diff --git a/docs/verify-transaction-cut.md b/docs/verify-transaction-cut.md index 9e39b2f..0d3db31 100644 --- a/docs/verify-transaction-cut.md +++ b/docs/verify-transaction-cut.md @@ -1245,3 +1245,117 @@ deleted with the workspace. Nothing is compiled on Starfire in any cut. - **Gap, honestly reported: `resolve()`'s own fsck flag has no test.** Reaching the real `resolve()` needs a validated binding, which needs an HTTPS origin. Rewriting the origin with `insteadOf` fails `ensure_checkout`'s own origin-equality check first, so the shortcut cannot work. **Soul has a working smart-HTTPS rig from its first pass; that is where this closes.** - A note on the fsck fixtures: some hostile objects are refused by the git server's own `pack-objects` before any Idunn code runs, so they cannot serve as already-local fixtures. The test asserts that at least one fixture reaches the explicit fsck, so it cannot pass vacuously. - **Soul's fifth pass dispatched**, including a judgement on the batch's size. + +## Soul pass 5 on Cut 1's fourth fix batch, 2026-09-22 + +Range `f540d50..9475dfa`, all runs on Yggdrasil (`eureka-verify-rust:471272061cc0`, +4 CPUs / 12 GiB). Baseline at `9475dfa`: 168 passed, 0 failed, 2 ignored. + +**Verdict: Cut 1 closes on mechanism.** Soul could not falsify any claim the +batch made. The resolver rewrite is correct on every shape it could build, +memoisation is sound and pinned, the fsck path holds against a real +smart-HTTPS origin, and the digests are unchanged across five real targets +with 1,975 entries hash-compared against `ls-tree` and zero mismatches. What +survives is a bill, not a blocker. + +- **S5-1, medium. S4-1 is half fixed, and the line that costs the time is + dead.** `drivers.rs:6039-6042` calls `canonicalize()` per path component. + The budget charges distinct symlinks read and never charges components + walked, so one link with k real components costs roughly O(k^3): 7.35 ms at + k=50, 255 ms at k=200, **14.92 s at k=800**, extrapolating to about four + minutes at the `PATH_MAX` ceiling. Through the production walk, depth 400 x + 40 links took **78.6 s**. `frame.resolved` is already canonical there, so + the call cannot change the answer: replacing the four lines with + `stack[top].resolved = candidate;` leaves 168/168 green. **This restores + S4-1's own failure scenario at a lower exponent** - a push adding 40 + symlinks with long targets wedges the scheduler thread, twice. +- **S5-2, medium. The traversal budget is the resolver's only termination + guarantee and nothing tests it.** `MAX_LINK_TRAVERSALS` to `u32::MAX` leaves + 168/168 green. `cargo mutants --in-diff` found 16 mutants, 11 caught, 3 + unviable, **2 missed, both on `:5963`**, each making the budget never + decrease. Cycles are refused *only* by the budget - memoisation cannot help, + because in-progress frames are never inserted. One character turns a + two-link cycle in a bound repository into an unbounded loop on the scheduler + thread. +- **S5-3, low-medium. The digest is blind to symlink targets.** Deleting the + target from the hash at `:6205` leaves 168/168 green. Since `observe_frozen` + compares `frozen_source_sha256` against the receipt, repointing every + symlink in a frozen tree to another in-root path passes both containment and + the digest. S4-2's test has one regular file and no symlink. +- **S5-4, low. The digest is blind to the executable bit.** Deleting the + `0o111` term leaves 168/168 green, and `validate_frozen_source` accepts both + `0444` and `0555`, so a frozen file can be made executable undetected. +- **S5-5, low. S4-6 landed with no test, and the batch note called it + landed.** Both `ensure!`s replaced with `true` leave 168/168 green. The + mechanism does hold - a 64 MiB blob at mode `120000` is refused with VmHWM + unchanged - but the threshold is off by one: 4095 bytes is admitted by the + guard, written, then refused downstream. +- **S5-6, low-medium. A legitimate target through more than 39 symlinked + components is now refused**, where `f540d50` accepted it. The old recursion + charged each sibling depth 1, so the ceiling never fired for that shape. + Fail-closed, undeclared, and the error names no link. +- **S5-7, low. `resolve()` is still unpinned and has no test at all.** Soul + settled the mechanism on a real rig - self-signed CA, `git-http-backend` + behind TLS, a validated binding, a clean `--filter=blob:none` clone, then + `main` moved onto a hostile commit. As shipped: clean admitted, duplicate + trees refused, `.GIT` refused. With the flag deleted: both admitted. **The + gap is a test gap, not a mechanism gap.** +- **S5-8, informational. Four containment checks where one suffices**, each + surviving deletion alone because the loop tail covers all three arms; only + `:6021-6024` earns its place. `FrozenSymlinkFrame::symlink_path` is an + `Option` only ever constructed as `Some`, and its doc comment says the + opposite. +- **S5-9. 940 lines, about 400 nameable as deletion.** The 189-line + `resolve_style_fetch_then_freeze_exact_refuses_hostile_trees` asserts + nothing today: its only assertion sits in an `Ok(_)` arm that pass 4 showed + is never taken, and a newer test runs the same seven fixtures plus four more + through a harder unguarded fetch. About 190 further lines are boilerplate + six module-level helpers would collapse. + +**Promises that held, with numbers.** S4-1's headline (n=20 chain 43,700 ms to +instant, and it freezes); S4-2's zero-buffer and first-chunk-only mutants both +killed; all three of S4-3's guards killed by isolating tests; S4-4's explicit +fsck and its own fetch flag killed. Memoisation is sound: making the memo +never hit kills the n=20 test, and no stale answer was found by probe or by +reading. Seven of the eight earlier link shapes reproduce identically. The +budget is per call and that is fine: 31,200 symlinks validate in 8.65 s, +linear at about 11 ms per link. + +**FU-Heimdall-Gitlink has cleared upstream.** Heimdall froze end to end: +`e0618f7f`, 10.07 s, 945 entries, 0 mismatches; `vendor/CultLib @ b6b1d9c6` +serves again. No Idunn change caused the break or the fix. **The ops follow-up +closes.** + +### Self's rulings for the fifth fix batch, 2026-09-22 + +- **R-I1 (S5-1). Delete `drivers.rs:6039-6042`.** Soul proved the call cannot + change the answer and that deleting it leaves the suite green. This is not + an optimisation, it is removing dead code that costs cubic time. **Then pin + the cost**: a test that freezes a link with a long component chain and fails + if it is not linear-ish, so the term cannot come back unnoticed. +- **R-I2 (S5-2). The budget gets the two fixtures Soul specified**: a + two-link cycle that must refuse, and 41 distinct links that must refuse. + Both must die under their own mutation - a budget that never decreases must + turn them red. cargo-mutants missed both mutants on that line, which is + exactly why a hand check belongs here. +- **R-I3 (S5-3, S5-4). The digest covers everything a tamper could change**: + symlink targets and the executable bit, each with a test that fails when its + term is removed. A digest that is the tamper check must not be blind to a + field the validator permits to vary. +- **R-I4 (S5-5). S4-6 gets its test, and the off-by-one is fixed** so the + guard refuses exactly what the kernel refuses. The batch note is corrected: + "landed" must not mean "landed unpinned". +- **R-I5 (S5-6). Keep the 40-traversal ceiling** - it matches the kernel's own + `ELOOP` limit, and a fail-closed refusal at that boundary is the right + behaviour. **But declare it**: the limit is documented, and the error names + the link and the count it reached. My earlier ruling said "keep S6's + behaviour exactly"; this is a deliberate, narrow departure from it, recorded + as such rather than left as drift. +- **R-I6 (S5-7). Commit the rig.** It buys the only coverage `resolve()` has + and runs in 1.5 s. It **skips** rather than fails when `openssl` or + `git-http-backend` is missing, since neither is guaranteed on a workstation. +- **R-I7 (S5-8, S5-9). Take the deletion.** The three redundant containment + checks, the dead `Option` and its wrong comment, the 189-line test that + asserts nothing, and the boilerplate the six helpers collapse. **Delete the + dead test rather than repairing it** - a newer test already covers its + fixtures through a harder path.