Boot test: fail on a logged publication fault, and require presence at startup

A silent early return in the startup publication would otherwise pass, the 10 s
pulse loop filling in the frames later.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

README.md

@@ -12,6 +12,19 @@ The point is painfully simple:
   become "everything phones home for every request"
 - keep app-domain data separate so "shared auth" does not become "shared swamp"
 
+## Front Door
+
+- **Value:** one shared auth authority: provider OAuth (Discord, Patreon, GitHub, Twitch, YouTube, Spotify), linked identities, grants, entitlements and session issuance, with Ed25519-signed claims that app backends verify locally.
+- **Problem:** every GameCult app was rebuilding Discord/Patreon login glue. Heimdall centralizes identity authority and keeps app-domain data in the apps.
+- **Entry points:**
+  - `src/index.ts` and `src/app.ts`: the Fastify service. `src/signing.ts` and `src/claims.ts` issue JWTs and serve `/.well-known/jwks.json`; `src/oauth.ts` and `src/providers.ts` own provider flows.
+  - `src/verifier.ts`: the local verifier helper an app backend imports to validate Heimdall JWTs without phoning home.
+  - `src/odin-publication.ts` and `plugins/gamecult.heimdall.access`: the redacted Odin/Eve provider advertisement and the `gamecult.heimdall.access` plugin (`docs/eve-access-plugin.md`).
+  - `docs/architecture.md`, `docs/service-contract.md`, `docs/verse-service-contract.md`, `docs/app-profiles/`: the contracts.
+  - `pnpm install`, `pnpm dev`, `pnpm test` (see Dev Commands).
+- **Live:** a stateful first slice: signing and JWKS, OAuth state for six providers, in-memory and Postgres stores, a real Discord callback path for the Repixelizer flow, sealed provider tokens, the loopback CultNet operation boundary, Idunn health publication, and the deployed Ghostlight Eve host consuming the discovered boundary.
+- **Planned:** the two-account and eight-account Ghostlight human canaries, refresh and revocation flows, admin surfaces, and broader inspection projections beyond the redacted access boundary.
+
 ## Current Shape
 
 This repo now has a stateful first slice instead of a decorative skeleton.

deployment/idunn/recipe.toml

@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ optional_environment = [
   "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_DISCORD_CLIENT_ID",
   "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_DISCORD_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE",
   "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE",
+  "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_JOYSTICK_CLIENT_ID",
+  "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_JOYSTICK_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE",
   "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_PATREON_CLIENT_ID",
   "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_PATREON_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE",
   "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_SPOTIFY_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE",

docs/app-profiles/spotiverse.md

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 > still reports `providers=2/6`, which counts it.
 >
 > **Why it was removed anyway:** `/v1/oauth/spotify/start` is gated by
-> `supportsProvider(profile, provider)`, so a provider with no app behind it is
+> `admitsProviderForMode(profile, provider, mode)`, so a provider with no app behind it is
 > unreachable. While the profile existed, that path was publicly reachable and
 > would have run a real OAuth handshake against a real client secret, taking
 > custody of a user's Spotify refresh token on behalf of a consumer that could

docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md

@@ -20,7 +20,11 @@ Corroborated by `gamecult-ops/nginx/streampixels.gamecult.org.conf:14`
 The current StreamPixels architecture already makes useful splits:
 
 - the web app owns the remembered viewer session
-- the service owns provider OAuth exchange and identity resolution
+- Heimdall owns provider OAuth exchange, identity resolution and refresh-token
+  custody for Twitch, YouTube and Joystick; StreamPixels never calls a provider
+  token endpoint and holds no provider refresh token. It asks Heimdall for a
+  short-lived access token (`managed-credentials/resolve`) and treats `410
+  managed_credential_revoked` as "the creator must reconnect"
 - the overlay remains auth-free
 - creator memberships and operator roles are separate from general viewer state
 
@@ -38,7 +42,7 @@ In the service-first Heimdall version, the most likely reusable slice is:
 
 - provider OAuth authority
 - identity-linking authority
-- managed Twitch/YouTube credential custody for creator connections
+- managed Twitch/YouTube/Joystick credential custody for creator connections (Joystick is a managed connection only, not a viewer sign-in provider: `startOAuthFlow` admits `sign_in` and `link` only for `identityProviders` and `connect` only for `managedConnectionProviders` or `identityProviders`, and refuses anything else before any redirect. The callback decides again from the signed state's mode: a `connect` for a managed-connection-only provider is admitted only with `connection.kind` `creator` and a `targetId`, refused otherwise at start and again at the callback before the code exchange; an admitted one stores the credential and mints a claim with no facts, no capabilities and no refresh token. Heimdall's claim is therefore never a viewer session. Heimdall cannot stop an app from minting its own viewer from a completion, so StreamPixels' redeem must treat a non-creator Joystick completion as an error, never as a sign-in. This is an S1 rule, recorded for SP)
 - entitlement refresh
 - shared claim semantics
 

docs/architecture.md

@@ -305,6 +305,159 @@ Important rule:
   connection is tied to a user or account rather than a purely app-local secret
 - app-specific binding semantics and runtime behavior still stay app-owned
 
+## Managed credential custody
+
+Source-grounded as of branch `eureka/joystick-h1` at 6db84bf (PR
+GameCult/Heimdall#1, unmerged). Nothing here is deployed.
+
+### One owner: `refreshManagedCredential`
+
+`src/managed-credential.ts` owns every decision to present a stored refresh
+token to a provider. The entitlement path (`refreshAppSession`), the Bifrost
+Patreon sync and `managed-credentials/resolve` all call it; none of them reads
+`tokenExpiresAt` or a provider token endpoint itself. The earlier
+`refreshLinkedIdentityCredentialIfNeeded` is deleted, and callers no longer
+write refreshed tokens through `upsertLinkedIdentity`: a refresh reaches the row
+only through the store port below. The only other writer of credential columns
+is the OAuth callback's grant write (`app.ts`, once).
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| Input | a `StoredLinkedIdentity` snapshot, the config, the token custody (AES-256-GCM seal), the provider runtimes, an injectable clock and timeout |
+| Output | `{kind: "current" or "revoked", identity}`, or a thrown `ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed` (carries the provider and nothing the provider said) |
+| Forbidden writers | any caller writing token columns or `token_expires_at` outside `updateLinkedIdentityCredential` and the callback's grant write; any caller computing "is a refresh due" |
+
+The snapshot is a hint. It may answer without a lock when the identity holds no
+access token (`revoked`) or no refresh is due (`current`; due means a known
+expiry within 5 minutes, a stored refresh token, and a runtime that refreshes).
+It never decides that a refresh happens.
+
+### Three nested guards
+
+1. **Single flight, per process.** `refreshesInFlight` is keyed by store, then
+   linked identity id. A caller arriving while an attempt is in flight joins it
+   and receives its outcome, success or failure, so nobody queues behind a
+   failed holder and re-presents the same token. The entry ends with the
+   attempt; a later request retries.
+2. **Store-port lock, across processes.**
+   `HeimdallStore.updateLinkedIdentityCredential(id, decide)` runs `decide`
+   against the row as read under the lock. `PostgresStore` takes
+   `SELECT ... FOR UPDATE` inside a transaction; `InMemoryStore` serialises per
+   id on a promise chain that deletes its entry only when it is still the tail.
+   `decide` re-checks `dueForRefresh` on the locked row, so a process that
+   waited finds the token already rotated and returns `keep`. The provider call
+   is aborted at 10 seconds (`MANAGED_CREDENTIAL_REFRESH_TIMEOUT_MS`), which
+   bounds how long any waiter holds a pooled connection.
+3. **Decision, not mutation.** `decide` returns a `CredentialDecision`: `keep`,
+   `revoke`, or `rotate` with the access token, refresh token and
+   `tokenExpiresAt` all required. The store applies it and returns the row. The
+   new pair is persisted before the access token is returned. A store that
+   keeps the old expiry on rotate is a type error, not a test.
+
+### Typed answers
+
+- **Revoked** (`410 managed_credential_revoked`, audit
+  `managed_credential_revoked {provider, reason}`, all three token columns
+  cleared). Two reasons only: `provider_revoked`, an HTTP 400 whose OAuth
+  `error` is exactly `invalid_grant`; and `rotation_missing`, a well-formed
+  refresh answer without a refresh token from a provider whose descriptor says
+  `rotatesRefreshTokens`. An identity with no access token is also `revoked`.
+  `404` means no linked identity exists. On the entitlement path a revoked
+  identity is skipped; on the Bifrost sync it is `404
+  patreon_identity_not_linked` with Bifrost uncalled.
+- **Refresh failed** (`502 managed_credential_refresh_failed`, tokens
+  untouched, retry allowed): invalid client, a 401 or 5xx whatever its body,
+  timeout, a 2xx without a string `access_token` or carrying `error`, a
+  `refresh_token` present but not a string, an empty or non-JSON body.
+  `ProviderResponseError.oauthError` is drawn only from the closed RFC 6749 code
+  set and is read only from a 400; no provider body reaches a message, stack or
+  audit payload.
+- An empty-string `refresh_token` counts as missing.
+
+### Provider descriptor and the one token request
+
+`providerCatalog` (`src/providers.ts`) is the only place a provider's token
+behaviour is written down. Fields beyond the authorize side:
+
+- `tokenEndpoint`: where both grants go.
+- `tokenEndpointAuthMethod`: `client_secret_basic` or `client_secret_post`
+  (RFC 7591 names); exactly one client-auth method per request.
+- `rotatesRefreshTokens`: true only for Joystick. Drives fail-closed on
+  refresh (`rotation_missing`) and a failed callback on exchange when the grant
+  carries no refresh token.
+- `defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds`: 3600 for all seven providers. Applied
+  when an answer has no usable `expires_in`; unusable means absent, non-numeric,
+  not a positive number or positive-integer string, or above 365 days. An
+  unknown expiry is therefore never stored, so every credential comes due.
+
+`requestProviderTokens(provider, config, grant)` in `src/oauth.ts` replaces the
+ten per-provider exchange and refresh functions. Authorization-code and refresh
+grants share it, it returns an `ExpiringTokenSet` (`expiresAt` required), and it
+rejects a malformed 2xx typed as `provider_body_not_token_set` on both grants.
+The per-provider runtimes keep only identity resolution.
+
+### Mode x role at the gates
+
+`src/app-profiles.ts` holds both questions, and the profile's role lists are
+their only input:
+
+- `admitsProviderForMode(profile, provider, mode)`, the start gate: `sign_in`
+  and `link` take `identityProviders` only; `connect` takes
+  `managedConnectionProviders` or `identityProviders` (Bifrost connects its
+  identity providers). `supportsProvider` is deleted.
+- `callbackMint(profile, provider, mode, connection)`, decided at the callback
+  from the signed state and asked again at start, so an unbound connect never
+  reaches a redirect:
+  - `viewer_session`: the provider is in `identityProviders`; a normal session
+    with the profile's capabilities.
+  - `custody_only`: a `connect` for a provider that is only a managed
+    connection (Joystick on StreamPixels) with `connection.kind = "creator"` and
+    a non-empty `targetId`.
+  - `refused`: everything else, before the code exchange.
+
+A custody-only completion stores the credential and issues a claim with no
+facts, no capabilities and no hybrid capabilities (`withoutCapabilities` in
+`src/claims.ts`, the one owner of a capability-free claim). The completion
+payload and the `backend_callback` handoff carry no `refreshToken` or
+`refresh`, because the refresh route recomputes facts from the account and would
+turn that session into a viewer session. A session row still exists, and
+`BackendHandoffSuccessPayload` types both fields optional for this reason. The
+consumer's redeem reads only account id, provider, mode, connection and claim
+identities, so the claim form is unchanged for it.
+
+### Verification layer
+
+The rules above are pinned by `tests/managed-credential.test.ts` on three rigs
+(memory, Postgres with one app, Postgres with two pools),
+`tests/provider-token-request.test.ts`, `tests/app.test.ts` (a matrix over all
+profiles x providers x modes, callback mint, handoff strip) and
+`tests/recipe-secrets.test.ts`. Evidence is the Yggdrasil `ygg-verify` run on
+Linux (node:24, postgres:16, `HEIMDALL_REQUIRE_LIVE_PG=1`; 600 passed, 8
+skipped, none a live-Postgres suite), hand and StrykerJS mutants over the diff,
+and Soul's pass 4 verdict `joystick:verdict:cut-h1.s4`. The deploy path's own
+builder was not used.
+
+### Open follow-ups
+
+- `joystick:follow_up:cross-process-failed-refresh-marker`: single flight is per
+  process, so N Heimdall processes can present one token N times after a
+  transient failure. Needs a failed-attempt marker on the row, read under the
+  lock. Must land before or with Idunn onboarding.
+- `joystick:follow_up:connect-start-needs-app-auth`: connect starts are
+  unauthenticated, so anyone can name `{creator, targetId}`; the callback
+  re-check proves a binding exists, not that the caller owns it. It also owns
+  the whitespace-only `targetId` that passes both gates and the callback's
+  fail-open `''` fallback for a vanished profile (finding
+  `joystick:finding:cut-h1.s4.whitespace-targetid-passes-custody-gate`). Must
+  land before the public Joystick bot or a second creator.
+- `joystick:follow_up:heimdall-idunn-onboarding` (gamecult-ops): live Heimdall
+  is a hand-copied release under `heimdall.service`, not an Idunn-admitted
+  generation; the recipe's Joystick lines are declared but unproven by a
+  deploy.
+- `joystick:follow_up:joystick-viewer-signin-public-bot`: Joystick stays out of
+  StreamPixels `identityProviders` until the public bot is registered; viewer
+  sign-in must not rewrite a creator's credential row.
+
 ## Policy model
 
 The shared authority should not hard-code one app's access rules. It should
@@ -514,24 +667,17 @@ each provider**. That URL cannot move on deploy.
 
 ### Finding: the `spotify` provider outlived its consumer
 
-`spotiverse` is the only profile naming `spotify`, and Spotiverse was lost with
-the `E:` drive — it was a small daemon exposing the Spotify API to agents, and
-it no longer exists in the swarm.
+`spotiverse` was the only profile naming `spotify`, and Spotiverse was lost with
+the `E:` drive. The profile has since been removed from the registry
+(`docs/app-profiles/spotiverse.md` is the restore spec), and
+`admitsProviderForMode` refuses a provider no profile lists, so
+`/v1/oauth/spotify/start` no longer reaches a handshake.
 
-What survives it: `GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_SPOTIFY_CLIENT_ID` and
-`GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_SPOTIFY_CLIENT_SECRET` are configured in
-`/srv/heimdall/env/service.env`, the profile is advertised in the public
-discovery document, and `/v1/oauth/spotify/start` is reachable from the open
-web. That path would run a real OAuth handshake against a real client secret and
-take custody of a user's Spotify refresh token on behalf of a consumer that
-cannot use it.
-
-This is not an active compromise. It is a live credential and a token-custody
-code path kept alive for nothing, which is exactly the shape that becomes an
-incident later. Retire the profile and the provider config together, or record
-why Spotiverse is expected back. Retiring is a change to `src/app-profiles.ts`
-and the provider catalog and should be decided on its own, not folded into the
-boundary change.
+What survives: the `spotify` catalog entry and runtime, and, wherever an
+operator env still holds them, `GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_SPOTIFY_CLIENT_ID` and
+`GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_SPOTIFY_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE`. A live credential kept for a
+consumer that does not exist is the shape that becomes an incident later.
+Retire the provider config, or record why Spotiverse is expected back.
 
 ## Deployment modes
 
@@ -588,14 +734,14 @@ Plain settings:
 - `GC_ACCESS_SIGNING_KEY_ID=...`
 - `GC_ACCESS_SESSION_TTL_SECONDS=3600`
 - `GC_ACCESS_STATE_TTL_SECONDS=600`
-- `GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_{DISCORD,PATREON,GITHUB,TWITCH,YOUTUBE,SPOTIFY}_CLIENT_ID=...`
+- `GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_{DISCORD,PATREON,GITHUB,TWITCH,YOUTUBE,SPOTIFY,JOYSTICK}_CLIENT_ID=...`
 - `GC_ACCESS_APP_{APP_SLUG}_BACKEND_CALLBACK_URLS=...`
 
 Secret files:
 
 - `GC_ACCESS_DATABASE_URL_FILE=/etc/gamecult/heimdall/credentials/GC_ACCESS_DATABASE_URL`
 - `GC_ACCESS_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY_BASE64_FILE=...`
-- `GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_{DISCORD,PATREON,GITHUB,TWITCH,YOUTUBE,SPOTIFY}_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE=...`
+- `GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_{DISCORD,PATREON,GITHUB,TWITCH,YOUTUBE,SPOTIFY,JOYSTICK}_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE=...`
 - `GC_ACCESS_APP_{APP_SLUG}_SHARED_SECRET_FILE=...`
 - `GC_ACCESS_BIFROST_PATRON_SUPPORT_SECRET_FILE=...`
 

docs/implementation-plan.md

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ What exists right now is:
   and managed creator connections
 - an app-authenticated managed-credential resolve endpoint so StreamPixels can
   call provider APIs without storing refresh tokens locally
-- managed Twitch/YouTube credentials refresh inside Heimdall before resolution
+- managed Twitch/YouTube/Joystick credentials refresh inside Heimdall before resolution
   when they are expired or near expiry
 - StreamPixels now starts viewer and creator Twitch/YouTube OAuth through
   Heimdall, redeems one-time completion codes server-side, and keeps local
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ Landed in the first pass:
 Still to do in this phase:
 
 - key rotation policy instead of just stable key loading
-- token custody retrieval/refresh surfaces beyond initial storage
+- token custody retrieval and refresh have landed (see `docs/architecture.md`, Managed credential custody); the open pieces are the follow-ups listed there
 
 ### Phase 2: Heimdall service skeleton
 

docs/service-contract.md

@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ Supported providers in the skeleton:
 - `twitch`
 - `youtube`
 - `spotify`
+- `joystick`
 
 Request body:
 
@@ -172,7 +173,7 @@ Failure modes:
 Launch note:
 
 - Discord and Patreon are the implemented provider runtimes for Repixelizer
-- Twitch and YouTube now have generic OAuth exchange and identity runtimes for
+- Twitch, YouTube and Joystick have generic OAuth exchange and identity runtimes for
   StreamPixels viewer auth and managed creator connections
 - GitHub is still catalogued for start URLs, but its callback runtime is not
   implemented yet
@@ -430,9 +431,11 @@ Important behavior:
 
 - the refresh token is signed by Heimdall and scoped to one app session
 - the access token remains short-lived; app backends still verify it locally
-- if a stored provider access token is expired or near expiry, Heimdall uses
-  the stored provider refresh token and persists any rotation before
-  evaluating entitlements
+- if a stored provider access token is expired or near expiry, Heimdall takes
+  a row lock on the linked identity, re-reads it, uses the stored provider
+  refresh token and persists any rotation before evaluating entitlements; an
+  identity whose grant the provider has revoked (no stored access token)
+  contributes no entitlement
 - any app authenticated via `x-heimdall-app-secret` (`resolveAppCaller`) may
   send `entitlementPolicies`; Heimdall matches each stored identity to the
   policy for that provider. Sending policy without authenticating is
@@ -484,7 +487,36 @@ Important behavior:
 - it returns access tokens only; refresh tokens remain in Heimdall custody
 - when a stored managed credential is expired or within the refresh window,
   Heimdall refreshes it before returning the access token and persists rotated
-  access/refresh tokens
+  access/refresh tokens. The refresh runs under a row lock on the linked
+  identity (`SELECT ... FOR UPDATE`), so a given refresh token is presented to
+  the provider once across concurrent requests and across two Heimdall
+  processes sharing one database. Within one process, concurrent refreshes of
+  one identity share a single attempt and its outcome (success or failure), so
+  nobody re-presents a token behind a failed holder in that burst. Residual
+  risk, tracked as follow-up `joystick:follow_up:cross-process-failed-refresh-marker`:
+  the guard is one presentation per process per burst, so N
+  Heimdall processes can present one token N times after a transient failure.
+  The provider call is bounded at 10 seconds
+- a provider whose refresh tokens rotate (Joystick) fails closed: a refresh
+  response without a new refresh token revokes the credential instead of
+  keeping the old token
+- `410 {"error":"managed_credential_revoked","provider":...}`: the provider
+  rejected the grant (HTTP 400 whose OAuth `error` is exactly `invalid_grant`),
+  or the identity holds no access token.
+  The stored tokens are cleared and an audit event `managed_credential_revoked`
+  is written; the owner must reconnect. `404 managed_credential_not_found`
+  means no linked identity exists
+- `502 {"error":"managed_credential_refresh_failed","provider":...}`: the
+  refresh failed for any reason that is not a grant verdict (invalid client,
+  a 401 or 5xx whatever its body says, timeout, a 2xx without a string
+  `access_token` or carrying an `error`, a `refresh_token` that is present but
+  not a string, an empty or non-JSON body). Stored tokens are untouched and a
+  later request may succeed. An empty-string `refresh_token` counts as missing,
+  so a rotating provider revokes (`rotation_missing`). A token answer without a
+  usable `expires_in` (absent, non-numeric, or not a positive number or
+  positive-integer string) stores the expiry as now plus the provider's default
+  access-token lifetime (3600 seconds), so an expiry is never unknown and the
+  credential always comes due for refresh
 - app-local binding, diagnostics, subscription setup, and runtime behavior stay
   app-owned
 

notes/fresh-workspace-handoff.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Fresh Workspace Handoff
 
-This is the re-entry packet for `E:\Projects\Heimdall`.
+This is the re-entry packet for this repo (path: whatever the checkout is; it has moved drives before).
 
 It is intentionally short. Historical proof belongs in git history and the
 distilled `state/evidence.jsonl` ledger; the shared architecture belongs in
@@ -12,8 +12,7 @@ distilled `state/evidence.jsonl` ledger; the shared architecture belongs in
 From the repo root:
 
 ```powershell
-# This repo has no dedicated venv yet. Use any working Python 3.11+.
-E:\Projects\repixelizer\.venv\Scripts\python.exe .\tools\heimdall_state.py status
+python .\tools\heimdall_state.py status
 Get-Content '.\state\map.yaml'
 Get-Content '.\notes\fresh-workspace-handoff.md'
 Get-Content '.\docs\architecture.md'
@@ -25,10 +24,25 @@ Get-Content '.\state\evidence.jsonl' -Tail 8
 
 Do not trust this file for the exact live HEAD. Always check git.
 
+## Active Work
+
+Joystick H1 is merged and live (PR GameCult/Heimdall#1; campaign
+`joystick:campaign:self`). Next: `joystick:follow_up:h1-joystick-consent-round-trip`, then
+StreamPixels S0/S1 (other sessions). Open Heimdall follow-ups, by id:
+`joystick:follow_up:cross-process-failed-refresh-marker`,
+`joystick:follow_up:connect-start-needs-app-auth`,
+`joystick:follow_up:heimdall-idunn-onboarding`,
+`joystick:follow_up:joystick-viewer-signin-public-bot`. The Ghostlight KLTST
+canaries below stay open, behind them.
+
 ## Current Orientation
 
-- Yggdrasil runs Heimdall
-  `1086aee01169bf60e8a492b2740db1c6f3e8cabf` with CultLib
+Yggdrasil runs Heimdall `d51fa6b`, hand-deployed 2026-10-19 15:51Z;
+gamecult-ops `210a1af` records backup, rollback and provenance. Facts below
+about Odin, Ghostlight and CultLib pins were verified at `1086aee` (2026-08-22)
+and are not re-verified at `d51fa6b`.
+
+- At `1086aee01169bf60e8a492b2740db1c6f3e8cabf` Heimdall ran with CultLib
   `5cefa0db0079a8e3ee22f29d7b9e6e5aa60912a9`
 - Heimdall publishes four redacted access records to Odin under unique keys:
   `eve:provider:heimdall`, `heimdall:command-boundary`,
@@ -148,8 +162,7 @@ Do not trust this file for the exact live HEAD. Always check git.
   over `cultnet.transport.rudp.v0` when `GC_ACCESS_IDUNN_RUDP_HEALTH` is
   configured; HTTP `/healthz`, JWKS, discovery, systemd, and nginx routing
   remain compatibility witnesses
-- Yggdrasil now runs Heimdall commit
-  `1086aee01169bf60e8a492b2740db1c6f3e8cabf`. Heimdall persists its private
+- Since `1086aee` Heimdall persists its private
   provider-health identity at `/srv/heimdall/keys/provider-health-identity.cc`
   and publishes canonical signed health independently of the slower Verse
   snapshot cadence. Idunn owns the exact root trust binding, authenticated
@@ -171,6 +184,8 @@ Do not trust this file for the exact live HEAD. Always check git.
 
 ## Next Real Move
 
+The Active Work follow-ups first. Everything below is the standing queue.
+
 Do not continue implementation automatically from a rehydrate-only request.
 
 The Idunn/swarm health transport cut is live. Do not regress Heimdall to

package.json

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
     "@gamecult/cultcache-ts": "file:vendor/CultLib/packages/cultcache-ts",
     "cultmesh-ts": "file:vendor/CultLib/packages/cultmesh-ts",
     "cultnet-ts": "file:vendor/CultLib/packages/cultnet-ts",
-    "fastify": "^5.8.5",
+    "fastify": "^5.12.6",
     "pg": "^8.20.0",
     "zod": "^3.25.76"
   },

pnpm-lock.yaml

@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ importers:
         specifier: file:vendor/CultLib/packages/cultnet-ts
         version: file:vendor/CultLib/packages/cultnet-ts
       fastify:
-        specifier: ^5.8.5
-        version: 5.8.5
+        specifier: ^5.12.6
+        version: 5.12.7
       pg:
         specifier: ^8.20.0
         version: 8.20.0
@@ -532,17 +532,23 @@ packages:
   fast-json-stringify@6.3.0:
     resolution: {integrity: sha512-oRCntNDY/329HJPlmdNLIdogNtt6Vyjb1WuT01Soss3slIdyUp8kAcDU3saQTOquEK8KFVfwIIF7FebxUAu+yA==}
 
+  fast-json-stringify@7.1.3:
+    resolution: {integrity: sha512-5TDM1yOF/BDFOclKz2G6rs1RsIl5HXMCrg/npmdNIPNQCezshR5kIHjhwBNuMY67jhkTUAm9DguL8xkL/x0Wtw==}
+
   fast-querystring@1.1.2:
     resolution: {integrity: sha512-g6KuKWmFXc0fID8WWH0jit4g0AGBoJhCkJMb1RmbsSEUNvQ+ZC8D6CUZ+GtF8nMzSPXnhiePyyqqipzNNEnHjg==}
 
   fast-uri@3.1.0:
     resolution: {integrity: sha512-iPeeDKJSWf4IEOasVVrknXpaBV0IApz/gp7S2bb7Z4Lljbl2MGJRqInZiUrQwV16cpzw/D3S5j5Julj/gT52AA==}
 
+  fast-uri@4.2.3:
+    resolution: {integrity: sha512-I1PXwP5eAhlNlcdpjt9CgB59op2ZvZfxw+BkqGFVIUOgNpCVTcTqp3HhTX7brxj5vsip+nSY4nTvff+eIA76hg==}
+
   fastify-plugin@5.1.0:
     resolution: {integrity: sha512-FAIDA8eovSt5qcDgcBvDuX/v0Cjz0ohGhENZ/wpc3y+oZCY2afZ9Baqql3g/lC+OHRnciQol4ww7tuthOb9idw==}
 
-  fastify@5.8.5:
-    resolution: {integrity: sha512-Yqptv59pQzPgQUSIm87hMqHJmdkb1+GPxdE6vW6FRyVE9G86mt7rOghitiU4JHRaTyDUk9pfeKmDeu70lAwM4Q==}
+  fastify@5.12.7:
+    resolution: {integrity: sha512-v4pEPsTRPuqlDIYiQFB+BHjVN4SdHX9u0ABk0ZDUKbbdY1vsNryUd1j4Z+jQEZajvYIVk047Kimva9/AJ79GYw==}
 
   fastq@1.20.1:
     resolution: {integrity: sha512-GGToxJ/w1x32s/D2EKND7kTil4n8OVk/9mycTc4VDza13lOvpUZTGX3mFSCtV9ksdGBVzvsyAVLM6mHFThxXxw==}
@@ -556,8 +562,8 @@ packages:
       picomatch:
         optional: true
 
-  find-my-way@9.5.0:
-    resolution: {integrity: sha512-VW2RfnmscZO5KgBY5XVyKREMW5nMZcxDy+buTOsL+zIPnBlbKm+00sgzoQzq1EVh4aALZLfKdwv6atBGcjvjrQ==}
+  find-my-way@9.10.0:
+    resolution: {integrity: sha512-eru+uCPQ2g+nLBkf84MHP/KyNNMar0BDy0j+i8Fb72GF9/YHBZ58q7FODUtfVV7XU9nfRUHXSmaM8NmZcIbZ4Q==}
     engines: {node: '>=20'}
 
   fsevents@2.3.3:
@@ -853,8 +859,8 @@ packages:
   process-warning@4.0.1:
     resolution: {integrity: sha512-3c2LzQ3rY9d0hc1emcsHhfT9Jwz0cChib/QN89oME2R451w5fy3f0afAhERFZAwrbDU43wk12d0ORBpDVME50Q==}
 
-  process-warning@5.0.0:
-    resolution: {integrity: sha512-a39t9ApHNx2L4+HBnQKqxxHNs1r7KF+Intd8Q/g1bUh6q0WIp9voPXJ/x0j+ZL45KF1pJd9+q2jLIRMfvEshkA==}
+  process-warning@5.1.1:
+    resolution: {integrity: sha512-oCkNVj4OKnKEcocVBcDfiIugN1/cE6rgfT3nCtzeqZPA8+rIxMaQ0xXzIkGP8Gj2qUaP1UR7uhJ1VD8lUCpzCg==}
 
   quick-format-unescaped@4.0.4:
     resolution: {integrity: sha512-tYC1Q1hgyRuHgloV/YXs2w15unPVh8qfu/qCTfhTYamaw7fyhumKa2yGpdSo87vY32rIclj+4fWYQXUMs9EHvg==}
@@ -1475,15 +1481,26 @@ snapshots:
       json-schema-ref-resolver: 3.0.0
       rfdc: 1.4.1
 
+  fast-json-stringify@7.1.3:
+    dependencies:
+      '@fastify/merge-json-schemas': 0.2.1
+      ajv: 8.20.0
+      ajv-formats: 3.0.1(ajv@8.20.0)
+      fast-uri: 4.2.3
+      json-schema-ref-resolver: 3.0.0
+      rfdc: 1.4.1
+
   fast-querystring@1.1.2:
     dependencies:
       fast-decode-uri-component: 1.0.1
 
   fast-uri@3.1.0: {}
 
+  fast-uri@4.2.3: {}
+
   fastify-plugin@5.1.0: {}
 
-  fastify@5.8.5:
+  fastify@5.12.7:
     dependencies:
       '@fastify/ajv-compiler': 4.0.5
       '@fastify/error': 4.2.0
@@ -1491,11 +1508,11 @@ snapshots:
       '@fastify/proxy-addr': 5.1.0
       abstract-logging: 2.0.1
       avvio: 9.2.0
-      fast-json-stringify: 6.3.0
-      find-my-way: 9.5.0
+      fast-json-stringify: 7.1.3
+      find-my-way: 9.10.0
       light-my-request: 6.6.0
       pino: 10.3.1
-      process-warning: 5.0.0
+      process-warning: 5.1.1
       rfdc: 1.4.1
       secure-json-parse: 4.1.0
       semver: 7.7.4
@@ -1509,7 +1526,7 @@ snapshots:
     optionalDependencies:
       picomatch: 4.0.4
 
-  find-my-way@9.5.0:
+  find-my-way@9.10.0:
     dependencies:
       fast-deep-equal: 3.1.3
       fast-querystring: 1.1.2
@@ -1733,7 +1750,7 @@ snapshots:
       on-exit-leak-free: 2.1.2
       pino-abstract-transport: 3.0.0
       pino-std-serializers: 7.1.0
-      process-warning: 5.0.0
+      process-warning: 5.1.1
       quick-format-unescaped: 4.0.4
       real-require: 0.2.0
       safe-stable-stringify: 2.5.0
@@ -1758,7 +1775,7 @@ snapshots:
 
   process-warning@4.0.1: {}
 
-  process-warning@5.0.0: {}
+  process-warning@5.1.1: {}
 
   quick-format-unescaped@4.0.4: {}
 

schemas/heimdall.auth_begin_command.v1.schema.json

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
   "type": "object",
   "required": ["provider", "mode", "returnTo", "entitlementPolicy"],
   "properties": {
-    "provider": { "enum": ["discord", "patreon", "github", "twitch", "youtube", "spotify"] },
+    "provider": { "enum": ["discord", "patreon", "github", "twitch", "youtube", "spotify", "joystick"] },
     "mode": { "enum": ["sign_in", "link", "connect"] },
     "returnTo": { "type": "string", "format": "uri" },
     "entitlementPolicy": {

src/app-profiles.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import {
   type CapabilityDefinition,
   type CapabilityMode,
 } from "./capability-rules.js";
-import { type AppSlug, type LinkedIdentityInput, type OAuthEntitlementPolicy, type Provider } from "./contracts.js";
+import { type AppSlug, type LinkedIdentityInput, type OAuthConnectionBinding, type OAuthEntitlementPolicy, type OAuthMode, type Provider } from "./contracts.js";
 import { entitlementFacts, grantFacts, identityFacts } from "./facts.js";
 
 export type { CapabilityDefinition, CapabilityMode };
@@ -99,10 +99,10 @@ const repixelizerProfile: AppProfile = {
 const streampixelsProfile: AppProfile = {
   slug: "streampixels",
   displayName: "StreamPixels",
-  profileVersion: "2026-04-26",
+  profileVersion: "2026-10-19",
   identityProviders: ["twitch", "youtube"],
   entitlementSources: [],
-  managedConnectionProviders: ["twitch", "youtube"],
+  managedConnectionProviders: ["twitch", "youtube", "joystick"],
   allowedReturnOrigins: ["https://streampixels.gamecult.org"],
   capabilities: [
     {
@@ -222,12 +222,19 @@ export function serializeAppProfile(profile: AppProfile): Record<string, unknown
   };
 }
 
-export function supportsProvider(profile: AppProfile, provider: Provider): boolean {
-  return (
-    profile.identityProviders.includes(provider) ||
-    profile.managedConnectionProviders.includes(provider) ||
-    profile.entitlementSources.includes(provider)
-  );
+/**
+ * Whether the profile admits this provider for this mode. The role lists
+ * decide: `sign_in` and `link` mint viewer identity, so they take only
+ * `identityProviders`; a provider that is only a managed connection (Joystick)
+ * can never sign anyone in or link. `connect` takes either list:
+ * `managedConnectionProviders` for creator credentials, and
+ * `identityProviders` because Bifrost and its siblings already connect their
+ * identity providers. A provider in neither list is refused before any redirect.
+ */
+export function admitsProviderForMode(profile: AppProfile, provider: Provider, mode: OAuthMode): boolean {
+  return mode === "connect"
+    ? profile.managedConnectionProviders.includes(provider) || profile.identityProviders.includes(provider)
+    : profile.identityProviders.includes(provider);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -243,3 +250,34 @@ export function isAllowedReturnOrigin(profile: AppProfile, returnTo: string): bo
     return false;
   }
 }
+
+/**
+ * What a completed OAuth callback may mint, decided at the callback from the
+ * signed state's mode and the provider's role in the profile (the start gate
+ * is only an early refusal). `viewer_session`: the provider is one of the
+ * profile's `identityProviders`, so the completion signs the account in with
+ * the profile's capabilities. `custody_only`: a `connect` for a provider that
+ * is only a managed connection (Joystick on StreamPixels), bound to a creator
+ * target, stores the creator credential and mints a claim with no capabilities
+ * and no refresh token. Without a creator binding it is `refused`, as is any
+ * other combination. The start gate asks this same question, so an unbound
+ * connect never reaches a redirect.
+ */
+export type CallbackMint = "viewer_session" | "custody_only" | "refused";
+
+export function callbackMint(
+  profile: AppProfile,
+  provider: Provider,
+  mode: OAuthMode,
+  connection: OAuthConnectionBinding | null | undefined
+): CallbackMint {
+  if (profile.identityProviders.includes(provider)) {
+    return "viewer_session";
+  }
+  return mode === "connect" &&
+    profile.managedConnectionProviders.includes(provider) &&
+    connection?.kind === "creator" &&
+    connection.targetId !== ""
+    ? "custody_only"
+    : "refused";
+}

src/app.ts

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ import {
   type Provider,
 } from "./contracts.js";
 import { issueAccessClaim, type IssueAccessClaimInput } from "./claims.js";
-import { builtInAppProfiles, getAppProfile, isAllowedReturnOrigin, serializeAppProfile, supportsProvider } from "./app-profiles.js";
+import { builtInAppProfiles, getAppProfile, isAllowedReturnOrigin, serializeAppProfile, admitsProviderForMode, callbackMint } from "./app-profiles.js";
 import { renderBrowserHandoffPage } from "./browser-handoff.js";
 import { type HeimdallConfig, loadConfig } from "./config.js";
 import { createTokenCustody, type TokenCustody } from "./custody.js";
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ import {
   summarizePatreonMemberships,
   type OAuthRuntimeRegistry,
 } from "./oauth.js";
+import { ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed, refreshManagedCredential } from "./managed-credential.js";
 import { buildAuthorizationUrl, providerCatalog, providerExpectedEnv } from "./providers.js";
 import { createRuntimeKeyMaterial, signJwt, verifyJwt } from "./signing.js";
 import { createStore, type HeimdallStore } from "./store/index.js";
@@ -44,8 +45,6 @@ import {
   type UpsertLinkedIdentityInput,
 } from "./store/types.js";
 
-const MANAGED_CREDENTIAL_REFRESH_SKEW_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
-
 export interface BuildAppOptions {
   config?: HeimdallConfig;
   store?: HeimdallStore;
@@ -367,63 +366,6 @@ function centsToDecimalString(cents: number): string {
   return (cents / 100).toFixed(2);
 }
 
-async function refreshLinkedIdentityCredentialIfNeeded(options: {
-  config: HeimdallConfig;
-  store: HeimdallStore;
-  tokenCustody: TokenCustody;
-  oauthRuntimes: OAuthRuntimeRegistry;
-  linkedIdentity: StoredLinkedIdentity;
-  now: string;
-}): Promise<StoredLinkedIdentity> {
-  const expiresAt = options.linkedIdentity.tokenExpiresAt ? Date.parse(options.linkedIdentity.tokenExpiresAt) : undefined;
-  if (
-    !expiresAt ||
-    expiresAt - Date.now() > MANAGED_CREDENTIAL_REFRESH_SKEW_MS ||
-    !options.linkedIdentity.refreshTokenEncrypted
-  ) {
-    return options.linkedIdentity;
-  }
-
-  const runtime = options.oauthRuntimes[options.linkedIdentity.provider];
-  if (!runtime.refreshAccessToken) {
-    return options.linkedIdentity;
-  }
-
-  const refreshToken = options.tokenCustody.decrypt(options.linkedIdentity.refreshTokenEncrypted);
-  const refreshed = await runtime.refreshAccessToken({
-    config: options.config,
-    refreshToken,
-  });
-
-  const upsertInput: UpsertLinkedIdentityInput = {
-    id: options.linkedIdentity.id,
-    accountId: options.linkedIdentity.accountId,
-    provider: options.linkedIdentity.provider,
-    providerUserId: options.linkedIdentity.providerUserId,
-    accessTokenEncrypted: options.tokenCustody.encrypt(refreshed.accessToken),
-    refreshTokenEncrypted: options.tokenCustody.encrypt(refreshed.refreshToken ?? refreshToken),
-    scopes: refreshed.scope.length ? refreshed.scope : options.linkedIdentity.scopes,
-    profileJson: options.linkedIdentity.profileJson,
-    createdAt: options.linkedIdentity.createdAt,
-    updatedAt: options.now,
-  };
-  const tokenExpiresAt = refreshed.expiresAt ?? options.linkedIdentity.tokenExpiresAt;
-  if (tokenExpiresAt !== undefined) {
-    upsertInput.tokenExpiresAt = tokenExpiresAt;
-  }
-  if (options.linkedIdentity.username !== undefined) {
-    upsertInput.username = options.linkedIdentity.username;
-  }
-  if (options.linkedIdentity.displayName !== undefined) {
-    upsertInput.displayName = options.linkedIdentity.displayName;
-  }
-  if (options.linkedIdentity.primaryEmail !== undefined) {
-    upsertInput.primaryEmail = options.linkedIdentity.primaryEmail;
-  }
-
-  return options.store.upsertLinkedIdentity(upsertInput);
-}
-
 function storedIdentityToResolvedIdentity(identity: StoredLinkedIdentity) {
   const resolved = {
     provider: identity.provider,
@@ -450,7 +392,6 @@ async function evaluateStoredEntitlements(options: {
   appSlug: AppSlug;
   accountId: string;
   entitlementPolicies: OAuthEntitlementPolicy[];
-  now: string;
 }): Promise<string[]> {
   const profile = getAppProfile(options.appSlug);
   if (!profile) {
@@ -460,19 +401,13 @@ async function evaluateStoredEntitlements(options: {
   const facts: string[] = [];
 
   for (const storedIdentity of linkedIdentities) {
-    if (!profile.entitlementSources.includes(storedIdentity.provider) || !storedIdentity.accessTokenEncrypted) {
+    if (!profile.entitlementSources.includes(storedIdentity.provider)) {
       continue;
     }
 
-    const linkedIdentity = await refreshLinkedIdentityCredentialIfNeeded({
-      config: options.config,
-      store: options.store,
-      tokenCustody: options.tokenCustody,
-      oauthRuntimes: options.oauthRuntimes,
-      linkedIdentity: storedIdentity,
-      now: options.now,
-    });
-    if (!linkedIdentity.accessTokenEncrypted) {
+    const refreshed = await refreshManagedCredential(options, storedIdentity);
+    const linkedIdentity = refreshed.identity;
+    if (refreshed.kind === "revoked" || !linkedIdentity.accessTokenEncrypted) {
       continue;
     }
 
@@ -559,10 +494,20 @@ export async function startOAuthFlow(
     return { statusCode: 404, body: { error: "unknown_app", detail: "No app is registered under that slug." } };
   }
 
-  if (!supportsProvider(profile, provider)) {
+  if (!admitsProviderForMode(profile, provider, input.mode)) {
     return {
       statusCode: 400,
-      body: { error: "provider_not_supported_for_app", provider, appSlug: profile.slug },
+      body: { error: "provider_not_supported_for_app", provider, mode: input.mode, appSlug: profile.slug },
+    };
+  }
+
+  if (callbackMint(profile, provider, input.mode, input.connection) === "refused") {
+    return {
+      statusCode: 400,
+      body: {
+        error: "creator_connection_required",
+        detail: `${provider} on ${profile.slug} is a managed creator connection: connect needs connection.kind creator and a targetId.`,
+      },
     };
   }
 
@@ -714,7 +659,6 @@ export async function refreshAppSession(
     appSlug,
     accountId: refreshClaim.account_id,
     entitlementPolicies,
-    now: nowIso,
   });
   const issueInput: IssueAccessClaimInput = {
     appSlug,
@@ -1074,6 +1018,11 @@ export async function buildApp(options: BuildAppOptions = {}): Promise<FastifyIn
       const runtime = oauthRuntimes[request.params.provider];
 
       try {
+        const callbackProfile = getAppProfile(statePayload.app_slug);
+        const mint = callbackProfile ? callbackMint(callbackProfile, request.params.provider, statePayload.mode, statePayload.connection) : "refused";
+        if (mint === "refused") {
+          throw new Error("The signed state names a mode the provider has no role for in this app.");
+        }
         const tokenSet = await runtime.exchangeAuthorizationCode({
           config,
           code: request.query.code,
@@ -1159,6 +1108,7 @@ export async function buildApp(options: BuildAppOptions = {}): Promise<FastifyIn
           accountId: account.id,
           linkedIdentities: await store.listLinkedIdentitiesForAccount(account.id),
           facts: [...entitlementEvaluation.facts, ...buildGrantFacts(grants)],
+          ...(mint === "custody_only" ? { withoutCapabilities: true } : {}),
         };
         if (account.displayName !== undefined) {
           issueInput.displayName = account.displayName;
@@ -1170,6 +1120,14 @@ export async function buildApp(options: BuildAppOptions = {}): Promise<FastifyIn
           store,
           input: issueInput,
         });
+        // A custody-only completion carries no refresh token: the refresh
+        // route recomputes capabilities from the account's facts, so one
+        // would turn the capability-free session into a viewer session.
+        const { refreshToken: issuedRefreshToken, refresh: issuedRefresh, ...issuedWithoutRefresh } = issued;
+        const delivered =
+          mint === "custody_only"
+            ? issuedWithoutRefresh
+            : { ...issuedWithoutRefresh, refreshToken: issuedRefreshToken, refresh: issuedRefresh };
 
         await store.createAuditEvent({
           accountId: account.id,
@@ -1209,7 +1167,7 @@ export async function buildApp(options: BuildAppOptions = {}): Promise<FastifyIn
           entitlements: entitlementEvaluation,
           returnTo: statePayload.return_to,
           connection: statePayload.connection,
-          ...issued,
+          ...delivered,
         };
         if (handoff.kind === "backend_callback") {
           await maybeDeliverBackendHandoff(handoff, {
@@ -1225,7 +1183,7 @@ export async function buildApp(options: BuildAppOptions = {}): Promise<FastifyIn
             connection: statePayload.connection,
             account: accountSummary,
             entitlements: entitlementEvaluation,
-            ...issued,
+            ...delivered,
           });
 
           await store.createAuditEvent({
@@ -1620,21 +1578,15 @@ export async function buildApp(options: BuildAppOptions = {}): Promise<FastifyIn
       }
 
       const storedLinkedIdentity = await store.findStoredLinkedIdentityForAccount(request.body.accountId, "patreon");
-      if (!storedLinkedIdentity?.accessTokenEncrypted) {
+      if (!storedLinkedIdentity) {
         reply.code(404);
         return { error: "patreon_identity_not_linked" };
       }
 
       const now = new Date().toISOString();
-      const linkedIdentity = await refreshLinkedIdentityCredentialIfNeeded({
-        config,
-        store,
-        tokenCustody,
-        oauthRuntimes,
-        linkedIdentity: storedLinkedIdentity,
-        now,
-      });
-      if (!linkedIdentity.accessTokenEncrypted) {
+      const refreshed = await refreshManagedCredential({ config, store, tokenCustody, oauthRuntimes }, storedLinkedIdentity);
+      const linkedIdentity = refreshed.identity;
+      if (refreshed.kind === "revoked" || !linkedIdentity.accessTokenEncrypted) {
         reply.code(404);
         return { error: "patreon_identity_not_linked" };
       }
@@ -1772,22 +1724,24 @@ export async function buildApp(options: BuildAppOptions = {}): Promise<FastifyIn
       }
 
       const storedLinkedIdentity = await store.findStoredLinkedIdentityForAccount(request.body.accountId, request.body.provider);
-      if (!storedLinkedIdentity?.accessTokenEncrypted) {
+      if (!storedLinkedIdentity) {
         reply.code(404);
         return { error: "managed_credential_not_found" };
       }
-      const now = new Date().toISOString();
-      const linkedIdentity = await refreshLinkedIdentityCredentialIfNeeded({
-        config,
-        store,
-        tokenCustody,
-        oauthRuntimes,
-        linkedIdentity: storedLinkedIdentity,
-        now,
-      });
-      if (!linkedIdentity.accessTokenEncrypted) {
-        reply.code(404);
-        return { error: "managed_credential_not_found" };
+      let refreshed;
+      try {
+        refreshed = await refreshManagedCredential({ config, store, tokenCustody, oauthRuntimes }, storedLinkedIdentity);
+      } catch (error) {
+        if (error instanceof ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed) {
+          reply.code(502);
+          return { error: error.code, provider: error.provider };
+        }
+        throw error;
+      }
+      const linkedIdentity = refreshed.identity;
+      if (refreshed.kind === "revoked" || !linkedIdentity.accessTokenEncrypted) {
+        reply.code(410);
+        return { error: "managed_credential_revoked", provider: linkedIdentity.provider };
       }
 
       const response: {

src/backend-handoff.ts

@@ -19,7 +19,13 @@ interface BackendHandoffBase {
   connection: OAuthConnectionBinding | null;
 }
 
-export interface BackendHandoffSuccessPayload extends BackendHandoffBase, IssuedAccessClaimResult {
+/** A custody-only completion (callbackMint) carries no refresh token. */
+type RefreshFields = "refreshToken" | "refresh";
+
+export interface BackendHandoffSuccessPayload
+  extends BackendHandoffBase,
+    Omit<IssuedAccessClaimResult, RefreshFields>,
+    Partial<Pick<IssuedAccessClaimResult, RefreshFields>> {
   status: "success";
   mode: OAuthMode;
   account: AccountSummary;

src/claims.ts

@@ -39,6 +39,12 @@ export interface IssueAccessClaimInput {
   displayName?: string;
   linkedIdentities: LinkedIdentityInput[];
   facts: string[];
+  /**
+   * The claim names the account and its identities and carries no facts and
+   * no capabilities (a managed-credential connect for a provider that is not
+   * an identity provider). The facts are not even `identity.authenticated`.
+   */
+  withoutCapabilities?: boolean;
   sessionId?: string;
   accessRevision?: number;
   ttlSeconds?: number;
@@ -80,11 +86,15 @@ export async function issueAccessClaim(options: {
     // would name an app no verifier can resolve a profile for.
     throw new Error(`Cannot issue an access claim for unknown app '${options.input.appSlug}'.`);
   }
-  const facts = normalizeFacts(options.input.accountId, options.input.linkedIdentities, options.input.facts);
-  const factSet = new Set(facts);
+  const withoutCapabilities = options.input.withoutCapabilities === true;
+  const facts = withoutCapabilities
+    ? []
+    : normalizeFacts(options.input.accountId, options.input.linkedIdentities, options.input.facts);
+  // Every shared capability needs a non-empty anyOf (capability-rules), so an
+  // empty fact set yields no capabilities: facts are the one owner of that.
   const sharedCapabilities = evaluateSharedCapabilities(profile, {
     accountId: options.input.accountId,
-    facts: factSet,
+    facts: new Set(facts),
     identities: options.input.linkedIdentities,
   });
 
@@ -176,6 +186,8 @@ export async function issueAccessClaim(options: {
       kid: options.keys.kid,
     },
     sharedCapabilities,
-    hybridCapabilities: profile.capabilities.filter((capability) => capability.mode === "hybrid"),
+    hybridCapabilities: withoutCapabilities
+      ? []
+      : profile.capabilities.filter((capability) => capability.mode === "hybrid"),
   };
 }

src/contracts.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-export const providers = ["discord", "patreon", "github", "twitch", "youtube", "spotify"] as const;
+export const providers = ["discord", "patreon", "github", "twitch", "youtube", "spotify", "joystick"] as const;
 
 export type Provider = (typeof providers)[number];
 

src/index.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-import path from "node:path";
 import { resolveWriteLease, WriteLeaseNotHeldError } from "./process-write-lease.js";
 import { buildApp } from "./app.js";
 import { loadConfig } from "./config.js";
@@ -7,14 +6,16 @@ import { publishHeimdallOdinState } from "./odin-publication.js";
 import { startHeimdallPrivateCommandPlane } from "./private-command-plane.js";
 import type { CultNetOperationServer } from "cultnet-ts";
 import { createHeimdallRuntimePulse, buildHeimdallHealthDetail, publishHeimdallVerseState } from "./verse-state.js";
-import {
-  buildPresenceStatement,
-  nextPublisherSequence,
-  readRuntimeBundleFacts,
-  type RuntimeBundleFacts,
-} from "./runtime-presence.js";
+import { openPresenceAuthority } from "./runtime-presence.js";
 
 const config = loadConfig();
+// Under Idunn the launch's presence keys, bundle facts and publisher sequence
+// open here, before anything listens. A launch-contract fault throws, uncaught,
+// and the process exits non-zero with no listener: Idunn fails Warming in
+// seconds rather than waiting on a candidate that can never sign.
+const presenceAuthority = config.idunnRuntimeBundlePath
+  ? await openPresenceAuthority(config)
+  : undefined;
 const app = await buildApp({ config });
 const versePulseIntervalMs = 60_000;
 const healthPulseIntervalMs = 10_000;
@@ -70,13 +71,6 @@ async function publishVerseState(): Promise<void> {
   await publishHeimdallOdinState(config, pulse);
 }
 
-/**
- * Read once and keep: the bundle is Idunn's immutable record of this launch and
- * cannot change while the process lives, so re-reading it every pulse would be
- * work that can only ever return the same answer or fail.
- */
-let runtimeBundleFacts: RuntimeBundleFacts | undefined;
-
 async function publishHealthState(): Promise<void> {
   const pulse = createHeimdallRuntimePulse(config);
 
@@ -94,32 +88,17 @@ async function publishHealthState(): Promise<void> {
     ? buildHeimdallHealthDetail(config, pulse)
     : `Heimdall candidate warming; ${lease.reason}`;
 
-  if (!config.idunnRuntimeBundlePath) {
+  if (!presenceAuthority) {
     // Outside Idunn there is no launch to attest and nothing that admits the
     // statement; publishing is simply not part of that world.
     return;
   }
-  runtimeBundleFacts ??= await readRuntimeBundleFacts(config.idunnRuntimeBundlePath);
-
-  const observedAtUnixMillis = Date.parse(pulse.updatedAt);
-  const presence = await buildPresenceStatement({
-    bundle: runtimeBundleFacts,
-    state: lease.mayWrite ? "active" : "warming",
-    detail,
-    boundEndpoint: `http://${config.host}:${config.port}`,
-    // A warming candidate holds no lease and must not claim one; the contract
-    // refuses the pair, and Idunn needs the warming statement to promote it.
-    writeLeaseSha256: null,
-    observedAtUnixMillis,
-    publisherSequence: await nextPublisherSequence(
-      path.join(config.dataRoot, "runtime-presence-sequence"),
-    ),
-    providerHealthIdentityPath: config.providerHealthIdentityPath,
-  });
+  const state = lease.mayWrite ? "active" : "warming";
+  const presence = presenceAuthority.sign(state, detail, Date.parse(pulse.updatedAt));
 
   await publishIdunnRudpHealth(config, {
     daemonId: config.daemonId,
-    state: lease.mayWrite ? "active" : "warming",
+    state,
     detail,
     observedAt: pulse.updatedAt,
     presence,

src/managed-credential.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+import { type HeimdallConfig } from "./config.js";
+import { type Provider } from "./contracts.js";
+import { type TokenCustody } from "./custody.js";
+import { type OAuthProviderRuntime, type OAuthRuntimeRegistry, ProviderResponseError } from "./oauth.js";
+import { providerCatalog } from "./providers.js";
+import { type HeimdallStore } from "./store/index.js";
+import { type CredentialDecision, type StoredLinkedIdentity } from "./store/types.js";
+
+/** A stored access token this close to expiry (or past it) is refreshed before use. */
+export const MANAGED_CREDENTIAL_REFRESH_SKEW_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
+
+/**
+ * The longest a refresh may hold the row lock: the provider call is aborted
+ * at this bound, and every waiter holds a pooled connection for at most this
+ * long behind the holder.
+ */
+export const MANAGED_CREDENTIAL_REFRESH_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000;
+
+export interface ManagedCredentialContext {
+  config: HeimdallConfig;
+  store: HeimdallStore;
+  tokenCustody: TokenCustody;
+  oauthRuntimes: OAuthRuntimeRegistry;
+  clock?: () => number;
+  timeoutMs?: number;
+}
+
+export type ManagedCredentialRevocationReason = "provider_revoked" | "rotation_missing";
+
+/** `revoked` means the identity holds no access token: the provider took the grant back, or it was never held. */
+export type ManagedCredentialOutcome =
+  | { kind: "current"; identity: StoredLinkedIdentity }
+  | { kind: "revoked"; identity: StoredLinkedIdentity };
+
+/**
+ * The provider could not be asked, or answered with something that is not a
+ * grant verdict (invalid_client, 5xx, timeout, malformed body). The stored
+ * tokens are untouched. Carries the provider and nothing the provider said.
+ */
+export class ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed extends Error {
+  readonly code = "managed_credential_refresh_failed";
+  readonly provider: Provider;
+
+  constructor(provider: Provider) {
+    super(`${providerCatalog[provider].displayName} managed credential refresh failed.`);
+    this.name = "ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed";
+    this.provider = provider;
+  }
+}
+
+function dueForRefresh(identity: StoredLinkedIdentity, runtime: OAuthProviderRuntime, now: number): boolean {
+  if (!identity.tokenExpiresAt || !identity.refreshTokenEncrypted || !runtime.refreshAccessToken) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return Date.parse(identity.tokenExpiresAt) - now <= MANAGED_CREDENTIAL_REFRESH_SKEW_MS;
+}
+
+function withoutTokens(identity: StoredLinkedIdentity): StoredLinkedIdentity {
+  const { accessTokenEncrypted: _a, refreshTokenEncrypted: _r, tokenExpiresAt: _e, ...rest } = identity;
+  return rest;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Refreshes in flight in this process, per store and linked identity. The row
+ * lock serialises processes; it cannot tell a waiter that queued behind a
+ * failed holder from a caller that arrived after the failure, so each waiter
+ * would present the same refresh token again. Callers that arrive while an
+ * attempt is in flight join it and receive its outcome, success or failure.
+ * The entry lives exactly as long as the attempt: a later request retries.
+ *
+ * Known residual risk (docs/service-contract.md): one presentation per
+ * process per burst, so N processes may present one token N times. The
+ * cross-process failed-refresh marker that would close it is
+ * joystick:follow_up:cross-process-failed-refresh-marker.
+ */
+const refreshesInFlight = new WeakMap<HeimdallStore, Map<string, Promise<ManagedCredentialOutcome>>>();
+
+/**
+ * The one refresh policy. `snapshot` is a hint: it may skip the lock when no
+ * refresh is due and never decides one. The row's lock owns when a refresh
+ * token is presented across processes; this process makes one attempt per
+ * identity at a time; the decision is made on the row as read under the lock.
+ */
+export async function refreshManagedCredential(
+  ctx: ManagedCredentialContext,
+  snapshot: StoredLinkedIdentity
+): Promise<ManagedCredentialOutcome> {
+  const clock = ctx.clock ?? Date.now;
+  const runtime = ctx.oauthRuntimes[snapshot.provider];
+
+  if (!snapshot.accessTokenEncrypted) {
+    return { kind: "revoked", identity: snapshot };
+  }
+  if (!dueForRefresh(snapshot, runtime, clock())) {
+    return { kind: "current", identity: snapshot };
+  }
+
+  let inFlight = refreshesInFlight.get(ctx.store);
+  if (!inFlight) {
+    inFlight = new Map();
+    refreshesInFlight.set(ctx.store, inFlight);
+  }
+  const joined = inFlight.get(snapshot.id);
+  if (joined) {
+    return joined;
+  }
+  const attempt = refreshUnderLock(ctx, snapshot).finally(() => {
+    inFlight.delete(snapshot.id);
+  });
+  inFlight.set(snapshot.id, attempt);
+  return attempt;
+}
+
+async function refreshUnderLock(
+  ctx: ManagedCredentialContext,
+  snapshot: StoredLinkedIdentity
+): Promise<ManagedCredentialOutcome> {
+  const clock = ctx.clock ?? Date.now;
+  const provider = snapshot.provider;
+  const runtime = ctx.oauthRuntimes[provider];
+
+  let revocation: ManagedCredentialRevocationReason | undefined;
+  const decide = async (locked: StoredLinkedIdentity): Promise<CredentialDecision> => {
+    if (!locked.accessTokenEncrypted || !dueForRefresh(locked, runtime, clock())) {
+      return { kind: "keep" };
+    }
+    const updatedAt = new Date(clock()).toISOString();
+    const refreshToken = ctx.tokenCustody.decrypt(locked.refreshTokenEncrypted!);
+
+    let refreshed;
+    try {
+      refreshed = await runtime.refreshAccessToken!({
+        config: ctx.config,
+        refreshToken,
+        signal: AbortSignal.timeout(ctx.timeoutMs ?? MANAGED_CREDENTIAL_REFRESH_TIMEOUT_MS),
+      });
+    } catch (error) {
+      if (error instanceof ProviderResponseError && error.oauthError === "invalid_grant") {
+        revocation = "provider_revoked";
+        return { kind: "revoke", updatedAt };
+      }
+      throw new ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed(provider);
+    }
+
+    let refreshTokenEncrypted: string;
+    if (refreshed.refreshToken) {
+      refreshTokenEncrypted = ctx.tokenCustody.encrypt(refreshed.refreshToken);
+    } else if (providerCatalog[provider].rotatesRefreshTokens) {
+      revocation = "rotation_missing";
+      return { kind: "revoke", updatedAt };
+    } else {
+      refreshTokenEncrypted = locked.refreshTokenEncrypted!;
+    }
+
+    // The refreshed set always carries an expiry (the provider's, or the
+    // descriptor's default lifetime): the old one is already due, and an
+    // unknown one would never come due (dueForRefresh).
+    return {
+      kind: "rotate",
+      accessTokenEncrypted: ctx.tokenCustody.encrypt(refreshed.accessToken),
+      refreshTokenEncrypted,
+      tokenExpiresAt: refreshed.expiresAt,
+      scopes: refreshed.scope.length ? refreshed.scope : locked.scopes,
+      updatedAt,
+    };
+  };
+
+  const committed = await ctx.store.updateLinkedIdentityCredential(snapshot.id, decide);
+  if (revocation) {
+    await ctx.store.createAuditEvent({
+      accountId: snapshot.accountId,
+      eventType: "managed_credential_revoked",
+      eventPayloadJson: { provider, reason: revocation },
+      createdAt: new Date(clock()).toISOString(),
+    });
+  }
+  if (!committed) {
+    return { kind: "revoked", identity: withoutTokens(snapshot) };
+  }
+  return { kind: committed.accessTokenEncrypted ? "current" : "revoked", identity: committed };
+}

src/oauth.ts

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import {
 } from "./contracts.js";
 import { type HeimdallConfig } from "./config.js";
 import { entitlementFacts } from "./facts.js";
+import { providerCatalog } from "./providers.js";
 import { type CreateEntitlementSnapshotInput } from "./store/types.js";
 
 export interface OAuthTokenSet {
@@ -40,6 +41,9 @@ export interface OAuthCallbackContext {
   entitlementPolicy: OAuthEntitlementPolicy | null;
 }
 
+/** A token set whose access-token expiry is known: the provider's own, or the descriptor's default. */
+export type ExpiringTokenSet = OAuthTokenSet & { expiresAt: string };
+
 export interface OAuthProviderRuntime {
   exchangeAuthorizationCode(options: {
     config: HeimdallConfig;
@@ -49,7 +53,8 @@ export interface OAuthProviderRuntime {
   refreshAccessToken?(options: {
     config: HeimdallConfig;
     refreshToken: string;
-  }): Promise<OAuthTokenSet>;
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
+  }): Promise<ExpiringTokenSet>;
   resolveIdentity(options: { config: HeimdallConfig; accessToken: string }): Promise<ResolvedIdentity>;
   evaluateEntitlements(options: {
     config: HeimdallConfig;
@@ -59,6 +64,25 @@ export interface OAuthProviderRuntime {
   }): Promise<EntitlementEvaluation>;
 }
 
+const oauthErrorCodes = [
+  "invalid_request",
+  "invalid_client",
+  "invalid_grant",
+  "unauthorized_client",
+  "unsupported_grant_type",
+  "invalid_scope",
+] as const;
+export type OAuthErrorCode = (typeof oauthErrorCodes)[number];
+
+function readOAuthErrorCode(text: string): OAuthErrorCode | undefined {
+  try {
+    const error = (JSON.parse(text) as { error?: unknown } | null)?.error;
+    return oauthErrorCodes.find((code) => code === error);
+  } catch {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+}
+
 /**
  * A provider answer Heimdall cannot use: a non-2xx status, or a body that is
  * not JSON. It carries the status and a code, never the body or the parser's
@@ -68,13 +92,19 @@ export interface OAuthProviderRuntime {
  */
 export class ProviderResponseError extends Error {
   readonly status: number;
-  readonly code: "provider_status" | "provider_body_not_json";
+  readonly code: "provider_status" | "provider_body_not_json" | "provider_body_not_token_set";
+  /**
+   * The RFC 6749 section 5.2 error code of a refusal, when the provider sent
+   * one from that closed set. The only value taken from a provider's body.
+   */
+  readonly oauthError: OAuthErrorCode | undefined;
 
-  constructor(status: number, code: ProviderResponseError["code"], failure: string) {
+  constructor(status: number, code: ProviderResponseError["code"], failure: string, oauthError?: OAuthErrorCode) {
     super(`${failure} (status ${status}, ${code}).`);
     this.name = "ProviderResponseError";
     this.status = status;
     this.code = code;
+    this.oauthError = oauthError;
   }
 }
 
@@ -82,7 +112,14 @@ export class ProviderResponseError extends Error {
 async function readProviderJson<T>(response: Response, failure: string): Promise<T> {
   const text = await response.text();
   if (!response.ok) {
-    throw new ProviderResponseError(response.status, "provider_status", failure);
+    // RFC 6749 section 5.2 sends a grant verdict as 400 only. The same JSON
+    // behind a 401, a 5xx or a gateway page is not one.
+    throw new ProviderResponseError(
+      response.status,
+      "provider_status",
+      failure,
+      response.status === 400 ? readOAuthErrorCode(text) : undefined
+    );
   }
   if (!text) {
     return {} as T;
@@ -106,512 +143,133 @@ function normalizeScopes(scope: string | string[] | undefined): string[] {
   return scope?.split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean) ?? [];
 }
 
-async function exchangeDiscordAuthorizationCode(options: {
-  config: HeimdallConfig;
-  code: string;
-  redirectUri: string;
-}): Promise<OAuthTokenSet> {
-  const providerConfig = options.config.providers.discord;
+export type TokenGrant =
+  | { grant_type: "authorization_code"; code: string; redirect_uri: string }
+  | { grant_type: "refresh_token"; refresh_token: string };
+
+/**
+ * The one token request: endpoint, client authentication and rotation all come
+ * from the provider's descriptor. `basic` sends the client as an Authorization
+ * header and nothing in the body; `post` sends it in the body. A refresh token
+ * is returned only when the provider sent one; keeping or discarding the old
+ * one is the caller's rule (ProviderDescriptor.rotatesRefreshTokens).
+ */
+export async function requestProviderTokens(
+  provider: Provider,
+  config: HeimdallConfig,
+  grant: TokenGrant,
+  signal?: AbortSignal
+): Promise<ExpiringTokenSet> {
+  const descriptor = providerCatalog[provider];
+  const providerConfig = config.providers[provider];
   if (!providerConfig.clientId || !providerConfig.clientSecret) {
-    throw new Error("Discord OAuth is not fully configured.");
+    throw new Error(`${descriptor.displayName} OAuth is not fully configured.`);
   }
 
-  const body = new URLSearchParams({
-    grant_type: "authorization_code",
-    code: options.code,
-    redirect_uri: options.redirectUri,
-  });
-  const basicAuth = Buffer.from(`${providerConfig.clientId}:${providerConfig.clientSecret}`).toString("base64");
-  const tokenResponse = await fetchJson<{
-    access_token: string;
-    refresh_token?: string;
-    token_type: string;
-    expires_in: number;
-    scope?: string | string[];
-  }>(
-    "https://discord.com/api/v10/oauth2/token",
-    {
-      method: "POST",
-      headers: {
-        Authorization: `Basic ${basicAuth}`,
-        "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
-      },
-      body,
-    },
-    "Discord token exchange failed"
-  );
+  const body = new URLSearchParams(grant);
+  const headers: Record<string, string> = {
+    "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+    Accept: "application/json",
+  };
+  if (descriptor.tokenEndpointAuthMethod === "client_secret_basic") {
+    headers.Authorization = `Basic ${Buffer.from(`${providerConfig.clientId}:${providerConfig.clientSecret}`).toString("base64")}`;
+  } else {
+    body.set("client_id", providerConfig.clientId);
+    body.set("client_secret", providerConfig.clientSecret);
+  }
 
-  const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = {
-    accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token,
-    tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type,
-    scope: normalizeScopes(tokenResponse.scope),
-    expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + tokenResponse.expires_in * 1000).toISOString(),
-    raw: tokenResponse as unknown as Record<string, unknown>,
+  const init: RequestInit = { method: "POST", headers, body };
+  if (signal) {
+    init.signal = signal;
+  }
+  const label = grant.grant_type === "refresh_token" ? "refresh" : "exchange";
+  const failure = `${descriptor.displayName} token ${label} failed`;
+  const response = await fetch(descriptor.tokenEndpoint, init);
+  const answer = await readProviderJson<unknown>(response, failure);
+  // A 2xx is a token set only when it is an object holding a string access
+  // token and no error.
+  if (
+    typeof answer !== "object" ||
+    answer === null ||
+    typeof (answer as { access_token?: unknown }).access_token !== "string" ||
+    !(answer as { access_token: string }).access_token ||
+    (answer as { error?: unknown }).error !== undefined
+  ) {
+    throw new ProviderResponseError(response.status, "provider_body_not_token_set", failure);
+  }
+  const tokenResponse = answer as {
+    access_token: string;
+    refresh_token?: unknown;
+    token_type?: string;
+    expires_in?: unknown;
+    scope?: string | string[];
   };
 
+  // A refresh token that is present must be a string: anything else is a
+  // malformed grant answer, refused here as a typed failure rather than
+  // reaching custody as a TypeError.
+  if (tokenResponse.refresh_token !== undefined && typeof tokenResponse.refresh_token !== "string") {
+    throw new ProviderResponseError(response.status, "provider_body_not_token_set", failure);
+  }
+
+  // Nothing issued here has an unknown expiry: an answer without a usable
+  // expires_in takes the descriptor's default lifetime.
+  const lifetimeSeconds = usableExpiresIn(tokenResponse.expires_in) ?? descriptor.defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds;
+  const tokenSet: ExpiringTokenSet = {
+    accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token,
+    tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type ?? "Bearer",
+    scope: normalizeScopes(tokenResponse.scope),
+    expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + lifetimeSeconds * 1000).toISOString(),
+    raw: tokenResponse as unknown as Record<string, unknown>,
+  };
   if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) {
     tokenSet.refreshToken = tokenResponse.refresh_token;
   }
-
   return tokenSet;
 }
 
-async function refreshDiscordAccessToken(options: {
-  config: HeimdallConfig;
-  refreshToken: string;
-}): Promise<OAuthTokenSet> {
-  const providerConfig = options.config.providers.discord;
-  if (!providerConfig.clientId || !providerConfig.clientSecret) {
-    throw new Error("Discord OAuth is not fully configured.");
-  }
+/** The longest access token lifetime taken at its word: a year. Anything above is not a lifetime. */
+const MAX_USABLE_EXPIRES_IN_SECONDS = 365 * 24 * 60 * 60;
 
-  const basicAuth = Buffer.from(`${providerConfig.clientId}:${providerConfig.clientSecret}`).toString("base64");
-  const tokenResponse = await fetchJson<{
-    access_token: string;
-    refresh_token?: string;
-    token_type: string;
-    expires_in: number;
-    scope?: string | string[];
-  }>(
-    "https://discord.com/api/v10/oauth2/token",
-    {
-      method: "POST",
-      headers: {
-        Authorization: `Basic ${basicAuth}`,
-        "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
-      },
-      body: new URLSearchParams({
-        grant_type: "refresh_token",
-        refresh_token: options.refreshToken,
-      }),
-    },
-    "Discord token refresh failed"
-  );
+/**
+ * A positive finite number of seconds, or a string that is a positive integer,
+ * no longer than a year. A larger value would overflow the Date the expiry is
+ * stored as, so it is unusable and the descriptor's default lifetime applies.
+ */
+function usableExpiresIn(value: unknown): number | undefined {
+  const seconds = typeof value === "string" && /^\s*\d+\s*$/.test(value) ? Number(value) : value;
+  return typeof seconds === "number" && Number.isFinite(seconds) && seconds > 0 && seconds <= MAX_USABLE_EXPIRES_IN_SECONDS
+    ? seconds
+    : undefined;
+}
 
-  const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = {
-    accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token,
-    tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type,
-    scope: normalizeScopes(tokenResponse.scope),
-    expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + tokenResponse.expires_in * 1000).toISOString(),
-    raw: tokenResponse as unknown as Record<string, unknown>,
+function sharedRuntimeExchange(provider: Provider): OAuthProviderRuntime["exchangeAuthorizationCode"] {
+  return async (options) => {
+    const tokenSet = await requestProviderTokens(provider, options.config, {
+      grant_type: "authorization_code",
+      code: options.code,
+      redirect_uri: options.redirectUri,
+    });
+    // A rotating provider's refresh token is the only way back to the
+    // credential: a grant that arrives without one would be stored as a row
+    // the first refresh revokes, so the callback fails before it writes.
+    if (providerCatalog[provider].rotatesRefreshTokens && !tokenSet.refreshToken) {
+      throw new ProviderResponseError(200, "provider_body_not_token_set", `${providerCatalog[provider].displayName} token exchange failed`);
+    }
+    return tokenSet;
   };
-
-  if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) {
-    tokenSet.refreshToken = tokenResponse.refresh_token;
-  }
-
-  return tokenSet;
 }
 
-async function exchangePatreonAuthorizationCode(options: {
-  config: HeimdallConfig;
-  code: string;
-  redirectUri: string;
-}): Promise<OAuthTokenSet> {
-  const providerConfig = options.config.providers.patreon;
-  if (!providerConfig.clientId || !providerConfig.clientSecret) {
-    throw new Error("Patreon OAuth is not fully configured.");
-  }
-
-  const body = new URLSearchParams({
-    grant_type: "authorization_code",
-    code: options.code,
-    client_id: providerConfig.clientId,
-    client_secret: providerConfig.clientSecret,
-    redirect_uri: options.redirectUri,
-  });
-  const tokenResponse = await fetchJson<{
-    access_token: string;
-    refresh_token?: string;
-    token_type: string;
-    expires_in?: number;
-    scope?: string | string[];
-  }>(
-    "https://www.patreon.com/api/oauth2/token",
-    {
-      method: "POST",
-      headers: {
-        "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
-      },
-      body,
-    },
-    "Patreon token exchange failed"
-  );
-
-  const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = {
-    accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token,
-    tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type,
-    scope: normalizeScopes(tokenResponse.scope),
-    raw: tokenResponse as unknown as Record<string, unknown>,
-  };
-
-  if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) {
-    tokenSet.refreshToken = tokenResponse.refresh_token;
-  }
-
-  if (tokenResponse.expires_in) {
-    tokenSet.expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + tokenResponse.expires_in * 1000).toISOString();
-  }
-
-  return tokenSet;
+function sharedRuntimeRefresh(provider: Provider): NonNullable<OAuthProviderRuntime["refreshAccessToken"]> {
+  return (options) =>
+    requestProviderTokens(
+      provider,
+      options.config,
+      { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: options.refreshToken },
+      options.signal
+    );
 }
 
-async function refreshPatreonAccessToken(options: {
-  config: HeimdallConfig;
-  refreshToken: string;
-}): Promise<OAuthTokenSet> {
-  const providerConfig = options.config.providers.patreon;
-  if (!providerConfig.clientId || !providerConfig.clientSecret) {
-    throw new Error("Patreon OAuth is not fully configured.");
-  }
-
-  const tokenResponse = await fetchJson<{
-    access_token: string;
-    refresh_token?: string;
-    token_type: string;
-    expires_in?: number;
-    scope?: string | string[];
-  }>(
-    "https://www.patreon.com/api/oauth2/token",
-    {
-      method: "POST",
-      headers: {
-        "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
-      },
-      body: new URLSearchParams({
-        grant_type: "refresh_token",
-        refresh_token: options.refreshToken,
-        client_id: providerConfig.clientId,
-        client_secret: providerConfig.clientSecret,
-      }),
-    },
-    "Patreon token refresh failed"
-  );
-
-  const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = {
-    accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token,
-    tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type,
-    scope: normalizeScopes(tokenResponse.scope),
-    raw: tokenResponse as unknown as Record<string, unknown>,
-  };
-
-  if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) {
-    tokenSet.refreshToken = tokenResponse.refresh_token;
-  }
-
-  if (tokenResponse.expires_in) {
-    tokenSet.expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + tokenResponse.expires_in * 1000).toISOString();
-  }
-
-  return tokenSet;
-}
-
-async function exchangeTwitchAuthorizationCode(options: {
-  config: HeimdallConfig;
-  code: string;
-  redirectUri: string;
-}): Promise<OAuthTokenSet> {
-  const providerConfig = options.config.providers.twitch;
-  if (!providerConfig.clientId || !providerConfig.clientSecret) {
-    throw new Error("Twitch OAuth is not fully configured.");
-  }
-
-  const tokenResponse = await fetchJson<{
-    access_token: string;
-    refresh_token?: string;
-    token_type: string;
-    expires_in?: number;
-    scope?: string | string[];
-  }>(
-    "https://id.twitch.tv/oauth2/token",
-    {
-      method: "POST",
-      headers: {
-        "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
-      },
-      body: new URLSearchParams({
-        client_id: providerConfig.clientId,
-        client_secret: providerConfig.clientSecret,
-        code: options.code,
-        grant_type: "authorization_code",
-        redirect_uri: options.redirectUri,
-      }),
-    },
-    "Twitch token exchange failed"
-  );
-
-  const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = {
-    accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token,
-    tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type,
-    scope: normalizeScopes(tokenResponse.scope),
-    raw: tokenResponse as unknown as Record<string, unknown>,
-  };
-
-  if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) {
-    tokenSet.refreshToken = tokenResponse.refresh_token;
-  }
-
-  if (tokenResponse.expires_in) {
-    tokenSet.expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + tokenResponse.expires_in * 1000).toISOString();
-  }
-
-  return tokenSet;
-}
-
-async function refreshTwitchAccessToken(options: {
-  config: HeimdallConfig;
-  refreshToken: string;
-}): Promise<OAuthTokenSet> {
-  const providerConfig = options.config.providers.twitch;
-  if (!providerConfig.clientId || !providerConfig.clientSecret) {
-    throw new Error("Twitch OAuth is not fully configured.");
-  }
-
-  const tokenResponse = await fetchJson<{
-    access_token: string;
-    refresh_token?: string;
-    token_type: string;
-    expires_in?: number;
-    scope?: string | string[];
-  }>(
-    "https://id.twitch.tv/oauth2/token",
-    {
-      method: "POST",
-      headers: {
-        "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
-      },
-      body: new URLSearchParams({
-        client_id: providerConfig.clientId,
-        client_secret: providerConfig.clientSecret,
-        grant_type: "refresh_token",
-        refresh_token: options.refreshToken,
-      }),
-    },
-    "Twitch token refresh failed"
-  );
-
-  const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = {
-    accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token,
-    tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type,
-    scope: normalizeScopes(tokenResponse.scope),
-    raw: tokenResponse as unknown as Record<string, unknown>,
-  };
-
-  if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) {
-    tokenSet.refreshToken = tokenResponse.refresh_token;
-  }
-
-  if (tokenResponse.expires_in) {
-    tokenSet.expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + tokenResponse.expires_in * 1000).toISOString();
-  }
-
-  return tokenSet;
-}
-
-async function exchangeYouTubeAuthorizationCode(options: {
-  config: HeimdallConfig;
-  code: string;
-  redirectUri: string;
-}): Promise<OAuthTokenSet> {
-  const providerConfig = options.config.providers.youtube;
-  if (!providerConfig.clientId || !providerConfig.clientSecret) {
-    throw new Error("YouTube OAuth is not fully configured.");
-  }
-
-  const tokenResponse = await fetchJson<{
-    access_token: string;
-    refresh_token?: string;
-    token_type: string;
-    expires_in?: number;
-    scope?: string | string[];
-    id_token?: string;
-  }>(
-    "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token",
-    {
-      method: "POST",
-      headers: {
-        "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
-      },
-      body: new URLSearchParams({
-        client_id: providerConfig.clientId,
-        client_secret: providerConfig.clientSecret,
-        code: options.code,
-        grant_type: "authorization_code",
-        redirect_uri: options.redirectUri,
-      }),
-    },
-    "YouTube token exchange failed"
-  );
-
-  const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = {
-    accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token,
-    tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type,
-    scope: normalizeScopes(tokenResponse.scope),
-    raw: tokenResponse as unknown as Record<string, unknown>,
-  };
-
-  if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) {
-    tokenSet.refreshToken = tokenResponse.refresh_token;
-  }
-
-  if (tokenResponse.expires_in) {
-    tokenSet.expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + tokenResponse.expires_in * 1000).toISOString();
-  }
-
-  return tokenSet;
-}
-
-async function refreshYouTubeAccessToken(options: {
-  config: HeimdallConfig;
-  refreshToken: string;
-}): Promise<OAuthTokenSet> {
-  const providerConfig = options.config.providers.youtube;
-  if (!providerConfig.clientId || !providerConfig.clientSecret) {
-    throw new Error("YouTube OAuth is not fully configured.");
-  }
-
-  const tokenResponse = await fetchJson<{
-    access_token: string;
-    refresh_token?: string;
-    token_type: string;
-    expires_in?: number;
-    scope?: string | string[];
-  }>(
-    "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token",
-    {
-      method: "POST",
-      headers: {
-        "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
-      },
-      body: new URLSearchParams({
-        client_id: providerConfig.clientId,
-        client_secret: providerConfig.clientSecret,
-        grant_type: "refresh_token",
-        refresh_token: options.refreshToken,
-      }),
-    },
-    "YouTube token refresh failed"
-  );
-
-  const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = {
-    accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token,
-    tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type,
-    scope: normalizeScopes(tokenResponse.scope),
-    raw: tokenResponse as unknown as Record<string, unknown>,
-  };
-
-  if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) {
-    tokenSet.refreshToken = tokenResponse.refresh_token;
-  }
-
-  if (tokenResponse.expires_in) {
-    tokenSet.expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + tokenResponse.expires_in * 1000).toISOString();
-  }
-
-  return tokenSet;
-}
-
-async function exchangeSpotifyAuthorizationCode(options: {
-  config: HeimdallConfig;
-  code: string;
-  redirectUri: string;
-}): Promise<OAuthTokenSet> {
-  const providerConfig = options.config.providers.spotify;
-  if (!providerConfig.clientId || !providerConfig.clientSecret) {
-    throw new Error("Spotify OAuth is not fully configured.");
-  }
-
-  const basicAuth = Buffer.from(`${providerConfig.clientId}:${providerConfig.clientSecret}`).toString("base64");
-  const tokenResponse = await fetchJson<{
-    access_token: string;
-    refresh_token?: string;
-    token_type: string;
-    expires_in?: number;
-    scope?: string | string[];
-  }>(
-    "https://accounts.spotify.com/api/token",
-    {
-      method: "POST",
-      headers: {
-        Authorization: `Basic ${basicAuth}`,
-        "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
-      },
-      body: new URLSearchParams({
-        grant_type: "authorization_code",
-        code: options.code,
-        redirect_uri: options.redirectUri,
-      }),
-    },
-    "Spotify token exchange failed"
-  );
-
-  const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = {
-    accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token,
-    tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type,
-    scope: normalizeScopes(tokenResponse.scope),
-    raw: tokenResponse as unknown as Record<string, unknown>,
-  };
-
-  if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) {
-    tokenSet.refreshToken = tokenResponse.refresh_token;
-  }
-
-  if (tokenResponse.expires_in) {
-    tokenSet.expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + tokenResponse.expires_in * 1000).toISOString();
-  }
-
-  return tokenSet;
-}
-
-async function refreshSpotifyAccessToken(options: {
-  config: HeimdallConfig;
-  refreshToken: string;
-}): Promise<OAuthTokenSet> {
-  const providerConfig = options.config.providers.spotify;
-  if (!providerConfig.clientId || !providerConfig.clientSecret) {
-    throw new Error("Spotify OAuth is not fully configured.");
-  }
-
-  const basicAuth = Buffer.from(`${providerConfig.clientId}:${providerConfig.clientSecret}`).toString("base64");
-  const tokenResponse = await fetchJson<{
-    access_token: string;
-    refresh_token?: string;
-    token_type: string;
-    expires_in?: number;
-    scope?: string | string[];
-  }>(
-    "https://accounts.spotify.com/api/token",
-    {
-      method: "POST",
-      headers: {
-        Authorization: `Basic ${basicAuth}`,
-        "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
-      },
-      body: new URLSearchParams({
-        grant_type: "refresh_token",
-        refresh_token: options.refreshToken,
-      }),
-    },
-    "Spotify token refresh failed"
-  );
-
-  const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = {
-    accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token,
-    tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type,
-    scope: normalizeScopes(tokenResponse.scope),
-    raw: tokenResponse as unknown as Record<string, unknown>,
-  };
-
-  if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) {
-    tokenSet.refreshToken = tokenResponse.refresh_token;
-  }
-
-  if (tokenResponse.expires_in) {
-    tokenSet.expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + tokenResponse.expires_in * 1000).toISOString();
-  }
-
-  return tokenSet;
-}
 
 async function resolveDiscordIdentity(options: { accessToken: string }): Promise<ResolvedIdentity> {
   const user = await fetchJson<{
@@ -910,6 +568,45 @@ async function resolveSpotifyIdentity(options: { accessToken: string }): Promise
   return identity;
 }
 
+async function resolveJoystickIdentity(options: { accessToken: string }): Promise<ResolvedIdentity> {
+  const profile = await fetchJson<{
+    channel_id?: string;
+    username?: string;
+    nickname?: string;
+    photo_url?: string;
+  }>(
+    "https://api.joystick.tv/api/v1/me/identity",
+    {
+      headers: {
+        Authorization: `Bearer ${options.accessToken}`,
+      },
+    },
+    "Joystick identity lookup failed"
+  );
+
+  if (!profile.channel_id) {
+    throw new Error("Joystick identity response did not include a channel id.");
+  }
+
+  const identity: ResolvedIdentity = {
+    provider: "joystick",
+    providerUserId: profile.channel_id,
+    profile: profile as unknown as Record<string, unknown>,
+  };
+  const displayName = profile.nickname ?? profile.username;
+  if (profile.username) {
+    identity.username = profile.username;
+  }
+  if (displayName) {
+    identity.displayName = displayName;
+  }
+  if (profile.photo_url) {
+    identity.avatarUrl = profile.photo_url;
+  }
+
+  return identity;
+}
+
 async function evaluateDiscordEntitlements(options: {
   config: HeimdallConfig;
   callback: OAuthCallbackContext;
@@ -1217,22 +914,22 @@ async function evaluatePatreonEntitlements(options: {
 }
 
 const discordRuntime: OAuthProviderRuntime = {
-  exchangeAuthorizationCode: exchangeDiscordAuthorizationCode,
-  refreshAccessToken: refreshDiscordAccessToken,
+  exchangeAuthorizationCode: sharedRuntimeExchange("discord"),
+  refreshAccessToken: sharedRuntimeRefresh("discord"),
   resolveIdentity: resolveDiscordIdentity,
   evaluateEntitlements: evaluateDiscordEntitlements,
 };
 
 const patreonRuntime: OAuthProviderRuntime = {
-  exchangeAuthorizationCode: exchangePatreonAuthorizationCode,
-  refreshAccessToken: refreshPatreonAccessToken,
+  exchangeAuthorizationCode: sharedRuntimeExchange("patreon"),
+  refreshAccessToken: sharedRuntimeRefresh("patreon"),
   resolveIdentity: resolvePatreonIdentity,
   evaluateEntitlements: evaluatePatreonEntitlements,
 };
 
 const twitchRuntime: OAuthProviderRuntime = {
-  exchangeAuthorizationCode: exchangeTwitchAuthorizationCode,
-  refreshAccessToken: refreshTwitchAccessToken,
+  exchangeAuthorizationCode: sharedRuntimeExchange("twitch"),
+  refreshAccessToken: sharedRuntimeRefresh("twitch"),
   resolveIdentity: resolveTwitchIdentity,
   async evaluateEntitlements() {
     return { facts: [], snapshots: [] };
@@ -1240,8 +937,8 @@ const twitchRuntime: OAuthProviderRuntime = {
 };
 
 const youtubeRuntime: OAuthProviderRuntime = {
-  exchangeAuthorizationCode: exchangeYouTubeAuthorizationCode,
-  refreshAccessToken: refreshYouTubeAccessToken,
+  exchangeAuthorizationCode: sharedRuntimeExchange("youtube"),
+  refreshAccessToken: sharedRuntimeRefresh("youtube"),
   resolveIdentity: resolveYouTubeIdentity,
   async evaluateEntitlements() {
     return { facts: [], snapshots: [] };
@@ -1249,14 +946,23 @@ const youtubeRuntime: OAuthProviderRuntime = {
 };
 
 const spotifyRuntime: OAuthProviderRuntime = {
-  exchangeAuthorizationCode: exchangeSpotifyAuthorizationCode,
-  refreshAccessToken: refreshSpotifyAccessToken,
+  exchangeAuthorizationCode: sharedRuntimeExchange("spotify"),
+  refreshAccessToken: sharedRuntimeRefresh("spotify"),
   resolveIdentity: resolveSpotifyIdentity,
   async evaluateEntitlements() {
     return { facts: [], snapshots: [] };
   },
 };
 
+const joystickRuntime: OAuthProviderRuntime = {
+  exchangeAuthorizationCode: sharedRuntimeExchange("joystick"),
+  refreshAccessToken: sharedRuntimeRefresh("joystick"),
+  resolveIdentity: resolveJoystickIdentity,
+  async evaluateEntitlements() {
+    return { facts: [], snapshots: [] };
+  },
+};
+
 const notImplementedRuntime: OAuthProviderRuntime = {
   async exchangeAuthorizationCode() {
     throw new Error("Provider callback exchange is not implemented yet.");
@@ -1279,5 +985,6 @@ export function createOAuthRuntimeRegistry(): OAuthRuntimeRegistry {
     twitch: twitchRuntime,
     youtube: youtubeRuntime,
     spotify: spotifyRuntime,
+    joystick: joystickRuntime,
   };
 }

src/provider-health-identity.ts

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import {
   sign,
   type KeyObject,
 } from "node:crypto";
-import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { closeSync, fstatSync, readSync } from "node:fs";
 import { chmod, readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
 import { SingleFileMessagePackBackingStore, type CultCacheEnvelope } from "@gamecult/cultcache-ts";
 import { readPrivateStoreRecord } from "./idunn-store.js";
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ export async function openOrEnrollProviderHealthIdentity(path: string): Promise<
   if (existing.length !== 1) {
     throw new Error("Provider-health identity store must contain exactly one record.");
   }
-  return decodePrivateIdentity(existing[0]!.payload, await readMachineId());
+  return decodePrivateIdentity(existing[0]!.payload, await readMachineId(), "bin");
 }
 
 const PRESENCE_IDENTITY_FD_NAME = "gamecult-runtime-presence-identity";
@@ -124,19 +124,50 @@ export function passedDescriptor(
  */
 export async function openProviderHealthIdentity(
   path: string,
-  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env
+  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,
+  machineId: () => Promise<string> = readMachineId
 ): Promise<PrivateIdentity> {
   const descriptor = passedDescriptor(PRESENCE_IDENTITY_FD_NAME, env);
   if (descriptor === undefined) {
+    if (env.GAMECULT_IDUNN_RUNTIME_BUNDLE) {
+      // Inside an Idunn generation a self-enrolled key is one Idunn does not
+      // trust, and its private store would land in a state root the next
+      // generation must share. The descriptor is the only identity there.
+      throw new Error(
+        `Idunn runtime bundle is set but the ${PRESENCE_IDENTITY_FD_NAME} descriptor was not passed; refusing to self-enroll`
+      );
+    }
     return openOrEnrollProviderHealthIdentity(path);
   }
 
   const payload = readPrivateStoreRecord(
-    readFileSync(descriptor),
+    readPassedDescriptor(descriptor),
     "Idunn runtime presence identity"
   );
 
-  return decodePrivateIdentity(payload, await readMachineId());
+  // The descriptor's writer is the Rust owner, whose key fields are integer arrays.
+  return decodePrivateIdentity(payload, await machineId(), "int-array");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read a passed descriptor whole, from offset 0, and close it. A descriptor is
+ * a one-shot input: reading it again starts at the offset the last read left,
+ * which is the end, so the owner reads once at open and keeps what it decoded.
+ */
+export function readPassedDescriptor(descriptor: number): Buffer {
+  try {
+    const size = fstatSync(descriptor).size;
+    const bytes = Buffer.alloc(size);
+    let read = 0;
+    while (read < size) {
+      const count = readSync(descriptor, bytes, read, size - read, read);
+      if (count === 0) break;
+      read += count;
+    }
+    return bytes.subarray(0, read);
+  } finally {
+    closeSync(descriptor);
+  }
 }
 
 export function signProviderHealthPayload(identity: PrivateIdentity, payload: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
@@ -168,23 +199,58 @@ export function providerHealthPublicIdentity(identity: PrivateIdentity): {
   return { identityId: identity.identityId, publicKeyHex: Buffer.from(identity.publicKey).toString("hex") };
 }
 
-function decodePrivateIdentity(payload: Uint8Array, machineId: string): PrivateIdentity {
+/**
+ * Which writer produced the record. The self-enrolling store this process
+ * writes keeps key fields as MessagePack bin; the Rust owner (cultnet-rs
+ * service_identity.rs) serialises a Vec<u8> without serde_bytes, so its key
+ * fields are arrays of integers. Each source is read in its own shape and the
+ * other is refused.
+ */
+type KeyShape = "bin" | "int-array";
+
+function keyBytes(value: unknown, shape: KeyShape, field: string): Uint8Array {
+  const bytes =
+    shape === "bin"
+      ? value instanceof Uint8Array
+        ? value
+        : undefined
+      : Array.isArray(value) &&
+          value.every((byte) => typeof byte === "number" && Number.isInteger(byte) && byte >= 0 && byte <= 255)
+        ? Uint8Array.from(value as number[])
+        : undefined;
+  if (bytes === undefined || bytes.length !== 32) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `Provider-health identity key shape check failed: ${field} is not a 32-byte ${shape === "bin" ? "binary" : "integer-array"} key field.`
+    );
+  }
+  return bytes;
+}
+
+function decodePrivateIdentity(payload: Uint8Array, machineId: string, shape: KeyShape): PrivateIdentity {
   const value = decode(payload);
   if (!Array.isArray(value) || value.length !== 10) {
-    throw new Error("Provider-health identity payload is malformed.");
+    throw new Error("Provider-health identity schema check failed: payload is not a 10-field record.");
   }
-  const [schema, identityId, publicKey, protectedSeed, protector, binding, version] = value;
-  if (
-    schema !== PRIVATE_SCHEMA ||
-    typeof identityId !== "string" ||
-    !(publicKey instanceof Uint8Array) || publicKey.length !== 32 ||
-    !(protectedSeed instanceof Uint8Array) || protectedSeed.length !== 32 ||
-    protector !== "linux_file_mode_machine_id_binding" ||
-    binding !== protectorBinding(machineId) ||
-    version !== "v1" ||
-    identityId !== deriveIdentityId(publicKey)
-  ) {
-    throw new Error("Provider-health identity does not belong to this host or profile.");
+  const [schema, identityId, publicKeyField, protectedSeedField, protector, binding, version] = value;
+  if (schema !== PRIVATE_SCHEMA) {
+    throw new Error("Provider-health identity schema check failed: unexpected schema id.");
+  }
+  if (typeof identityId !== "string") {
+    throw new Error("Provider-health identity id check failed: id is not a string.");
+  }
+  const publicKey = keyBytes(publicKeyField, shape, "public key");
+  const protectedSeed = keyBytes(protectedSeedField, shape, "protected seed");
+  if (protector !== "linux_file_mode_machine_id_binding") {
+    throw new Error("Provider-health identity protector check failed: unexpected protector.");
+  }
+  if (binding !== protectorBinding(machineId)) {
+    throw new Error("Provider-health identity binding check failed: not bound to this host's machine id.");
+  }
+  if (version !== "v1") {
+    throw new Error("Provider-health identity version check failed: unexpected version.");
+  }
+  if (identityId !== deriveIdentityId(publicKey)) {
+    throw new Error("Provider-health identity id check failed: id does not derive from the public key.");
   }
   const seed = xorSeed(protectedSeed, binding);
   const privateKey = privateKeyFromSeed(seed);

src/providers.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,17 @@ export interface ProviderDescriptor {
   key: Provider;
   displayName: string;
   authorizationEndpoint: string;
+  tokenEndpoint: string;
+  /** RFC 7591 names: how the client authenticates at the token endpoint. */
+  tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_basic" | "client_secret_post";
+  /** True when a refresh response replaces the refresh token and the old one dies. */
+  rotatesRefreshTokens: boolean;
+  /**
+   * Seconds an access token lives when a token answer carries no usable
+   * `expires_in` (RFC 6749 5.1 makes it RECOMMENDED, not required). An unknown
+   * expiry is never stored: the credential would never come due for refresh.
+   */
+  defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds: number;
   defaultScopes: string[];
   roles: ProviderRole[];
   clientIdEnv: string;
@@ -18,6 +29,10 @@ export const providerCatalog: Record<Provider, ProviderDescriptor> = {
     key: "discord",
     displayName: "Discord",
     authorizationEndpoint: "https://discord.com/oauth2/authorize",
+    tokenEndpoint: "https://discord.com/api/v10/oauth2/token",
+    tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_basic",
+    rotatesRefreshTokens: false,
+    defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds: 3600,
     defaultScopes: ["identify", "guilds.members.read"],
     roles: ["identity", "entitlement"],
     clientIdEnv: "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_DISCORD_CLIENT_ID",
@@ -27,6 +42,10 @@ export const providerCatalog: Record<Provider, ProviderDescriptor> = {
     key: "patreon",
     displayName: "Patreon",
     authorizationEndpoint: "https://www.patreon.com/oauth2/authorize",
+    tokenEndpoint: "https://www.patreon.com/api/oauth2/token",
+    tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_post",
+    rotatesRefreshTokens: false,
+    defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds: 3600,
     defaultScopes: ["identity", "identity[email]"],
     roles: ["identity", "entitlement"],
     clientIdEnv: "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_PATREON_CLIENT_ID",
@@ -36,6 +55,10 @@ export const providerCatalog: Record<Provider, ProviderDescriptor> = {
     key: "github",
     displayName: "GitHub",
     authorizationEndpoint: "https://github.com/login/oauth/authorize",
+    tokenEndpoint: "https://github.com/login/oauth/access_token",
+    tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_post",
+    rotatesRefreshTokens: false,
+    defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds: 3600,
     defaultScopes: ["read:user", "user:email"],
     roles: ["identity", "managed_credential"],
     clientIdEnv: "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_GITHUB_CLIENT_ID",
@@ -45,6 +68,10 @@ export const providerCatalog: Record<Provider, ProviderDescriptor> = {
     key: "twitch",
     displayName: "Twitch",
     authorizationEndpoint: "https://id.twitch.tv/oauth2/authorize",
+    tokenEndpoint: "https://id.twitch.tv/oauth2/token",
+    tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_post",
+    rotatesRefreshTokens: false,
+    defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds: 3600,
     defaultScopes: ["user:read:email"],
     roles: ["identity", "managed_credential"],
     clientIdEnv: "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_TWITCH_CLIENT_ID",
@@ -54,6 +81,10 @@ export const providerCatalog: Record<Provider, ProviderDescriptor> = {
     key: "youtube",
     displayName: "YouTube",
     authorizationEndpoint: "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth",
+    tokenEndpoint: "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token",
+    tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_post",
+    rotatesRefreshTokens: false,
+    defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds: 3600,
     defaultScopes: [
       "openid",
       "email",
@@ -73,6 +104,10 @@ export const providerCatalog: Record<Provider, ProviderDescriptor> = {
     key: "spotify",
     displayName: "Spotify",
     authorizationEndpoint: "https://accounts.spotify.com/authorize",
+    tokenEndpoint: "https://accounts.spotify.com/api/token",
+    tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_basic",
+    rotatesRefreshTokens: false,
+    defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds: 3600,
     defaultScopes: [
       "user-read-currently-playing",
       "user-read-playback-state",
@@ -82,6 +117,19 @@ export const providerCatalog: Record<Provider, ProviderDescriptor> = {
     clientIdEnv: "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_SPOTIFY_CLIENT_ID",
     clientSecretEnv: "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_SPOTIFY_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE",
   },
+  joystick: {
+    key: "joystick",
+    displayName: "Joystick",
+    authorizationEndpoint: "https://joystick.tv/api/oauth/authorize",
+    tokenEndpoint: "https://api.joystick.tv/api/oauth/token",
+    tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_basic",
+    rotatesRefreshTokens: true,
+    defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds: 3600,
+    defaultScopes: ["identity:read", "stream:read", "chat:read", "followers:read", "subscribers:read"],
+    roles: ["identity", "managed_credential"],
+    clientIdEnv: "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_JOYSTICK_CLIENT_ID",
+    clientSecretEnv: "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_JOYSTICK_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE",
+  },
 };
 
 export function buildAuthorizationUrl(options: {

src/runtime-presence.ts

@@ -19,8 +19,6 @@
 
 import path from "node:path";
 import { createHash, createPrivateKey, type KeyObject } from "node:crypto";
-import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
-import { readFile, writeFile, rename } from "node:fs/promises";
 
 import { decode } from "@msgpack/msgpack";
 import {
@@ -34,11 +32,14 @@ import {
   type RuntimePresenceState,
 } from "cultnet-ts";
 
+import type { HeimdallConfig } from "./config.js";
 import { readIdunnStoreRecord } from "./idunn-store.js";
 import {
   openProviderHealthIdentity,
   passedDescriptor,
+  readPassedDescriptor,
   signWithIdentity,
+  type PrivateIdentity,
 } from "./provider-health-identity.js";
 
 const PKCS8_ED25519_SEED_PREFIX = Buffer.from("302e020100300506032b657004220420", "hex");
@@ -178,70 +179,37 @@ export async function readRuntimeBundleFacts(bundlePath: string): Promise<Runtim
 }
 
 /**
- * Open the activation signing key Idunn passed as a descriptor.
+ * The publisher sequence a process stamps on its presence statements.
  *
- * The credential is exactly 32 bytes: the raw Ed25519 seed. It is passed as a
- * parent-only descriptor and not as a path, so only the process Idunn launched
- * can produce this half of the proof.
+ * Odin compares `publisher_sequence` only against stored presence of the same
+ * activation, and Idunn mints a fresh activation for every start, continuity
+ * restarts included. So the sequence need only strictly increase within this
+ * process; nothing has to survive a restart, and nothing is written to the
+ * state root. Muninn derives its sequence the same way: the observation clock,
+ * never below the previous value plus one.
  */
-export function openActivationSigner(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): KeyObject | undefined {
-  const descriptor = passedDescriptor(IDUNN_RUNTIME_ACTIVATION_CREDENTIAL_NAME, env);
-  if (descriptor === undefined) {
-    return undefined;
-  }
-  const seed = readFileSync(descriptor);
-  if (seed.length !== 32) {
-    throw new Error("Idunn runtime activation credential is not a 32-byte seed");
-  }
-  return createPrivateKey({
-    key: Buffer.concat([PKCS8_ED25519_SEED_PREFIX, seed]),
-    format: "der",
-    type: "pkcs8",
-  });
-}
+export class PublisherSequence {
+  private last = 0;
 
-/**
- * The publisher sequence must strictly increase for the life of a signer
- * identity, because Idunn treats a repeat or a regression as a replay and
- * refuses the observation.
- *
- * An in-process counter is therefore not enough: a restart would reset it and
- * every statement afterwards would be refused until the count climbed past the
- * old high-water mark. It lives beside the target's state instead, and is
- * advanced before use.
- */
-export async function nextPublisherSequence(sequencePath: string): Promise<number> {
-  let current = 0;
-  try {
-    const raw = (await readFile(sequencePath, "utf8")).trim();
-    const parsed = Number(raw);
-    if (Number.isSafeInteger(parsed) && parsed > 0) {
-      current = parsed;
-    }
-  } catch (error) {
-    if ((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code !== "ENOENT") {
-      throw error;
+  next(observedAtUnixMillis: number): number {
+    if (!Number.isSafeInteger(observedAtUnixMillis)) {
+      throw new Error("observedAtUnixMillis is not a safe integer");
     }
+    this.last = Math.max(observedAtUnixMillis, this.last + 1);
+    return this.last;
   }
-  const next = current + 1;
-  // Written through a temporary file: a torn write here would look like a
-  // regression and cost the target every future observation.
-  const temporary = `${sequencePath}.next`;
-  await writeFile(temporary, `${next}\n`, { mode: 0o600 });
-  await rename(temporary, sequencePath);
-  return next;
 }
 
 export interface PresenceStatementInputs {
   bundle: RuntimeBundleFacts;
+  identity: PrivateIdentity;
+  activationKey: KeyObject;
   state: RuntimePresenceState;
   detail: string;
   boundEndpoint: string | null;
   writeLeaseSha256: string | null;
   observedAtUnixMillis: number;
   publisherSequence: number;
-  providerHealthIdentityPath: string;
-  env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
 }
 
 export interface PresenceStatement {
@@ -250,24 +218,14 @@ export interface PresenceStatement {
 }
 
 /**
- * Build and dual-sign one presence statement.
+ * Build and dual-sign one presence statement from keys and facts already open.
  *
  * Returns the target alongside the bytes because the document key must equal
  * the signed target; Odin refuses the pair when they differ, and that is the
  * one part of the envelope the transport cannot infer.
  */
-export async function buildPresenceStatement(
-  inputs: PresenceStatementInputs,
-): Promise<PresenceStatement> {
-  const env = inputs.env ?? process.env;
-  const activationKey = openActivationSigner(env);
-  if (activationKey === undefined) {
-    throw new Error(
-      "Idunn passed no runtime activation credential, so this process cannot prove it is the " +
-        "incarnation Idunn started",
-    );
-  }
-  const identity = await openProviderHealthIdentity(inputs.providerHealthIdentityPath, env);
+export function buildPresenceStatement(inputs: PresenceStatementInputs): PresenceStatement {
+  const { identity } = inputs;
 
   const presence: RuntimePresenceHealth = {
     target: inputs.bundle.target,
@@ -295,7 +253,7 @@ export async function buildPresenceStatement(
   const proof = runtimePresenceProofPayload(presence);
   const signature = signWithIdentity(identity, runtimePresenceProviderSigningMessage(proof));
   const activationSignature = signWithIdentity(
-    { ...identity, privateKey: activationKey },
+    { ...identity, privateKey: inputs.activationKey },
     runtimePresenceActivationSigningMessage(proof),
   );
 
@@ -304,3 +262,72 @@ export async function buildPresenceStatement(
     payload: encodeRuntimePresenceHealth(presence, signature, activationSignature),
   };
 }
+
+export interface PresenceAuthority {
+  sign(
+    state: RuntimePresenceState,
+    detail: string,
+    observedAtUnixMillis: number,
+  ): PresenceStatement;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Open everything this launch's presence statements stand on, once, before the
+ * process listens: Idunn's bundle facts, the activation seed and the presence
+ * identity (each descriptor is read whole and closed), and the one publisher
+ * sequence. It owns them for the life of the process; a pulse supplies only its
+ * state, detail and observation time.
+ *
+ * A launch-contract fault (a missing or malformed bundle, descriptor or
+ * identity) throws here, so the process exits before it accepts a request and
+ * Idunn fails Warming at once, instead of a listener that can never sign.
+ */
+export async function openPresenceAuthority(
+  config: Pick<HeimdallConfig, "idunnRuntimeBundlePath" | "host" | "port" | "providerHealthIdentityPath">,
+  env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env,
+  machineId?: () => Promise<string>,
+): Promise<PresenceAuthority> {
+  if (!config.idunnRuntimeBundlePath) {
+    throw new Error("no Idunn runtime bundle path: presence has no launch to attest");
+  }
+  const bundle = await readRuntimeBundleFacts(config.idunnRuntimeBundlePath);
+
+  const activationDescriptor = passedDescriptor(IDUNN_RUNTIME_ACTIVATION_CREDENTIAL_NAME, env);
+  if (activationDescriptor === undefined) {
+    throw new Error(
+      "Idunn passed no runtime activation credential, so this process cannot prove it is the " +
+        "incarnation Idunn started",
+    );
+  }
+  const seed = readPassedDescriptor(activationDescriptor);
+  if (seed.length !== 32) {
+    throw new Error("Idunn runtime activation credential is not a 32-byte seed");
+  }
+  const activationKey = createPrivateKey({
+    key: Buffer.concat([PKCS8_ED25519_SEED_PREFIX, seed]),
+    format: "der",
+    type: "pkcs8",
+  });
+
+  const identity = await openProviderHealthIdentity(config.providerHealthIdentityPath, env, machineId);
+  const boundEndpoint = `http://${config.host}:${config.port}`;
+  const sequence = new PublisherSequence();
+
+  return {
+    sign: (state, detail, observedAtUnixMillis) =>
+      buildPresenceStatement({
+        bundle,
+        identity,
+        activationKey,
+        state,
+        detail,
+        boundEndpoint,
+        // A warming candidate holds no lease and must not claim one; the
+        // contract refuses the pair, and Idunn needs the warming statement to
+        // promote it.
+        writeLeaseSha256: null,
+        observedAtUnixMillis,
+        publisherSequence: sequence.next(observedAtUnixMillis),
+      }),
+  };
+}

src/store/in-memory.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import {
   type CreateAuthCompletionInput,
   type CreateAuditEventInput,
   type CreateCapabilityGrantInput,
+  type CredentialDecision,
   type CreateEntitlementSnapshotInput,
   type CreateSessionInput,
   type CreatePrivateCommandReceiptInput,
@@ -37,6 +38,8 @@ function isGrantActive(grant: StoredCapabilityGrant, appSlug: AppSlug, at: strin
 }
 
 export class InMemoryStore implements HeimdallStore {
+  /** Tail of each linked identity's credential-decision chain; an entry is removed when it drains. */
+  private readonly credentialChains = new Map<string, Promise<unknown>>();
   private readonly accounts = new Map<string, StoredAccount>();
   private readonly linkedIdentities = new Map<string, StoredLinkedIdentity>();
   private readonly grants = new Map<string, StoredCapabilityGrant>();
@@ -174,6 +177,43 @@ export class InMemoryStore implements HeimdallStore {
     return clone(linkedIdentity);
   }
 
+  async updateLinkedIdentityCredential(
+    id: string,
+    decide: (locked: StoredLinkedIdentity) => Promise<CredentialDecision>,
+  ): Promise<StoredLinkedIdentity | null> {
+    const previous = this.credentialChains.get(id) ?? Promise.resolve();
+    const run = previous.then(async () => {
+      const current = this.linkedIdentities.get(id);
+      if (!current) {
+        return null;
+      }
+      const decision = await decide(clone(current));
+      if (decision.kind === "keep") {
+        return clone(current);
+      }
+      const next: StoredLinkedIdentity = { ...current, updatedAt: decision.updatedAt };
+      delete next.accessTokenEncrypted;
+      delete next.refreshTokenEncrypted;
+      delete next.tokenExpiresAt;
+      if (decision.kind === "rotate") {
+        next.accessTokenEncrypted = decision.accessTokenEncrypted;
+        next.refreshTokenEncrypted = decision.refreshTokenEncrypted;
+        next.tokenExpiresAt = decision.tokenExpiresAt;
+        next.scopes = [...decision.scopes];
+      }
+      this.linkedIdentities.set(id, clone(next));
+      return clone(next);
+    });
+    const tail = run.catch(() => undefined);
+    this.credentialChains.set(id, tail);
+    void tail.then(() => {
+      if (this.credentialChains.get(id) === tail) {
+        this.credentialChains.delete(id);
+      }
+    });
+    return run;
+  }
+
   async listLinkedIdentitiesForAccount(accountId: string): Promise<LinkedIdentityInput[]> {
     return [...this.linkedIdentities.values()]
       .filter((identity) => identity.accountId === accountId)

src/store/index.ts

@@ -32,9 +32,13 @@ export async function createStore(config: HeimdallConfig): Promise<HeimdallStore
     // A refused store is never handed out, so it is closed here: its pool
     // would otherwise hold the connection open.
     await store.close().catch(() => undefined);
-    throw new Error(
-      `Postgres storage could not be prepared (${typeof code === "string" ? code : "error"}); check GC_ACCESS_DATABASE_URL_FILE.`
-    );
+    // A role that may not create temporary tables is not a bad URL, so that
+    // refusal names the privilege instead.
+    const remedy =
+      code === "SCHEMA_TEMP_PRIVILEGE"
+        ? "grant the database role TEMPORARY on its database"
+        : "check GC_ACCESS_DATABASE_URL_FILE";
+    throw new Error(`Postgres storage could not be prepared (${typeof code === "string" ? code : "error"}); ${remedy}.`);
   }
 
   return store;

src/store/postgres.ts

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import {
   type CreateAuthCompletionInput,
   type CreateAuditEventInput,
   type CreateCapabilityGrantInput,
+  type CredentialDecision,
   type CreateEntitlementSnapshotInput,
   type CreateSessionInput,
   type CreatePrivateCommandReceiptInput,
@@ -158,8 +159,8 @@ function mapLinkedIdentityRow(row: LinkedIdentityRow): StoredLinkedIdentity {
     providerUserId: row.provider_user_id,
     scopes: parseScopes(row.scopes),
     profileJson: row.profile_json,
-    createdAt: row.created_at,
-    updatedAt: row.updated_at,
+    createdAt: new Date(row.created_at).toISOString(),
+    updatedAt: new Date(row.updated_at).toISOString(),
   };
 
   if (row.username) {
@@ -183,7 +184,8 @@ function mapLinkedIdentityRow(row: LinkedIdentityRow): StoredLinkedIdentity {
   }
 
   if (row.token_expires_at) {
-    identity.tokenExpiresAt = row.token_expires_at;
+    // pg hands back a Date for TIMESTAMPTZ whatever the row type says; the port promises ISO strings.
+    identity.tokenExpiresAt = new Date(row.token_expires_at).toISOString();
   }
 
   return identity;
@@ -363,36 +365,6 @@ export function samePredicate(declared: string, actual: string, keyColumns: stri
   return left.length === right.length && left.every((condition, index) => condition === right[index]);
 }
 
-/**
- * Each REQUIRED_KEYS predicate as Postgres prints it back (empty for none).
- * One simple-protocol round trip on one connection: a transaction that
- * builds a temporary copy of each keyed table's declared columns, indexes
- * it with the declared predicate, reads the printed form and rolls back.
- * The names and SQL are the schema's own constants, never input.
- */
-export async function printedDeclaredPredicates(pool: Pick<Pool, "query">): Promise<string[]> {
-  const partial = REQUIRED_KEYS.flatMap((required, index) => (required.predicate ? [{ ...required, index }] : []));
-  if (partial.length === 0) return REQUIRED_KEYS.map(() => "");
-  const statements = partial.flatMap(({ table, columns, predicate, index }) => {
-    const probe = `heimdall_key_probe_${index}`;
-    const declared = REQUIRED_COLUMNS.filter((column) => column.table === table)
-      .map((column) => `${column.column} ${column.type}`)
-      .join(", ");
-    return [
-      `CREATE TEMP TABLE ${probe} (${declared}) ON COMMIT DROP`,
-      `CREATE UNIQUE INDEX ${probe}_idx ON ${probe} (${columns}) WHERE ${predicate}`,
-    ];
-  });
-  const select = partial
-    .map(({ index }) => `SELECT ${index} AS key, pg_get_expr(indpred, indrelid) AS predicate FROM pg_index WHERE indexrelid = 'pg_temp.heimdall_key_probe_${index}_idx'::regclass`)
-    .join(" UNION ALL ");
-  const results = (await pool.query(["BEGIN", ...statements, select, "ROLLBACK"].join(";\n"))) as unknown as Array<{
-    rows: Array<{ key: number; predicate: string }>;
-  }>;
-  const printed = results[results.length - 2]!.rows;
-  return REQUIRED_KEYS.map((_, index) => printed.find((row) => row.key === index)?.predicate ?? "");
-}
-
 /**
  * What the store's statements do to each table, and so the privileges its
  * database role needs: it reads what it returns or looks up, inserts what it
@@ -411,120 +383,180 @@ export const STORE_TABLE_PRIVILEGES: Readonly<Record<string, readonly ("SELECT"
   audit_events: ["INSERT"],
 };
 
+/** What a database must hold for a store to serve it; see checkSchemaRequirements. */
+export interface SchemaRequirements {
+  tables: readonly string[];
+  columns: readonly { table: string; column: string; type: string; nullable: boolean }[];
+  keys: readonly { table: string; columns: string; predicate: string }[];
+  privileges: Readonly<Record<string, readonly string[]>>;
+}
+
+/** What Heimdall's store needs, read from its schema and its statements. */
+export const HEIMDALL_SCHEMA_REQUIREMENTS: SchemaRequirements = {
+  tables: REQUIRED_TABLES,
+  columns: REQUIRED_COLUMNS,
+  keys: REQUIRED_KEYS,
+  privileges: STORE_TABLE_PRIVILEGES,
+};
+
+/**
+ * Each required key's predicate as Postgres prints it back (empty for none).
+ * One simple-protocol round trip on one connection: a transaction that builds
+ * a temporary copy of each keyed table's declared columns, indexes it with the
+ * declared predicate, reads the printed form and rolls back. The names and SQL
+ * come from the requirements, which are constants, never input. A role that
+ * may not create temporary tables fails with code SCHEMA_TEMP_PRIVILEGE.
+ */
+export async function printedDeclaredPredicates(pool: Pick<Pool, "query">, requirements: SchemaRequirements): Promise<string[]> {
+  const partial = requirements.keys.flatMap((required, index) => (required.predicate ? [{ ...required, index }] : []));
+  if (partial.length === 0) return requirements.keys.map(() => "");
+  const statements = partial.flatMap(({ table, columns, predicate, index }) => {
+    const probe = `heimdall_key_probe_${index}`;
+    const declared = requirements.columns
+      .filter((column) => column.table === table)
+      .map((column) => `${column.column} ${column.type}`)
+      .join(", ");
+    return [
+      `CREATE TEMP TABLE ${probe} (${declared}) ON COMMIT DROP`,
+      `CREATE UNIQUE INDEX ${probe}_idx ON ${probe} (${columns}) WHERE ${predicate}`,
+    ];
+  });
+  const select = partial
+    .map(({ index }) => `SELECT ${index} AS key, pg_get_expr(indpred, indrelid) AS predicate FROM pg_index WHERE indexrelid = 'pg_temp.heimdall_key_probe_${index}_idx'::regclass`)
+    .join(" UNION ALL ");
+  let results: Array<{ rows: Array<{ key: number; predicate: string }> }>;
+  try {
+    results = (await pool.query(["BEGIN", ...statements, select, "ROLLBACK"].join(";\n"))) as unknown as typeof results;
+  } catch (error) {
+    if ((error as { code?: unknown }).code === "42501") {
+      throw Object.assign(new Error("The Heimdall database role may not create temporary tables."), { code: "SCHEMA_TEMP_PRIVILEGE" });
+    }
+    throw error;
+  }
+  const printed = results[results.length - 2]!.rows;
+  return requirements.keys.map((_, index) => printed.find((row) => row.key === index)?.predicate ?? "");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Proves that the database can take a store's requests: every required
+ * table; every column with its declared type, under a deterministic
+ * collation, and nullable where declared nullable; every unique key; and
+ * every privilege, held on the table or on each of its columns. A missing or
+ * altered piece fails with code SCHEMA_MISSING and a missing privilege with
+ * SCHEMA_PRIVILEGES; neither error names the piece.
+ *
+ * A key is met by a unique index on its table that is valid (a failed
+ * CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY or an interrupted DROP INDEX CONCURRENTLY leaves
+ * one that is not; Postgres never marks an index valid before it is ready),
+ * immediate (ON CONFLICT refuses a deferrable arbiter), has exactly the key's
+ * columns as its key columns (INCLUDE columns aside), compares them under
+ * deterministic collations (a case-insensitive one would merge two
+ * providers' user ids into one row), and has the key's predicate. A
+ * predicate matches when both, as Postgres prints them, are the same set of
+ * AND-ed conditions; a `key_column IS NOT NULL` condition may be absent on
+ * either side, because a unique index never makes NULL keys collide unless
+ * it is NULLS NOT DISTINCT. Postgres prints the declared predicates itself
+ * (printedDeclaredPredicates).
+ *
+ * What this does not prove is listed where the schema is: see schema.ts.
+ */
+export async function checkSchemaRequirements(pool: Pick<Pool, "query">, requirements: SchemaRequirements): Promise<void> {
+  const declaredPredicates = await printedDeclaredPredicates(pool, requirements);
+  const privileges = Object.entries(requirements.privileges).flatMap(([table, wanted]) =>
+    wanted.map((privilege) => ({ table, privilege }))
+  );
+  const result = await pool.query<{
+    kind: "missing" | "privilege" | "candidate";
+    key: number | null;
+    predicate: string | null;
+    nulls_not_distinct: boolean | null;
+  }>(
+    `
+    SELECT 'missing' AS kind, NULL::int AS key, NULL::text AS predicate, NULL::boolean AS nulls_not_distinct
+    FROM unnest($1::text[]) AS name WHERE to_regclass(name) IS NULL
+    UNION ALL
+    SELECT 'missing', NULL, NULL, NULL
+    FROM unnest($2::text[], $3::text[], $4::text[], $5::boolean[]) AS required(table_name, column_name, type_name, nullable)
+    WHERE NOT EXISTS (
+      SELECT 1 FROM pg_attribute a
+      WHERE a.attrelid = to_regclass(required.table_name)
+        AND a.attname = required.column_name
+        AND a.attnum > 0
+        AND NOT a.attisdropped
+        AND a.atttypid = to_regtype(required.type_name)
+        AND (NOT required.nullable OR NOT a.attnotnull)
+        AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_collation c WHERE c.oid = a.attcollation AND NOT c.collisdeterministic)
+    )
+    UNION ALL
+    SELECT 'candidate', required.key::int, pg_get_expr(i.indpred, i.indrelid),
+      coalesce((to_jsonb(i) ->> 'indnullsnotdistinct')::boolean, false)
+    FROM unnest($6::text[], $7::text[]) WITH ORDINALITY AS required(table_name, columns, key)
+    JOIN pg_index i ON i.indrelid = to_regclass(required.table_name)
+    WHERE i.indisunique
+      AND i.indisvalid
+      AND i.indimmediate
+      AND i.indnkeyatts = cardinality(string_to_array(required.columns, ','))
+      AND (
+        SELECT string_agg(a.attname, ',' ORDER BY a.attname)
+        FROM unnest(i.indkey::int2[]) WITH ORDINALITY AS key(attnum, position)
+        JOIN pg_attribute a ON a.attrelid = i.indrelid AND a.attnum = key.attnum
+        WHERE key.position <= i.indnkeyatts
+      ) = required.columns
+      AND NOT EXISTS (
+        SELECT 1 FROM unnest(i.indcollation::oid[]) WITH ORDINALITY AS key_collation(oid, position)
+        JOIN pg_collation c ON c.oid = key_collation.oid
+        WHERE key_collation.position <= i.indnkeyatts AND NOT c.collisdeterministic
+      )
+    UNION ALL
+    SELECT 'privilege', NULL, NULL, NULL
+    FROM unnest($8::text[], $9::text[]) AS required(table_name, privilege)
+    WHERE EXISTS (
+      SELECT 1 FROM unnest($2::text[], $3::text[]) AS used(table_name, column_name)
+      JOIN pg_attribute a ON a.attrelid = to_regclass(used.table_name) AND a.attname = used.column_name AND NOT a.attisdropped
+      WHERE used.table_name = required.table_name
+        AND NOT has_column_privilege(a.attrelid, a.attnum, required.privilege)
+    )
+    `,
+    [
+      requirements.tables,
+      requirements.columns.map((required) => required.table),
+      requirements.columns.map((required) => required.column),
+      requirements.columns.map((required) => required.type),
+      requirements.columns.map((required) => required.nullable),
+      requirements.keys.map((required) => required.table),
+      requirements.keys.map((required) => required.columns),
+      privileges.map((required) => required.table),
+      privileges.map((required) => required.privilege),
+    ]
+  );
+  const keyMet = requirements.keys.map((required, index) =>
+    result.rows.some(
+      (row) =>
+        row.kind === "candidate" &&
+        row.key === index + 1 &&
+        samePredicate(declaredPredicates[index]!, row.predicate ?? "", required.columns.split(","), row.nulls_not_distinct === true)
+    )
+  );
+  if (result.rows.some((row) => row.kind === "missing") || keyMet.includes(false)) {
+    throw Object.assign(new Error("The Heimdall schema is not applied."), { code: "SCHEMA_MISSING" });
+  }
+  if (result.rows.some((row) => row.kind === "privilege")) {
+    throw Object.assign(new Error("The Heimdall database role lacks a privilege the store needs."), {
+      code: "SCHEMA_PRIVILEGES",
+    });
+  }
+}
+
 export class PostgresStore implements HeimdallStore {
-  constructor(private readonly pool: Pick<Pool, "query" | "end">) {}
+  constructor(private readonly pool: Pick<Pool, "query" | "end" | "connect">) {}
 
   async ensureSchema(): Promise<void> {
     await this.pool.query(CREATE_SCHEMA_SQL);
   }
 
-  /**
-   * Proves, before Heimdall serves, that the database can take its requests:
-   * every table the schema makes; every column with its declared type, and
-   * nullable where the schema leaves it nullable; every unique key; and every
-   * privilege in STORE_TABLE_PRIVILEGES, held on the table or on each of its
-   * columns. A missing or altered piece fails with code SCHEMA_MISSING and a
-   * missing privilege with SCHEMA_PRIVILEGES; neither error names the piece.
-   *
-   * A key is met by a unique index on its table that is valid (a failed
-   * CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY or an interrupted DROP INDEX CONCURRENTLY leaves
-   * one that is not; Postgres never marks an index valid before it is ready),
-   * immediate (ON CONFLICT refuses a deferrable arbiter), has exactly the key's columns
-   * as its key columns (INCLUDE columns aside), compares them under
-   * deterministic collations (a case-insensitive one would merge two
-   * providers' user ids into one row), and has the key's predicate. A
-   * predicate matches when both, as Postgres prints them, are the same set of
-   * AND-ed conditions; a `key_column IS NOT NULL` condition may be absent on
-   * either side, because a unique index never makes NULL keys collide unless
-   * it is NULLS NOT DISTINCT.
-   *
-   * Postgres prints the declared predicates itself: they are indexed on a
-   * temporary copy of the table in a transaction that is rolled back.
-   */
+  /** Proves, before Heimdall serves, that the database can take its requests (checkSchemaRequirements). */
   async checkSchema(): Promise<void> {
-    const declaredPredicates = await printedDeclaredPredicates(this.pool);
-    const privileges = Object.entries(STORE_TABLE_PRIVILEGES).flatMap(([table, wanted]) =>
-      wanted.map((privilege) => ({ table, privilege }))
-    );
-    const result = await this.pool.query<{
-      kind: "missing" | "privilege" | "candidate";
-      key: number | null;
-      predicate: string | null;
-      nulls_not_distinct: boolean | null;
-    }>(
-      `
-      SELECT 'missing' AS kind, NULL::int AS key, NULL::text AS predicate, NULL::boolean AS nulls_not_distinct
-      FROM unnest($1::text[]) AS name WHERE to_regclass(name) IS NULL
-      UNION ALL
-      SELECT 'missing', NULL, NULL, NULL
-      FROM unnest($2::text[], $3::text[], $4::text[], $5::boolean[]) AS required(table_name, column_name, type_name, nullable)
-      WHERE NOT EXISTS (
-        SELECT 1 FROM pg_attribute a
-        WHERE a.attrelid = to_regclass(required.table_name)
-          AND a.attname = required.column_name
-          AND a.attnum > 0
-          AND NOT a.attisdropped
-          AND a.atttypid = to_regtype(required.type_name)
-          AND (NOT required.nullable OR NOT a.attnotnull)
-      )
-      UNION ALL
-      SELECT 'candidate', required.key::int, pg_get_expr(i.indpred, i.indrelid),
-        coalesce((to_jsonb(i) ->> 'indnullsnotdistinct')::boolean, false)
-      FROM unnest($6::text[], $7::text[]) WITH ORDINALITY AS required(table_name, columns, key)
-      JOIN pg_index i ON i.indrelid = to_regclass(required.table_name)
-      WHERE i.indisunique
-        AND i.indisvalid
-        AND i.indimmediate
-        AND i.indnkeyatts = cardinality(string_to_array(required.columns, ','))
-        AND (
-          SELECT string_agg(a.attname, ',' ORDER BY a.attname)
-          FROM unnest(i.indkey::int2[]) WITH ORDINALITY AS key(attnum, position)
-          JOIN pg_attribute a ON a.attrelid = i.indrelid AND a.attnum = key.attnum
-          WHERE key.position <= i.indnkeyatts
-        ) = required.columns
-        AND NOT EXISTS (
-          SELECT 1 FROM unnest(i.indcollation::oid[]) WITH ORDINALITY AS key_collation(oid, position)
-          JOIN pg_collation c ON c.oid = key_collation.oid
-          WHERE key_collation.position <= i.indnkeyatts AND NOT c.collisdeterministic
-        )
-      UNION ALL
-      SELECT 'privilege', NULL, NULL, NULL
-      FROM unnest($8::text[], $9::text[]) AS required(table_name, privilege)
-      WHERE EXISTS (
-        SELECT 1 FROM unnest($2::text[], $3::text[]) AS used(table_name, column_name)
-        JOIN pg_attribute a ON a.attrelid = to_regclass(used.table_name) AND a.attname = used.column_name AND NOT a.attisdropped
-        WHERE used.table_name = required.table_name
-          AND NOT has_column_privilege(a.attrelid, a.attnum, required.privilege)
-      )
-      `,
-      [
-        REQUIRED_TABLES,
-        REQUIRED_COLUMNS.map((required) => required.table),
-        REQUIRED_COLUMNS.map((required) => required.column),
-        REQUIRED_COLUMNS.map((required) => required.type),
-        REQUIRED_COLUMNS.map((required) => required.nullable),
-        REQUIRED_KEYS.map((required) => required.table),
-        REQUIRED_KEYS.map((required) => required.columns),
-        privileges.map((required) => required.table),
-        privileges.map((required) => required.privilege),
-      ]
-    );
-    const keyMet = REQUIRED_KEYS.map((required, index) =>
-      result.rows.some(
-        (row) =>
-          row.kind === "candidate" &&
-          row.key === index + 1 &&
-          samePredicate(declaredPredicates[index]!, row.predicate ?? "", required.columns.split(","), row.nulls_not_distinct === true)
-      )
-    );
-    if (result.rows.some((row) => row.kind === "missing") || keyMet.includes(false)) {
-      throw Object.assign(new Error("The Heimdall schema is not applied."), { code: "SCHEMA_MISSING" });
-    }
-    if (result.rows.some((row) => row.kind === "privilege")) {
-      throw Object.assign(new Error("The Heimdall database role lacks a privilege the store needs."), {
-        code: "SCHEMA_PRIVILEGES",
-      });
-    }
+    await checkSchemaRequirements(this.pool, HEIMDALL_SCHEMA_REQUIREMENTS);
   }
 
   async close(): Promise<void> {
@@ -692,6 +724,60 @@ export class PostgresStore implements HeimdallStore {
     return mapLinkedIdentityRow(expectRow(result.rows[0], "upsertLinkedIdentity"));
   }
 
+  async updateLinkedIdentityCredential(
+    id: string,
+    decide: (locked: StoredLinkedIdentity) => Promise<CredentialDecision>,
+  ): Promise<StoredLinkedIdentity | null> {
+    const client = await this.pool.connect();
+    try {
+      await client.query("BEGIN");
+      try {
+        const locked = await client.query<LinkedIdentityRow>(
+          "SELECT * FROM linked_identities WHERE id = $1 FOR UPDATE",
+          [id]
+        );
+        if (!locked.rowCount) {
+          await client.query("COMMIT");
+          return null;
+        }
+        const row = mapLinkedIdentityRow(expectRow(locked.rows[0], "updateLinkedIdentityCredential"));
+        const decision = await decide(row);
+        let committed = row;
+        if (decision.kind !== "keep") {
+          const rotated = decision.kind === "rotate" ? decision : undefined;
+          const written = await client.query<LinkedIdentityRow>(
+            `
+            UPDATE linked_identities
+            SET access_token_encrypted = $2,
+                refresh_token_encrypted = $3,
+                token_expires_at = $4,
+                scopes = $5,
+                updated_at = $6
+            WHERE id = $1
+            RETURNING *
+            `,
+            [
+              id,
+              nullable(rotated?.accessTokenEncrypted),
+              nullable(rotated?.refreshTokenEncrypted),
+              nullable(rotated?.tokenExpiresAt),
+              (rotated?.scopes ?? row.scopes).join(" "),
+              decision.updatedAt,
+            ]
+          );
+          committed = mapLinkedIdentityRow(expectRow(written.rows[0], "updateLinkedIdentityCredential"));
+        }
+        await client.query("COMMIT");
+        return committed;
+      } catch (error) {
+        await client.query("ROLLBACK");
+        throw error;
+      }
+    } finally {
+      client.release();
+    }
+  }
+
   async listLinkedIdentitiesForAccount(accountId: string): Promise<LinkedIdentityInput[]> {
     const result = await this.pool.query<LinkedIdentityRow>(
       `

src/store/schema.ts

@@ -187,8 +187,15 @@ function keyColumns(line: string, keyword: "PRIMARY KEY" | "UNIQUE"): string | u
  * speed lookups are not required; the unique ones are, by shape, in
  * REQUIRED_KEYS.
  *
- * Out of scope: CHECK constraints, triggers and row-level security. Each can
- * make a write fail on a database that passes this check.
+ * Out of scope, each able to make a write fail on a database that passes the
+ * check: CHECK constraints; triggers; row-level security; unique indexes
+ * beyond the required keys, or stricter than them, including the leftovers of
+ * an interrupted concurrent index build (a valid extra one refuses rows the
+ * store expects to write, and even an invalid one that is ready is enforced
+ * on writes); NOT NULL columns the schema does not declare and that have no
+ * default, which the store's INSERTs leave out; and SELECT granted column by
+ * column when a statement reads `SELECT *` or `RETURNING *`, which needs
+ * SELECT on every column the table has, not only the declared ones.
  */
 
 /** Every table the schema creates. */

src/store/types.ts

@@ -56,6 +56,23 @@ export interface UpsertLinkedIdentityInput {
   updatedAt: string;
 }
 
+/**
+ * What the owner of a refresh decides after reading the row under its lock.
+ * `rotate` and `revoke` write token columns, scopes and updated_at only; they
+ * never touch account, profile or identity fields.
+ */
+export type CredentialDecision =
+  | { kind: "keep" }
+  | {
+      kind: "rotate";
+      accessTokenEncrypted: string;
+      refreshTokenEncrypted: string;
+      tokenExpiresAt: string;
+      scopes: string[];
+      updatedAt: string;
+    }
+  | { kind: "revoke"; updatedAt: string };
+
 export interface StoredSession {
   id: string;
   accountId: string;
@@ -213,6 +230,17 @@ export interface HeimdallStore {
   findStoredLinkedIdentityForAccount(accountId: string, provider: Provider): Promise<StoredLinkedIdentity | null>;
   listStoredLinkedIdentitiesForAccount(accountId: string): Promise<StoredLinkedIdentity[]>;
   upsertLinkedIdentity(input: UpsertLinkedIdentityInput): Promise<StoredLinkedIdentity>;
+  /**
+   * Serialise decisions about one row's credential. `decide` receives the row
+   * as read under the lock (never a caller's snapshot) and the decision is
+   * committed before this resolves, so a rotated pair is persisted before any
+   * caller sees the new access token. Returns the committed row, or null when
+   * no row has that id. A throw from `decide` writes nothing.
+   */
+  updateLinkedIdentityCredential(
+    id: string,
+    decide: (locked: StoredLinkedIdentity) => Promise<CredentialDecision>,
+  ): Promise<StoredLinkedIdentity | null>;
   listLinkedIdentitiesForAccount(accountId: string): Promise<LinkedIdentityInput[]>;
   createCapabilityGrant(input: CreateCapabilityGrantInput): Promise<StoredCapabilityGrant>;
   listActiveGrants(accountId: string, appSlug: AppSlug, at: string): Promise<StoredCapabilityGrant[]>;

state/branches.json

@@ -12,6 +12,15 @@
         "docs/implementation-plan.md"
       ],
       "notes": "Current mainline. Repixelizer is the first auth-blank binding target; StreamPixels is the migration and boundary stress test."
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "eureka/joystick-h1",
+      "hypothesis": "One locked refresh primitive plus a Joystick OAuth provider in Heimdall lets StreamPixels ingest Joystick without ever presenting a provider refresh token.",
+      "status": "accepted",
+      "artifacts": [
+        "state/map.yaml"
+      ],
+      "notes": "Merged as PR GameCult/Heimdall#1 (d51fa6b), deployed to Yggdrasil 2026-10-19 15:51Z; gamecult-ops 210a1af. Campaign joystick:campaign:self."
     }
   ]
 }

state/evidence.jsonl

@@ -35,3 +35,5 @@
 {"ts":"2026-08-22T02:01:00+00:00","type":"deployment","status":"accepted","note":"Yggdrasil runs Heimdall 1086aee01169bf60e8a492b2740db1c6f3e8cabf with CultLib 5cefa0db0079a8e3ee22f29d7b9e6e5aa60912a9. Odin b4f9a2e95f0b41cebdeddc49223781d1d3c7b42a returns Heimdall's provider, command boundary, Eve plugin, and transport profile under unique catalog keys. Ghostlight b515ca90c25573005a616244143803b37f2d06ec accepted canonical auth.begin through the Odin-resolved boundary; only advertised Discord and Heimdall navigation origins reached the browser."}
 {"ts": "2026-09-06T22:12:03+00:00", "type": "design", "status": "accepted", "note": "App slugs are no longer compile-time. AppSlug is a string; membership is a registry lookup, or isAppSlug shape validation where no store is reachable (the offline verifier). Capability rules are data (anyOf over Heimdall's own fact vocabulary), replacing a per-profile evaluateSharedCapabilities function that could not be accepted from a stranger. POST /v1/apps registers in RFC 7591 shape, gated on GC_ACCESS_APP_REGISTRATION_SECRET and closed until it is set. Built-in slugs are reserved so a registration cannot shadow a shipped app's audience. Motivation: a creator self-hosting Erycina alongside Heimdall would otherwise maintain a patched auth server to add one slug."}
 {"ts": "2026-09-08T12:20:12+00:00", "type": "security", "status": "accepted", "note": "epiphany/heimdall-caller-identity, second Hands pass: closed the two Soul-proven holes. (1) auth-completions redeem code is now always store-minted (never handoff.attemptId); attemptId survives only as a separate correlation field on StoredAuthCompletion/CreateAuthCompletionInput, and a new store.consumeAuthCompletionByAttempt(appSlug, attemptId, at) lets the private command plane's completeAuth redeem by the handle it already owns instead of forging an HTTP self-call with completionCode=handle. (2) startOAuthFlow now refuses any returnTo whose origin is not in AppProfile.allowedReturnOrigins (repixelizer/streampixels/bifrost -> <slug>.gamecult.org, ghostlight -> yggdrasil.gamecult.org per its docs/app-profiles doc and existing test fixtures; a registered app's allowlist is derived from its stored redirectUris origins). AppCaller is now branded with an unexported Symbol (app-caller.ts); private-command-plane.ts's two { appSlug } literals are gone, replaced by app-caller.ts's callerFromOpenedEnvelope. Deleted: validateAppRegistration, AppRegistrationRequest, RegistrationProblem, AppRegistrationError, HeimdallStore.registerApp (writer). Kept: findRegisteredApp/listRegisteredApps/resolveAppProfile fallback -- AppSlug is a plain string (contracts.ts), registered_apps is a real extension point for a slug Heimdall was never rebuilt for, and isBuiltInApp's only production call site (listAppProfiles) depends on that fallback existing; a row is now provisioned by direct SQL (or InMemoryStore.seedRegisteredApp in tests), not by any app-facing writer. Deleted the two appSlug===\"ghostlight\" branches in private-command-plane.ts; the requirement is now AppProfile.requiredEntitlementPolicyKind, checked generically through resolveAppProfile. tsc --noEmit clean; vitest 94 passed/1 pre-existing-skip, only pre-existing failure is tests/odin-publication.test.ts (Cannot find module 'cultcache-ts', present on main too).", "branch": "epiphany/heimdall-caller-identity"}
+{"ts": "2026-10-19T15:56:24+00:00", "type": "design", "status": "accepted", "note": "Refresh is now one locked primitive for every provider (replaces unserialized refreshLinkedIdentityCredentialIfNeeded); Joystick is managed-only (Heimdall-held credential, no viewer sign-in until joystick:follow_up:joystick-viewer-signin-public-bot). Merged in PR #1, live at d51fa6b; campaign joystick:campaign:self.", "branch": "eureka/joystick-h1"}
+{"ts": "2026-10-19T16:03:16+00:00", "type": "verification", "status": "accepted", "note": "Live d51fa6b (H1) verified by a real human sign-in: the operator's StreamPixels Twitch sign-in through Heimdall start/callback, 2026-10-19 ('Twitch auth worked fine'); a streampixels session was created 16:02:33Z, after the 15:51Z switch. Joystick consent round trip still open: joystick:follow_up:h1-joystick-consent-round-trip."}

state/map.yaml

@@ -59,13 +59,14 @@ data_flow:
     - reject per-request auth round-trip chatter
 
 active_subgoals:
-  - Pressure the deployed Ghostlight gamecult.heimdall.access integration with two- and eight-account human canaries.
+  - Joystick H1 is merged and live (PR GameCult/Heimdall#1, d51fa6b; campaign joystick:campaign:self). Open follow-ups by id: joystick:follow_up:h1-joystick-consent-round-trip (next), cross-process-failed-refresh-marker, connect-start-needs-app-auth, heimdall-idunn-onboarding, joystick-viewer-signin-public-bot. StreamPixels S0/S1 run in other sessions.
+  - OPEN, behind the H1 live round-trips: pressure the deployed Ghostlight gamecult.heimdall.access integration with two- and eight-account human canaries.
   - Keep the shared architecture explicit and separate from app profiles.
   - Preserve the default boundary that app-domain data remains app-owned.
   - Align the plan to Heimdall as a Yggdrasil-hosted authority service.
   - Publish Heimdall daemon health and boundary state for Idunn/Odin without moving auth truth out of Heimdall.
   - Verify the Discord and Patreon Repixelizer auth paths with real provider credentials, stable signing, persistent storage, and live browser callback verification.
-  - Wire StreamPixels through Heimdall for Twitch/YouTube viewer identity and managed creator-provider credentials without moving StreamPixels domain state into Heimdall.
+  - Wire StreamPixels through Heimdall for Twitch/YouTube (Joystick joins under H1) viewer identity and managed creator-provider credentials without moving StreamPixels domain state into Heimdall.
 
 accepted_design:
   - `gamecult.heimdall.access` owns access-gate representation and browser navigation semantics; it has no access-grant or provider-state authority.
@@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ accepted_design:
 
 landed_baseline:
   - Heimdall publishes its redacted provider, command boundary, Eve plugin, and transport profile through Odin under globally unique record keys; Ghostlight resolves that boundary instead of owning a direct endpoint.
-  - Yggdrasil runs Heimdall 1086aee01169bf60e8a492b2740db1c6f3e8cabf with CultLib 5cefa0db0079a8e3ee22f29d7b9e6e5aa60912a9; live Ghostlight auth.begin through Odin discovery is accepted.
+  - Yggdrasil runs Heimdall d51fa6b (hand-deployed 2026-10-19 15:51Z; gamecult-ops 210a1af holds backup, rollback and provenance; prior 1086aee) with CultLib 5cefa0db0079a8e3ee22f29d7b9e6e5aa60912a9; live Ghostlight auth.begin through Odin discovery is accepted.
   - The Heimdall access plugin, persistent OAuth attempts, encrypted private CultNet commands, conformance fixtures, and browser reference adapter are implemented and locally verified.
   - Exact-session refresh validation and logout revocation are implemented; stale or racing refresh cannot resurrect a revoked session.
   - Shared architecture extracted into its own repo and renamed to Heimdall.
@@ -125,5 +126,5 @@ rejected_paths:
     reason: reusing auth mechanics does not justify centralizing app-domain audience or product data
 
 current_status:
-  summary: Yggdrasil runs the gamecult.heimdall.access plugin and encrypted loopback begin, complete, refresh, and logout plane at 1086aee01169bf60e8a492b2740db1c6f3e8cabf. Odin returns all four redacted discovery records, Ghostlight resolves the boundary through Odin, and live anonymous auth.begin is accepted without exposing claims or secrets.
-  next_action: Run separate-account KLTST completion, refresh, logout, privacy, and stale-attempt canaries through the deployed Ghostlight Eve host; keep provider credential rotation on the operator list because prior tool output exposed OAuth secrets.
+  summary: Yggdrasil runs Heimdall release d51fa6b (hand-deployed 2026-10-19 15:51Z, gamecult-ops 210a1af), which includes Joystick H1 (PR #1). The plugin and encrypted loopback begin, complete, refresh and logout plane, the Odin discovery records and Ghostlight resolution were verified at 1086aee (2026-08-22) and are not re-verified at d51fa6b.
+  next_action: Run joystick:follow_up:h1-joystick-consent-round-trip, then StreamPixels S0/S1 (other sessions). Still open behind that: separate-account KLTST completion, refresh, logout, privacy, and stale-attempt canaries through the deployed Ghostlight Eve host; keep provider credential rotation on the operator list because prior tool output exposed OAuth secrets.

tests/access-plugin.test.ts

@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ function testConfig(): HeimdallConfig {
     storage: { backend: "memory", applySchemaOnStartup: true },
     providers: {
       discord: { clientId: "discord-client", clientSecret: "discord-secret" },
-      patreon: {}, github: {}, twitch: {}, youtube: {}, spotify: {},
+      patreon: {}, github: {}, twitch: {}, youtube: {}, spotify: {}, joystick: {},
     },
   };
 }

tests/app.test.ts

@@ -1,12 +1,16 @@
+import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { join } from "node:path";
 import { inspect } from "node:util";
 import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
 import { type FastifyInstance } from "fastify";
 import { buildApp, errorIdentity } from "../src/app.js";
+import { builtInAppProfiles, callbackMint } from "../src/app-profiles.js";
 import { deliverBackendHandoff, type BackendHandoffPayload } from "../src/backend-handoff.js";
 import { type HeimdallConfig, loadConfig } from "../src/config.js";
 import { entitlementFacts, identityFacts } from "../src/facts.js";
-import { createOAuthRuntimeRegistry, type OAuthProviderRuntime } from "../src/oauth.js";
-import { verifyJwt } from "../src/signing.js";
+import { createOAuthRuntimeRegistry, ProviderResponseError, type OAuthProviderRuntime } from "../src/oauth.js";
+import { createRuntimeKeyMaterial, signJwt, verifyJwt } from "../src/signing.js";
 import { InMemoryStore } from "../src/store/index.js";
 
 function createTestConfig(): HeimdallConfig {
@@ -49,6 +53,7 @@ function createTestConfig(): HeimdallConfig {
       twitch: { clientId: "twitch-client", clientSecret: "twitch-secret" },
       youtube: { clientId: "youtube-client", clientSecret: "youtube-secret" },
       spotify: { clientId: "spotify-client", clientSecret: "spotify-secret" },
+      joystick: { clientId: "joystick-client", clientSecret: "joystick-secret" },
     },
   };
 }
@@ -974,7 +979,8 @@ describe("Heimdall service", () => {
     expect(profileResponse.json()).toEqual(
       expect.objectContaining({
         slug: "streampixels",
-        managedConnectionProviders: ["twitch", "youtube"],
+        identityProviders: ["twitch", "youtube"],
+        managedConnectionProviders: ["twitch", "youtube", "joystick"],
       })
     );
   });
@@ -1238,6 +1244,361 @@ describe("Heimdall service", () => {
     expect(credentialResponse.body).not.toContain("rotated-twitch-refresh-token");
   });
 
+  it("revocation-is-typed: a revoked identity contributes no entitlement at session refresh", async () => {
+    const store = new InMemoryStore();
+    let evaluations = 0;
+    const base = createMockDiscordRuntime();
+    const app = await buildApp({
+      config: createTestConfig(),
+      store,
+      oauthRuntimes: {
+        discord: {
+          ...base,
+          async exchangeAuthorizationCode() {
+            return {
+              accessToken: "expired-discord-access-token",
+              refreshToken: "discord-refresh-token",
+              tokenType: "Bearer",
+              scope: ["identify"],
+              expiresAt: "2026-04-26T13:00:00.000Z",
+              raw: {},
+            };
+          },
+          async refreshAccessToken() {
+            throw new ProviderResponseError(400, "provider_status", "Discord token refresh failed", "invalid_grant");
+          },
+          async evaluateEntitlements(options) {
+            evaluations += 1;
+            return base.evaluateEntitlements(options);
+          },
+        },
+      },
+    });
+    apps.push(app);
+
+    const stateToken = await startDiscordSignIn(app);
+    const callbackResponse = await app.inject({
+      method: "GET",
+      url: `/v1/oauth/discord/callback?code=test-code&state=${encodeURIComponent(stateToken)}`,
+    });
+    expect(callbackResponse.statusCode).toBe(201);
+    const evaluationsAtSignIn = evaluations;
+
+    const refreshResponse = await app.inject({
+      method: "POST",
+      url: "/v1/apps/repixelizer/sessions/refresh",
+      headers: { "x-heimdall-app-secret": "repixelizer-secret" },
+      payload: {
+        refreshToken: callbackResponse.json().refreshToken as string,
+        entitlementPolicies: [{ kind: "discord_role_access", guildId: "gamecult-guild", allowedRoleIds: ["role-repixelizer"] }],
+      },
+    });
+
+    expect(refreshResponse.statusCode).toBe(201);
+    expect(evaluations).toBe(evaluationsAtSignIn);
+    const accountId = callbackResponse.json().account.id as string;
+    const row = await store.findStoredLinkedIdentityForAccount(accountId, "discord");
+    expect(row?.accessTokenEncrypted).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(row?.refreshTokenEncrypted).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it("revocation-is-typed: a revoked Patreon identity is not linked for Bifrost sync and Bifrost is not called", async () => {
+    const baseConfig = createTestConfig();
+    const store = new InMemoryStore();
+    const app = await buildApp({
+      config: {
+        ...baseConfig,
+        bifrostPatronSupportEndpoint: "https://bifrost.gamecult.org/heimdall/patron-support/events",
+        bifrostPatronSupportSecret: "bifrost-support-secret",
+      },
+      store,
+      oauthRuntimes: {
+        patreon: {
+          ...createOAuthRuntimeRegistry().patreon,
+          async refreshAccessToken() {
+            throw new ProviderResponseError(400, "provider_status", "Patreon token refresh failed", "invalid_grant");
+          },
+        },
+      },
+    });
+    apps.push(app);
+    const context = getHeimdallContext(app);
+    const now = "2026-06-09T17:00:00.000Z";
+    await store.createAccount({ id: "acct-p", createdAt: now, lastSeenAt: now });
+    await store.upsertLinkedIdentity({
+      accountId: "acct-p",
+      provider: "patreon",
+      providerUserId: "patreon-user-456",
+      accessTokenEncrypted: context.tokenCustody.encrypt("patreon-access-token"),
+      refreshTokenEncrypted: context.tokenCustody.encrypt("patreon-refresh-token"),
+      tokenExpiresAt: "2026-06-09T17:01:00.000Z",
+      scopes: [],
+      profileJson: {},
+      createdAt: now,
+      updatedAt: now,
+    });
+    const urls: string[] = [];
+    globalThis.fetch = async (input) => {
+      urls.push(String(input));
+      return new Response("unexpected", { status: 500 });
+    };
+
+    const response = await app.inject({
+      method: "POST",
+      url: "/v1/apps/bifrost/patron-support/sync",
+      headers: { "x-heimdall-app-secret": "bifrost-secret" },
+      payload: { accountId: "acct-p", requiredTierTitle: "Inner Sanctum", supportedAtUtc: now },
+    });
+
+    expect(response.statusCode).toBe(404);
+    expect(response.json()).toEqual({ error: "patreon_identity_not_linked" });
+    expect(urls).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  describe("joystick connect", () => {
+    const creator = { kind: "creator", targetId: "creator-1" };
+    async function connect(app: FastifyInstance, extra: Record<string, unknown> = { connection: creator }) {
+      const start = await app.inject({
+        method: "POST",
+        url: "/v1/oauth/joystick/start",
+        payload: { appSlug: "streampixels", mode: "connect", returnTo: "https://streampixels.gamecult.org/auth/connect", ...extra },
+      });
+      return start;
+    }
+
+    it.each([
+      ["no connection", {}, "creator_connection_required"],
+      ["an account connection", { connection: { kind: "account", targetId: "victim-1" } }, "creator_connection_required"],
+      ["an empty targetId", { connection: { kind: "creator", targetId: "" } }, "invalid_request"],
+    ])("refuses a joystick connect with %s at start, before any redirect", async (_name, extra, error) => {
+      const app = await buildApp({ config: createTestConfig() });
+      apps.push(app);
+      const start = await connect(app, extra);
+      expect(start.statusCode).toBe(400);
+      expect(start.json().error).toBe(error);
+      expect(start.json().authorizationUrl).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(start.json().stateToken).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    it.each([
+      ["no connection", null],
+      ["an account connection", { kind: "account", targetId: "victim-1" }],
+      ["an empty targetId", { kind: "creator", targetId: "" }],
+    ])("the callback refuses a signed joystick connect with %s before the code exchange, and nothing is written", async (_name, connection) => {
+      const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "heimdall-forge-"));
+      try {
+        const config = { ...createTestConfig(), signingPrivateKeyPath: join(dir, "signing.pem"), bootstrapSigningPrivateKeyOnMissing: true };
+        const store = new InMemoryStore();
+        const app = await buildApp({ config, store });
+        apps.push(app);
+        const keys = createRuntimeKeyMaterial({ ...config, bootstrapSigningPrivateKeyOnMissing: false });
+        const calls = stubJoystick({ channel_id: "chan-forged", username: "deru" });
+        const stateToken = (await connect(app)).json().stateToken as string;
+        const verified = verifyJwt(stateToken, keys.publicKey);
+        expect(verified.valid).toBe(true);
+        const forged = signJwt({ ...(verified as { payload: Record<string, unknown> }).payload, connection }, keys);
+
+        const callback = await app.inject({
+          method: "GET",
+          url: `/v1/oauth/joystick/callback?code=c&state=${encodeURIComponent(forged)}`,
+        });
+        expect(callback.statusCode).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
+        expect(calls).toEqual([]);
+        expect(await store.findStoredLinkedIdentity("joystick", "chan-forged")).toBeNull();
+      } finally {
+        rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+      }
+    });
+
+    it("a backend_callback delivery of a joystick connect carries no refresh token and no capabilities", async () => {
+      const callbackUrl = "https://streampixels.gamecult.org/api/heimdall/callback";
+      const app = await buildApp({
+        config: { ...createTestConfig(), appBackendCallbacks: { streampixels: [callbackUrl] } },
+      });
+      apps.push(app);
+      stubJoystick({ channel_id: "chan-hand", username: "deru" });
+      const providerFetch = globalThis.fetch;
+      const deliveries: Array<Record<string, any>> = [];
+      globalThis.fetch = (async (input: string | URL, init?: RequestInit) => {
+        if (String(input) === callbackUrl) {
+          deliveries.push(JSON.parse(String(init?.body)) as Record<string, any>);
+          return new Response(null, { status: 204 });
+        }
+        return providerFetch(input, init);
+      }) as typeof fetch;
+
+      const start = await connect(app, {
+        connection: creator,
+        handoff: { kind: "backend_callback", attemptId: "attempt-js-1", callbackUrl },
+      });
+      expect(start.statusCode).toBe(201);
+      const callback = await app.inject({
+        method: "GET",
+        url: `/v1/oauth/joystick/callback?code=c&state=${encodeURIComponent(start.json().stateToken as string)}`,
+      });
+      expect(callback.statusCode).toBeLessThan(300);
+
+      expect(deliveries).toHaveLength(1);
+      const delivered = deliveries[0]!;
+      expect(delivered).toMatchObject({ status: "success", handoffKind: "backend_callback", mode: "connect", attemptId: "attempt-js-1" });
+      expect(typeof delivered.accessToken).toBe("string");
+      expect(delivered.refreshToken).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(delivered.refresh).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(delivered.claimSet.capabilities).toEqual([]);
+      expect(JSON.stringify(delivered)).not.toContain("js-refresh");
+    });
+
+    it("starts a streampixels connect at joystick.tv with the five scopes and the callback redirect", async () => {
+      const app = await buildApp({ config: createTestConfig() });
+      apps.push(app);
+      const start = await connect(app);
+      expect(start.statusCode).toBe(201);
+      const url = new URL(start.json().authorizationUrl as string);
+      expect(`${url.origin}${url.pathname}`).toBe("https://joystick.tv/api/oauth/authorize");
+      expect(url.searchParams.get("client_id")).toBe("joystick-client");
+      expect(url.searchParams.get("scope")).toBe("identity:read stream:read chat:read followers:read subscribers:read");
+      expect(url.searchParams.get("redirect_uri")).toBe("https://heimdall.gamecult.org/v1/oauth/joystick/callback");
+    });
+
+    it.each(["sign_in", "link"] as const)(
+      "refuses %s for joystick on streampixels before any redirect, and Deru's managed row is untouched",
+      async (mode) => {
+        const store = new InMemoryStore();
+        const app = await buildApp({ config: createTestConfig(), store });
+        apps.push(app);
+        stubJoystick({ channel_id: "deru-chan", username: "deru" });
+        const stateToken = (await connect(app)).json().stateToken as string;
+        const connected = await app.inject({
+          method: "GET",
+          url: `/v1/oauth/joystick/callback?code=a&state=${encodeURIComponent(stateToken)}`,
+        });
+        const accountId = connected.json().account.id as string;
+        const before = await store.findStoredLinkedIdentityForAccount(accountId, "joystick");
+
+        const start = await app.inject({
+          method: "POST",
+          url: "/v1/oauth/joystick/start",
+          payload: { appSlug: "streampixels", mode, returnTo: "https://streampixels.gamecult.org/auth/connect" },
+        });
+        expect(start.statusCode).toBe(400);
+        expect(start.json()).toMatchObject({ error: "provider_not_supported_for_app", provider: "joystick", mode });
+        expect(start.json().authorizationUrl).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(await store.findStoredLinkedIdentityForAccount(accountId, "joystick")).toEqual(before);
+      }
+    );
+
+    function stubJoystick(identity: Record<string, unknown>) {
+      const calls: Array<{ url: string; headers: Record<string, string>; body?: URLSearchParams | undefined }> = [];
+      globalThis.fetch = (async (input: string | URL, init?: RequestInit) => {
+        const url = String(input);
+        calls.push({ url, headers: (init?.headers ?? {}) as Record<string, string>, body: init?.body as URLSearchParams | undefined });
+        if (url === "https://api.joystick.tv/api/oauth/token") {
+          return new Response(
+            JSON.stringify({ access_token: "js-access", refresh_token: "js-refresh", token_type: "Bearer", expires_in: 864000 }),
+            { status: 200 }
+          );
+        }
+        if (url === "https://api.joystick.tv/api/v1/me/identity") {
+          return new Response(JSON.stringify(identity), { status: 200 });
+        }
+        return new Response("unexpected", { status: 500 });
+      }) as typeof fetch;
+      return calls;
+    }
+
+    it.each(["sign_in", "link"] as const)(
+      "the callback refuses a signed %s state for joystick on streampixels before the code exchange, and nothing is written",
+      async (mode) => {
+        // The start gate already refuses these words, so the state is re-signed with the app's own key.
+        const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "heimdall-forge-"));
+        try {
+          const config = { ...createTestConfig(), signingPrivateKeyPath: join(dir, "signing.pem"), bootstrapSigningPrivateKeyOnMissing: true };
+          const store = new InMemoryStore();
+          const app = await buildApp({ config, store });
+          apps.push(app);
+          const keys = createRuntimeKeyMaterial({ ...config, bootstrapSigningPrivateKeyOnMissing: false });
+          const calls = stubJoystick({ channel_id: "chan-forged", username: "deru" });
+          const stateToken = (await connect(app)).json().stateToken as string;
+          const verified = verifyJwt(stateToken, keys.publicKey);
+          expect(verified.valid).toBe(true);
+          const forged = signJwt({ ...(verified as { payload: Record<string, unknown> }).payload, mode }, keys);
+
+          const callback = await app.inject({
+            method: "GET",
+            url: `/v1/oauth/joystick/callback?code=c&state=${encodeURIComponent(forged)}`,
+          });
+          expect(callback.statusCode).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
+          expect(callback.body).not.toContain("viewer_access");
+          expect(calls).toEqual([]);
+          expect(await store.findStoredLinkedIdentity("joystick", "chan-forged")).toBeNull();
+        } finally {
+          rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+        }
+      }
+    );
+
+    it("exchanges the code with Basic client auth and links the identity by channel id", async () => {
+      const store = new InMemoryStore();
+      const app = await buildApp({ config: createTestConfig(), store });
+      apps.push(app);
+      const calls = stubJoystick({ channel_id: "chan-9", username: "deru", nickname: "Deru!", photo_url: "https://img/x.png" });
+      const stateToken = (await connect(app)).json().stateToken as string;
+
+      const callback = await app.inject({
+        method: "GET",
+        url: `/v1/oauth/joystick/callback?code=the-code&state=${encodeURIComponent(stateToken)}`,
+      });
+      expect(callback.statusCode).toBeLessThan(300);
+
+      const exchange = calls.find((c) => c.url === "https://api.joystick.tv/api/oauth/token")!;
+      expect(exchange.headers.Authorization).toBe(`Basic ${Buffer.from("joystick-client:joystick-secret").toString("base64")}`);
+      expect(exchange.body!.get("grant_type")).toBe("authorization_code");
+      expect(exchange.body!.get("code")).toBe("the-code");
+      expect(exchange.body!.get("redirect_uri")).toBe("https://heimdall.gamecult.org/v1/oauth/joystick/callback");
+      expect(exchange.body!.has("client_secret")).toBe(false);
+      const identityCall = calls.find((c) => c.url === "https://api.joystick.tv/api/v1/me/identity")!;
+      expect(identityCall.headers.Authorization).toBe("Bearer js-access");
+
+      const accountId = callback.json().account.id as string;
+      const row = await store.findStoredLinkedIdentityForAccount(accountId, "joystick");
+      expect(row).toMatchObject({ providerUserId: "chan-9", username: "deru", displayName: "Deru!" });
+      expect(row?.accessTokenEncrypted).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+      expect(row?.accessTokenEncrypted).not.toContain("js-access");
+      expect(row?.refreshTokenEncrypted).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+      const left = Date.parse(row!.tokenExpiresAt!) - Date.now();
+      expect(left).toBeGreaterThan(863_000 * 1000);
+      expect(left).toBeLessThanOrEqual(864_000 * 1000);
+    });
+
+    it("falls back to the username for the display name", async () => {
+      const store = new InMemoryStore();
+      const app = await buildApp({ config: createTestConfig(), store });
+      apps.push(app);
+      stubJoystick({ channel_id: "chan-9", username: "deru" });
+      const stateToken = (await connect(app)).json().stateToken as string;
+      const callback = await app.inject({
+        method: "GET",
+        url: `/v1/oauth/joystick/callback?code=c&state=${encodeURIComponent(stateToken)}`,
+      });
+      const row = await store.findStoredLinkedIdentityForAccount(callback.json().account.id as string, "joystick");
+      expect(row?.displayName).toBe("deru");
+    });
+
+    it("fails the callback when the identity has no channel id", async () => {
+      const store = new InMemoryStore();
+      const app = await buildApp({ config: createTestConfig(), store });
+      apps.push(app);
+      stubJoystick({ username: "deru" });
+      const stateToken = (await connect(app)).json().stateToken as string;
+      const callback = await app.inject({
+        method: "GET",
+        url: `/v1/oauth/joystick/callback?code=c&state=${encodeURIComponent(stateToken)}`,
+      });
+      expect(callback.statusCode).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400);
+      expect(await store.findStoredLinkedIdentity("joystick", "undefined")).toBeNull();
+    });
+  });
+
   it("no longer honors a global shared secret across apps", async () => {
     // A per-app identity model with a global fallback is a two-app shared
     // secret in practice (R6, fork 2). GC_ACCESS_APP_SHARED_SECRET alone must
@@ -1774,3 +2135,63 @@ describe("what may be recorded about a caught error", () => {
     expect(errorIdentity(error)).toEqual(expected);
   });
 });
+
+describe("OAuth start admits a provider by the profile's role for the mode", () => {
+  const allProviders = ["discord", "patreon", "github", "twitch", "youtube", "spotify", "joystick"] as const;
+  const modes = ["sign_in", "link", "connect"] as const;
+
+  it("sign_in and link take identityProviders only; connect takes managedConnectionProviders or identityProviders, for every profile", async () => {
+    const app = await buildApp({ config: createTestConfig() });
+    try {
+      for (const profile of Object.values(builtInAppProfiles)) {
+        for (const provider of allProviders) {
+          for (const mode of modes) {
+            const start = await app.inject({
+              method: "POST",
+              url: `/v1/oauth/${provider}/start`,
+              payload: { appSlug: profile.slug, mode, returnTo: `${profile.allowedReturnOrigins[0]}/x` },
+            });
+            const roleList =
+              mode === "connect"
+                ? [...profile.managedConnectionProviders, ...profile.identityProviders]
+                : profile.identityProviders;
+            const refused = start.json().error === "provider_not_supported_for_app";
+            expect([profile.slug, provider, mode, refused]).toEqual([profile.slug, provider, mode, !roleList.includes(provider)]);
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    } finally {
+      await app.close();
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+describe("callbackMint", () => {
+  const streampixels = builtInAppProfiles.streampixels!;
+  it.each([
+    ["twitch", "sign_in", "viewer_session"],
+    ["twitch", "link", "viewer_session"],
+    ["youtube", "sign_in", "viewer_session"],
+    ["twitch", "connect", "viewer_session"],
+    ["joystick", "connect", "custody_only"],
+    ["joystick", "sign_in", "refused"],
+    ["joystick", "link", "refused"],
+    ["discord", "connect", "refused"],
+    ["discord", "sign_in", "refused"],
+  ] as const)("%s %s on streampixels is %s", (provider, mode, expected) => {
+    expect(callbackMint(streampixels, provider, mode, { kind: "creator", targetId: "creator-1" })).toBe(expected);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ["null", null],
+    ["undefined", undefined],
+    ["an account binding", { kind: "account", targetId: "a-1" }],
+    ["an empty creator targetId", { kind: "creator", targetId: "" }],
+  ] as const)("a joystick connect with %s is refused", (_name, connection) => {
+    expect(callbackMint(streampixels, "joystick", "connect", connection)).toBe("refused");
+  });
+
+  it("keeps Bifrost's discord connect a viewer session", () => {
+    expect(callbackMint(builtInAppProfiles.bifrost!, "discord", "connect", null)).toBe("viewer_session");
+  });
+});

tests/caller-identity-attack-soul-r21.test.ts

@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ function testConfig(overrides: Partial<HeimdallConfig> = {}): HeimdallConfig {
       twitch: {},
       youtube: {},
       spotify: {},
+      joystick: {},
     },
     ...overrides,
   };

tests/caller-identity-attack-soul.test.ts

@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ function testConfig(): HeimdallConfig {
       twitch: {},
       youtube: {},
       spotify: {},
+      joystick: {},
     },
   };
 }

tests/caller-identity-soul.test.ts

@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ function testConfig(): HeimdallConfig {
       twitch: {},
       youtube: {},
       spotify: {},
+      joystick: {},
     },
   };
 }

tests/fastify-malformed-url.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+import Fastify, { type FastifyReply, type FastifyRequest } from "fastify";
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+
+// GHSA-p68q-wchp-6fh7 (fastify < 5.12.2): a malformed request target under one
+// plugin prefix, with a method that has no route in the main router, was
+// dispatched to the not-found handler of a sibling plugin, skipping that
+// handler's preHandler. This pins the framework fix; it is not about a Heimdall
+// route.
+describe("fastify malformed URL under sibling not-found handlers", () => {
+  const apps: Array<ReturnType<typeof Fastify>> = [];
+  afterEach(async () => {
+    await Promise.all(apps.splice(0).map((app) => app.close()));
+  });
+
+  async function build() {
+    const app = Fastify();
+    apps.push(app);
+    await app.register(async (pub) => {
+      pub.get("/ping", async () => "pong");
+    }, { prefix: "/public" });
+    await app.register(async (priv) => {
+      priv.setNotFoundHandler(
+        {
+          preHandler: async (request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) => {
+            if (!request.headers.authorization) return reply.code(401).send({ error: "auth" });
+          },
+        },
+        (_request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) => reply.code(404).send({ secret: "PRIVATE-TENANT-DATA" }),
+      );
+      priv.get("/x", async () => "x");
+    }, { prefix: "/private" });
+    return app;
+  }
+
+  it("fails closed with 400 and never reaches another prefix's not-found handler", async () => {
+    const app = await build();
+    const response = await app.inject({ method: "DELETE", url: "/public/%zz" });
+    expect(response.body).not.toContain("PRIVATE-TENANT-DATA");
+    expect(response.statusCode).toBe(400);
+  });
+
+  it("still runs the authenticated not-found preHandler for a well-formed URL", async () => {
+    const app = await build();
+    const response = await app.inject({ method: "DELETE", url: "/private/nothing" });
+    expect(response.statusCode).toBe(401);
+  });
+});

tests/fixtures/fake-idunn-rudp.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/**
+ * A stand-in for Idunn's health endpoint: it accepts each RUDP connect, acks
+ * the frame that follows and keeps every delivered frame. Heimdall opens a
+ * fresh socket and session per publication, so sessions are kept per remote.
+ */
+import dgram from "node:dgram";
+import {
+  CultNetRudpSession,
+  decodeRudpPacket,
+  encodeRudpPacket,
+  type CultNetTransportFrame,
+} from "cultnet-ts";
+
+export interface FakeIdunnRudp {
+  port: number;
+  frames: CultNetTransportFrame[];
+  /** Resolves with the nth delivered frame (0-based) once it has arrived. */
+  frame(index: number): Promise<CultNetTransportFrame>;
+  close(): void;
+}
+
+export async function startFakeIdunnRudp(): Promise<FakeIdunnRudp> {
+  const server = dgram.createSocket("udp4");
+  const sessions = new Map<string, CultNetRudpSession>();
+  const frames: CultNetTransportFrame[] = [];
+  const waiting: Array<{ index: number; resolve: (frame: CultNetTransportFrame) => void }> = [];
+
+  server.on("message", (wire, remote) => {
+    const packet = decodeRudpPacket(wire);
+    const key = `${remote.address}:${remote.port}`;
+    if (packet.packetType === "connect") {
+      const session = new CultNetRudpSession({
+        connectionId: 0x1d0d0001,
+        initialSequence: 1,
+        resendDelayMs: 100,
+      });
+      sessions.set(key, session);
+      server.send(encodeRudpPacket(session.acceptConnect(packet, Date.now())), remote.port, remote.address);
+      return;
+    }
+    const session = sessions.get(key);
+    if (!session) return;
+    const result = session.receive(packet, Date.now());
+    if (result.reply) server.send(encodeRudpPacket(result.reply), remote.port, remote.address);
+    for (const frame of result.delivered) {
+      frames.push(frame);
+      for (const waiter of waiting.filter((entry) => entry.index === frames.length - 1)) waiter.resolve(frame);
+    }
+    if (result.delivered.length > 0) {
+      server.send(encodeRudpPacket(session.createAck()), remote.port, remote.address);
+    }
+  });
+  await new Promise<void>((resolve) => server.bind(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve));
+
+  return {
+    port: server.address().port,
+    frames,
+    frame: (index) =>
+      frames[index]
+        ? Promise.resolve(frames[index]!)
+        : new Promise((resolve) => waiting.push({ index, resolve })),
+    close: () => server.close(),
+  };
+}

tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/.gitattributes

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+* -text

tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# Idunn runtime fixtures
+
+Written by the Rust owner, not by Heimdall's tests. Copied byte for byte from CultLib
+`217a9480`, `packages/cultnet-ts/test/fixtures/idunn-runtime/web` (`expected.cc`,
+`activation.cc`, `activation-key.seed`, `provider-identity.credential`) and that directory's
+`machine-id`. CultLib regenerates them with `packages/cultnet-rs/examples/idunn_runtime_fixture.rs`
+(its own README has the Yggdrasil command); the provider identity is bound to `machine-id`, so a
+test that decodes it supplies that machine id instead of `/etc/machine-id`.
+
+Every key here is a test key. `provider-identity.credential` is the shape Idunn passes on the
+presence-identity descriptor: key fields are 32-integer arrays, which only the Rust owner writes.

tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/activation-key.seed

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+¯ÂOd×f¯l*oµ‘ÀFªv‰n<E280B0>hLûÑpšS
´p

tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/machine-id

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+c1c1c1c1c1c1c1c1c1c1c1c1c1c1c1c1

tests/fixtures/presence-descriptors.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/**
+ * What Idunn hands a generation for runtime presence: the bundle directory, a
+ * parent-only identity store and an activation seed, the last two passed as
+ * descriptors named in LISTEN_FDNAMES. The bytes are the Rust owner's, copied
+ * from CultLib (see idunn-runtime/README.md); every key in them is a test key.
+ */
+import { closeSync, openSync } from "node:fs";
+import { chmod, copyFile, mkdir, readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+
+import { IDUNN_RUNTIME_ACTIVATION_CREDENTIAL_NAME } from "cultnet-ts";
+
+export const idunnRuntimeFixtures = path.join(import.meta.dirname, "idunn-runtime");
+
+const FIXTURE_FILES = [
+  "expected.cc",
+  "activation.cc",
+  "activation-key.seed",
+  "provider-identity.credential",
+  "machine-id",
+] as const;
+
+/** The machine id the fixture identity is bound to, in place of /etc/machine-id. */
+export const fixtureMachineId = async (dir: string = idunnRuntimeFixtures): Promise<string> =>
+  (await readFile(path.join(dir, "machine-id"), "utf8")).trim();
+
+/** Copy the fixtures into `dir`, readable by any uid (the children run as others). */
+export async function writePresenceFixtures(dir: string): Promise<void> {
+  await mkdir(dir, { recursive: true });
+  await chmod(dir, 0o755);
+  for (const name of FIXTURE_FILES) {
+    const target = path.join(dir, name);
+    await copyFile(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, name), target);
+    await chmod(target, 0o644);
+  }
+}
+
+/** Open both descriptors and name them the way systemd's LISTEN_FDNAMES does. */
+export function openPresenceDescriptors(dir: string): { env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv; close: () => void } {
+  const fds = [
+    [openSync(path.join(dir, "provider-identity.credential"), "r"), "gamecult-runtime-presence-identity"],
+    [openSync(path.join(dir, "activation-key.seed"), "r"), IDUNN_RUNTIME_ACTIVATION_CREDENTIAL_NAME],
+  ] as const;
+  const names: string[] = [];
+  for (const [fd, name] of fds) {
+    while (names.length < fd - 3) names.push(`pad-${names.length}`);
+    names[fd - 3] = name;
+  }
+  return {
+    env: { LISTEN_FDNAMES: names.join(":") },
+    // The authority closes each descriptor it reads; this releases only what it did not.
+    close: () =>
+      fds.forEach(([fd]) => {
+        try {
+          closeSync(fd);
+        } catch {
+          // already closed by the reader
+        }
+      }),
+  };
+}

tests/fixtures/state-root-generation-child.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/**
+ * One Idunn generation, as a process: it runs as the uid and gid its parent
+ * gave it, under UMask=0007, and does what Heimdall does to a state root on a
+ * pulse. The parent test spawns two of these under different uids that share
+ * a group.
+ *
+ * argv: <role: first|next> <stateRoot> <fixtureDir>
+ */
+import { readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+
+import { loadConfig } from "../../src/config.js";
+import { openPresenceAuthority } from "../../src/runtime-presence.js";
+import { fixtureMachineId, openPresenceDescriptors } from "./presence-descriptors.js";
+import { createHeimdallRuntimePulse, publishHeimdallVerseState } from "../../src/verse-state.js";
+
+const [role, stateRoot, fixtureDir] = process.argv.slice(2) as [string, string, string];
+process.umask(0o007);
+
+const config = loadConfig({
+  GC_ACCESS_BASE_URL: "https://heimdall.example.test",
+  GC_ACCESS_DATA_ROOT: stateRoot,
+});
+
+async function publishPresence(): Promise<void> {
+  const descriptors = openPresenceDescriptors(fixtureDir);
+  try {
+    const authority = await openPresenceAuthority(
+      {
+        idunnRuntimeBundlePath: fixtureDir,
+        host: config.host,
+        port: config.port,
+        providerHealthIdentityPath: path.join(stateRoot, "provider-health-identity.cc"),
+      },
+      descriptors.env,
+      () => fixtureMachineId(fixtureDir),
+    );
+    authority.sign("warming", "generation probe", Date.now());
+  } finally {
+    descriptors.close();
+  }
+}
+
+if (role === "next") {
+  // Generation N+1 reads what N left before it replaces it.
+  const previous = await readFile(config.cultCachePath);
+  if (previous.length === 0) throw new Error("previous generation's snapshot is empty");
+}
+
+await publishHeimdallVerseState(config, createHeimdallRuntimePulse(config));
+await publishPresence();
+
+if (role === "first") {
+  // The 0600 counter the 2026-09-07 generation left behind. Nothing reads it
+  // now; it stays as the stale fixture the next generation must live beside.
+  await writeFile(path.join(stateRoot, "runtime-presence-sequence"), "41\n", { mode: 0o600 });
+}

tests/idunn-boot.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,320 @@
+import { execFile, spawn, type ChildProcess } from "node:child_process";
+import { createPublicKey, createPrivateKey, verify } from "node:crypto";
+import dgram from "node:dgram";
+import { chmod, copyFile, mkdir, mkdtemp, readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { closeSync, openSync } from "node:fs";
+import net from "node:net";
+import os from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { promisify } from "node:util";
+
+import { decode, encode } from "@msgpack/msgpack";
+import {
+  RUNTIME_PRESENCE_SLOT,
+  parseCultNetMessage,
+  runtimePresenceActivationSigningMessage,
+  runtimePresenceProviderSigningMessage,
+} from "cultnet-ts";
+import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+
+import { startFakeIdunnRudp, type FakeIdunnRudp } from "./fixtures/fake-idunn-rudp.js";
+import { idunnRuntimeFixtures } from "./fixtures/presence-descriptors.js";
+
+const run = promisify(execFile);
+
+const GENERATION_UID = 61184;
+const STATE_GID = 4242;
+const ED25519_SPKI_PREFIX = Buffer.from("302a300506032b6570032100", "hex");
+const PKCS8_ED25519_SEED_PREFIX = Buffer.from("302e020100300506032b657004220420", "hex");
+
+// The launch needs root (to pick the uid and bind a machine-id) and a mount
+// namespace (so the fixture machine-id does not replace the host's). The
+// stopgap's node container has both; anywhere else the test steps aside.
+const canLaunch =
+  process.getuid?.() === 0 &&
+  (await run("unshare", ["--mount", "--", "true"]).then(
+    () => true,
+    () => false
+  ));
+
+/**
+ * The artifact under test. By default the esbuild bundle `pnpm bundle` makes,
+ * run by this process's node; a runbook proves a sealed release by naming its
+ * bundle and node here instead.
+ */
+const bundleOverride = process.env.HEIMDALL_BOOT_BUNDLE;
+const nodeOverride = process.env.HEIMDALL_BOOT_NODE;
+
+async function freePort(): Promise<number> {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const probe = net.createServer();
+    probe.once("error", reject);
+    probe.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => {
+      const { port } = probe.address() as net.AddressInfo;
+      probe.close(() => resolve(port));
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+interface Launch {
+  child: ChildProcess;
+  stderr: () => string;
+  exited: Promise<number | null>;
+  candidatePort: number;
+}
+
+describe.skipIf(!canLaunch)("the bundle booted as Idunn launches it", () => {
+  let base: string;
+  let bundle: string;
+  let node: string;
+  let idunn: FakeIdunnRudp;
+  let odin: dgram.Socket;
+  let odinPort: number;
+  const launched: ChildProcess[] = [];
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    base = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "heimdall-boot-"));
+    await chmod(base, 0o755);
+    if (bundleOverride) {
+      bundle = bundleOverride;
+    } else {
+      await run("corepack", ["pnpm", "bundle"], { cwd: path.join(import.meta.dirname, "..") });
+      bundle = path.join(base, "heimdall.mjs");
+      await copyFile(path.join(import.meta.dirname, "..", "dist", "heimdall"), bundle);
+      await chmod(bundle, 0o644);
+    }
+    node = nodeOverride ?? process.execPath;
+    idunn = await startFakeIdunnRudp();
+    odin = dgram.createSocket("udp4");
+    await new Promise<void>((resolve) => odin.bind(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve));
+    odinPort = odin.address().port;
+  }, 120_000);
+
+  afterAll(() => {
+    for (const child of launched) child.kill("SIGKILL");
+    idunn?.close();
+    odin?.close();
+  });
+
+  /** Credential files as Idunn holds them: readable only by the parent. */
+  async function credentials(dir: string, identity: Buffer | undefined) {
+    await mkdir(dir, { recursive: true });
+    const seed = path.join(dir, "activation-key.seed");
+    await copyFile(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, "activation-key.seed"), seed);
+    await chmod(seed, 0o400);
+    let identityFile: string | undefined;
+    if (identity) {
+      identityFile = path.join(dir, "provider-identity.credential");
+      await writeFile(identityFile, identity, { mode: 0o400 });
+    }
+    return { seed, identityFile };
+  }
+
+  /** Start the bundle as the generation unit does, with the fixture machine-id bound over the host's. */
+  async function launch(label: string, identity: Buffer | undefined): Promise<Launch> {
+    const dir = path.join(base, label);
+    await mkdir(dir, { recursive: true });
+    await chmod(dir, 0o755);
+
+    // Idunn's runtime bundle: the two records, read-only.
+    const bundleDir = path.join(dir, "bundle");
+    await mkdir(bundleDir);
+    for (const name of ["expected.cc", "activation.cc"]) {
+      await copyFile(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, name), path.join(bundleDir, name));
+      await chmod(path.join(bundleDir, name), 0o444);
+    }
+    await chmod(bundleDir, 0o555);
+
+    const machineId = path.join(dir, "machine-id");
+    await copyFile(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, "machine-id"), machineId);
+    await chmod(machineId, 0o444);
+
+    const stateRoot = path.join(dir, "state");
+    await mkdir(stateRoot);
+    await run("chown", [`0:${STATE_GID}`, stateRoot]);
+    await chmod(stateRoot, 0o2770);
+
+    const heimdall = path.join(dir, "heimdall.mjs");
+    await copyFile(bundle, heimdall);
+    await chmod(heimdall, 0o444);
+
+    const files = await credentials(path.join(dir, "credentials"), identity);
+    const candidatePort = await freePort();
+
+    const fds = [openSync(files.seed, "r")];
+    const names = ["gamecult-idunn-runtime-activation-key"];
+    if (files.identityFile) {
+      fds.push(openSync(files.identityFile, "r"));
+      names.push("gamecult-runtime-presence-identity");
+    }
+
+    const env = {
+      PATH: process.env.PATH ?? "",
+      LISTEN_FDS: String(fds.length),
+      LISTEN_FDNAMES: names.join(":"),
+      GAMECULT_IDUNN_CANDIDATE_BIND: `127.0.0.1:${candidatePort}`,
+      GAMECULT_IDUNN_RUNTIME_BUNDLE: bundleDir,
+      GAMECULT_IDUNN_PROCESS_WRITE_LEASE: path.join(dir, "process-write-lease.cc"),
+      GC_ACCESS_BASE_URL: "https://heimdall.test",
+      GC_ACCESS_ISSUER: "https://heimdall.test",
+      GC_ACCESS_STORAGE_BACKEND: "memory",
+      GC_ACCESS_IDUNN_RUDP_HEALTH: `127.0.0.1:${idunn.port}`,
+      GC_ACCESS_IDUNN_HEALTH_CONTRACT: "heimdall.cultnet-rudp-provider-health",
+      GC_ACCESS_ODIN_CULTMESH_URI: `rudp://127.0.0.1:${odinPort}`,
+      CULTMESH_URI_ODIN_RUDP: `rudp://127.0.0.1:${odinPort}`,
+      GC_ACCESS_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_BOOTSTRAP: "1",
+      GC_ACCESS_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH: path.join(stateRoot, "signing.pem"),
+      GC_ACCESS_SIGNING_KEY_ID: "boot-test",
+    };
+
+    // uid, gid and umask as Idunn's DynamicUser unit gives them. The fixture
+    // machine-id is bound only inside this mount namespace.
+    const script =
+      `mount --bind ${machineId} /etc/machine-id && ` +
+      `exec setpriv --reuid ${GENERATION_UID} --regid ${STATE_GID} --clear-groups ` +
+      `sh -c 'umask 0007; cd ${dir}; exec ${node} heimdall.mjs --state-root ${stateRoot}'`;
+    const child = spawn("unshare", ["--mount", "--", "sh", "-c", script], {
+      env,
+      stdio: ["ignore", "ignore", "pipe", ...fds],
+    });
+    launched.push(child);
+    fds.forEach((fd) => closeSync(fd));
+
+    let stderr = "";
+    child.stderr!.on("data", (chunk: Buffer) => {
+      stderr += chunk.toString();
+    });
+    const exited = new Promise<number | null>((resolve) => child.once("exit", (code) => resolve(code)));
+    return { child, stderr: () => stderr, exited, candidatePort };
+  }
+
+  async function answers(port: number): Promise<number | undefined> {
+    return fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/.well-known/jwks.json`).then(
+      (response) => response.status,
+      () => undefined
+    );
+  }
+
+  it("signs warming presence on every pulse and answers HTTP", async () => {
+    const credential = await readFile(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, "provider-identity.credential"));
+    const generation = await launch("signs", credential);
+
+    // Startup publication, then one per 10 s pulse. A publication fault is
+    // reported as it is logged rather than after the frames never arrive.
+    const publicationFault = new Promise<never>((_resolve, reject) => {
+      const watch = setInterval(() => {
+        if (generation.stderr().includes(" failed on ")) {
+          clearInterval(watch);
+          reject(new Error(`publication failed; stderr: ${generation.stderr()}`));
+        }
+      }, 200);
+      void idunn.frame(2).then(() => clearInterval(watch));
+    });
+    const exitedEarly = generation.exited.then((code) => {
+      throw new Error(`bundle exited ${code}; stderr: ${generation.stderr()}`);
+    });
+    // The first statement is the startup publication, which follows the listen
+    // directly; the 10 s pulse loop has not yet fired.
+    await Promise.race([
+      idunn.frame(0),
+      publicationFault,
+      exitedEarly,
+      new Promise<never>((_resolve, reject) =>
+        setTimeout(() => reject(new Error(`no presence at startup; stderr: ${generation.stderr()}`)), 8_000)
+      ),
+    ]);
+    await Promise.race([idunn.frame(2), publicationFault, exitedEarly]);
+
+    expect(await answers(generation.candidatePort)).toBe(200);
+
+    // Public keys of the two proofs, from the fixtures' test keys.
+    const store = decode(credential) as unknown[][];
+    const record = decode(store[0]![2] as Uint8Array) as unknown[];
+    const providerKey = createPublicKey({
+      key: Buffer.concat([ED25519_SPKI_PREFIX, Buffer.from(record[2] as number[])]),
+      format: "der",
+      type: "spki",
+    });
+    const activationKey = createPublicKey(
+      createPrivateKey({
+        key: Buffer.concat([
+          PKCS8_ED25519_SEED_PREFIX,
+          await readFile(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, "activation-key.seed")),
+        ]),
+        format: "der",
+        type: "pkcs8",
+      })
+    );
+
+    let previousSequence = 0;
+    for (const frame of idunn.frames.slice(0, 3)) {
+      const message = parseCultNetMessage(decode(frame.payload), "cultnet.schema.v0");
+      if (message.schemaVersion !== "cultnet.document_put_raw.v0") throw new Error("not a raw document put");
+      const fields = decode(message.document.payload) as unknown[];
+      expect(fields[RUNTIME_PRESENCE_SLOT.state]).toBe("warming");
+
+      const unsigned = [...fields];
+      unsigned[RUNTIME_PRESENCE_SLOT.signature] = new Uint8Array();
+      unsigned[RUNTIME_PRESENCE_SLOT.activationSignature] = new Uint8Array();
+      const proof = encode(unsigned);
+      expect(
+        verify(
+          null,
+          runtimePresenceProviderSigningMessage(proof),
+          providerKey,
+          fields[RUNTIME_PRESENCE_SLOT.signature] as Uint8Array
+        )
+      ).toBe(true);
+      expect(
+        verify(
+          null,
+          runtimePresenceActivationSigningMessage(proof),
+          activationKey,
+          fields[RUNTIME_PRESENCE_SLOT.activationSignature] as Uint8Array
+        )
+      ).toBe(true);
+
+      const sequence = fields[RUNTIME_PRESENCE_SLOT.publisherSequence] as number;
+      expect(sequence).toBeGreaterThan(previousSequence);
+      previousSequence = sequence;
+    }
+
+    expect(generation.stderr()).not.toContain("failed on startup");
+    expect(generation.stderr()).not.toContain("failed on interval");
+    generation.child.kill("SIGKILL");
+  }, 90_000);
+
+  it.each([
+    ["the identity descriptor is not passed", undefined, "gamecult-runtime-presence-identity"],
+    ["the identity is damaged", "damaged", "identity id check"],
+  ])("exits before listening when %s", async (_name, damage, expected) => {
+    const credential = await readFile(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, "provider-identity.credential"));
+    const store = decode(credential) as unknown[][];
+    const record = decode(store[0]![2] as Uint8Array) as unknown[];
+    const publicKey = [...(record[2] as number[])];
+    const original = { publicKeyHex: Buffer.from(publicKey).toString("hex"), id: record[1] as string, binding: record[5] as string };
+    let identity: Buffer | undefined;
+    if (damage) {
+      publicKey[0] = publicKey[0]! ^ 1;
+      record[2] = publicKey;
+      identity = Buffer.from(encode([[store[0]![0], store[0]![1], encode(record), store[0]![3], store[0]![4]]]));
+    }
+    const started = Date.now();
+    const generation = await launch(damage ? "damaged" : "no-identity", identity);
+
+    const code = await Promise.race([
+      generation.exited,
+      new Promise<"timeout">((resolve) => setTimeout(() => resolve("timeout"), 5_000)),
+    ]);
+
+    expect(code, generation.stderr()).not.toBe("timeout");
+    expect(code).not.toBe(0);
+    expect(Date.now() - started).toBeLessThan(6_000);
+    expect(await answers(generation.candidatePort)).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(generation.stderr()).toContain(expected);
+    // No byte of the credential: not the key bytes, not the id, not the binding.
+    expect(generation.stderr()).not.toContain(original.publicKeyHex);
+    expect(generation.stderr()).not.toContain(original.id.slice(0, 16));
+    expect(generation.stderr()).not.toContain(original.binding.slice(-16));
+  }, 30_000);
+});

tests/idunn-rudp-health.test.ts

@@ -1,18 +1,12 @@
-import dgram from "node:dgram";
 import { mkdtemp } from "node:fs/promises";
 import os from "node:os";
 import path from "node:path";
 import { decode } from "@msgpack/msgpack";
-import {
-  CultNetRudpSession,
-  decodeRudpPacket,
-  encodeRudpPacket,
-  parseCultNetMessage,
-  type CultNetTransportFrame,
-} from "cultnet-ts";
+import { parseCultNetMessage } from "cultnet-ts";
 import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
 import { loadConfig } from "../src/config.js";
 import { publishIdunnRudpHealth } from "../src/idunn-rudp-health.js";
+import { startFakeIdunnRudp } from "./fixtures/fake-idunn-rudp.js";
 
 vi.mock("node:fs/promises", async (importOriginal) => {
   const original = await importOriginal<typeof import("node:fs/promises")>();
@@ -27,37 +21,12 @@ vi.mock("node:fs/promises", async (importOriginal) => {
 
 describe("Heimdall Idunn health publication", () => {
   it("completes the canonical RUDP handshake before publishing its signed frame", async () => {
-    const server = dgram.createSocket("udp4");
-    const session = new CultNetRudpSession({
-      connectionId: 0x1d0d0001,
-      initialSequence: 1,
-      resendDelayMs: 100,
-    });
-    let resolveFrame!: (frame: CultNetTransportFrame) => void;
-    const frameReceived = new Promise<CultNetTransportFrame>((resolve) => {
-      resolveFrame = resolve;
-    });
-
-    server.on("message", (wire, remote) => {
-      const packet = decodeRudpPacket(wire);
-      if (packet.packetType === "connect") {
-        server.send(encodeRudpPacket(session.acceptConnect(packet, Date.now())), remote.port, remote.address);
-        return;
-      }
-      const result = session.receive(packet, Date.now());
-      if (result.reply) server.send(encodeRudpPacket(result.reply), remote.port, remote.address);
-      for (const frame of result.delivered) resolveFrame(frame);
-      if (result.delivered.length > 0) {
-        server.send(encodeRudpPacket(session.createAck()), remote.port, remote.address);
-      }
-    });
-    await new Promise<void>((resolve) => server.bind(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve));
+    const server = await startFakeIdunnRudp();
 
     try {
       const tmp = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "heimdall-idunn-rudp-"));
-      const address = server.address();
       const config = loadConfig({
-        GC_ACCESS_IDUNN_RUDP_HEALTH: `127.0.0.1:${address.port}`,
+        GC_ACCESS_IDUNN_RUDP_HEALTH: `127.0.0.1:${server.port}`,
         GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_HEALTH_IDENTITY_PATH: path.join(tmp, "provider-health-identity.cc"),
       });
       const observedAt = "2026-08-22T00:45:00.000Z";
@@ -78,7 +47,7 @@ describe("Heimdall Idunn health publication", () => {
         observedAt,
         presence,
       });
-      const frame = await frameReceived;
+      const frame = await server.frame(0);
       const message = parseCultNetMessage(decode(frame.payload), "cultnet.schema.v0");
 
       expect(frame.channelId).toBe("schema");

tests/presence-identity-descriptor.test.ts

@@ -1,18 +1,17 @@
-import { mkdtemp, readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
-import { openSync, closeSync } from "node:fs";
+import { access, mkdtemp, readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { openSync } from "node:fs";
 import os from "node:os";
 import path from "node:path";
 
-import { encode } from "@msgpack/msgpack";
-import { SingleFileMessagePackBackingStore } from "@gamecult/cultcache-ts";
+import { decode, encode } from "@msgpack/msgpack";
 import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
 
 import {
-  openOrEnrollProviderHealthIdentity,
   openProviderHealthIdentity,
   passedDescriptor,
   providerHealthPublicIdentity,
 } from "../src/provider-health-identity.js";
+import { fixtureMachineId, idunnRuntimeFixtures } from "./fixtures/presence-descriptors.js";
 
 const machineIdAvailable = await readFile("/etc/machine-id", "utf8").then(
   () => true,
@@ -23,59 +22,79 @@ const machineIdAvailable = await readFile("/etc/machine-id", "utf8").then(
  * The identity is machine-id bound, so enrolment only works where a machine-id
  * exists. These run on Linux and are skipped elsewhere.
  */
-describe.skipIf(!machineIdAvailable)("presence identity from a passed descriptor", () => {
-  it("reads an Idunn-written store, not a cultcache-ts one", async () => {
+/** Name the presence descriptor so it lands on whatever fd open() returned. */
+function presenceEnv(fd: number): NodeJS.ProcessEnv {
+  // The lookup maps a name index onto 3 + index, so the name list is padded
+  // until the presence entry lands on the descriptor open() actually returned.
+  // Assuming it is 3 is how this passes on one machine and reads the wrong
+  // descriptor on another.
+  const names = [
+    ...Array.from({ length: fd - 3 }, (_, i) => `pad-${i}`),
+    "gamecult-runtime-presence-identity",
+  ].join(":");
+  return { LISTEN_FDNAMES: names, LISTEN_PID: String(process.pid) };
+}
+
+describe("presence identity from a passed descriptor", () => {
+  it("decodes the Rust owner's record, whose key fields are integer arrays", async () => {
     const dir = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "heimdall-presence-"));
+    const fd = openSync(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, "provider-identity.credential"), "r");
 
-    // Enrol with the TypeScript client to get a genuine machine-bound payload,
-    // then re-wrap that payload the way cultcache-rs writes a store: a bare
-    // array of positional [key, type, payload, stored_at, schema_id] envelopes.
-    // Idunn writes with the Rust client, and cultcache-ts cannot read that
-    // layout, so wrapping it here is what makes this test resemble reality.
-    const tsStore = path.join(dir, "ts-enrolled.cc");
-    const enrolled = await openOrEnrollProviderHealthIdentity(tsStore);
-    const records = await new SingleFileMessagePackBackingStore(tsStore).pullAll();
-    expect(records).toHaveLength(1);
-
-    const idunnStore = path.join(dir, "runtime-presence-identity.cc");
-    await writeFile(
-      idunnStore,
-      encode([
-        [
-          "gamecult-provider-health-identity",
-          "gamecult.provider_health_identity.private.v1",
-          records[0]!.payload,
-          "2026-09-06T00:00:00.000Z",
-          "gamecult.provider_health_identity.private.v1",
-        ],
-      ])
+    const opened = await openProviderHealthIdentity(
+      path.join(dir, "would-be-self-enrolled.cc"),
+      presenceEnv(fd),
+      fixtureMachineId
     );
 
-    const fd = openSync(idunnStore, "r");
-    try {
-      // The lookup maps a name index onto 3 + index, so the name list is padded
-      // until the presence entry lands on whatever descriptor open() actually
-      // returned. Assuming it is 3 is how this passes on one machine and reads
-      // the wrong descriptor on another.
-      const names = [
-        ...Array.from({ length: fd - 3 }, (_, i) => `pad-${i}`),
-        "gamecult-runtime-presence-identity",
-      ].join(":");
+    // The fixture's own public key means it came from the descriptor. A fresh
+    // self-enrolment would produce a different key, which is exactly the failure
+    // that makes Idunn refuse this daemon's health and stall promotion.
+    const store = decode(await readFile(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, "provider-identity.credential"))) as unknown[][];
+    const record = decode(store[0]![2] as Uint8Array) as unknown[];
+    expect(providerHealthPublicIdentity(opened).publicKeyHex).toBe(
+      Buffer.from(record[2] as number[]).toString("hex")
+    );
+    await expect(access(path.join(dir, "would-be-self-enrolled.cc"))).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "ENOENT" });
+  });
 
-      const opened = await openProviderHealthIdentity(
-        path.join(dir, "would-be-self-enrolled.cc"),
-        { LISTEN_FDNAMES: names, LISTEN_PID: String(process.pid) }
-      );
+  it("refuses a bin-shaped record on the descriptor path, naming the key-shape check and no value", async () => {
+    const dir = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "heimdall-presence-bin-"));
+    const store = decode(await readFile(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, "provider-identity.credential"))) as unknown[][];
+    const record = decode(store[0]![2] as Uint8Array) as unknown[];
+    // What this process's own enroller writes: the same record with bin key fields.
+    const binRecord = record.map((field, index) =>
+      index === 2 || index === 3 ? Uint8Array.from(field as number[]) : field
+    );
+    const binStore = path.join(dir, "bin-shaped.cc");
+    await writeFile(binStore, encode([[store[0]![0], store[0]![1], encode(binRecord), store[0]![3], store[0]![4]]]));
+    const fd = openSync(binStore, "r");
 
-      // Same key means it came from the descriptor. A fresh self-enrolment
-      // would produce a different key -- which is exactly the failure that
-      // makes Idunn refuse this daemon's health and stall promotion.
-      expect(providerHealthPublicIdentity(opened).publicKeyHex).toBe(
-        providerHealthPublicIdentity(enrolled).publicKeyHex
-      );
-    } finally {
-      closeSync(fd);
-    }
+    const failure = await openProviderHealthIdentity(path.join(dir, "x.cc"), presenceEnv(fd), fixtureMachineId).then(
+      () => undefined,
+      (error: Error) => error
+    );
+
+    expect(failure?.message).toContain("key shape check");
+    expect(failure?.message).not.toContain((record[1] as string).slice(0, 16));
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ["schema", 0, "bogus", "schema check"],
+    ["protector", 4, "bogus", "protector check"],
+    ["binding", 5, "bogus", "binding check"],
+    ["version", 6, "v9", "version check"],
+  ])("a record failing only the %s check is refused by that check", async (_name, index, replacement, check) => {
+    const dir = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "heimdall-presence-check-"));
+    const store = decode(await readFile(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, "provider-identity.credential"))) as unknown[][];
+    const record = decode(store[0]![2] as Uint8Array) as unknown[];
+    record[index] = replacement;
+    const damaged = path.join(dir, "damaged.cc");
+    await writeFile(damaged, encode([[store[0]![0], store[0]![1], encode(record), store[0]![3], store[0]![4]]]));
+    const fd = openSync(damaged, "r");
+
+    await expect(
+      openProviderHealthIdentity(path.join(dir, "x.cc"), presenceEnv(fd), fixtureMachineId)
+    ).rejects.toThrow(check);
   });
 });
 
@@ -112,3 +131,29 @@ describe("presence identity descriptor selection", () => {
     });
   });
 });
+
+describe("an Idunn generation without the presence identity descriptor", () => {
+  it("refuses, naming the descriptor, and enrolls nothing", async () => {
+    const dir = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "heimdall-nodescriptor-"));
+    const identityPath = path.join(dir, "provider-health-identity.cc");
+
+    await expect(
+      openProviderHealthIdentity(identityPath, {
+        GAMECULT_IDUNN_RUNTIME_BUNDLE: "/run/idunn/bundle",
+        LISTEN_FDNAMES: "some-other-descriptor",
+      })
+    ).rejects.toThrow("gamecult-runtime-presence-identity");
+
+    await expect(access(identityPath)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "ENOENT" });
+  });
+
+  it("still self-enrolls outside Idunn", async () => {
+    if (!machineIdAvailable) return;
+    const dir = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "heimdall-outside-idunn-"));
+    const identityPath = path.join(dir, "provider-health-identity.cc");
+
+    await openProviderHealthIdentity(identityPath, {});
+
+    await expect(access(identityPath)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});

tests/private-command-diagnostics.test.ts

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ function config(): HeimdallConfig {
     bootstrapSigningPrivateKeyOnMissing: false, tokenEncryptionKeyBase64: Buffer.alloc(32, 7).toString("base64"),
     appSharedSecrets: { ghostlight: secret }, appRuntimeIds: { ghostlight: ["yggdrasil-ghostlight"] }, appBackendCallbacks: {},
     storage: { backend: "memory", applySchemaOnStartup: true },
-    providers: { discord: { clientId: "discord-client", clientSecret: "discord-secret" }, patreon: {}, github: {}, twitch: {}, youtube: {}, spotify: {} },
+    providers: { discord: { clientId: "discord-client", clientSecret: "discord-secret" }, patreon: {}, github: {}, twitch: {}, youtube: {}, spotify: {}, joystick: {} },
   } as HeimdallConfig;
 }
 
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ it("keeps a provider's malformed 2xx refresh body out of every plaintext part of
   );
 
   expect(reply.status).toBe("denied");
-  expect(reply.diagnostics).toEqual(["Heimdall denied the private command (ProviderResponseError, provider_body_not_json)."]);
+  expect(reply.diagnostics).toEqual(["Heimdall denied the private command (ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed, managed_credential_refresh_failed)."]);
   expect(plaintext(reply)).not.toContain("CANARY");
 });
 
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ it("keeps a provider's refusal body out of every plaintext part of the reply", a
   const reply = await refreshAgainst(() => new Response('CANARYrefused {"error":"invalid_grant"}', { status: 400 }));
 
   expect(reply.status).toBe("denied");
-  expect(reply.diagnostics).toEqual(["Heimdall denied the private command (ProviderResponseError, provider_status)."]);
+  expect(reply.diagnostics).toEqual(["Heimdall denied the private command (ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed, managed_credential_refresh_failed)."]);
   expect(plaintext(reply)).not.toContain("CANARY");
 });
 

tests/provider-token-request.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+import { inspect } from "node:util";
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { type HeimdallConfig } from "../src/config.js";
+import { providers, type Provider } from "../src/contracts.js";
+import { createOAuthRuntimeRegistry, requestProviderTokens } from "../src/oauth.js";
+import { providerCatalog } from "../src/providers.js";
+
+const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch;
+afterEach(() => {
+  globalThis.fetch = originalFetch;
+});
+
+function configFor(): HeimdallConfig {
+  return {
+    providers: Object.fromEntries(providers.map((p) => [p, { clientId: `${p}-client`, clientSecret: `${p}-secret` }])),
+  } as unknown as HeimdallConfig;
+}
+
+interface Captured {
+  url: string;
+  method: string | undefined;
+  headers: Record<string, string>;
+  body: URLSearchParams;
+}
+
+function capture(answer: () => Response): { calls: Captured[] } {
+  const calls: Captured[] = [];
+  globalThis.fetch = (async (input: string | URL, init?: RequestInit) => {
+    calls.push({
+      url: String(input),
+      method: init?.method,
+      headers: init?.headers as Record<string, string>,
+      body: init?.body as URLSearchParams,
+    });
+    return answer();
+  }) as typeof fetch;
+  return { calls };
+}
+
+const ok = () =>
+  new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", refresh_token: "r", token_type: "Bearer", expires_in: 3600, scope: "x y" }), {
+    status: 200,
+  });
+
+const requestable: Provider[] = [...providers];
+
+describe("requestProviderTokens follows the provider descriptor", () => {
+  it.each(requestable.flatMap((p) => [[p, "authorization_code"] as const, [p, "refresh_token"] as const]))(
+    "%s %s hits its token endpoint with its client-auth method only",
+    async (provider, grantType) => {
+      const { calls } = capture(ok);
+      const descriptor = providerCatalog[provider];
+      const grant =
+        grantType === "authorization_code"
+          ? ({ grant_type: "authorization_code", code: "the-code", redirect_uri: "https://h/cb" } as const)
+          : ({ grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "the-refresh" } as const);
+
+      const tokens = await requestProviderTokens(provider, configFor(), grant);
+
+      expect(calls).toHaveLength(1);
+      const call = calls[0]!;
+      expect(call.url).toBe(descriptor.tokenEndpoint);
+      expect(call.method).toBe("POST");
+      expect(call.headers["Content-Type"]).toBe("application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
+      expect(call.headers.Accept).toBe("application/json");
+      expect(call.body.get("grant_type")).toBe(grantType);
+      if (descriptor.tokenEndpointAuthMethod === "client_secret_basic") {
+        expect(call.headers.Authorization).toBe(`Basic ${Buffer.from(`${provider}-client:${provider}-secret`).toString("base64")}`);
+        expect(call.body.has("client_id")).toBe(false);
+        expect(call.body.has("client_secret")).toBe(false);
+      } else {
+        expect(call.headers.Authorization).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(call.body.get("client_id")).toBe(`${provider}-client`);
+        expect(call.body.get("client_secret")).toBe(`${provider}-secret`);
+      }
+      expect(tokens.accessToken).toBe("a");
+      expect(tokens.refreshToken).toBe("r");
+      expect(tokens.scope).toEqual(["x", "y"]);
+      expect(Date.parse(tokens.expiresAt ?? "")).toBeGreaterThan(Date.now());
+    }
+  );
+
+  it("sends the code and redirect uri on exchange and the refresh token on refresh", async () => {
+    const { calls } = capture(ok);
+    await requestProviderTokens("spotify", configFor(), { grant_type: "authorization_code", code: "C", redirect_uri: "https://h/cb" });
+    await requestProviderTokens("spotify", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "R" });
+    expect(calls[0]!.body.get("code")).toBe("C");
+    expect(calls[0]!.body.get("redirect_uri")).toBe("https://h/cb");
+    expect(calls[1]!.body.get("refresh_token")).toBe("R");
+    expect(calls[1]!.body.has("code")).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  const everyProvider = Object.keys(providerCatalog) as Provider[];
+
+  it("gives every provider a default access-token lifetime of 3600 seconds", () => {
+    for (const provider of everyProvider) {
+      expect(providerCatalog[provider].defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds).toBe(3600);
+    }
+  });
+
+  // expires_in is RECOMMENDED (RFC 6749 5.1): unusable means the default, never an unknown expiry.
+  it.each([
+    ["no expires_in", undefined, 3600],
+    ["a zero expires_in", 0, 3600],
+    ["a negative expires_in", -5, 3600],
+    ["a null expires_in", null, 3600],
+    ["an object expires_in", {}, 3600],
+    ["a non-numeric string", "abc", 3600],
+    ["an empty string", "", 3600],
+    ["a negative string", "-1", 3600],
+    ["a zero string", "0", 3600],
+    ["a fractional string", "12.5", 3600],
+    ["an exponent string", "1e3", 3600],
+    ["a numeric string", "7200", 7200],
+    ["a padded numeric string", " 7200 ", 7200],
+    ["a number", 7200, 7200],
+  ])("stores now plus the right lifetime for %s, on every provider and grant", async (_n, expiresIn, seconds) => {
+    for (const provider of everyProvider) {
+      for (const grant of [
+        { grant_type: "authorization_code", code: "c", redirect_uri: "u" } as const,
+        { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "R" } as const,
+      ]) {
+        capture(() => new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", ...(expiresIn === undefined ? {} : { expires_in: expiresIn }) }), { status: 200 }));
+        const before = Date.now();
+        const tokens = await requestProviderTokens(provider, configFor(), grant);
+        const stored = Date.parse(tokens.expiresAt ?? "");
+        expect(stored - before).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(seconds * 1000);
+        expect(stored - before).toBeLessThan(seconds * 1000 + 5_000);
+        expect(tokens.refreshToken).toBeUndefined();
+      }
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("takes the default lifetime for an expires_in too large to be a date", async () => {
+    capture(() => new Response('{"access_token":"a","expires_in":1e999}', { status: 200 }));
+    const before = Date.now();
+    const tokens = await requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "R" });
+    expect(Date.parse(tokens.expiresAt ?? "") - before).toBeLessThan(3600 * 1000 + 5_000);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ["exactly a year", 31_536_000, 31_536_000],
+    ["a second over a year", 31_536_001, 3600],
+    ["3e11", 3e11, 3600],
+    ["3e11 as a string", "300000000000", 3600],
+  ])("takes an expires_in of %s as %i seconds' worth of lifetime", async (_n, expiresIn, seconds) => {
+    capture(() => new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", expires_in: expiresIn }), { status: 200 }));
+    const before = Date.now();
+    const tokens = await requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "R" });
+    expect(Date.parse(tokens.expiresAt ?? "") - before).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(seconds * 1000 - 1000);
+    expect(Date.parse(tokens.expiresAt ?? "") - before).toBeLessThan(seconds * 1000 + 5_000);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ["no refresh_token", {}],
+    ["an empty refresh_token", { refresh_token: "" }],
+  ])("a rotating provider's code exchange with %s is a typed malformed token set; a non-rotating one is not", async (_n, extra) => {
+    capture(() => new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", expires_in: 3600, ...extra }), { status: 200 }));
+    const runtimes = createOAuthRuntimeRegistry();
+    const exchange = { config: configFor(), code: "c", redirectUri: "https://h/cb" };
+    await expect(runtimes.joystick.exchangeAuthorizationCode(exchange)).rejects.toMatchObject({
+      name: "ProviderResponseError",
+      code: "provider_body_not_token_set",
+    });
+    expect((await runtimes.twitch.exchangeAuthorizationCode(exchange)).refreshToken).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ["a number", 42],
+    ["an object", { a: 1 }],
+    ["an array", ["r"]],
+    ["true", true],
+    ["null", null],
+  ])("refuses a 2xx whose refresh_token is %s as a malformed token set", async (_n, refreshToken) => {
+    capture(() => new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", refresh_token: refreshToken, expires_in: 3600 }), { status: 200 }));
+    await expect(
+      requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "R" })
+    ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "provider_body_not_token_set" });
+  });
+
+  it("reads an empty-string refresh_token as no refresh token", async () => {
+    capture(() => new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", refresh_token: "", expires_in: 3600 }), { status: 200 }));
+    const tokens = await requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "R" });
+    expect(tokens.refreshToken).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ["authorization_code", { grant_type: "authorization_code", code: "c", redirect_uri: "u" } as const, "exchange"],
+    ["refresh_token", { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" } as const, "refresh"],
+  ])("keeps the failure label for %s", async (_g, grant, word) => {
+    capture(() => new Response("nope", { status: 500 }));
+    await expect(requestProviderTokens("youtube", configFor(), grant)).rejects.toThrow(
+      `YouTube token ${word} failed (status 500, provider_status).`
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("passes the abort signal to the provider call", async () => {
+    let seen: AbortSignal | null | undefined;
+    globalThis.fetch = (async (_input: string | URL, init?: RequestInit) => {
+      seen = init?.signal;
+      return ok();
+    }) as typeof fetch;
+    const controller = new AbortController();
+    await requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" }, controller.signal);
+    expect(seen).toBe(controller.signal);
+  });
+
+  it("keeps the provider's token type and defaults a missing one to Bearer", async () => {
+    capture(() => new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", token_type: "bearer" }), { status: 200 }));
+    expect((await requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" })).tokenType).toBe("bearer");
+    capture(() => new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a" }), { status: 200 }));
+    expect((await requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" })).tokenType).toBe("Bearer");
+  });
+
+  it("trims scope entries and drops empty ones", async () => {
+    capture(() => new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", scope: [" a ", "", "b"] }), { status: 200 }));
+    expect((await requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" })).scope).toEqual(["a", "b"]);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ["an empty body", ""],
+    ["an empty object", "{}"],
+    ["JSON null", "null"],
+    ["a JSON array", "[]"],
+    ["an error beside an access token", JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", error: "invalid_grant" })],
+    ["an empty access token", JSON.stringify({ access_token: "" })],
+    ["a numeric access token", JSON.stringify({ access_token: 5 })],
+  ])("refuses a 2xx with %s as not a token set, carrying nothing of the body", async (_name, body) => {
+    capture(() => new Response(body, { status: 200 }));
+    const error = await requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" }).then(
+      () => {
+        throw new Error("expected a refusal");
+      },
+      (e: unknown) => e as Error & { code?: string; status?: number; oauthError?: unknown }
+    );
+    expect(error.name).toBe("ProviderResponseError");
+    expect(error.code).toBe("provider_body_not_token_set");
+    expect(error.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(error.oauthError).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it("sets no refreshToken key when the provider sent none", async () => {
+    capture(() => new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a" }), { status: 200 }));
+    const tokens = await requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" });
+    expect("refreshToken" in tokens).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ["only the secret missing", { clientId: "id" }],
+    ["only the id missing", { clientSecret: "secret" }],
+  ])("refuses a provider with %s", async (_n, partial) => {
+    const config = { providers: { twitch: partial } } as unknown as HeimdallConfig;
+    await expect(requestProviderTokens("twitch", config, { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" })).rejects.toThrow(
+      "Twitch OAuth is not fully configured."
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("refuses an unconfigured provider by display name", async () => {
+    const config = { providers: { patreon: {} } } as unknown as HeimdallConfig;
+    await expect(
+      requestProviderTokens("patreon", config, { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" })
+    ).rejects.toThrow("Patreon OAuth is not fully configured.");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("oauthError is a closed set", () => {
+  const refresh = { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" } as const;
+  async function failure(body: string, status = 400) {
+    capture(() => new Response(body, { status }));
+    return requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), refresh).then(
+      () => {
+        throw new Error("expected a refusal");
+      },
+      (error: unknown) => error as Error & { oauthError?: string }
+    );
+  }
+
+  it("takes invalid_grant from the body and carries nothing else of it", async () => {
+    const error = await failure(JSON.stringify({ error: "invalid_grant", error_description: "CANARY" }));
+    expect(error.oauthError).toBe("invalid_grant");
+    expect(`${error.message} ${error.stack} ${inspect(error, { depth: 5, showHidden: true })} ${JSON.stringify(error)}`).not.toContain("CANARY");
+  });
+
+  it.each([401, 403, 429, 500, 502, 503])("takes no oauthError from a %i, whatever its body says", async (status) => {
+    const error = await failure(JSON.stringify({ error: "invalid_grant" }), status);
+    expect(error.oauthError).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
+  it.each(["invalid_grant_extra", "not_invalid_grant", "INVALID_GRANT", " invalid_grant", "invalid_grant "])(
+    "takes the code by exact match only: %j is no code",
+    async (code) => {
+      const error = await failure(JSON.stringify({ error: code }));
+      expect(error.oauthError).toBeUndefined();
+    }
+  );
+
+  it.each([
+    ["an error outside the RFC set", JSON.stringify({ error: "CANARY_unknown" })],
+    ["a non-string error", JSON.stringify({ error: { code: "invalid_grant" } })],
+    ["a body that is not JSON", "CANARY <html>"],
+    ["JSON null", "null"],
+  ])("leaves oauthError undefined for %s", async (_name, body) => {
+    const error = await failure(body);
+    expect(error.oauthError).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(`${error.message} ${inspect(error, { depth: 5, showHidden: true })}`).not.toContain("CANARY");
+  });
+});

tests/publisher-sequence.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+import { mkdtemp, readdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import os from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+
+import { loadConfig } from "../src/config.js";
+import { PublisherSequence, openPresenceAuthority } from "../src/runtime-presence.js";
+import { fixtureMachineId, openPresenceDescriptors, writePresenceFixtures } from "./fixtures/presence-descriptors.js";
+
+describe("PublisherSequence", () => {
+  it("starts at the observed millis", () => {
+    expect(new PublisherSequence().next(1_700_000_000_000)).toBe(1_700_000_000_000);
+  });
+
+  it("strictly increases for equal, earlier and later observations", () => {
+    const sequence = new PublisherSequence();
+    const first = sequence.next(1_700_000_000_000);
+    const equal = sequence.next(1_700_000_000_000);
+    const earlier = sequence.next(1_699_999_990_000);
+    const later = sequence.next(1_700_000_050_000);
+    expect([first, equal, earlier, later]).toEqual([
+      1_700_000_000_000,
+      1_700_000_000_001,
+      1_700_000_000_002,
+      1_700_000_050_000,
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("never falls below the observed millis once the clock moves ahead", () => {
+    const sequence = new PublisherSequence();
+    sequence.next(1_700_000_000_000);
+    sequence.next(1_700_000_000_000);
+    sequence.next(1_700_000_000_000);
+    expect(sequence.next(1_700_000_000_002)).toBe(1_700_000_000_003);
+    expect(sequence.next(1_700_000_000_010)).toBe(1_700_000_000_010);
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a value that is not a safe integer and keeps its place", () => {
+    const sequence = new PublisherSequence();
+    expect(sequence.next(10)).toBe(10);
+    for (const bad of [Number.NaN, Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY, 1.5, 2 ** 60]) {
+      expect(() => sequence.next(bad)).toThrow("observedAtUnixMillis");
+    }
+    expect(sequence.next(5)).toBe(11);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("the presence authority", () => {
+  it("opens once, touches no path under dataRoot, and signs every pulse after its descriptors are gone", async () => {
+    const dir = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "heimdall-nodataroot-"));
+    const fixtures = path.join(dir, "fixtures");
+    await writePresenceFixtures(fixtures);
+    // A regular file as dataRoot: opening anything beneath it fails with
+    // ENOTDIR for every uid, root included.
+    const dataRoot = path.join(dir, "not-a-directory");
+    await writeFile(dataRoot, "");
+    const config = loadConfig({
+      GC_ACCESS_BASE_URL: "https://heimdall.example.test",
+      GC_ACCESS_DATA_ROOT: dataRoot,
+    });
+
+    const descriptors = openPresenceDescriptors(fixtures);
+    try {
+      const authority = await openPresenceAuthority(
+        { ...config, idunnRuntimeBundlePath: fixtures },
+        descriptors.env,
+        fixtureMachineId,
+      );
+      // The descriptors were read whole and closed: a second read would find
+      // nothing, so signing again proves the authority holds what it decoded.
+      const observedAtUnixMillis = Date.parse("2026-10-23T12:00:00.000Z");
+      const first = authority.sign("warming", "probe", observedAtUnixMillis);
+      const second = authority.sign("warming", "probe", observedAtUnixMillis);
+      expect(first.target).toBe("streampixels-web");
+      expect(second.target).toBe("streampixels-web");
+      expect(Buffer.from(second.payload).equals(Buffer.from(first.payload))).toBe(false);
+    } finally {
+      descriptors.close();
+    }
+    expect((await readdir(dir)).sort()).toEqual(["fixtures", "not-a-directory"]);
+  });
+});

tests/recipe-secrets.test.ts

@@ -42,7 +42,10 @@ const everyDeclaredName = [...recipe.replace(/\r\n/g, "\n").matchAll(/^\w+_envir
 // secret found so far set in plaintext; then each name read so far set to
 // each probe value (a few shapes, plus every string literal in config.ts);
 // then every name at once, each set to a value loadConfig accepted for it
-// alone. A run that throws still counts the reads it made first.
+// alone; and every combined run again as Idunn starts Heimdall, with the
+// recipe's service arguments and a candidate socket with its base URL, a
+// pair loadConfig refuses one name at a time. A run that throws still counts
+// the reads it made first.
 //
 // Known limit: a read gated on a value that is none of the probe values and
 // not accepted alone in combination with the others stays unseen.
@@ -83,17 +86,31 @@ async function withRecordingProcessEnv<T>(run: () => T | Promise<T>): Promise<T>
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * How Idunn starts Heimdall: the recipe's [service] arguments after the
+ * entry script, each binding given a probe value, and the environment an
+ * Idunn candidate always has (a loopback socket, which requires the base URL).
+ */
+const recipeArguments = [...(/^\[service\][\s\S]*?^arguments = \[([\s\S]*?)^\]/m.exec(recipe.replace(/\r\n/g, "\n"))?.[1] ?? "").matchAll(
+  /\{ kind = "(literal|binding)", (?:value|name) = "([^"]+)" \}/g
+)].map((match) => (match[1] === "literal" ? match[2]! : "/probe/idunn-binding"));
+const idunnArgv = recipeArguments.slice(1);
+const idunnEnv = { GAMECULT_IDUNN_CANDIDATE_BIND: "127.0.0.1:4100", GC_ACCESS_BASE_URL: "https://probe.test" };
+
 vi.resetModules();
 const { loadConfig } = await withRecordingProcessEnv(() => import("../src/config.js"));
 
 /** The names one loadConfig run reads under `values`, and whether it accepted them. */
-async function readsOf(values: Readonly<Record<string, string>>): Promise<{ names: Set<string>; accepted: boolean }> {
+async function readsOf(
+  values: Readonly<Record<string, string>>,
+  argv: readonly string[] = []
+): Promise<{ names: Set<string>; accepted: boolean }> {
   recorder.values = { ...values };
   recorder.names = new Set();
   let accepted = true;
   await withRecordingProcessEnv(() => {
     try {
-      loadConfig(recordingEnv, []);
+      loadConfig(recordingEnv, argv);
     } catch {
       accepted = false; // the reads before the refusal still count
     }
@@ -113,6 +130,7 @@ async function exploreLoadConfig(): Promise<{ names: Set<string>; enumerated: bo
     const keep = (run: { names: Set<string> }) => run.names.forEach((name) => names.add(name));
     keep(await readsOf({}));
     keep(await readsOf(secrets));
+    keep(await readsOf({ ...secrets, ...idunnEnv }, idunnArgv));
     for (const name of settable) {
       for (const value of probeValues) {
         const run = await readsOf({ ...secrets, [name]: value });
@@ -124,6 +142,7 @@ async function exploreLoadConfig(): Promise<{ names: Set<string>; enumerated: bo
     for (let round = 0; round < widest; round += 1) {
       const together = Object.fromEntries([...accepted].map(([name, values]) => [name, values[round % values.length]!]));
       keep(await readsOf({ ...secrets, ...together }));
+      keep(await readsOf({ ...secrets, ...together, ...idunnEnv }, idunnArgv));
     }
     grew = names.size > before;
   }
@@ -161,6 +180,12 @@ describe("Idunn recipe secret declarations", () => {
     expect(plaintext).toEqual([]);
   });
 
+  it("starts the exploration the way the recipe starts Heimdall", async () => {
+    expect(idunnArgv).toEqual(["--state-root", "/probe/idunn-binding"]);
+    expect(serviceNames).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining(Object.keys(idunnEnv)));
+    expect((await readsOf({ ...idunnEnv }, idunnArgv)).accepted).toBe(true);
+  });
+
   it("reads the environment only by name, never by copying or enumerating it", () => {
     expect(explored.enumerated).toBe(false);
   });

tests/security.test.ts

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ function createTestConfig(overrides: Partial<HeimdallConfig> = {}): HeimdallConf
       twitch: {},
       youtube: {},
       spotify: {},
+      joystick: {},
     },
     ...overrides,
   };

tests/state-root-generations.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
+import { chmod, chown, mkdir, mkdtemp, readdir, stat } from "node:fs/promises";
+import os from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { promisify } from "node:util";
+
+import { build } from "esbuild";
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+
+import { writePresenceFixtures } from "./fixtures/presence-descriptors.js";
+
+const run = promisify(execFile);
+
+const STATE_GID = 4242;
+const GENERATION_N = 61184;
+const GENERATION_N_PLUS_1 = 61185;
+
+// Creating uids and groups needs root; the stopgap's node container runs as root.
+const isRoot = process.getuid?.() === 0;
+
+async function walk(dir: string): Promise<string[]> {
+  const found: string[] = [];
+  for (const entry of await readdir(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
+    const full = path.join(dir, entry.name);
+    found.push(full);
+    if (entry.isDirectory()) found.push(...(await walk(full)));
+  }
+  return found;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Idunn gives every generation a fresh DynamicUser uid and one shared group,
+ * UMask=0007, and a 2770 setgid state root. Generation N+1 runs beside or after
+ * N and must be able to read and replace everything N left there.
+ */
+describe.skipIf(!isRoot)("Idunn state root across generations", () => {
+  it("generation N+1, a different uid in the same group, reads and replaces generation N's state", async () => {
+    const base = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "heimdall-generations-"));
+    await chmod(base, 0o755);
+
+    // The fixtures stand in for what Idunn passes as descriptors.
+    const fixtures = path.join(base, "fixtures");
+    await writePresenceFixtures(fixtures);
+
+    const stateRoot = path.join(base, "state");
+    await mkdir(stateRoot);
+    await chown(stateRoot, 0, STATE_GID);
+    await chmod(stateRoot, 0o2770);
+
+    // The generations run as uids that cannot read the checkout, so each runs
+    // one self-contained bundle built into the world-readable scratch root.
+    const child = path.join(base, "generation.mjs");
+    await build({
+      entryPoints: [path.join(import.meta.dirname, "fixtures", "state-root-generation-child.ts")],
+      bundle: true,
+      platform: "node",
+      format: "esm",
+      target: "node24",
+      outfile: child,
+      external: ["pg-native"],
+      banner: {
+        js: "import{createRequire}from'node:module';const require=createRequire(import.meta.url);",
+      },
+      logLevel: "silent",
+    });
+    await chmod(child, 0o644);
+    const generation = (role: "first" | "next", uid: number) =>
+      run(process.execPath, [child, role, stateRoot, fixtures], {
+        uid,
+        gid: STATE_GID,
+        cwd: base,
+        env: { PATH: process.env.PATH ?? "", HOME: fixtures },
+      });
+
+    await generation("first", GENERATION_N);
+
+    const left = await walk(stateRoot);
+    expect(left.map((entry) => path.relative(stateRoot, entry)).sort()).toEqual([
+      "cultcache",
+      path.join("cultcache", "heimdall.service.cc"),
+      "runtime-presence-sequence",
+    ]);
+
+    await generation("next", GENERATION_N_PLUS_1);
+
+    // Generation N+1 replaced the snapshot, and no owner-only file is left
+    // behind for generation N+2: everything but the stale 0600 fixture is
+    // readable and writable by the state group.
+    const snapshot = await stat(path.join(stateRoot, "cultcache", "heimdall.service.cc"));
+    expect(snapshot.uid).toBe(GENERATION_N_PLUS_1);
+    expect(snapshot.gid).toBe(STATE_GID);
+    for (const entry of await walk(stateRoot)) {
+      if (path.basename(entry) === "runtime-presence-sequence") continue;
+      expect((await stat(entry)).mode & 0o060, path.relative(stateRoot, entry)).toBe(0o060);
+    }
+    expect((await readdir(stateRoot)).sort()).toEqual(["cultcache", "runtime-presence-sequence"]);
+  }, 60_000);
+});

tests/store.test.ts

@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ import { createStore } from "../src/store/index.js";
 import {
   createPostgresStore,
   PostgresStore,
+  checkSchemaRequirements,
+  HEIMDALL_SCHEMA_REQUIREMENTS,
   predicateConditions,
   printedDeclaredPredicates,
   samePredicate,
@@ -267,6 +269,7 @@ describe("PostgresStore.checkSchema", () => {
       "consumed_at IS NULL",
     ]);
     expect(predicateConditions("(s = 'x AND (y'::text)")).toEqual(["s = 'x AND (y'::text"]);
+    expect(predicateConditions('(("odd AND (name" IS NULL) AND b)')).toEqual(['"odd AND (name" IS NULL', "b"]);
     expect(predicateConditions("")).toEqual([]);
   });
 
@@ -323,7 +326,8 @@ async function exerciseStore(store: PostgresStore): Promise<Set<string>> {
     createdAt: now,
     updatedAt: now,
   };
-  await s.upsertLinkedIdentity(identity);
+  const linked = await s.upsertLinkedIdentity(identity);
+  await s.updateLinkedIdentityCredential(linked.id, async () => ({ kind: "keep" }));
   await s.upsertLinkedIdentity({ ...identity, username: "again" });
   await s.findAccountByLinkedIdentity("discord", "u1");
   await s.findStoredLinkedIdentity("discord", "u1");
@@ -519,7 +523,7 @@ describe.skipIf(!adminUrl)("startup against a live Postgres (HEIMDALL_TEST_PG_AD
 
   it("prints each declared predicate exactly as Postgres prints the applied index's", async () => {
     const { owner } = await appliedDatabase();
-    const printed = await printedDeclaredPredicates(owner);
+    const printed = await printedDeclaredPredicates(owner, HEIMDALL_SCHEMA_REQUIREMENTS);
     const applied = await owner.query<{ predicate: string }>(
       "SELECT pg_get_expr(indpred, indrelid) AS predicate FROM pg_index WHERE indexrelid = 'auth_completions_attempt_unconsumed_unique_idx'::regclass"
     );
@@ -552,6 +556,51 @@ describe.skipIf(!adminUrl)("startup against a live Postgres (HEIMDALL_TEST_PG_AD
     await exerciseStore(new PostgresStore(pool));
   });
 
+  it("refuses a privilege missing on one column of another table", async () => {
+    const { name, owner } = await appliedDatabase();
+    await grant(owner, { ...STORE_TABLE_PRIVILEGES, auth_completions: [] });
+    const columns = REQUIRED_COLUMNS.filter((column) => column.table === "auth_completions" && column.column !== "attempt_id")
+      .map((column) => column.column)
+      .join(", ");
+    for (const privilege of STORE_TABLE_PRIVILEGES.auth_completions!) {
+      await owner.query(`GRANT ${privilege} (${columns}) ON auth_completions TO ${role}`);
+    }
+
+    expect(await start(urlFor(name, role, rolePassword), false)).toBe(refusal("SCHEMA_PRIVILEGES"));
+  });
+
+  it("names the TEMPORARY privilege when the role may not create temporary tables", async () => {
+    const { name, owner } = await appliedDatabase();
+    await grant(owner, STORE_TABLE_PRIVILEGES);
+    await owner.query(`REVOKE TEMPORARY ON DATABASE ${name} FROM PUBLIC`);
+
+    expect(await start(urlFor(name, role, rolePassword), false)).toBe(
+      "Postgres storage could not be prepared (SCHEMA_TEMP_PRIVILEGE); grant the database role TEMPORARY on its database."
+    );
+  });
+
+  // The schema's own predicate splits into the same conditions raw or
+  // printed, so only a predicate whose printed form differs (a literal gains
+  // its cast) shows that the check compares Postgres's printing.
+  it("matches a declared predicate that Postgres prints differently from how it is written", async () => {
+    const { owner } = await appliedDatabase();
+    await owner.query("CREATE TABLE predicate_probe (id INTEGER NOT NULL, state TEXT, attempts INTEGER)");
+    await owner.query("CREATE UNIQUE INDEX predicate_probe_live ON predicate_probe (id) WHERE state = 'live' AND attempts > 0");
+    const requirements = {
+      tables: ["predicate_probe"],
+      columns: [
+        { table: "predicate_probe", column: "id", type: "INTEGER", nullable: false },
+        { table: "predicate_probe", column: "state", type: "TEXT", nullable: true },
+        { table: "predicate_probe", column: "attempts", type: "INTEGER", nullable: true },
+      ],
+      keys: [{ table: "predicate_probe", columns: "id", predicate: "state = 'live' AND attempts > 0" }],
+      privileges: {},
+    };
+
+    expect((await printedDeclaredPredicates(owner, requirements))[0]).toBe("((state = 'live'::text) AND (attempts > 0))");
+    await expect(checkSchemaRequirements(owner, requirements)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
   it("refuses a privilege held on only some of a table's columns", async () => {
     const { name, owner } = await appliedDatabase();
     await grant(owner, { ...STORE_TABLE_PRIVILEGES, audit_events: [] });
@@ -598,6 +647,18 @@ describe.skipIf(!adminUrl)("startup against a live Postgres (HEIMDALL_TEST_PG_AD
       ["ALTER TABLE linked_identities DROP CONSTRAINT linked_identities_provider_provider_user_id_key",
         "CREATE UNIQUE INDEX li_half_dropped ON linked_identities(provider, provider_user_id)",
         "UPDATE pg_index SET indisvalid = false WHERE indexrelid = 'li_half_dropped'::regclass"]],
+    ["a key's first column compared under a case-insensitive collation",
+      ["CREATE COLLATION heimdall_ci (provider = icu, locale = 'und-u-ks-level2', deterministic = false)",
+        "ALTER TABLE linked_identities DROP CONSTRAINT linked_identities_provider_provider_user_id_key",
+        "CREATE UNIQUE INDEX li_ci_first ON linked_identities(provider COLLATE heimdall_ci, provider_user_id)"]],
+    // Soul pass 7: the key index compares under "C", but the column itself is
+    // case-insensitive, so the store's own lookups by provider_user_id match
+    // other users' ids.
+    ["a column declared under a case-insensitive collation, its key index under C",
+      ["CREATE COLLATION heimdall_ci (provider = icu, locale = 'und-u-ks-level2', deterministic = false)",
+        "ALTER TABLE linked_identities DROP CONSTRAINT linked_identities_provider_provider_user_id_key",
+        "ALTER TABLE linked_identities ALTER COLUMN provider_user_id TYPE text COLLATE heimdall_ci",
+        'CREATE UNIQUE INDEX li_c ON linked_identities(provider, provider_user_id COLLATE "C")']],
     ["a key compared under a case-insensitive collation (two users' ids become one row)",
       ["CREATE COLLATION heimdall_ci (provider = icu, locale = 'und-u-ks-level2', deterministic = false)",
         "ALTER TABLE linked_identities DROP CONSTRAINT linked_identities_provider_provider_user_id_key",
@@ -617,6 +678,8 @@ describe.skipIf(!adminUrl)("startup against a live Postgres (HEIMDALL_TEST_PG_AD
     ["a column retyped", ["ALTER TABLE sessions ALTER COLUMN access_revision TYPE TEXT"]],
     ["a created table's column dropped", ["ALTER TABLE auth_completions DROP COLUMN mode"]],
     ["NOT NULL added to a column the store leaves null", ["ALTER TABLE auth_completions ALTER COLUMN attempt_id SET NOT NULL"]],
+    ["NOT NULL added to a nullable column of another table",
+      ["UPDATE linked_identities SET username = ''", "ALTER TABLE linked_identities ALTER COLUMN username SET NOT NULL"]],
   ])("refuses %s", async (_damage, steps) => {
     const { name, owner } = await appliedDatabase();
     for (const step of steps) {
@@ -639,6 +702,13 @@ describe.skipIf(!adminUrl)("startup against a live Postgres (HEIMDALL_TEST_PG_AD
     ["the attempt index without its redundant attempt_id IS NOT NULL",
       ["DROP INDEX auth_completions_attempt_unconsumed_unique_idx", "CREATE UNIQUE INDEX attempt_unconsumed ON auth_completions(app_slug, attempt_id) WHERE consumed_at IS NULL"]],
     ["a lookup index dropped", ["DROP INDEX audit_events_lookup_idx", "DROP INDEX auth_completions_lookup_idx"]],
+    // Only a key's own columns decide which rows collide; an INCLUDEd column's
+    // collation does not, whatever it is.
+    ["a key index that INCLUDEs an undeclared case-insensitive column",
+      ["CREATE COLLATION heimdall_ci (provider = icu, locale = 'und-u-ks-level2', deterministic = false)",
+        "ALTER TABLE linked_identities ADD COLUMN operator_note text COLLATE heimdall_ci",
+        "ALTER TABLE linked_identities DROP CONSTRAINT linked_identities_provider_provider_user_id_key",
+        "CREATE UNIQUE INDEX li_note ON linked_identities(provider, provider_user_id) INCLUDE (operator_note)"]],
   ])("accepts %s", async (_change, steps) => {
     const { name, owner } = await appliedDatabase();
     for (const step of steps) await owner.query(step);

tests/verse-runtime.test.ts

@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ describe("Heimdall verse runtime publication", () => {
     expect(bySchema.get("idunn.daemon_health")).toEqual([
       "yggdrasil-heimdall",
       "active",
-      "Heimdall auth runtime active; storage=postgres; providers=2/6; apps=4; healthTransport=CultNet/RUDP",
+      "Heimdall auth runtime active; storage=postgres; providers=2/7; apps=4; healthTransport=CultNet/RUDP",
       "2026-06-16T17:10:00.000Z",
       "heimdall.cultnet-rudp-provider-health",
       "daemon-published",

tests/verse-witness.test.ts

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ describe("Heimdall Verse witness advertisement", () => {
       "twitch",
       "youtube",
       "spotify",
+      "joystick",
     ]);
     expect(advertisement.appProfiles.map((profile) => profile.slug)).toEqual([
       "repixelizer",