and its only brake is the
deployment brake -- which doctrine forbids using for this, since a
deployment brake must not suspend continuity. Stopping codex-connector
therefore produced eighty "decision: restart" lines in ten minutes against
a service we had just retired. Suspending continuity for one target is
precisely the current generation's lifecycle brake. The estate found the
argument for its own migration by trying to throw something away.
Gjallar was handled correctly by contrast: its failure classified as
dependency-unavailable, so Idunn raised an alarm instead of resurrecting
it. The old generation can tell failures it owns from failures it does
not; it cannot tell a broken target from a finished one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The README and unit file I wrote at extraction documented the previous
generation's CLI. Running the deployed ExecStart against a build of this
repository returns `unknown Idunn command "--swarm-profile"`: commit 330e4cd
rebuilt Idunn around typed authority ports and a test now asserts that
--deploy-command, --restart-command and --swarm-profile are rejected. Anyone
following the README would have installed a unit that crashloops on exec
every 5 seconds under Restart=always.
Corrected against the binary, not against the old docs:
- deploy/idunn-yggdrasil.service now invokes `idunn serve` with the real
flags. systemd-analyze verify passes on yggdrasil. /var/lib/gamecult/odin
moved from ReadWritePaths to ReadOnlyPaths -- Idunn only reads Odin's
topology correlation (pull_all_read_only_snapshot, absent store yields
None), and it gates deployment promotion only: continuity never consults
it, per stale_odin_provider_receipt_cannot_gate_continuity_restart.
- README documents the three declarative commands, and adds a section on the
recipe/binding split, which is the security model: capability lives in the
target's repo, privilege lives in the host binding, and a binding that
omits an affordance the recipe derives fails admit().
- Corrected two inherited claims. The distinct-brake check is per-binding
validation ("deployment and lifecycle brakes are identical"), not a
startup check. And the "inputs: nothing else" claim was false -- the Odin
correlation read is a real, deliberate exception and now says so.
The legacy actuator moves to deploy/legacy/ rather than being deleted: it is
what is installed and running, so it is the before-side of the migration.
Its README maps each shell mechanism to the contract that replaced it, and
preserves the eleven-target inventory read out of deployment_target_policy().
Seven of the eleven are pinned to a codex/ branch rather than main.
docs/guide.md is marked as the previous generation rather than silently
carrying dead commands, and docs/migration.md is new: per-target order,
what to fix before carrying a ref forward, and why the authority cuts over
last. Also fixes a broken cross-link in authority-map.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings across everything an operator needs to run Idunn without reference to
Odin. deploy/ carries the worked systemd installation -- unit, operator
wrapper, and the narrow sudoers grant. docs/ carries the four documents that
were scattered across Odin's tree.
The README is new and is the public entry point the repo lacked: what Idunn
decides, how to build and run it, the authority model in the form doctrine
asks for, how to install it as a service, and where the deeper documents are.
Two corrections made while moving:
Requires=docker.service becomes Wants=. Deployment runners use Docker;
continuity actuation does not. A hard requirement lets a Docker outage stop
Idunn itself and take daemon survival down with it, which is precisely the
invariant Idunn exists to hold. This is live on yggdrasil today and should be
changed there too.
The guide still told operators to run from E:\Projects\Odin -- a drive that no
longer exists -- via npm wrappers that belonged to Odin. Paths generalised,
commands moved to direct cargo invocations, and a note added that the document
predates the extraction.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
