From d029e08a2e55f43a45f1d85557f48b6ae2128d9a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2026 22:52:40 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 01/45] Recipe test: explore loadConfig as Idunn starts Heimdall Soul pass 7, S7-1. The exploration always called loadConfig with no arguments, and the candidate socket alone is refused (it needs the base URL), so neither the Idunn candidate path nor --state-root was ever run: a secret read only there (Y6, Y7) went unseen. The recipe's [service] arguments after the entry script, each binding given a probe path, are now the argv of an Idunn-shaped run, together with a loopback candidate socket and its base URL. That run is added on its own and to every combined run. A test pins the parsed argv, that both environment names are declared in the recipe, and that loadConfig accepts the shape. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- tests/recipe-secrets.test.ts | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/recipe-secrets.test.ts b/tests/recipe-secrets.test.ts index d7f69ec..ea144c5 100644 --- a/tests/recipe-secrets.test.ts +++ b/tests/recipe-secrets.test.ts @@ -42,7 +42,10 @@ const everyDeclaredName = [...recipe.replace(/\r\n/g, "\n").matchAll(/^\w+_envir // secret found so far set in plaintext; then each name read so far set to // each probe value (a few shapes, plus every string literal in config.ts); // then every name at once, each set to a value loadConfig accepted for it -// alone. A run that throws still counts the reads it made first. +// alone; and every combined run again as Idunn starts Heimdall, with the +// recipe's service arguments and a candidate socket with its base URL, a +// pair loadConfig refuses one name at a time. A run that throws still counts +// the reads it made first. // // Known limit: a read gated on a value that is none of the probe values and // not accepted alone in combination with the others stays unseen. @@ -83,17 +86,31 @@ async function withRecordingProcessEnv(run: () => T | Promise): Promise } } +/** + * How Idunn starts Heimdall: the recipe's [service] arguments after the + * entry script, each binding given a probe value, and the environment an + * Idunn candidate always has (a loopback socket, which requires the base URL). + */ +const recipeArguments = [...(/^\[service\][\s\S]*?^arguments = \[([\s\S]*?)^\]/m.exec(recipe.replace(/\r\n/g, "\n"))?.[1] ?? "").matchAll( + /\{ kind = "(literal|binding)", (?:value|name) = "([^"]+)" \}/g +)].map((match) => (match[1] === "literal" ? match[2]! : "/probe/idunn-binding")); +const idunnArgv = recipeArguments.slice(1); +const idunnEnv = { GAMECULT_IDUNN_CANDIDATE_BIND: "127.0.0.1:4100", GC_ACCESS_BASE_URL: "https://probe.test" }; + vi.resetModules(); const { loadConfig } = await withRecordingProcessEnv(() => import("../src/config.js")); /** The names one loadConfig run reads under `values`, and whether it accepted them. */ -async function readsOf(values: Readonly>): Promise<{ names: Set; accepted: boolean }> { +async function readsOf( + values: Readonly>, + argv: readonly string[] = [] +): Promise<{ names: Set; accepted: boolean }> { recorder.values = { ...values }; recorder.names = new Set(); let accepted = true; await withRecordingProcessEnv(() => { try { - loadConfig(recordingEnv, []); + loadConfig(recordingEnv, argv); } catch { accepted = false; // the reads before the refusal still count } @@ -113,6 +130,7 @@ async function exploreLoadConfig(): Promise<{ names: Set; enumerated: bo const keep = (run: { names: Set }) => run.names.forEach((name) => names.add(name)); keep(await readsOf({})); keep(await readsOf(secrets)); + keep(await readsOf({ ...secrets, ...idunnEnv }, idunnArgv)); for (const name of settable) { for (const value of probeValues) { const run = await readsOf({ ...secrets, [name]: value }); @@ -124,6 +142,7 @@ async function exploreLoadConfig(): Promise<{ names: Set; enumerated: bo for (let round = 0; round < widest; round += 1) { const together = Object.fromEntries([...accepted].map(([name, values]) => [name, values[round % values.length]!])); keep(await readsOf({ ...secrets, ...together })); + keep(await readsOf({ ...secrets, ...together, ...idunnEnv }, idunnArgv)); } grew = names.size > before; } @@ -161,6 +180,12 @@ describe("Idunn recipe secret declarations", () => { expect(plaintext).toEqual([]); }); + it("starts the exploration the way the recipe starts Heimdall", async () => { + expect(idunnArgv).toEqual(["--state-root", "/probe/idunn-binding"]); + expect(serviceNames).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining(Object.keys(idunnEnv))); + expect((await readsOf({ ...idunnEnv }, idunnArgv)).accepted).toBe(true); + }); + it("reads the environment only by name, never by copying or enumerating it", () => { expect(explored.enumerated).toBe(false); }); From 588739857a441731b5a7baa53d1bf2ef9c409445 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2026 22:52:40 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 02/45] Schema: name what the startup check does not prove Soul pass 7, S7-2. The out-of-scope list named CHECK constraints, triggers and row-level security. It now also names unique indexes beyond or stricter than the required keys (including leftovers of an interrupted concurrent build, which are enforced once ready), NOT NULL columns the schema does not declare and that have no default, and column-level SELECT under SELECT * or RETURNING *, which needs every column of the table. Documentation only. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- src/store/schema.ts | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/store/schema.ts b/src/store/schema.ts index f3588c0..420f5e6 100644 --- a/src/store/schema.ts +++ b/src/store/schema.ts @@ -187,8 +187,15 @@ function keyColumns(line: string, keyword: "PRIMARY KEY" | "UNIQUE"): string | u * speed lookups are not required; the unique ones are, by shape, in * REQUIRED_KEYS. * - * Out of scope: CHECK constraints, triggers and row-level security. Each can - * make a write fail on a database that passes this check. + * Out of scope, each able to make a write fail on a database that passes the + * check: CHECK constraints; triggers; row-level security; unique indexes + * beyond the required keys, or stricter than them, including the leftovers of + * an interrupted concurrent index build (a valid extra one refuses rows the + * store expects to write, and even an invalid one that is ready is enforced + * on writes); NOT NULL columns the schema does not declare and that have no + * default, which the store's INSERTs leave out; and SELECT granted column by + * column when a statement reads `SELECT *` or `RETURNING *`, which needs + * SELECT on every column the table has, not only the declared ones. */ /** Every table the schema creates. */ From 996f21f58cd60fdcbad0f02323ca77cf6e476c03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2026 22:52:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 03/45] Schema check: deterministic column collations, a named TEMP refusal, and kills for the printer Soul pass 7, S7-3 and S7-4, P7-3 and P7-5. Columns (S7-3): every declared column must be under a deterministic collation. A case-insensitive provider_user_id whose key index compares under "C" passed, and the store's own lookups then matched other users' ids. The check becomes checkSchemaRequirements(pool, requirements), with Heimdall's store calling it with HEIMDALL_SCHEMA_REQUIREMENTS (its tables, columns, keys and privileges). That seam lets a live test check a predicate Postgres prints differently from how it is written (a literal gains its cast): the check must still pass, so comparing the raw text instead of the printed form (P7-3's Y1) now fails. A role that may not create temporary tables was refused with 42501 and told to check GC_ACCESS_DATABASE_URL_FILE (P7-5). The predicate printer now refuses it as SCHEMA_TEMP_PRIVILEGE, and startup says to grant the role TEMPORARY on its database, in fixed text. New fixtures (S7-4): a case-insensitive collation on a key's first column (Y3), NOT NULL added to a nullable column of linked_identities (Y5), and every privilege on auth_completions except on attempt_id (Y8) are refused; a key index that INCLUDEs an undeclared case-insensitive column starts (Y4). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- src/store/index.ts | 10 +- src/store/postgres.ts | 302 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- tests/store.test.ts | 70 +++++++++- 3 files changed, 242 insertions(+), 140 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/store/index.ts b/src/store/index.ts index 972bd8f..69abbe6 100644 --- a/src/store/index.ts +++ b/src/store/index.ts @@ -32,9 +32,13 @@ export async function createStore(config: HeimdallConfig): Promise undefined); - throw new Error( - `Postgres storage could not be prepared (${typeof code === "string" ? code : "error"}); check GC_ACCESS_DATABASE_URL_FILE.` - ); + // A role that may not create temporary tables is not a bad URL, so that + // refusal names the privilege instead. + const remedy = + code === "SCHEMA_TEMP_PRIVILEGE" + ? "grant the database role TEMPORARY on its database" + : "check GC_ACCESS_DATABASE_URL_FILE"; + throw new Error(`Postgres storage could not be prepared (${typeof code === "string" ? code : "error"}); ${remedy}.`); } return store; diff --git a/src/store/postgres.ts b/src/store/postgres.ts index e589f2e..64f013d 100644 --- a/src/store/postgres.ts +++ b/src/store/postgres.ts @@ -363,36 +363,6 @@ export function samePredicate(declared: string, actual: string, keyColumns: stri return left.length === right.length && left.every((condition, index) => condition === right[index]); } -/** - * Each REQUIRED_KEYS predicate as Postgres prints it back (empty for none). - * One simple-protocol round trip on one connection: a transaction that - * builds a temporary copy of each keyed table's declared columns, indexes - * it with the declared predicate, reads the printed form and rolls back. - * The names and SQL are the schema's own constants, never input. - */ -export async function printedDeclaredPredicates(pool: Pick): Promise { - const partial = REQUIRED_KEYS.flatMap((required, index) => (required.predicate ? [{ ...required, index }] : [])); - if (partial.length === 0) return REQUIRED_KEYS.map(() => ""); - const statements = partial.flatMap(({ table, columns, predicate, index }) => { - const probe = `heimdall_key_probe_${index}`; - const declared = REQUIRED_COLUMNS.filter((column) => column.table === table) - .map((column) => `${column.column} ${column.type}`) - .join(", "); - return [ - `CREATE TEMP TABLE ${probe} (${declared}) ON COMMIT DROP`, - `CREATE UNIQUE INDEX ${probe}_idx ON ${probe} (${columns}) WHERE ${predicate}`, - ]; - }); - const select = partial - .map(({ index }) => `SELECT ${index} AS key, pg_get_expr(indpred, indrelid) AS predicate FROM pg_index WHERE indexrelid = 'pg_temp.heimdall_key_probe_${index}_idx'::regclass`) - .join(" UNION ALL "); - const results = (await pool.query(["BEGIN", ...statements, select, "ROLLBACK"].join(";\n"))) as unknown as Array<{ - rows: Array<{ key: number; predicate: string }>; - }>; - const printed = results[results.length - 2]!.rows; - return REQUIRED_KEYS.map((_, index) => printed.find((row) => row.key === index)?.predicate ?? ""); -} - /** * What the store's statements do to each table, and so the privileges its * database role needs: it reads what it returns or looks up, inserts what it @@ -411,6 +381,170 @@ export const STORE_TABLE_PRIVILEGES: Readonly>; +} + +/** What Heimdall's store needs, read from its schema and its statements. */ +export const HEIMDALL_SCHEMA_REQUIREMENTS: SchemaRequirements = { + tables: REQUIRED_TABLES, + columns: REQUIRED_COLUMNS, + keys: REQUIRED_KEYS, + privileges: STORE_TABLE_PRIVILEGES, +}; + +/** + * Each required key's predicate as Postgres prints it back (empty for none). + * One simple-protocol round trip on one connection: a transaction that builds + * a temporary copy of each keyed table's declared columns, indexes it with the + * declared predicate, reads the printed form and rolls back. The names and SQL + * come from the requirements, which are constants, never input. A role that + * may not create temporary tables fails with code SCHEMA_TEMP_PRIVILEGE. + */ +export async function printedDeclaredPredicates(pool: Pick, requirements: SchemaRequirements): Promise { + const partial = requirements.keys.flatMap((required, index) => (required.predicate ? [{ ...required, index }] : [])); + if (partial.length === 0) return requirements.keys.map(() => ""); + const statements = partial.flatMap(({ table, columns, predicate, index }) => { + const probe = `heimdall_key_probe_${index}`; + const declared = requirements.columns + .filter((column) => column.table === table) + .map((column) => `${column.column} ${column.type}`) + .join(", "); + return [ + `CREATE TEMP TABLE ${probe} (${declared}) ON COMMIT DROP`, + `CREATE UNIQUE INDEX ${probe}_idx ON ${probe} (${columns}) WHERE ${predicate}`, + ]; + }); + const select = partial + .map(({ index }) => `SELECT ${index} AS key, pg_get_expr(indpred, indrelid) AS predicate FROM pg_index WHERE indexrelid = 'pg_temp.heimdall_key_probe_${index}_idx'::regclass`) + .join(" UNION ALL "); + let results: Array<{ rows: Array<{ key: number; predicate: string }> }>; + try { + results = (await pool.query(["BEGIN", ...statements, select, "ROLLBACK"].join(";\n"))) as unknown as typeof results; + } catch (error) { + if ((error as { code?: unknown }).code === "42501") { + throw Object.assign(new Error("The Heimdall database role may not create temporary tables."), { code: "SCHEMA_TEMP_PRIVILEGE" }); + } + throw error; + } + const printed = results[results.length - 2]!.rows; + return requirements.keys.map((_, index) => printed.find((row) => row.key === index)?.predicate ?? ""); +} + +/** + * Proves that the database can take a store's requests: every required + * table; every column with its declared type, under a deterministic + * collation, and nullable where declared nullable; every unique key; and + * every privilege, held on the table or on each of its columns. A missing or + * altered piece fails with code SCHEMA_MISSING and a missing privilege with + * SCHEMA_PRIVILEGES; neither error names the piece. + * + * A key is met by a unique index on its table that is valid (a failed + * CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY or an interrupted DROP INDEX CONCURRENTLY leaves + * one that is not; Postgres never marks an index valid before it is ready), + * immediate (ON CONFLICT refuses a deferrable arbiter), has exactly the key's + * columns as its key columns (INCLUDE columns aside), compares them under + * deterministic collations (a case-insensitive one would merge two + * providers' user ids into one row), and has the key's predicate. A + * predicate matches when both, as Postgres prints them, are the same set of + * AND-ed conditions; a `key_column IS NOT NULL` condition may be absent on + * either side, because a unique index never makes NULL keys collide unless + * it is NULLS NOT DISTINCT. Postgres prints the declared predicates itself + * (printedDeclaredPredicates). + * + * What this does not prove is listed where the schema is: see schema.ts. + */ +export async function checkSchemaRequirements(pool: Pick, requirements: SchemaRequirements): Promise { + const declaredPredicates = await printedDeclaredPredicates(pool, requirements); + const privileges = Object.entries(requirements.privileges).flatMap(([table, wanted]) => + wanted.map((privilege) => ({ table, privilege })) + ); + const result = await pool.query<{ + kind: "missing" | "privilege" | "candidate"; + key: number | null; + predicate: string | null; + nulls_not_distinct: boolean | null; + }>( + ` + SELECT 'missing' AS kind, NULL::int AS key, NULL::text AS predicate, NULL::boolean AS nulls_not_distinct + FROM unnest($1::text[]) AS name WHERE to_regclass(name) IS NULL + UNION ALL + SELECT 'missing', NULL, NULL, NULL + FROM unnest($2::text[], $3::text[], $4::text[], $5::boolean[]) AS required(table_name, column_name, type_name, nullable) + WHERE NOT EXISTS ( + SELECT 1 FROM pg_attribute a + WHERE a.attrelid = to_regclass(required.table_name) + AND a.attname = required.column_name + AND a.attnum > 0 + AND NOT a.attisdropped + AND a.atttypid = to_regtype(required.type_name) + AND (NOT required.nullable OR NOT a.attnotnull) + AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_collation c WHERE c.oid = a.attcollation AND NOT c.collisdeterministic) + ) + UNION ALL + SELECT 'candidate', required.key::int, pg_get_expr(i.indpred, i.indrelid), + coalesce((to_jsonb(i) ->> 'indnullsnotdistinct')::boolean, false) + FROM unnest($6::text[], $7::text[]) WITH ORDINALITY AS required(table_name, columns, key) + JOIN pg_index i ON i.indrelid = to_regclass(required.table_name) + WHERE i.indisunique + AND i.indisvalid + AND i.indimmediate + AND i.indnkeyatts = cardinality(string_to_array(required.columns, ',')) + AND ( + SELECT string_agg(a.attname, ',' ORDER BY a.attname) + FROM unnest(i.indkey::int2[]) WITH ORDINALITY AS key(attnum, position) + JOIN pg_attribute a ON a.attrelid = i.indrelid AND a.attnum = key.attnum + WHERE key.position <= i.indnkeyatts + ) = required.columns + AND NOT EXISTS ( + SELECT 1 FROM unnest(i.indcollation::oid[]) WITH ORDINALITY AS key_collation(oid, position) + JOIN pg_collation c ON c.oid = key_collation.oid + WHERE key_collation.position <= i.indnkeyatts AND NOT c.collisdeterministic + ) + UNION ALL + SELECT 'privilege', NULL, NULL, NULL + FROM unnest($8::text[], $9::text[]) AS required(table_name, privilege) + WHERE EXISTS ( + SELECT 1 FROM unnest($2::text[], $3::text[]) AS used(table_name, column_name) + JOIN pg_attribute a ON a.attrelid = to_regclass(used.table_name) AND a.attname = used.column_name AND NOT a.attisdropped + WHERE used.table_name = required.table_name + AND NOT has_column_privilege(a.attrelid, a.attnum, required.privilege) + ) + `, + [ + requirements.tables, + requirements.columns.map((required) => required.table), + requirements.columns.map((required) => required.column), + requirements.columns.map((required) => required.type), + requirements.columns.map((required) => required.nullable), + requirements.keys.map((required) => required.table), + requirements.keys.map((required) => required.columns), + privileges.map((required) => required.table), + privileges.map((required) => required.privilege), + ] + ); + const keyMet = requirements.keys.map((required, index) => + result.rows.some( + (row) => + row.kind === "candidate" && + row.key === index + 1 && + samePredicate(declaredPredicates[index]!, row.predicate ?? "", required.columns.split(","), row.nulls_not_distinct === true) + ) + ); + if (result.rows.some((row) => row.kind === "missing") || keyMet.includes(false)) { + throw Object.assign(new Error("The Heimdall schema is not applied."), { code: "SCHEMA_MISSING" }); + } + if (result.rows.some((row) => row.kind === "privilege")) { + throw Object.assign(new Error("The Heimdall database role lacks a privilege the store needs."), { + code: "SCHEMA_PRIVILEGES", + }); + } +} + export class PostgresStore implements HeimdallStore { constructor(private readonly pool: Pick) {} @@ -418,113 +552,9 @@ export class PostgresStore implements HeimdallStore { await this.pool.query(CREATE_SCHEMA_SQL); } - /** - * Proves, before Heimdall serves, that the database can take its requests: - * every table the schema makes; every column with its declared type, and - * nullable where the schema leaves it nullable; every unique key; and every - * privilege in STORE_TABLE_PRIVILEGES, held on the table or on each of its - * columns. A missing or altered piece fails with code SCHEMA_MISSING and a - * missing privilege with SCHEMA_PRIVILEGES; neither error names the piece. - * - * A key is met by a unique index on its table that is valid (a failed - * CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY or an interrupted DROP INDEX CONCURRENTLY leaves - * one that is not; Postgres never marks an index valid before it is ready), - * immediate (ON CONFLICT refuses a deferrable arbiter), has exactly the key's columns - * as its key columns (INCLUDE columns aside), compares them under - * deterministic collations (a case-insensitive one would merge two - * providers' user ids into one row), and has the key's predicate. A - * predicate matches when both, as Postgres prints them, are the same set of - * AND-ed conditions; a `key_column IS NOT NULL` condition may be absent on - * either side, because a unique index never makes NULL keys collide unless - * it is NULLS NOT DISTINCT. - * - * Postgres prints the declared predicates itself: they are indexed on a - * temporary copy of the table in a transaction that is rolled back. - */ + /** Proves, before Heimdall serves, that the database can take its requests (checkSchemaRequirements). */ async checkSchema(): Promise { - const declaredPredicates = await printedDeclaredPredicates(this.pool); - const privileges = Object.entries(STORE_TABLE_PRIVILEGES).flatMap(([table, wanted]) => - wanted.map((privilege) => ({ table, privilege })) - ); - const result = await this.pool.query<{ - kind: "missing" | "privilege" | "candidate"; - key: number | null; - predicate: string | null; - nulls_not_distinct: boolean | null; - }>( - ` - SELECT 'missing' AS kind, NULL::int AS key, NULL::text AS predicate, NULL::boolean AS nulls_not_distinct - FROM unnest($1::text[]) AS name WHERE to_regclass(name) IS NULL - UNION ALL - SELECT 'missing', NULL, NULL, NULL - FROM unnest($2::text[], $3::text[], $4::text[], $5::boolean[]) AS required(table_name, column_name, type_name, nullable) - WHERE NOT EXISTS ( - SELECT 1 FROM pg_attribute a - WHERE a.attrelid = to_regclass(required.table_name) - AND a.attname = required.column_name - AND a.attnum > 0 - AND NOT a.attisdropped - AND a.atttypid = to_regtype(required.type_name) - AND (NOT required.nullable OR NOT a.attnotnull) - ) - UNION ALL - SELECT 'candidate', required.key::int, pg_get_expr(i.indpred, i.indrelid), - coalesce((to_jsonb(i) ->> 'indnullsnotdistinct')::boolean, false) - FROM unnest($6::text[], $7::text[]) WITH ORDINALITY AS required(table_name, columns, key) - JOIN pg_index i ON i.indrelid = to_regclass(required.table_name) - WHERE i.indisunique - AND i.indisvalid - AND i.indimmediate - AND i.indnkeyatts = cardinality(string_to_array(required.columns, ',')) - AND ( - SELECT string_agg(a.attname, ',' ORDER BY a.attname) - FROM unnest(i.indkey::int2[]) WITH ORDINALITY AS key(attnum, position) - JOIN pg_attribute a ON a.attrelid = i.indrelid AND a.attnum = key.attnum - WHERE key.position <= i.indnkeyatts - ) = required.columns - AND NOT EXISTS ( - SELECT 1 FROM unnest(i.indcollation::oid[]) WITH ORDINALITY AS key_collation(oid, position) - JOIN pg_collation c ON c.oid = key_collation.oid - WHERE key_collation.position <= i.indnkeyatts AND NOT c.collisdeterministic - ) - UNION ALL - SELECT 'privilege', NULL, NULL, NULL - FROM unnest($8::text[], $9::text[]) AS required(table_name, privilege) - WHERE EXISTS ( - SELECT 1 FROM unnest($2::text[], $3::text[]) AS used(table_name, column_name) - JOIN pg_attribute a ON a.attrelid = to_regclass(used.table_name) AND a.attname = used.column_name AND NOT a.attisdropped - WHERE used.table_name = required.table_name - AND NOT has_column_privilege(a.attrelid, a.attnum, required.privilege) - ) - `, - [ - REQUIRED_TABLES, - REQUIRED_COLUMNS.map((required) => required.table), - REQUIRED_COLUMNS.map((required) => required.column), - REQUIRED_COLUMNS.map((required) => required.type), - REQUIRED_COLUMNS.map((required) => required.nullable), - REQUIRED_KEYS.map((required) => required.table), - REQUIRED_KEYS.map((required) => required.columns), - privileges.map((required) => required.table), - privileges.map((required) => required.privilege), - ] - ); - const keyMet = REQUIRED_KEYS.map((required, index) => - result.rows.some( - (row) => - row.kind === "candidate" && - row.key === index + 1 && - samePredicate(declaredPredicates[index]!, row.predicate ?? "", required.columns.split(","), row.nulls_not_distinct === true) - ) - ); - if (result.rows.some((row) => row.kind === "missing") || keyMet.includes(false)) { - throw Object.assign(new Error("The Heimdall schema is not applied."), { code: "SCHEMA_MISSING" }); - } - if (result.rows.some((row) => row.kind === "privilege")) { - throw Object.assign(new Error("The Heimdall database role lacks a privilege the store needs."), { - code: "SCHEMA_PRIVILEGES", - }); - } + await checkSchemaRequirements(this.pool, HEIMDALL_SCHEMA_REQUIREMENTS); } async close(): Promise { diff --git a/tests/store.test.ts b/tests/store.test.ts index a94f76f..a7a45f5 100644 --- a/tests/store.test.ts +++ b/tests/store.test.ts @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ import { createStore } from "../src/store/index.js"; import { createPostgresStore, PostgresStore, + checkSchemaRequirements, + HEIMDALL_SCHEMA_REQUIREMENTS, predicateConditions, printedDeclaredPredicates, samePredicate, @@ -519,7 +521,7 @@ describe.skipIf(!adminUrl)("startup against a live Postgres (HEIMDALL_TEST_PG_AD it("prints each declared predicate exactly as Postgres prints the applied index's", async () => { const { owner } = await appliedDatabase(); - const printed = await printedDeclaredPredicates(owner); + const printed = await printedDeclaredPredicates(owner, HEIMDALL_SCHEMA_REQUIREMENTS); const applied = await owner.query<{ predicate: string }>( "SELECT pg_get_expr(indpred, indrelid) AS predicate FROM pg_index WHERE indexrelid = 'auth_completions_attempt_unconsumed_unique_idx'::regclass" ); @@ -552,6 +554,51 @@ describe.skipIf(!adminUrl)("startup against a live Postgres (HEIMDALL_TEST_PG_AD await exerciseStore(new PostgresStore(pool)); }); + it("refuses a privilege missing on one column of another table", async () => { + const { name, owner } = await appliedDatabase(); + await grant(owner, { ...STORE_TABLE_PRIVILEGES, auth_completions: [] }); + const columns = REQUIRED_COLUMNS.filter((column) => column.table === "auth_completions" && column.column !== "attempt_id") + .map((column) => column.column) + .join(", "); + for (const privilege of STORE_TABLE_PRIVILEGES.auth_completions!) { + await owner.query(`GRANT ${privilege} (${columns}) ON auth_completions TO ${role}`); + } + + expect(await start(urlFor(name, role, rolePassword), false)).toBe(refusal("SCHEMA_PRIVILEGES")); + }); + + it("names the TEMPORARY privilege when the role may not create temporary tables", async () => { + const { name, owner } = await appliedDatabase(); + await grant(owner, STORE_TABLE_PRIVILEGES); + await owner.query(`REVOKE TEMPORARY ON DATABASE ${name} FROM PUBLIC`); + + expect(await start(urlFor(name, role, rolePassword), false)).toBe( + "Postgres storage could not be prepared (SCHEMA_TEMP_PRIVILEGE); grant the database role TEMPORARY on its database." + ); + }); + + // The schema's own predicate splits into the same conditions raw or + // printed, so only a predicate whose printed form differs (a literal gains + // its cast) shows that the check compares Postgres's printing. + it("matches a declared predicate that Postgres prints differently from how it is written", async () => { + const { owner } = await appliedDatabase(); + await owner.query("CREATE TABLE predicate_probe (id INTEGER NOT NULL, state TEXT, attempts INTEGER)"); + await owner.query("CREATE UNIQUE INDEX predicate_probe_live ON predicate_probe (id) WHERE state = 'live' AND attempts > 0"); + const requirements = { + tables: ["predicate_probe"], + columns: [ + { table: "predicate_probe", column: "id", type: "INTEGER", nullable: false }, + { table: "predicate_probe", column: "state", type: "TEXT", nullable: true }, + { table: "predicate_probe", column: "attempts", type: "INTEGER", nullable: true }, + ], + keys: [{ table: "predicate_probe", columns: "id", predicate: "state = 'live' AND attempts > 0" }], + privileges: {}, + }; + + expect((await printedDeclaredPredicates(owner, requirements))[0]).toBe("((state = 'live'::text) AND (attempts > 0))"); + await expect(checkSchemaRequirements(owner, requirements)).resolves.toBeUndefined(); + }); + it("refuses a privilege held on only some of a table's columns", async () => { const { name, owner } = await appliedDatabase(); await grant(owner, { ...STORE_TABLE_PRIVILEGES, audit_events: [] }); @@ -598,6 +645,18 @@ describe.skipIf(!adminUrl)("startup against a live Postgres (HEIMDALL_TEST_PG_AD ["ALTER TABLE linked_identities DROP CONSTRAINT linked_identities_provider_provider_user_id_key", "CREATE UNIQUE INDEX li_half_dropped ON linked_identities(provider, provider_user_id)", "UPDATE pg_index SET indisvalid = false WHERE indexrelid = 'li_half_dropped'::regclass"]], + ["a key's first column compared under a case-insensitive collation", + ["CREATE COLLATION heimdall_ci (provider = icu, locale = 'und-u-ks-level2', deterministic = false)", + "ALTER TABLE linked_identities DROP CONSTRAINT linked_identities_provider_provider_user_id_key", + "CREATE UNIQUE INDEX li_ci_first ON linked_identities(provider COLLATE heimdall_ci, provider_user_id)"]], + // Soul pass 7: the key index compares under "C", but the column itself is + // case-insensitive, so the store's own lookups by provider_user_id match + // other users' ids. + ["a column declared under a case-insensitive collation, its key index under C", + ["CREATE COLLATION heimdall_ci (provider = icu, locale = 'und-u-ks-level2', deterministic = false)", + "ALTER TABLE linked_identities DROP CONSTRAINT linked_identities_provider_provider_user_id_key", + "ALTER TABLE linked_identities ALTER COLUMN provider_user_id TYPE text COLLATE heimdall_ci", + 'CREATE UNIQUE INDEX li_c ON linked_identities(provider, provider_user_id COLLATE "C")']], ["a key compared under a case-insensitive collation (two users' ids become one row)", ["CREATE COLLATION heimdall_ci (provider = icu, locale = 'und-u-ks-level2', deterministic = false)", "ALTER TABLE linked_identities DROP CONSTRAINT linked_identities_provider_provider_user_id_key", @@ -617,6 +676,8 @@ describe.skipIf(!adminUrl)("startup against a live Postgres (HEIMDALL_TEST_PG_AD ["a column retyped", ["ALTER TABLE sessions ALTER COLUMN access_revision TYPE TEXT"]], ["a created table's column dropped", ["ALTER TABLE auth_completions DROP COLUMN mode"]], ["NOT NULL added to a column the store leaves null", ["ALTER TABLE auth_completions ALTER COLUMN attempt_id SET NOT NULL"]], + ["NOT NULL added to a nullable column of another table", + ["UPDATE linked_identities SET username = ''", "ALTER TABLE linked_identities ALTER COLUMN username SET NOT NULL"]], ])("refuses %s", async (_damage, steps) => { const { name, owner } = await appliedDatabase(); for (const step of steps) { @@ -639,6 +700,13 @@ describe.skipIf(!adminUrl)("startup against a live Postgres (HEIMDALL_TEST_PG_AD ["the attempt index without its redundant attempt_id IS NOT NULL", ["DROP INDEX auth_completions_attempt_unconsumed_unique_idx", "CREATE UNIQUE INDEX attempt_unconsumed ON auth_completions(app_slug, attempt_id) WHERE consumed_at IS NULL"]], ["a lookup index dropped", ["DROP INDEX audit_events_lookup_idx", "DROP INDEX auth_completions_lookup_idx"]], + // Only a key's own columns decide which rows collide; an INCLUDEd column's + // collation does not, whatever it is. + ["a key index that INCLUDEs an undeclared case-insensitive column", + ["CREATE COLLATION heimdall_ci (provider = icu, locale = 'und-u-ks-level2', deterministic = false)", + "ALTER TABLE linked_identities ADD COLUMN operator_note text COLLATE heimdall_ci", + "ALTER TABLE linked_identities DROP CONSTRAINT linked_identities_provider_provider_user_id_key", + "CREATE UNIQUE INDEX li_note ON linked_identities(provider, provider_user_id) INCLUDE (operator_note)"]], ])("accepts %s", async (_change, steps) => { const { name, owner } = await appliedDatabase(); for (const step of steps) await owner.query(step); From 7904e17cd267c046e2fa08119f7ea310cbf68a83 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2026 23:18:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 04/45] Pin the predicate splitter on a quoted identifier Soul pass 7's Y2, treating only single quotes as quoted text, survived: no test gave the splitter a double-quoted identifier. One case now holds an identifier containing " AND (" and checks it stays whole. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- tests/store.test.ts | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/tests/store.test.ts b/tests/store.test.ts index a7a45f5..8eeaeb1 100644 --- a/tests/store.test.ts +++ b/tests/store.test.ts @@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ describe("PostgresStore.checkSchema", () => { "consumed_at IS NULL", ]); expect(predicateConditions("(s = 'x AND (y'::text)")).toEqual(["s = 'x AND (y'::text"]); + expect(predicateConditions('(("odd AND (name" IS NULL) AND b)')).toEqual(['"odd AND (name" IS NULL', "b"]); expect(predicateConditions("")).toEqual([]); }); From 8066bcbbee2ff49878de431502221356de5501aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 10:44:24 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 05/45] State: Joystick H1 is the active cut; Ghostlight canaries demoted behind it Points at campaign joystick:campaign:self; flags the 1086aee deploy fact as last-recorded (2026-08-22, ~100 commits behind HEAD); drops the stale E: path and repixelizer-venv rehydrate command from the handoff. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- notes/fresh-workspace-handoff.md | 14 +++++++++++++- state/branches.json | 9 +++++++++ state/map.yaml | 9 +++++---- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/notes/fresh-workspace-handoff.md b/notes/fresh-workspace-handoff.md index a8502a3..31358f9 100644 --- a/notes/fresh-workspace-handoff.md +++ b/notes/fresh-workspace-handoff.md @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Fresh Workspace Handoff -This is the re-entry packet for `E:\Projects\Heimdall`. +This is the re-entry packet for this repo (path: whatever the checkout is; it has moved drives before). It is intentionally short. Historical proof belongs in git history and the distilled `state/evidence.jsonl` ledger; the shared architecture belongs in @@ -25,8 +25,18 @@ Get-Content '.\state\evidence.jsonl' -Tail 8 Do not trust this file for the exact live HEAD. Always check git. +## Active Work + +Joystick H1 is the active, M1-critical cut (operator ruling 2026-10-18): +campaign `joystick:campaign:self`, target `joystick:target:r1`, branch +`eureka/joystick-h1`. Read the campaign and target in the typed mind; do not +re-derive them here. The Ghostlight KLTST canaries below stay open, behind H1. + ## Current Orientation +Deploy facts below are last-recorded, from 2026-08-22 (`1086aee`); HEAD has +moved ~100 commits past it. Check Yggdrasil, not this file, for what runs. + - Yggdrasil runs Heimdall `1086aee01169bf60e8a492b2740db1c6f3e8cabf` with CultLib `5cefa0db0079a8e3ee22f29d7b9e6e5aa60912a9` @@ -171,6 +181,8 @@ Do not trust this file for the exact live HEAD. Always check git. ## Next Real Move +Joystick H1 first (see Active Work). Everything below is the standing queue. + Do not continue implementation automatically from a rehydrate-only request. The Idunn/swarm health transport cut is live. Do not regress Heimdall to diff --git a/state/branches.json b/state/branches.json index ea9d340..643b64f 100644 --- a/state/branches.json +++ b/state/branches.json @@ -12,6 +12,15 @@ "docs/implementation-plan.md" ], "notes": "Current mainline. Repixelizer is the first auth-blank binding target; StreamPixels is the migration and boundary stress test." + }, + { + "id": "eureka/joystick-h1", + "hypothesis": "One locked refresh primitive plus a Joystick OAuth provider in Heimdall lets StreamPixels ingest Joystick without ever presenting a provider refresh token.", + "status": "active", + "artifacts": [ + "state/map.yaml" + ], + "notes": "Campaign joystick:campaign:self, target joystick:target:r1. Hands owns code in a separate worktree." } ] } diff --git a/state/map.yaml b/state/map.yaml index 71e57dc..3f8772a 100644 --- a/state/map.yaml +++ b/state/map.yaml @@ -59,13 +59,14 @@ data_flow: - reject per-request auth round-trip chatter active_subgoals: - - Pressure the deployed Ghostlight gamecult.heimdall.access integration with two- and eight-account human canaries. + - ACTIVE, M1-critical (operator ruling 2026-10-18): Joystick H1, campaign joystick:campaign:self (branch eureka/joystick-h1). Joystick OAuth provider, joystick as a streampixels viewer provider, one locked refresh primitive for every provider replacing refreshLinkedIdentityCredentialIfNeeded. + - OPEN, behind H1: pressure the deployed Ghostlight gamecult.heimdall.access integration with two- and eight-account human canaries. - Keep the shared architecture explicit and separate from app profiles. - Preserve the default boundary that app-domain data remains app-owned. - Align the plan to Heimdall as a Yggdrasil-hosted authority service. - Publish Heimdall daemon health and boundary state for Idunn/Odin without moving auth truth out of Heimdall. - Verify the Discord and Patreon Repixelizer auth paths with real provider credentials, stable signing, persistent storage, and live browser callback verification. - - Wire StreamPixels through Heimdall for Twitch/YouTube viewer identity and managed creator-provider credentials without moving StreamPixels domain state into Heimdall. + - Wire StreamPixels through Heimdall for Twitch/YouTube (Joystick joins under H1) viewer identity and managed creator-provider credentials without moving StreamPixels domain state into Heimdall. accepted_design: - `gamecult.heimdall.access` owns access-gate representation and browser navigation semantics; it has no access-grant or provider-state authority. @@ -125,5 +126,5 @@ rejected_paths: reason: reusing auth mechanics does not justify centralizing app-domain audience or product data current_status: - summary: Yggdrasil runs the gamecult.heimdall.access plugin and encrypted loopback begin, complete, refresh, and logout plane at 1086aee01169bf60e8a492b2740db1c6f3e8cabf. Odin returns all four redacted discovery records, Ghostlight resolves the boundary through Odin, and live anonymous auth.begin is accepted without exposing claims or secrets. - next_action: Run separate-account KLTST completion, refresh, logout, privacy, and stale-attempt canaries through the deployed Ghostlight Eve host; keep provider credential rotation on the operator list because prior tool output exposed OAuth secrets. + summary: Active work is Joystick H1 (campaign joystick:campaign:self). Last recorded Yggdrasil deploy (not verifiable from this repo; HEAD is far past it, see git): Yggdrasil runs the gamecult.heimdall.access plugin and encrypted loopback begin, complete, refresh, and logout plane at 1086aee01169bf60e8a492b2740db1c6f3e8cabf. Odin returns all four redacted discovery records, Ghostlight resolves the boundary through Odin, and live anonymous auth.begin is accepted without exposing claims or secrets. + next_action: Land Joystick H1 per campaign joystick:campaign:self and target joystick:target:r1 (worktree and branch eureka/joystick-h1). Then, still open, run separate-account KLTST completion, refresh, logout, privacy, and stale-attempt canaries through the deployed Ghostlight Eve host; keep provider credential rotation on the operator list because prior tool output exposed OAuth secrets. From 2108d1088b117f9644d9ae98a92c6603d2e797d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 10:44:29 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 06/45] Handoff: rehydrate with plain python, not the repixelizer venv on E: Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- notes/fresh-workspace-handoff.md | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/notes/fresh-workspace-handoff.md b/notes/fresh-workspace-handoff.md index 31358f9..4727d7f 100644 --- a/notes/fresh-workspace-handoff.md +++ b/notes/fresh-workspace-handoff.md @@ -12,8 +12,7 @@ distilled `state/evidence.jsonl` ledger; the shared architecture belongs in From the repo root: ```powershell -# This repo has no dedicated venv yet. Use any working Python 3.11+. -E:\Projects\repixelizer\.venv\Scripts\python.exe .\tools\heimdall_state.py status +python .\tools\heimdall_state.py status Get-Content '.\state\map.yaml' Get-Content '.\notes\fresh-workspace-handoff.md' Get-Content '.\docs\architecture.md' From 0dbcd98019eba61b320938d06bb90e6b410cccf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 11:06:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 07/45] Collapse ten per-provider token functions into one descriptor-driven request Endpoint, client-auth method (RFC 7591 names) and rotation now live on ProviderDescriptor; requestProviderTokens is the only code that talks to a token endpoint. Failure labels are unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- src/oauth.ts | 550 ++++----------------------- src/providers.ts | 23 ++ tests/provider-token-request.test.ts | 116 ++++++ 3 files changed, 203 insertions(+), 486 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/provider-token-request.test.ts diff --git a/src/oauth.ts b/src/oauth.ts index 33ae495..2d0020c 100644 --- a/src/oauth.ts +++ b/src/oauth.ts @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import { } from "./contracts.js"; import { type HeimdallConfig } from "./config.js"; import { entitlementFacts } from "./facts.js"; +import { providerCatalog } from "./providers.js"; import { type CreateEntitlementSnapshotInput } from "./store/types.js"; export interface OAuthTokenSet { @@ -49,6 +50,7 @@ export interface OAuthProviderRuntime { refreshAccessToken?(options: { config: HeimdallConfig; refreshToken: string; + signal?: AbortSignal; }): Promise; resolveIdentity(options: { config: HeimdallConfig; accessToken: string }): Promise; evaluateEntitlements(options: { @@ -106,512 +108,88 @@ function normalizeScopes(scope: string | string[] | undefined): string[] { return scope?.split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean) ?? []; } -async function exchangeDiscordAuthorizationCode(options: { - config: HeimdallConfig; - code: string; - redirectUri: string; -}): Promise { - const providerConfig = options.config.providers.discord; +export type TokenGrant = + | { grant_type: "authorization_code"; code: string; redirect_uri: string } + | { grant_type: "refresh_token"; refresh_token: string }; + +/** + * The one token request: endpoint, client authentication and rotation all come + * from the provider's descriptor. `basic` sends the client as an Authorization + * header and nothing in the body; `post` sends it in the body. A refresh token + * is returned only when the provider sent one; keeping or discarding the old + * one is the caller's rule (ProviderDescriptor.rotatesRefreshTokens). + */ +export async function requestProviderTokens( + provider: Provider, + config: HeimdallConfig, + grant: TokenGrant, + signal?: AbortSignal +): Promise { + const descriptor = providerCatalog[provider]; + const providerConfig = config.providers[provider]; if (!providerConfig.clientId || !providerConfig.clientSecret) { - throw new Error("Discord OAuth is not fully configured."); + throw new Error(`${descriptor.displayName} OAuth is not fully configured.`); } - const body = new URLSearchParams({ - grant_type: "authorization_code", - code: options.code, - redirect_uri: options.redirectUri, - }); - const basicAuth = Buffer.from(`${providerConfig.clientId}:${providerConfig.clientSecret}`).toString("base64"); - const tokenResponse = await fetchJson<{ - access_token: string; - refresh_token?: string; - token_type: string; - expires_in: number; - scope?: string | string[]; - }>( - "https://discord.com/api/v10/oauth2/token", - { - method: "POST", - headers: { - Authorization: `Basic ${basicAuth}`, - "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", - }, - body, - }, - "Discord token exchange failed" - ); - - const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = { - accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token, - tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type, - scope: normalizeScopes(tokenResponse.scope), - expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + tokenResponse.expires_in * 1000).toISOString(), - raw: tokenResponse as unknown as Record, + const body = new URLSearchParams(grant); + const headers: Record = { + "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", + Accept: "application/json", }; - - if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) { - tokenSet.refreshToken = tokenResponse.refresh_token; + if (descriptor.tokenEndpointAuthMethod === "client_secret_basic") { + headers.Authorization = `Basic ${Buffer.from(`${providerConfig.clientId}:${providerConfig.clientSecret}`).toString("base64")}`; + } else { + body.set("client_id", providerConfig.clientId); + body.set("client_secret", providerConfig.clientSecret); } - return tokenSet; -} - -async function refreshDiscordAccessToken(options: { - config: HeimdallConfig; - refreshToken: string; -}): Promise { - const providerConfig = options.config.providers.discord; - if (!providerConfig.clientId || !providerConfig.clientSecret) { - throw new Error("Discord OAuth is not fully configured."); + const init: RequestInit = { method: "POST", headers, body }; + if (signal) { + init.signal = signal; } - - const basicAuth = Buffer.from(`${providerConfig.clientId}:${providerConfig.clientSecret}`).toString("base64"); + const label = grant.grant_type === "refresh_token" ? "refresh" : "exchange"; const tokenResponse = await fetchJson<{ access_token: string; refresh_token?: string; - token_type: string; - expires_in: number; - scope?: string | string[]; - }>( - "https://discord.com/api/v10/oauth2/token", - { - method: "POST", - headers: { - Authorization: `Basic ${basicAuth}`, - "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", - }, - body: new URLSearchParams({ - grant_type: "refresh_token", - refresh_token: options.refreshToken, - }), - }, - "Discord token refresh failed" - ); - - const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = { - accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token, - tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type, - scope: normalizeScopes(tokenResponse.scope), - expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + tokenResponse.expires_in * 1000).toISOString(), - raw: tokenResponse as unknown as Record, - }; - - if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) { - tokenSet.refreshToken = tokenResponse.refresh_token; - } - - return tokenSet; -} - -async function exchangePatreonAuthorizationCode(options: { - config: HeimdallConfig; - code: string; - redirectUri: string; -}): Promise { - const providerConfig = options.config.providers.patreon; - if (!providerConfig.clientId || !providerConfig.clientSecret) { - throw new Error("Patreon OAuth is not fully configured."); - } - - const body = new URLSearchParams({ - grant_type: "authorization_code", - code: options.code, - client_id: providerConfig.clientId, - client_secret: providerConfig.clientSecret, - redirect_uri: options.redirectUri, - }); - const tokenResponse = await fetchJson<{ - access_token: string; - refresh_token?: string; - token_type: string; + token_type?: string; expires_in?: number; scope?: string | string[]; - }>( - "https://www.patreon.com/api/oauth2/token", - { - method: "POST", - headers: { - "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", - }, - body, - }, - "Patreon token exchange failed" - ); + }>(descriptor.tokenEndpoint, init, `${descriptor.displayName} token ${label} failed`); const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = { accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token, - tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type, + tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type ?? "Bearer", scope: normalizeScopes(tokenResponse.scope), raw: tokenResponse as unknown as Record, }; - if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) { tokenSet.refreshToken = tokenResponse.refresh_token; } - - if (tokenResponse.expires_in) { + if (typeof tokenResponse.expires_in === "number" && tokenResponse.expires_in > 0) { tokenSet.expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + tokenResponse.expires_in * 1000).toISOString(); } - return tokenSet; } -async function refreshPatreonAccessToken(options: { - config: HeimdallConfig; - refreshToken: string; -}): Promise { - const providerConfig = options.config.providers.patreon; - if (!providerConfig.clientId || !providerConfig.clientSecret) { - throw new Error("Patreon OAuth is not fully configured."); - } - - const tokenResponse = await fetchJson<{ - access_token: string; - refresh_token?: string; - token_type: string; - expires_in?: number; - scope?: string | string[]; - }>( - "https://www.patreon.com/api/oauth2/token", - { - method: "POST", - headers: { - "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", - }, - body: new URLSearchParams({ - grant_type: "refresh_token", - refresh_token: options.refreshToken, - client_id: providerConfig.clientId, - client_secret: providerConfig.clientSecret, - }), - }, - "Patreon token refresh failed" - ); - - const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = { - accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token, - tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type, - scope: normalizeScopes(tokenResponse.scope), - raw: tokenResponse as unknown as Record, - }; - - if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) { - tokenSet.refreshToken = tokenResponse.refresh_token; - } - - if (tokenResponse.expires_in) { - tokenSet.expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + tokenResponse.expires_in * 1000).toISOString(); - } - - return tokenSet; +function sharedRuntimeExchange(provider: Provider): OAuthProviderRuntime["exchangeAuthorizationCode"] { + return (options) => + requestProviderTokens(provider, options.config, { + grant_type: "authorization_code", + code: options.code, + redirect_uri: options.redirectUri, + }); } -async function exchangeTwitchAuthorizationCode(options: { - config: HeimdallConfig; - code: string; - redirectUri: string; -}): Promise { - const providerConfig = options.config.providers.twitch; - if (!providerConfig.clientId || !providerConfig.clientSecret) { - throw new Error("Twitch OAuth is not fully configured."); - } - - const tokenResponse = await fetchJson<{ - access_token: string; - refresh_token?: string; - token_type: string; - expires_in?: number; - scope?: string | string[]; - }>( - "https://id.twitch.tv/oauth2/token", - { - method: "POST", - headers: { - "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", - }, - body: new URLSearchParams({ - client_id: providerConfig.clientId, - client_secret: providerConfig.clientSecret, - code: options.code, - grant_type: "authorization_code", - redirect_uri: options.redirectUri, - }), - }, - "Twitch token exchange failed" - ); - - const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = { - accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token, - tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type, - scope: normalizeScopes(tokenResponse.scope), - raw: tokenResponse as unknown as Record, - }; - - if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) { - tokenSet.refreshToken = tokenResponse.refresh_token; - } - - if (tokenResponse.expires_in) { - tokenSet.expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + tokenResponse.expires_in * 1000).toISOString(); - } - - return tokenSet; +function sharedRuntimeRefresh(provider: Provider): NonNullable { + return (options) => + requestProviderTokens( + provider, + options.config, + { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: options.refreshToken }, + options.signal + ); } -async function refreshTwitchAccessToken(options: { - config: HeimdallConfig; - refreshToken: string; -}): Promise { - const providerConfig = options.config.providers.twitch; - if (!providerConfig.clientId || !providerConfig.clientSecret) { - throw new Error("Twitch OAuth is not fully configured."); - } - - const tokenResponse = await fetchJson<{ - access_token: string; - refresh_token?: string; - token_type: string; - expires_in?: number; - scope?: string | string[]; - }>( - "https://id.twitch.tv/oauth2/token", - { - method: "POST", - headers: { - "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", - }, - body: new URLSearchParams({ - client_id: providerConfig.clientId, - client_secret: providerConfig.clientSecret, - grant_type: "refresh_token", - refresh_token: options.refreshToken, - }), - }, - "Twitch token refresh failed" - ); - - const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = { - accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token, - tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type, - scope: normalizeScopes(tokenResponse.scope), - raw: tokenResponse as unknown as Record, - }; - - if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) { - tokenSet.refreshToken = tokenResponse.refresh_token; - } - - if (tokenResponse.expires_in) { - tokenSet.expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + tokenResponse.expires_in * 1000).toISOString(); - } - - return tokenSet; -} - -async function exchangeYouTubeAuthorizationCode(options: { - config: HeimdallConfig; - code: string; - redirectUri: string; -}): Promise { - const providerConfig = options.config.providers.youtube; - if (!providerConfig.clientId || !providerConfig.clientSecret) { - throw new Error("YouTube OAuth is not fully configured."); - } - - const tokenResponse = await fetchJson<{ - access_token: string; - refresh_token?: string; - token_type: string; - expires_in?: number; - scope?: string | string[]; - id_token?: string; - }>( - "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token", - { - method: "POST", - headers: { - "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", - }, - body: new URLSearchParams({ - client_id: providerConfig.clientId, - client_secret: providerConfig.clientSecret, - code: options.code, - grant_type: "authorization_code", - redirect_uri: options.redirectUri, - }), - }, - "YouTube token exchange failed" - ); - - const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = { - accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token, - tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type, - scope: normalizeScopes(tokenResponse.scope), - raw: tokenResponse as unknown as Record, - }; - - if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) { - tokenSet.refreshToken = tokenResponse.refresh_token; - } - - if (tokenResponse.expires_in) { - tokenSet.expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + tokenResponse.expires_in * 1000).toISOString(); - } - - return tokenSet; -} - -async function refreshYouTubeAccessToken(options: { - config: HeimdallConfig; - refreshToken: string; -}): Promise { - const providerConfig = options.config.providers.youtube; - if (!providerConfig.clientId || !providerConfig.clientSecret) { - throw new Error("YouTube OAuth is not fully configured."); - } - - const tokenResponse = await fetchJson<{ - access_token: string; - refresh_token?: string; - token_type: string; - expires_in?: number; - scope?: string | string[]; - }>( - "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token", - { - method: "POST", - headers: { - "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", - }, - body: new URLSearchParams({ - client_id: providerConfig.clientId, - client_secret: providerConfig.clientSecret, - grant_type: "refresh_token", - refresh_token: options.refreshToken, - }), - }, - "YouTube token refresh failed" - ); - - const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = { - accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token, - tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type, - scope: normalizeScopes(tokenResponse.scope), - raw: tokenResponse as unknown as Record, - }; - - if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) { - tokenSet.refreshToken = tokenResponse.refresh_token; - } - - if (tokenResponse.expires_in) { - tokenSet.expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + tokenResponse.expires_in * 1000).toISOString(); - } - - return tokenSet; -} - -async function exchangeSpotifyAuthorizationCode(options: { - config: HeimdallConfig; - code: string; - redirectUri: string; -}): Promise { - const providerConfig = options.config.providers.spotify; - if (!providerConfig.clientId || !providerConfig.clientSecret) { - throw new Error("Spotify OAuth is not fully configured."); - } - - const basicAuth = Buffer.from(`${providerConfig.clientId}:${providerConfig.clientSecret}`).toString("base64"); - const tokenResponse = await fetchJson<{ - access_token: string; - refresh_token?: string; - token_type: string; - expires_in?: number; - scope?: string | string[]; - }>( - "https://accounts.spotify.com/api/token", - { - method: "POST", - headers: { - Authorization: `Basic ${basicAuth}`, - "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", - }, - body: new URLSearchParams({ - grant_type: "authorization_code", - code: options.code, - redirect_uri: options.redirectUri, - }), - }, - "Spotify token exchange failed" - ); - - const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = { - accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token, - tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type, - scope: normalizeScopes(tokenResponse.scope), - raw: tokenResponse as unknown as Record, - }; - - if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) { - tokenSet.refreshToken = tokenResponse.refresh_token; - } - - if (tokenResponse.expires_in) { - tokenSet.expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + tokenResponse.expires_in * 1000).toISOString(); - } - - return tokenSet; -} - -async function refreshSpotifyAccessToken(options: { - config: HeimdallConfig; - refreshToken: string; -}): Promise { - const providerConfig = options.config.providers.spotify; - if (!providerConfig.clientId || !providerConfig.clientSecret) { - throw new Error("Spotify OAuth is not fully configured."); - } - - const basicAuth = Buffer.from(`${providerConfig.clientId}:${providerConfig.clientSecret}`).toString("base64"); - const tokenResponse = await fetchJson<{ - access_token: string; - refresh_token?: string; - token_type: string; - expires_in?: number; - scope?: string | string[]; - }>( - "https://accounts.spotify.com/api/token", - { - method: "POST", - headers: { - Authorization: `Basic ${basicAuth}`, - "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", - }, - body: new URLSearchParams({ - grant_type: "refresh_token", - refresh_token: options.refreshToken, - }), - }, - "Spotify token refresh failed" - ); - - const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = { - accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token, - tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type, - scope: normalizeScopes(tokenResponse.scope), - raw: tokenResponse as unknown as Record, - }; - - if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) { - tokenSet.refreshToken = tokenResponse.refresh_token; - } - - if (tokenResponse.expires_in) { - tokenSet.expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + tokenResponse.expires_in * 1000).toISOString(); - } - - return tokenSet; -} async function resolveDiscordIdentity(options: { accessToken: string }): Promise { const user = await fetchJson<{ @@ -1217,22 +795,22 @@ async function evaluatePatreonEntitlements(options: { } const discordRuntime: OAuthProviderRuntime = { - exchangeAuthorizationCode: exchangeDiscordAuthorizationCode, - refreshAccessToken: refreshDiscordAccessToken, + exchangeAuthorizationCode: sharedRuntimeExchange("discord"), + refreshAccessToken: sharedRuntimeRefresh("discord"), resolveIdentity: resolveDiscordIdentity, evaluateEntitlements: evaluateDiscordEntitlements, }; const patreonRuntime: OAuthProviderRuntime = { - exchangeAuthorizationCode: exchangePatreonAuthorizationCode, - refreshAccessToken: refreshPatreonAccessToken, + exchangeAuthorizationCode: sharedRuntimeExchange("patreon"), + refreshAccessToken: sharedRuntimeRefresh("patreon"), resolveIdentity: resolvePatreonIdentity, evaluateEntitlements: evaluatePatreonEntitlements, }; const twitchRuntime: OAuthProviderRuntime = { - exchangeAuthorizationCode: exchangeTwitchAuthorizationCode, - refreshAccessToken: refreshTwitchAccessToken, + exchangeAuthorizationCode: sharedRuntimeExchange("twitch"), + refreshAccessToken: sharedRuntimeRefresh("twitch"), resolveIdentity: resolveTwitchIdentity, async evaluateEntitlements() { return { facts: [], snapshots: [] }; @@ -1240,8 +818,8 @@ const twitchRuntime: OAuthProviderRuntime = { }; const youtubeRuntime: OAuthProviderRuntime = { - exchangeAuthorizationCode: exchangeYouTubeAuthorizationCode, - refreshAccessToken: refreshYouTubeAccessToken, + exchangeAuthorizationCode: sharedRuntimeExchange("youtube"), + refreshAccessToken: sharedRuntimeRefresh("youtube"), resolveIdentity: resolveYouTubeIdentity, async evaluateEntitlements() { return { facts: [], snapshots: [] }; @@ -1249,8 +827,8 @@ const youtubeRuntime: OAuthProviderRuntime = { }; const spotifyRuntime: OAuthProviderRuntime = { - exchangeAuthorizationCode: exchangeSpotifyAuthorizationCode, - refreshAccessToken: refreshSpotifyAccessToken, + exchangeAuthorizationCode: sharedRuntimeExchange("spotify"), + refreshAccessToken: sharedRuntimeRefresh("spotify"), resolveIdentity: resolveSpotifyIdentity, async evaluateEntitlements() { return { facts: [], snapshots: [] }; diff --git a/src/providers.ts b/src/providers.ts index 506e084..2998e4d 100644 --- a/src/providers.ts +++ b/src/providers.ts @@ -6,6 +6,11 @@ export interface ProviderDescriptor { key: Provider; displayName: string; authorizationEndpoint: string; + tokenEndpoint: string; + /** RFC 7591 names: how the client authenticates at the token endpoint. */ + tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_basic" | "client_secret_post"; + /** True when a refresh response replaces the refresh token and the old one dies. */ + rotatesRefreshTokens: boolean; defaultScopes: string[]; roles: ProviderRole[]; clientIdEnv: string; @@ -18,6 +23,9 @@ export const providerCatalog: Record = { key: "discord", displayName: "Discord", authorizationEndpoint: "https://discord.com/oauth2/authorize", + tokenEndpoint: "https://discord.com/api/v10/oauth2/token", + tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_basic", + rotatesRefreshTokens: false, defaultScopes: ["identify", "guilds.members.read"], roles: ["identity", "entitlement"], clientIdEnv: "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_DISCORD_CLIENT_ID", @@ -27,6 +35,9 @@ export const providerCatalog: Record = { key: "patreon", displayName: "Patreon", authorizationEndpoint: "https://www.patreon.com/oauth2/authorize", + tokenEndpoint: "https://www.patreon.com/api/oauth2/token", + tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_post", + rotatesRefreshTokens: false, defaultScopes: ["identity", "identity[email]"], roles: ["identity", "entitlement"], clientIdEnv: "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_PATREON_CLIENT_ID", @@ -36,6 +47,9 @@ export const providerCatalog: Record = { key: "github", displayName: "GitHub", authorizationEndpoint: "https://github.com/login/oauth/authorize", + tokenEndpoint: "https://github.com/login/oauth/access_token", + tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_post", + rotatesRefreshTokens: false, defaultScopes: ["read:user", "user:email"], roles: ["identity", "managed_credential"], clientIdEnv: "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_GITHUB_CLIENT_ID", @@ -45,6 +59,9 @@ export const providerCatalog: Record = { key: "twitch", displayName: "Twitch", authorizationEndpoint: "https://id.twitch.tv/oauth2/authorize", + tokenEndpoint: "https://id.twitch.tv/oauth2/token", + tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_post", + rotatesRefreshTokens: false, defaultScopes: ["user:read:email"], roles: ["identity", "managed_credential"], clientIdEnv: "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_TWITCH_CLIENT_ID", @@ -54,6 +71,9 @@ export const providerCatalog: Record = { key: "youtube", displayName: "YouTube", authorizationEndpoint: "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth", + tokenEndpoint: "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token", + tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_post", + rotatesRefreshTokens: false, defaultScopes: [ "openid", "email", @@ -73,6 +93,9 @@ export const providerCatalog: Record = { key: "spotify", displayName: "Spotify", authorizationEndpoint: "https://accounts.spotify.com/authorize", + tokenEndpoint: "https://accounts.spotify.com/api/token", + tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_basic", + rotatesRefreshTokens: false, defaultScopes: [ "user-read-currently-playing", "user-read-playback-state", diff --git a/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts b/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2d13a30 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest"; +import { type HeimdallConfig } from "../src/config.js"; +import { providers, type Provider } from "../src/contracts.js"; +import { requestProviderTokens } from "../src/oauth.js"; +import { providerCatalog } from "../src/providers.js"; + +const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch; +afterEach(() => { + globalThis.fetch = originalFetch; +}); + +function configFor(): HeimdallConfig { + return { + providers: Object.fromEntries(providers.map((p) => [p, { clientId: `${p}-client`, clientSecret: `${p}-secret` }])), + } as unknown as HeimdallConfig; +} + +interface Captured { + url: string; + headers: Record; + body: URLSearchParams; +} + +function capture(answer: () => Response): { calls: Captured[] } { + const calls: Captured[] = []; + globalThis.fetch = (async (input: string | URL, init?: RequestInit) => { + calls.push({ + url: String(input), + headers: init?.headers as Record, + body: init?.body as URLSearchParams, + }); + return answer(); + }) as typeof fetch; + return { calls }; +} + +const ok = () => + new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", refresh_token: "r", token_type: "Bearer", expires_in: 3600, scope: "x y" }), { + status: 200, + }); + +const requestable: Provider[] = [...providers]; + +describe("requestProviderTokens follows the provider descriptor", () => { + it.each(requestable.flatMap((p) => [[p, "authorization_code"] as const, [p, "refresh_token"] as const]))( + "%s %s hits its token endpoint with its client-auth method only", + async (provider, grantType) => { + const { calls } = capture(ok); + const descriptor = providerCatalog[provider]; + const grant = + grantType === "authorization_code" + ? ({ grant_type: "authorization_code", code: "the-code", redirect_uri: "https://h/cb" } as const) + : ({ grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "the-refresh" } as const); + + const tokens = await requestProviderTokens(provider, configFor(), grant); + + expect(calls).toHaveLength(1); + const call = calls[0]!; + expect(call.url).toBe(descriptor.tokenEndpoint); + expect(call.headers["Content-Type"]).toBe("application/x-www-form-urlencoded"); + expect(call.headers.Accept).toBe("application/json"); + expect(call.body.get("grant_type")).toBe(grantType); + if (descriptor.tokenEndpointAuthMethod === "client_secret_basic") { + expect(call.headers.Authorization).toBe(`Basic ${Buffer.from(`${provider}-client:${provider}-secret`).toString("base64")}`); + expect(call.body.has("client_id")).toBe(false); + expect(call.body.has("client_secret")).toBe(false); + } else { + expect(call.headers.Authorization).toBeUndefined(); + expect(call.body.get("client_id")).toBe(`${provider}-client`); + expect(call.body.get("client_secret")).toBe(`${provider}-secret`); + } + expect(tokens.accessToken).toBe("a"); + expect(tokens.refreshToken).toBe("r"); + expect(tokens.scope).toEqual(["x", "y"]); + expect(Date.parse(tokens.expiresAt ?? "")).toBeGreaterThan(Date.now()); + } + ); + + it("sends the code and redirect uri on exchange and the refresh token on refresh", async () => { + const { calls } = capture(ok); + await requestProviderTokens("spotify", configFor(), { grant_type: "authorization_code", code: "C", redirect_uri: "https://h/cb" }); + await requestProviderTokens("spotify", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "R" }); + expect(calls[0]!.body.get("code")).toBe("C"); + expect(calls[0]!.body.get("redirect_uri")).toBe("https://h/cb"); + expect(calls[1]!.body.get("refresh_token")).toBe("R"); + expect(calls[1]!.body.has("code")).toBe(false); + }); + + it.each([ + ["no expires_in", { access_token: "a" }], + ["a zero expires_in", { access_token: "a", expires_in: 0 }], + ["a string expires_in", { access_token: "a", expires_in: "3600" }], + ])("sets no expiry and no refresh token for %s", async (_n, body) => { + capture(() => new Response(JSON.stringify(body), { status: 200 })); + const tokens = await requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "R" }); + expect(tokens.expiresAt).toBeUndefined(); + expect(tokens.refreshToken).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + it.each([ + ["authorization_code", { grant_type: "authorization_code", code: "c", redirect_uri: "u" } as const, "exchange"], + ["refresh_token", { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" } as const, "refresh"], + ])("keeps the failure label for %s", async (_g, grant, word) => { + capture(() => new Response("nope", { status: 500 })); + await expect(requestProviderTokens("youtube", configFor(), grant)).rejects.toThrow( + `YouTube token ${word} failed (status 500, provider_status).` + ); + }); + + it("refuses an unconfigured provider by display name", async () => { + const config = { providers: { patreon: {} } } as unknown as HeimdallConfig; + await expect( + requestProviderTokens("patreon", config, { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" }) + ).rejects.toThrow("Patreon OAuth is not fully configured."); + }); +}); From c81f9238907fa34f7f53d83c93c9facdf89dd82f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 11:11:34 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 08/45] Refresh managed credentials under a row lock, with typed revocation refreshLinkedIdentityCredentialIfNeeded is deleted. refreshManagedCredential owns the policy; HeimdallStore.updateLinkedIdentityCredential owns the row (SELECT ... FOR UPDATE in Postgres, a per-id chain in memory), so a refresh token is presented once across concurrent requests and processes. invalid_grant clears the tokens (410 managed_credential_revoked); any other failure keeps them (502 managed_credential_refresh_failed). The "?? refreshToken" keep-old fallback is gone; keeping it is an explicit branch for non-rotating providers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- src/app.ts | 118 ++---- src/managed-credential.ts | 140 ++++++++ src/oauth.ts | 29 +- src/store/in-memory.ts | 42 +++ src/store/postgres.ts | 57 ++- src/store/types.ts | 28 ++ tests/app.test.ts | 113 +++++- tests/managed-credential.test.ts | 517 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/provider-token-request.test.ts | 31 ++ tests/store.test.ts | 3 +- 10 files changed, 979 insertions(+), 99 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/managed-credential.ts create mode 100644 tests/managed-credential.test.ts diff --git a/src/app.ts b/src/app.ts index 9621856..5345c40 100644 --- a/src/app.ts +++ b/src/app.ts @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ import { summarizePatreonMemberships, type OAuthRuntimeRegistry, } from "./oauth.js"; +import { ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed, refreshManagedCredential } from "./managed-credential.js"; import { buildAuthorizationUrl, providerCatalog, providerExpectedEnv } from "./providers.js"; import { createRuntimeKeyMaterial, signJwt, verifyJwt } from "./signing.js"; import { createStore, type HeimdallStore } from "./store/index.js"; @@ -44,8 +45,6 @@ import { type UpsertLinkedIdentityInput, } from "./store/types.js"; -const MANAGED_CREDENTIAL_REFRESH_SKEW_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000; - export interface BuildAppOptions { config?: HeimdallConfig; store?: HeimdallStore; @@ -367,63 +366,6 @@ function centsToDecimalString(cents: number): string { return (cents / 100).toFixed(2); } -async function refreshLinkedIdentityCredentialIfNeeded(options: { - config: HeimdallConfig; - store: HeimdallStore; - tokenCustody: TokenCustody; - oauthRuntimes: OAuthRuntimeRegistry; - linkedIdentity: StoredLinkedIdentity; - now: string; -}): Promise { - const expiresAt = options.linkedIdentity.tokenExpiresAt ? Date.parse(options.linkedIdentity.tokenExpiresAt) : undefined; - if ( - !expiresAt || - expiresAt - Date.now() > MANAGED_CREDENTIAL_REFRESH_SKEW_MS || - !options.linkedIdentity.refreshTokenEncrypted - ) { - return options.linkedIdentity; - } - - const runtime = options.oauthRuntimes[options.linkedIdentity.provider]; - if (!runtime.refreshAccessToken) { - return options.linkedIdentity; - } - - const refreshToken = options.tokenCustody.decrypt(options.linkedIdentity.refreshTokenEncrypted); - const refreshed = await runtime.refreshAccessToken({ - config: options.config, - refreshToken, - }); - - const upsertInput: UpsertLinkedIdentityInput = { - id: options.linkedIdentity.id, - accountId: options.linkedIdentity.accountId, - provider: options.linkedIdentity.provider, - providerUserId: options.linkedIdentity.providerUserId, - accessTokenEncrypted: options.tokenCustody.encrypt(refreshed.accessToken), - refreshTokenEncrypted: options.tokenCustody.encrypt(refreshed.refreshToken ?? refreshToken), - scopes: refreshed.scope.length ? refreshed.scope : options.linkedIdentity.scopes, - profileJson: options.linkedIdentity.profileJson, - createdAt: options.linkedIdentity.createdAt, - updatedAt: options.now, - }; - const tokenExpiresAt = refreshed.expiresAt ?? options.linkedIdentity.tokenExpiresAt; - if (tokenExpiresAt !== undefined) { - upsertInput.tokenExpiresAt = tokenExpiresAt; - } - if (options.linkedIdentity.username !== undefined) { - upsertInput.username = options.linkedIdentity.username; - } - if (options.linkedIdentity.displayName !== undefined) { - upsertInput.displayName = options.linkedIdentity.displayName; - } - if (options.linkedIdentity.primaryEmail !== undefined) { - upsertInput.primaryEmail = options.linkedIdentity.primaryEmail; - } - - return options.store.upsertLinkedIdentity(upsertInput); -} - function storedIdentityToResolvedIdentity(identity: StoredLinkedIdentity) { const resolved = { provider: identity.provider, @@ -450,7 +392,6 @@ async function evaluateStoredEntitlements(options: { appSlug: AppSlug; accountId: string; entitlementPolicies: OAuthEntitlementPolicy[]; - now: string; }): Promise { const profile = getAppProfile(options.appSlug); if (!profile) { @@ -460,19 +401,13 @@ async function evaluateStoredEntitlements(options: { const facts: string[] = []; for (const storedIdentity of linkedIdentities) { - if (!profile.entitlementSources.includes(storedIdentity.provider) || !storedIdentity.accessTokenEncrypted) { + if (!profile.entitlementSources.includes(storedIdentity.provider)) { continue; } - const linkedIdentity = await refreshLinkedIdentityCredentialIfNeeded({ - config: options.config, - store: options.store, - tokenCustody: options.tokenCustody, - oauthRuntimes: options.oauthRuntimes, - linkedIdentity: storedIdentity, - now: options.now, - }); - if (!linkedIdentity.accessTokenEncrypted) { + const refreshed = await refreshManagedCredential(options, storedIdentity); + const linkedIdentity = refreshed.identity; + if (refreshed.kind === "revoked" || !linkedIdentity.accessTokenEncrypted) { continue; } @@ -714,7 +649,6 @@ export async function refreshAppSession( appSlug, accountId: refreshClaim.account_id, entitlementPolicies, - now: nowIso, }); const issueInput: IssueAccessClaimInput = { appSlug, @@ -1620,21 +1554,15 @@ export async function buildApp(options: BuildAppOptions = {}): Promise number; + timeoutMs?: number; +} + +export type ManagedCredentialRevocationReason = "provider_revoked" | "rotation_missing"; + +/** `revoked` means the identity holds no access token: the provider took the grant back, or it was never held. */ +export type ManagedCredentialOutcome = + | { kind: "current"; identity: StoredLinkedIdentity } + | { kind: "revoked"; identity: StoredLinkedIdentity }; + +/** + * The provider could not be asked, or answered with something that is not a + * grant verdict (invalid_client, 5xx, timeout, malformed body). The stored + * tokens are untouched. Carries the provider and nothing the provider said. + */ +export class ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed extends Error { + readonly code = "managed_credential_refresh_failed"; + readonly provider: Provider; + + constructor(provider: Provider) { + super(`${providerCatalog[provider].displayName} managed credential refresh failed.`); + this.name = "ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed"; + this.provider = provider; + } +} + +function dueForRefresh(identity: StoredLinkedIdentity, runtime: OAuthProviderRuntime, now: number): boolean { + if (!identity.tokenExpiresAt || !identity.refreshTokenEncrypted || !runtime.refreshAccessToken) { + return false; + } + return Date.parse(identity.tokenExpiresAt) - now <= MANAGED_CREDENTIAL_REFRESH_SKEW_MS; +} + +function withoutTokens(identity: StoredLinkedIdentity): StoredLinkedIdentity { + const { accessTokenEncrypted: _a, refreshTokenEncrypted: _r, tokenExpiresAt: _e, ...rest } = identity; + return rest; +} + +/** + * The one refresh policy. `snapshot` is a hint: it may skip the lock when no + * refresh is due and never decides one. The row's lock owns when a refresh + * token is presented; the decision is made on the row as read under it. + */ +export async function refreshManagedCredential( + ctx: ManagedCredentialContext, + snapshot: StoredLinkedIdentity +): Promise { + const clock = ctx.clock ?? Date.now; + const provider = snapshot.provider; + const runtime = ctx.oauthRuntimes[provider]; + + if (!snapshot.accessTokenEncrypted) { + return { kind: "revoked", identity: snapshot }; + } + if (!dueForRefresh(snapshot, runtime, clock())) { + return { kind: "current", identity: snapshot }; + } + + let revocation: ManagedCredentialRevocationReason | undefined; + const decide = async (locked: StoredLinkedIdentity): Promise => { + if (!locked.accessTokenEncrypted || !dueForRefresh(locked, runtime, clock())) { + return { kind: "keep" }; + } + const updatedAt = new Date(clock()).toISOString(); + const refreshToken = ctx.tokenCustody.decrypt(locked.refreshTokenEncrypted!); + + let refreshed; + try { + refreshed = await runtime.refreshAccessToken!({ + config: ctx.config, + refreshToken, + signal: AbortSignal.timeout(ctx.timeoutMs ?? MANAGED_CREDENTIAL_REFRESH_TIMEOUT_MS), + }); + } catch (error) { + if (error instanceof ProviderResponseError && error.oauthError === "invalid_grant") { + revocation = "provider_revoked"; + return { kind: "revoke", updatedAt }; + } + throw new ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed(provider); + } + + let refreshTokenEncrypted: string; + if (refreshed.refreshToken) { + refreshTokenEncrypted = ctx.tokenCustody.encrypt(refreshed.refreshToken); + } else if (providerCatalog[provider].rotatesRefreshTokens) { + revocation = "rotation_missing"; + return { kind: "revoke", updatedAt }; + } else { + refreshTokenEncrypted = locked.refreshTokenEncrypted!; + } + + const tokenExpiresAt = refreshed.expiresAt ?? locked.tokenExpiresAt; + return { + kind: "rotate", + accessTokenEncrypted: ctx.tokenCustody.encrypt(refreshed.accessToken), + refreshTokenEncrypted, + ...(tokenExpiresAt !== undefined ? { tokenExpiresAt } : {}), + scopes: refreshed.scope.length ? refreshed.scope : locked.scopes, + updatedAt, + }; + }; + + const committed = await ctx.store.updateLinkedIdentityCredential(snapshot.id, decide); + if (revocation) { + await ctx.store.createAuditEvent({ + accountId: snapshot.accountId, + eventType: "managed_credential_revoked", + eventPayloadJson: { provider, reason: revocation }, + createdAt: new Date(clock()).toISOString(), + }); + } + if (!committed) { + return { kind: "revoked", identity: withoutTokens(snapshot) }; + } + return { kind: committed.accessTokenEncrypted ? "current" : "revoked", identity: committed }; +} diff --git a/src/oauth.ts b/src/oauth.ts index 2d0020c..187df6c 100644 --- a/src/oauth.ts +++ b/src/oauth.ts @@ -61,6 +61,25 @@ export interface OAuthProviderRuntime { }): Promise; } +const oauthErrorCodes = [ + "invalid_request", + "invalid_client", + "invalid_grant", + "unauthorized_client", + "unsupported_grant_type", + "invalid_scope", +] as const; +export type OAuthErrorCode = (typeof oauthErrorCodes)[number]; + +function readOAuthErrorCode(text: string): OAuthErrorCode | undefined { + try { + const error = (JSON.parse(text) as { error?: unknown } | null)?.error; + return oauthErrorCodes.find((code) => code === error); + } catch { + return undefined; + } +} + /** * A provider answer Heimdall cannot use: a non-2xx status, or a body that is * not JSON. It carries the status and a code, never the body or the parser's @@ -71,12 +90,18 @@ export interface OAuthProviderRuntime { export class ProviderResponseError extends Error { readonly status: number; readonly code: "provider_status" | "provider_body_not_json"; + /** + * The RFC 6749 section 5.2 error code of a refusal, when the provider sent + * one from that closed set. The only value taken from a provider's body. + */ + readonly oauthError: OAuthErrorCode | undefined; - constructor(status: number, code: ProviderResponseError["code"], failure: string) { + constructor(status: number, code: ProviderResponseError["code"], failure: string, oauthError?: OAuthErrorCode) { super(`${failure} (status ${status}, ${code}).`); this.name = "ProviderResponseError"; this.status = status; this.code = code; + this.oauthError = oauthError; } } @@ -84,7 +109,7 @@ export class ProviderResponseError extends Error { async function readProviderJson(response: Response, failure: string): Promise { const text = await response.text(); if (!response.ok) { - throw new ProviderResponseError(response.status, "provider_status", failure); + throw new ProviderResponseError(response.status, "provider_status", failure, readOAuthErrorCode(text)); } if (!text) { return {} as T; diff --git a/src/store/in-memory.ts b/src/store/in-memory.ts index 5583ac4..0dea560 100644 --- a/src/store/in-memory.ts +++ b/src/store/in-memory.ts @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import { type CreateAuthCompletionInput, type CreateAuditEventInput, type CreateCapabilityGrantInput, + type CredentialDecision, type CreateEntitlementSnapshotInput, type CreateSessionInput, type CreatePrivateCommandReceiptInput, @@ -37,6 +38,8 @@ function isGrantActive(grant: StoredCapabilityGrant, appSlug: AppSlug, at: strin } export class InMemoryStore implements HeimdallStore { + /** Tail of each linked identity's credential-decision chain; an entry is removed when it drains. */ + private readonly credentialChains = new Map>(); private readonly accounts = new Map(); private readonly linkedIdentities = new Map(); private readonly grants = new Map(); @@ -174,6 +177,45 @@ export class InMemoryStore implements HeimdallStore { return clone(linkedIdentity); } + async updateLinkedIdentityCredential( + id: string, + decide: (locked: StoredLinkedIdentity) => Promise, + ): Promise { + const previous = this.credentialChains.get(id) ?? Promise.resolve(); + const run = previous.then(async () => { + const current = this.linkedIdentities.get(id); + if (!current) { + return null; + } + const decision = await decide(clone(current)); + if (decision.kind === "keep") { + return clone(current); + } + const next: StoredLinkedIdentity = { ...current, updatedAt: decision.updatedAt }; + delete next.accessTokenEncrypted; + delete next.refreshTokenEncrypted; + delete next.tokenExpiresAt; + if (decision.kind === "rotate") { + next.accessTokenEncrypted = decision.accessTokenEncrypted; + next.refreshTokenEncrypted = decision.refreshTokenEncrypted; + if (decision.tokenExpiresAt !== undefined) { + next.tokenExpiresAt = decision.tokenExpiresAt; + } + next.scopes = [...decision.scopes]; + } + this.linkedIdentities.set(id, clone(next)); + return clone(next); + }); + const tail = run.catch(() => undefined); + this.credentialChains.set(id, tail); + void tail.then(() => { + if (this.credentialChains.get(id) === tail) { + this.credentialChains.delete(id); + } + }); + return run; + } + async listLinkedIdentitiesForAccount(accountId: string): Promise { return [...this.linkedIdentities.values()] .filter((identity) => identity.accountId === accountId) diff --git a/src/store/postgres.ts b/src/store/postgres.ts index 64f013d..f138f06 100644 --- a/src/store/postgres.ts +++ b/src/store/postgres.ts @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import { type CreateAuthCompletionInput, type CreateAuditEventInput, type CreateCapabilityGrantInput, + type CredentialDecision, type CreateEntitlementSnapshotInput, type CreateSessionInput, type CreatePrivateCommandReceiptInput, @@ -546,7 +547,7 @@ export async function checkSchemaRequirements(pool: Pick, require } export class PostgresStore implements HeimdallStore { - constructor(private readonly pool: Pick) {} + constructor(private readonly pool: Pick) {} async ensureSchema(): Promise { await this.pool.query(CREATE_SCHEMA_SQL); @@ -722,6 +723,60 @@ export class PostgresStore implements HeimdallStore { return mapLinkedIdentityRow(expectRow(result.rows[0], "upsertLinkedIdentity")); } + async updateLinkedIdentityCredential( + id: string, + decide: (locked: StoredLinkedIdentity) => Promise, + ): Promise { + const client = await this.pool.connect(); + try { + await client.query("BEGIN"); + try { + const locked = await client.query( + "SELECT * FROM linked_identities WHERE id = $1 FOR UPDATE", + [id] + ); + if (!locked.rowCount) { + await client.query("COMMIT"); + return null; + } + const row = mapLinkedIdentityRow(expectRow(locked.rows[0], "updateLinkedIdentityCredential")); + const decision = await decide(row); + let committed = row; + if (decision.kind !== "keep") { + const rotated = decision.kind === "rotate" ? decision : undefined; + const written = await client.query( + ` + UPDATE linked_identities + SET access_token_encrypted = $2, + refresh_token_encrypted = $3, + token_expires_at = $4, + scopes = $5, + updated_at = $6 + WHERE id = $1 + RETURNING * + `, + [ + id, + nullable(rotated?.accessTokenEncrypted), + nullable(rotated?.refreshTokenEncrypted), + nullable(rotated?.tokenExpiresAt), + (rotated?.scopes ?? row.scopes).join(" "), + decision.updatedAt, + ] + ); + committed = mapLinkedIdentityRow(expectRow(written.rows[0], "updateLinkedIdentityCredential")); + } + await client.query("COMMIT"); + return committed; + } catch (error) { + await client.query("ROLLBACK"); + throw error; + } + } finally { + client.release(); + } + } + async listLinkedIdentitiesForAccount(accountId: string): Promise { const result = await this.pool.query( ` diff --git a/src/store/types.ts b/src/store/types.ts index d1fabcf..0145626 100644 --- a/src/store/types.ts +++ b/src/store/types.ts @@ -56,6 +56,23 @@ export interface UpsertLinkedIdentityInput { updatedAt: string; } +/** + * What the owner of a refresh decides after reading the row under its lock. + * `rotate` and `revoke` write token columns, scopes and updated_at only; they + * never touch account, profile or identity fields. + */ +export type CredentialDecision = + | { kind: "keep" } + | { + kind: "rotate"; + accessTokenEncrypted: string; + refreshTokenEncrypted: string; + tokenExpiresAt?: string; + scopes: string[]; + updatedAt: string; + } + | { kind: "revoke"; updatedAt: string }; + export interface StoredSession { id: string; accountId: string; @@ -213,6 +230,17 @@ export interface HeimdallStore { findStoredLinkedIdentityForAccount(accountId: string, provider: Provider): Promise; listStoredLinkedIdentitiesForAccount(accountId: string): Promise; upsertLinkedIdentity(input: UpsertLinkedIdentityInput): Promise; + /** + * Serialise decisions about one row's credential. `decide` receives the row + * as read under the lock (never a caller's snapshot) and the decision is + * committed before this resolves, so a rotated pair is persisted before any + * caller sees the new access token. Returns the committed row, or null when + * no row has that id. A throw from `decide` writes nothing. + */ + updateLinkedIdentityCredential( + id: string, + decide: (locked: StoredLinkedIdentity) => Promise, + ): Promise; listLinkedIdentitiesForAccount(accountId: string): Promise; createCapabilityGrant(input: CreateCapabilityGrantInput): Promise; listActiveGrants(accountId: string, appSlug: AppSlug, at: string): Promise; diff --git a/tests/app.test.ts b/tests/app.test.ts index 7f9a72c..d938b9c 100644 --- a/tests/app.test.ts +++ b/tests/app.test.ts @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import { buildApp, errorIdentity } from "../src/app.js"; import { deliverBackendHandoff, type BackendHandoffPayload } from "../src/backend-handoff.js"; import { type HeimdallConfig, loadConfig } from "../src/config.js"; import { entitlementFacts, identityFacts } from "../src/facts.js"; -import { createOAuthRuntimeRegistry, type OAuthProviderRuntime } from "../src/oauth.js"; +import { createOAuthRuntimeRegistry, ProviderResponseError, type OAuthProviderRuntime } from "../src/oauth.js"; import { verifyJwt } from "../src/signing.js"; import { InMemoryStore } from "../src/store/index.js"; @@ -1238,6 +1238,117 @@ describe("Heimdall service", () => { expect(credentialResponse.body).not.toContain("rotated-twitch-refresh-token"); }); + it("revocation-is-typed: a revoked identity contributes no entitlement at session refresh", async () => { + const store = new InMemoryStore(); + let evaluations = 0; + const base = createMockDiscordRuntime(); + const app = await buildApp({ + config: createTestConfig(), + store, + oauthRuntimes: { + discord: { + ...base, + async exchangeAuthorizationCode() { + return { + accessToken: "expired-discord-access-token", + refreshToken: "discord-refresh-token", + tokenType: "Bearer", + scope: ["identify"], + expiresAt: "2026-04-26T13:00:00.000Z", + raw: {}, + }; + }, + async refreshAccessToken() { + throw new ProviderResponseError(400, "provider_status", "Discord token refresh failed", "invalid_grant"); + }, + async evaluateEntitlements(options) { + evaluations += 1; + return base.evaluateEntitlements(options); + }, + }, + }, + }); + apps.push(app); + + const stateToken = await startDiscordSignIn(app); + const callbackResponse = await app.inject({ + method: "GET", + url: `/v1/oauth/discord/callback?code=test-code&state=${encodeURIComponent(stateToken)}`, + }); + expect(callbackResponse.statusCode).toBe(201); + const evaluationsAtSignIn = evaluations; + + const refreshResponse = await app.inject({ + method: "POST", + url: "/v1/apps/repixelizer/sessions/refresh", + headers: { "x-heimdall-app-secret": "repixelizer-secret" }, + payload: { + refreshToken: callbackResponse.json().refreshToken as string, + entitlementPolicies: [{ kind: "discord_role_access", guildId: "gamecult-guild", allowedRoleIds: ["role-repixelizer"] }], + }, + }); + + expect(refreshResponse.statusCode).toBe(201); + expect(evaluations).toBe(evaluationsAtSignIn); + const accountId = callbackResponse.json().account.id as string; + const row = await store.findStoredLinkedIdentityForAccount(accountId, "discord"); + expect(row?.accessTokenEncrypted).toBeUndefined(); + expect(row?.refreshTokenEncrypted).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + it("revocation-is-typed: a revoked Patreon identity is not linked for Bifrost sync and Bifrost is not called", async () => { + const baseConfig = createTestConfig(); + const store = new InMemoryStore(); + const app = await buildApp({ + config: { + ...baseConfig, + bifrostPatronSupportEndpoint: "https://bifrost.gamecult.org/heimdall/patron-support/events", + bifrostPatronSupportSecret: "bifrost-support-secret", + }, + store, + oauthRuntimes: { + patreon: { + ...createOAuthRuntimeRegistry().patreon, + async refreshAccessToken() { + throw new ProviderResponseError(400, "provider_status", "Patreon token refresh failed", "invalid_grant"); + }, + }, + }, + }); + apps.push(app); + const context = getHeimdallContext(app); + const now = "2026-06-09T17:00:00.000Z"; + await store.createAccount({ id: "acct-p", createdAt: now, lastSeenAt: now }); + await store.upsertLinkedIdentity({ + accountId: "acct-p", + provider: "patreon", + providerUserId: "patreon-user-456", + accessTokenEncrypted: context.tokenCustody.encrypt("patreon-access-token"), + refreshTokenEncrypted: context.tokenCustody.encrypt("patreon-refresh-token"), + tokenExpiresAt: "2026-06-09T17:01:00.000Z", + scopes: [], + profileJson: {}, + createdAt: now, + updatedAt: now, + }); + const urls: string[] = []; + globalThis.fetch = async (input) => { + urls.push(String(input)); + return new Response("unexpected", { status: 500 }); + }; + + const response = await app.inject({ + method: "POST", + url: "/v1/apps/bifrost/patron-support/sync", + headers: { "x-heimdall-app-secret": "bifrost-secret" }, + payload: { accountId: "acct-p", requiredTierTitle: "Inner Sanctum", supportedAtUtc: now }, + }); + + expect(response.statusCode).toBe(404); + expect(response.json()).toEqual({ error: "patreon_identity_not_linked" }); + expect(urls).toEqual([]); + }); + it("no longer honors a global shared secret across apps", async () => { // A per-app identity model with a global fallback is a two-app shared // secret in practice (R6, fork 2). GC_ACCESS_APP_SHARED_SECRET alone must diff --git a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b0dc2a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,517 @@ +import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; +import { Pool } from "pg"; +import { afterAll, afterEach, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest"; +import { buildApp } from "../src/app.js"; +import { type HeimdallConfig } from "../src/config.js"; +import { type Provider } from "../src/contracts.js"; +import { createTokenCustody } from "../src/custody.js"; +import { + MANAGED_CREDENTIAL_REFRESH_SKEW_MS, + ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed, + refreshManagedCredential, +} from "../src/managed-credential.js"; +import { createOAuthRuntimeRegistry } from "../src/oauth.js"; +import { providerCatalog } from "../src/providers.js"; +import { InMemoryStore, PostgresStore, type HeimdallStore } from "../src/store/index.js"; +import { type StoredLinkedIdentity } from "../src/store/types.js"; + +const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch; +const sleep = (ms: number) => new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms)); + +function testConfig(): HeimdallConfig { + const clients = Object.fromEntries( + ["discord", "patreon", "github", "twitch", "youtube", "spotify", "joystick"].map((p) => [ + p, + { clientId: `${p}-client`, clientSecret: `${p}-secret` }, + ]) + ); + return { + serviceName: "heimdall", + host: "127.0.0.1", + port: 4100, + workspaceRoot: "E:/Projects/Heimdall", + dataRoot: "E:/Projects/Heimdall/.heimdall-data", + cultCachePath: "E:/Projects/Heimdall/.heimdall-data/cultcache/heimdall.service.cc", + publicBaseUrl: "https://heimdall.gamecult.org", + issuer: "https://heimdall.gamecult.org", + daemonId: "yggdrasil-heimdall", + idunnRudpHealth: undefined, + idunnHealthContract: "heimdall.cultnet-rudp-provider-health", + providerHealthIdentityPath: "E:/Projects/Heimdall/.heimdall-data/provider-health-identity.cc", + sessionTtlSeconds: 3600, + refreshTtlSeconds: 60 * 60 * 24 * 30, + stateTtlSeconds: 600, + completionTtlSeconds: 300, + bootstrapSigningPrivateKeyOnMissing: false, + tokenEncryptionKeyBase64: Buffer.alloc(32, 7).toString("base64"), + appSharedSecrets: { streampixels: "streampixels-secret", bifrost: "bifrost-secret" }, + appBackendCallbacks: {}, + storage: { backend: "memory", applySchemaOnStartup: true }, + bifrostPatronSupportEndpoint: "https://bifrost.gamecult.org/heimdall/patron-support/events", + bifrostPatronSupportSecret: "bifrost-support-secret", + providers: clients, + } as unknown as HeimdallConfig; +} + +type Mode = "normal" | "invalid_grant" | "invalid_client" | "server_error" | "not_json" | "no_refresh_token" | "hang"; + +/** + * A provider token endpoint with single-use refresh tokens. Presenting a + * consumed refresh token revokes the whole installation, as Joystick does: + * every later refresh answers 400 invalid_grant. + */ +function installTokenEndpoint(provider: Provider, firstRefreshToken: string) { + const state = { + calls: 0, + mode: "normal" as Mode, + live: firstRefreshToken, + issued: 0, + installationRevoked: false, + otherCalls: [] as string[], + }; + globalThis.fetch = (async (input: string | URL, init?: RequestInit) => { + const url = String(input); + if (url !== providerCatalog[provider].tokenEndpoint) { + state.otherCalls.push(url); + return new Response("unexpected", { status: 500 }); + } + state.calls += 1; + const presented = (init!.body as URLSearchParams).get("refresh_token"); + await sleep(25); + switch (state.mode) { + case "hang": + return new Promise((_resolve, reject) => { + init!.signal?.addEventListener("abort", () => reject(new DOMException("aborted", "AbortError"))); + }); + case "invalid_grant": + return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: "invalid_grant", error_description: "CANARY" }), { status: 400 }); + case "invalid_client": + return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: "invalid_client", error_description: "CANARY" }), { status: 401 }); + case "server_error": + return new Response("CANARY upstream exploded", { status: 500 }); + case "not_json": + return new Response("CANARY ", { status: 200 }); + case "no_refresh_token": + return new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "access-norefresh", token_type: "Bearer", expires_in: 3600 }), { + status: 200, + }); + case "normal": { + if (state.installationRevoked || presented !== state.live) { + state.installationRevoked = true; + return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: "invalid_grant", error_description: "reused CANARY" }), { status: 400 }); + } + state.issued += 1; + state.live = `refresh-${state.issued}`; + return new Response( + JSON.stringify({ + access_token: `access-${state.issued}`, + refresh_token: state.live, + token_type: "Bearer", + expires_in: 3600, + }), + { status: 200 } + ); + } + } + }) as typeof fetch; + return state; +} + +interface Rig { + stores: HeimdallStore[]; + apps: Awaited>[]; + accountId: string; + identityId: string; + custody: ReturnType; + config: HeimdallConfig; + provider: Provider; + row(): Promise; + audit(): Promise>; + resolve(appIndex?: number): Promise<{ statusCode: number; json: Record; body: string }>; + close(): Promise; +} + +const adminUrl = process.env.HEIMDALL_TEST_PG_ADMIN_URL; +const rigKinds = [ + { kind: "memory", live: false }, + { kind: "postgres one app", live: true }, + { kind: "postgres two apps", live: true }, +] as const; +// Providers whose refresh goes through the real shared runtime; rotation differs by descriptor. +const refreshProviders: Provider[] = ["twitch"]; + +for (const { kind, live } of rigKinds) describe.skipIf(live && !adminUrl)(`managed credential refresh, ${kind}`, () => { + const admin = live && adminUrl ? new Pool({ connectionString: adminUrl, max: 2 }) : undefined; + const suffix = randomUUID().replace(/-/g, "").slice(0, 12); + const template = `heimdall_mc_template_${suffix}`; + const cleanup: Array<() => Promise> = []; + + function urlFor(database: string): string { + const url = new URL(adminUrl!); + url.pathname = `/${database}`; + return url.toString(); + } + + beforeAll(async () => { + if (!live) return; + await admin!.query(`CREATE DATABASE ${template}`); + const pool = new Pool({ connectionString: urlFor(template), max: 1 }); + await new PostgresStore(pool).ensureSchema(); + await pool.end(); + }, 120_000); + + afterEach(async () => { + globalThis.fetch = originalFetch; + for (const step of cleanup.splice(0).reverse()) await step(); + }); + + afterAll(async () => { + if (!admin) return; + await admin.query(`DROP DATABASE IF EXISTS ${template}`); + await admin.end(); + }, 120_000); + + async function makeRig( + provider: Provider, + options: { expiresInMs?: number; refreshToken?: string | null; accessToken?: string | null } = {} + ): Promise { + const config = testConfig(); + const custody = createTokenCustody(config); + const stores: HeimdallStore[] = []; + let adminForDb: Pool | undefined; + if (!live) { + stores.push(new InMemoryStore()); + } else { + const name = `heimdall_mc_${randomUUID().replace(/-/g, "")}`; + await admin!.query(`CREATE DATABASE ${name} TEMPLATE ${template}`); + const count = kind === "postgres two apps" ? 2 : 1; + for (let i = 0; i < count; i += 1) { + const pool = new Pool({ connectionString: urlFor(name), max: 12 }); + pool.on("error", () => undefined); + stores.push(new PostgresStore(pool)); + } + adminForDb = new Pool({ connectionString: urlFor(name), max: 1 }); + adminForDb.on("error", () => undefined); + cleanup.push(async () => { + await adminForDb!.end(); + await admin!.query(`DROP DATABASE IF EXISTS ${name} WITH (FORCE)`); + }); + } + + const now = new Date().toISOString(); + const account = await stores[0]!.createAccount({ createdAt: now, lastSeenAt: now }); + const expiresInMs = options.expiresInMs ?? 60_000; + const input = { + accountId: account.id, + provider, + providerUserId: "channel-1", + username: "deru", + displayName: "Deru", + scopes: ["identity:read"], + profileJson: { keep: "me" }, + tokenExpiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + expiresInMs).toISOString(), + createdAt: now, + updatedAt: now, + }; + const seeded = await stores[0]!.upsertLinkedIdentity({ + ...input, + ...(options.accessToken === null ? {} : { accessTokenEncrypted: custody.encrypt(options.accessToken ?? "access-0") }), + ...(options.refreshToken === null ? {} : { refreshTokenEncrypted: custody.encrypt(options.refreshToken ?? "refresh-0") }), + }); + + const apps: Rig["apps"] = []; + for (const store of stores) { + apps.push(await buildApp({ config, store, tokenCustody: custody, oauthRuntimes: createOAuthRuntimeRegistry() })); + } + cleanup.push(async () => { + for (const app of apps) await app.close().catch(() => undefined); + }); + + return { + stores, + apps, + accountId: account.id, + identityId: seeded.id, + custody, + config, + provider, + async row() { + const row = await stores[0]!.findStoredLinkedIdentityForAccount(account.id, provider); + return row!; + }, + async audit() { + if (!live) { + const events = (stores[0] as unknown as { auditEvents: Map }).auditEvents; + return [...events.values()].map((e) => ({ eventType: e.eventType, payload: e.eventPayloadJson })); + } + const result = await adminForDb!.query<{ event_type: string; event_payload_json: unknown }>( + "SELECT event_type, event_payload_json FROM audit_events ORDER BY created_at" + ); + return result.rows.map((r) => ({ eventType: r.event_type, payload: r.event_payload_json })); + }, + async resolve(appIndex = 0) { + const response = await apps[appIndex]!.inject({ + method: "POST", + url: "/v1/apps/streampixels/managed-credentials/resolve", + headers: { "x-heimdall-app-secret": "streampixels-secret" }, + payload: { accountId: account.id, provider }, + }); + return { statusCode: response.statusCode, json: response.json() as Record, body: response.body }; + }, + async close() {}, + }; + } + + const timeout = { timeout: 60_000 }; + + describe.each(refreshProviders)("%s", (provider) => { + it("refresh-once-per-token: 20 concurrent resolves present the refresh token once", timeout, async () => { + const rig = await makeRig(provider); + const endpoint = installTokenEndpoint(provider, "refresh-0"); + + const answers = await Promise.all(Array.from({ length: 20 }, (_, i) => rig.resolve(i % rig.apps.length))); + + expect(endpoint.calls).toBe(1); + expect(answers.map((a) => a.statusCode)).toEqual(Array(20).fill(200)); + expect(new Set(answers.map((a) => a.json.accessToken))).toEqual(new Set(["access-1"])); + const row = await rig.row(); + expect(rig.custody.decrypt(row.accessTokenEncrypted!)).toBe("access-1"); + expect(rig.custody.decrypt(row.refreshTokenEncrypted!)).toBe("refresh-1"); + expect(await rig.audit()).toEqual([]); + }); + + it("rotated-pair-persisted-before-use: the stored pair is the one the caller was given", timeout, async () => { + const rig = await makeRig(provider); + installTokenEndpoint(provider, "refresh-0"); + const answer = await rig.resolve(); + const row = await rig.row(); + expect(rig.custody.decrypt(row.accessTokenEncrypted!)).toBe(answer.json.accessToken); + expect(Date.parse(row.tokenExpiresAt!)).toBeGreaterThan(Date.now() + MANAGED_CREDENTIAL_REFRESH_SKEW_MS); + }); + + it("outside the skew: no token call, the stored token is returned", timeout, async () => { + const rig = await makeRig(provider, { expiresInMs: 60 * 60 * 1000 }); + const endpoint = installTokenEndpoint(provider, "refresh-0"); + const answer = await rig.resolve(); + expect(endpoint.calls).toBe(0); + expect(answer.statusCode).toBe(200); + expect(answer.json.accessToken).toBe("access-0"); + }); + + it("revocation-is-typed: invalid_grant clears the tokens, answers 410, audits once, and stops calling the provider", timeout, async () => { + const rig = await makeRig(provider); + const endpoint = installTokenEndpoint(provider, "refresh-0"); + endpoint.mode = "invalid_grant"; + + const first = await rig.resolve(); + expect(first.statusCode).toBe(410); + expect(first.json).toEqual({ error: "managed_credential_revoked", provider }); + const row = await rig.row(); + expect(row.accessTokenEncrypted).toBeUndefined(); + expect(row.refreshTokenEncrypted).toBeUndefined(); + expect(row.tokenExpiresAt).toBeUndefined(); + expect(row.username).toBe("deru"); + expect(row.profileJson).toEqual({ keep: "me" }); + expect(row.scopes).toEqual(["identity:read"]); + + const second = await rig.resolve(); + expect(second.statusCode).toBe(410); + expect(endpoint.calls).toBe(1); + + const events = await rig.audit(); + expect(events.filter((e) => e.eventType === "managed_credential_revoked")).toEqual([ + { eventType: "managed_credential_revoked", payload: { provider, reason: "provider_revoked" } }, + ]); + expect(first.body + second.body + JSON.stringify(events)).not.toContain("CANARY"); + }); + + it.each(["invalid_client", "server_error", "not_json", "hang"] as const)( + "transient failure (%s) keeps custody: 502, tokens byte-identical, nothing leaked", + timeout, + async (mode) => { + const rig = await makeRig(provider); + const before = await rig.row(); + const endpoint = installTokenEndpoint(provider, "refresh-0"); + endpoint.mode = mode; + + let answer; + if (mode === "hang") { + // The route's own bound is 10 s; the primitive takes an injected one. + const failure = await refreshManagedCredential( + { config: rig.config, store: rig.stores[0]!, tokenCustody: rig.custody, oauthRuntimes: createOAuthRuntimeRegistry(), timeoutMs: 100 }, + before + ).then( + () => undefined, + (error: unknown) => error + ); + expect(failure).toBeInstanceOf(ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed); + expect((failure as ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed).provider).toBe(provider); + expect(String(failure) + JSON.stringify(failure)).not.toContain("CANARY"); + } else { + answer = await rig.resolve(); + expect(answer.statusCode).toBe(502); + expect(answer.json).toEqual({ error: "managed_credential_refresh_failed", provider }); + expect(answer.body).not.toContain("CANARY"); + } + + const after = await rig.row(); + expect(after.accessTokenEncrypted).toBe(before.accessTokenEncrypted); + expect(after.refreshTokenEncrypted).toBe(before.refreshTokenEncrypted); + expect(after.tokenExpiresAt).toBe(before.tokenExpiresAt); + expect(await rig.audit()).toEqual([]); + } + ); + + it("bounded lock: a refresh that never answers is aborted and the next resolve takes the lock", timeout, async () => { + const rig = await makeRig(provider); + const endpoint = installTokenEndpoint(provider, "refresh-0"); + endpoint.mode = "hang"; + const ctx = { config: rig.config, store: rig.stores[0]!, tokenCustody: rig.custody, oauthRuntimes: createOAuthRuntimeRegistry(), timeoutMs: 100 }; + const started = Date.now(); + await expect(refreshManagedCredential(ctx, await rig.row())).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed); + expect(Date.now() - started).toBeLessThan(5_000); + + endpoint.mode = "normal"; + const outcome = await refreshManagedCredential(ctx, await rig.row()); + expect(outcome.kind).toBe("current"); + expect(rig.custody.decrypt(outcome.identity.accessTokenEncrypted!)).toBe("access-1"); + }); + + it("a snapshot taken before another caller's refresh does not decide: the locked row does", timeout, async () => { + const rig = await makeRig(provider); + const endpoint = installTokenEndpoint(provider, "refresh-0"); + const stale = await rig.row(); + await rig.resolve(); + expect(endpoint.calls).toBe(1); + const outcome = await refreshManagedCredential( + { config: rig.config, store: rig.stores[0]!, tokenCustody: rig.custody, oauthRuntimes: createOAuthRuntimeRegistry() }, + stale + ); + expect(endpoint.calls).toBe(1); + expect(outcome.kind).toBe("current"); + expect(rig.custody.decrypt(outcome.identity.accessTokenEncrypted!)).toBe("access-1"); + }); + + it("a response without a refresh token keeps the old one for a non-rotating provider", timeout, async () => { + expect(providerCatalog[provider].rotatesRefreshTokens).toBe(false); + const rig = await makeRig(provider); + const endpoint = installTokenEndpoint(provider, "refresh-0"); + endpoint.mode = "no_refresh_token"; + const answer = await rig.resolve(); + expect(answer.statusCode).toBe(200); + expect(answer.json.accessToken).toBe("access-norefresh"); + expect(rig.custody.decrypt((await rig.row()).refreshTokenEncrypted!)).toBe("refresh-0"); + }); + + it("a row with no access token resolves as revoked (410), a missing row as not found (404)", timeout, async () => { + const rig = await makeRig(provider, { accessToken: null, refreshToken: null }); + const endpoint = installTokenEndpoint(provider, "refresh-0"); + const revoked = await rig.resolve(); + expect(revoked.statusCode).toBe(410); + expect(revoked.json).toEqual({ error: "managed_credential_revoked", provider }); + expect(endpoint.calls).toBe(0); + + const missing = await rig.apps[0]!.inject({ + method: "POST", + url: "/v1/apps/streampixels/managed-credentials/resolve", + headers: { "x-heimdall-app-secret": "streampixels-secret" }, + payload: { accountId: "no-such-account", provider }, + }); + expect(missing.statusCode).toBe(404); + expect(missing.json()).toEqual({ error: "managed_credential_not_found" }); + }); + }); + + describe("updateLinkedIdentityCredential", () => { + it("returns null for a missing id and does not call decide", async () => { + const rig = await makeRig("twitch"); + let called = false; + const result = await rig.stores[0]!.updateLinkedIdentityCredential(randomUUID(), async () => { + called = true; + return { kind: "keep" }; + }); + expect(result).toBeNull(); + expect(called).toBe(false); + }); + + it("hands decide the committed row, and a throw writes nothing", async () => { + const rig = await makeRig("twitch"); + const before = await rig.row(); + let seen: StoredLinkedIdentity | undefined; + await expect( + rig.stores[0]!.updateLinkedIdentityCredential(rig.identityId, async (locked) => { + seen = locked; + throw new Error("boom"); + }) + ).rejects.toThrow("boom"); + expect(seen).toEqual(before); + expect(await rig.row()).toEqual(before); + }); + + it("rotate writes token columns, scopes and updated_at and nothing else; keep writes nothing", async () => { + const rig = await makeRig("twitch"); + const before = await rig.row(); + const kept = await rig.stores[0]!.updateLinkedIdentityCredential(rig.identityId, async () => ({ kind: "keep" })); + expect(kept).toEqual(before); + + const rotated = await rig.stores[0]!.updateLinkedIdentityCredential(rig.identityId, async () => ({ + kind: "rotate", + accessTokenEncrypted: "A2", + refreshTokenEncrypted: "R2", + tokenExpiresAt: "2999-01-01T00:00:00.000Z", + scopes: ["a", "b"], + updatedAt: "2999-01-02T00:00:00.000Z", + })); + expect(rotated).toEqual({ + ...before, + accessTokenEncrypted: "A2", + refreshTokenEncrypted: "R2", + tokenExpiresAt: "2999-01-01T00:00:00.000Z", + scopes: ["a", "b"], + updatedAt: "2999-01-02T00:00:00.000Z", + }); + expect(await rig.row()).toEqual(rotated); + + const revoked = await rig.stores[0]!.updateLinkedIdentityCredential(rig.identityId, async () => ({ + kind: "revoke", + updatedAt: "2999-01-03T00:00:00.000Z", + })); + const { accessTokenEncrypted: _a, refreshTokenEncrypted: _r, tokenExpiresAt: _e, ...rest } = rotated!; + expect(revoked).toEqual({ ...rest, updatedAt: "2999-01-03T00:00:00.000Z" }); + expect(await rig.row()).toEqual(revoked); + }); + + it("serialises deciders on one row: each sees the previous commit", timeout, async () => { + const rig = await makeRig("twitch"); + const order: string[] = []; + await Promise.all( + [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].map((n) => + rig.stores[0]!.updateLinkedIdentityCredential(rig.identityId, async (locked) => { + order.push(`${n}:${locked.accessTokenEncrypted}`); + await sleep(20); + return { + kind: "rotate", + accessTokenEncrypted: `A${n}`, + refreshTokenEncrypted: `R${n}`, + scopes: locked.scopes, + updatedAt: new Date().toISOString(), + }; + }) + ) + ); + const seenValues = order.map((entry) => entry.split(":")[1]); + // Each decider saw the value the one before it wrote, so their reads form a chain. + expect(new Set(seenValues).size).toBe(5); + const wrote = order.map((entry) => `A${entry.split(":")[0]}`); + for (let i = 1; i < seenValues.length; i += 1) expect(seenValues[i]).toBe(wrote[i - 1]); + }); + }); +}); + +describe("live Postgres availability", () => { + it.skipIf(!!adminUrl)("is present whenever the job requires it", () => { + // Local workstation runs skip the live suites; the verification job sets + // HEIMDALL_REQUIRE_LIVE_PG=1 and fails here when they would have been skipped. + expect(process.env.HEIMDALL_REQUIRE_LIVE_PG).toBeUndefined(); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts b/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts index 2d13a30..ff13d72 100644 --- a/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts +++ b/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +import { inspect } from "node:util"; import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest"; import { type HeimdallConfig } from "../src/config.js"; import { providers, type Provider } from "../src/contracts.js"; @@ -114,3 +115,33 @@ describe("requestProviderTokens follows the provider descriptor", () => { ).rejects.toThrow("Patreon OAuth is not fully configured."); }); }); + +describe("oauthError is a closed set", () => { + const refresh = { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" } as const; + async function failure(body: string, status = 400) { + capture(() => new Response(body, { status })); + return requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), refresh).then( + () => { + throw new Error("expected a refusal"); + }, + (error: unknown) => error as Error & { oauthError?: string } + ); + } + + it("takes invalid_grant from the body and carries nothing else of it", async () => { + const error = await failure(JSON.stringify({ error: "invalid_grant", error_description: "CANARY" })); + expect(error.oauthError).toBe("invalid_grant"); + expect(`${error.message} ${error.stack} ${inspect(error, { depth: 5, showHidden: true })} ${JSON.stringify(error)}`).not.toContain("CANARY"); + }); + + it.each([ + ["an error outside the RFC set", JSON.stringify({ error: "CANARY_unknown" })], + ["a non-string error", JSON.stringify({ error: { code: "invalid_grant" } })], + ["a body that is not JSON", "CANARY "], + ["JSON null", "null"], + ])("leaves oauthError undefined for %s", async (_name, body) => { + const error = await failure(body); + expect(error.oauthError).toBeUndefined(); + expect(`${error.message} ${inspect(error, { depth: 5, showHidden: true })}`).not.toContain("CANARY"); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/store.test.ts b/tests/store.test.ts index 8eeaeb1..c5f6445 100644 --- a/tests/store.test.ts +++ b/tests/store.test.ts @@ -326,7 +326,8 @@ async function exerciseStore(store: PostgresStore): Promise> { createdAt: now, updatedAt: now, }; - await s.upsertLinkedIdentity(identity); + const linked = await s.upsertLinkedIdentity(identity); + await s.updateLinkedIdentityCredential(linked.id, async () => ({ kind: "keep" })); await s.upsertLinkedIdentity({ ...identity, username: "again" }); await s.findAccountByLinkedIdentity("discord", "u1"); await s.findStoredLinkedIdentity("discord", "u1"); From 1c38d12050c295d2739d39d0aa8fa49b9075fba3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 11:13:40 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 09/45] Add Joystick as a confidential, rotating managed-connection provider Joystick joins the catalog (Basic client auth, rotatesRefreshTokens), resolves identity by channel id, and is a streampixels managed-connection provider only: it is not an identity provider for the profile (ruling signin-waits-for-public-bot). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- ...heimdall.auth_begin_command.v1.schema.json | 2 +- src/app-profiles.ts | 4 +- src/contracts.ts | 2 +- src/oauth.ts | 49 ++++++++ src/providers.ts | 12 ++ tests/access-plugin.test.ts | 2 +- tests/app.test.ts | 107 +++++++++++++++++- tests/caller-identity-attack-soul-r21.test.ts | 1 + tests/caller-identity-attack-soul.test.ts | 1 + tests/caller-identity-soul.test.ts | 1 + tests/managed-credential.test.ts | 45 ++++++-- tests/private-command-diagnostics.test.ts | 2 +- tests/security.test.ts | 1 + tests/verse-witness.test.ts | 1 + 14 files changed, 212 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/schemas/heimdall.auth_begin_command.v1.schema.json b/schemas/heimdall.auth_begin_command.v1.schema.json index 81fdaf8..ca22ccf 100644 --- a/schemas/heimdall.auth_begin_command.v1.schema.json +++ b/schemas/heimdall.auth_begin_command.v1.schema.json @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ "type": "object", "required": ["provider", "mode", "returnTo", "entitlementPolicy"], "properties": { - "provider": { "enum": ["discord", "patreon", "github", "twitch", "youtube", "spotify"] }, + "provider": { "enum": ["discord", "patreon", "github", "twitch", "youtube", "spotify", "joystick"] }, "mode": { "enum": ["sign_in", "link", "connect"] }, "returnTo": { "type": "string", "format": "uri" }, "entitlementPolicy": { diff --git a/src/app-profiles.ts b/src/app-profiles.ts index bede115..88466d9 100644 --- a/src/app-profiles.ts +++ b/src/app-profiles.ts @@ -99,10 +99,10 @@ const repixelizerProfile: AppProfile = { const streampixelsProfile: AppProfile = { slug: "streampixels", displayName: "StreamPixels", - profileVersion: "2026-04-26", + profileVersion: "2026-10-19", identityProviders: ["twitch", "youtube"], entitlementSources: [], - managedConnectionProviders: ["twitch", "youtube"], + managedConnectionProviders: ["twitch", "youtube", "joystick"], allowedReturnOrigins: ["https://streampixels.gamecult.org"], capabilities: [ { diff --git a/src/contracts.ts b/src/contracts.ts index 743bfdc..d6cab2a 100644 --- a/src/contracts.ts +++ b/src/contracts.ts @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -export const providers = ["discord", "patreon", "github", "twitch", "youtube", "spotify"] as const; +export const providers = ["discord", "patreon", "github", "twitch", "youtube", "spotify", "joystick"] as const; export type Provider = (typeof providers)[number]; diff --git a/src/oauth.ts b/src/oauth.ts index 187df6c..c46976e 100644 --- a/src/oauth.ts +++ b/src/oauth.ts @@ -513,6 +513,45 @@ async function resolveSpotifyIdentity(options: { accessToken: string }): Promise return identity; } +async function resolveJoystickIdentity(options: { accessToken: string }): Promise { + const profile = await fetchJson<{ + channel_id?: string; + username?: string; + nickname?: string; + photo_url?: string; + }>( + "https://api.joystick.tv/api/v1/me/identity", + { + headers: { + Authorization: `Bearer ${options.accessToken}`, + }, + }, + "Joystick identity lookup failed" + ); + + if (!profile.channel_id) { + throw new Error("Joystick identity response did not include a channel id."); + } + + const identity: ResolvedIdentity = { + provider: "joystick", + providerUserId: profile.channel_id, + profile: profile as unknown as Record, + }; + const displayName = profile.nickname ?? profile.username; + if (profile.username) { + identity.username = profile.username; + } + if (displayName) { + identity.displayName = displayName; + } + if (profile.photo_url) { + identity.avatarUrl = profile.photo_url; + } + + return identity; +} + async function evaluateDiscordEntitlements(options: { config: HeimdallConfig; callback: OAuthCallbackContext; @@ -860,6 +899,15 @@ const spotifyRuntime: OAuthProviderRuntime = { }, }; +const joystickRuntime: OAuthProviderRuntime = { + exchangeAuthorizationCode: sharedRuntimeExchange("joystick"), + refreshAccessToken: sharedRuntimeRefresh("joystick"), + resolveIdentity: resolveJoystickIdentity, + async evaluateEntitlements() { + return { facts: [], snapshots: [] }; + }, +}; + const notImplementedRuntime: OAuthProviderRuntime = { async exchangeAuthorizationCode() { throw new Error("Provider callback exchange is not implemented yet."); @@ -882,5 +930,6 @@ export function createOAuthRuntimeRegistry(): OAuthRuntimeRegistry { twitch: twitchRuntime, youtube: youtubeRuntime, spotify: spotifyRuntime, + joystick: joystickRuntime, }; } diff --git a/src/providers.ts b/src/providers.ts index 2998e4d..9b139ab 100644 --- a/src/providers.ts +++ b/src/providers.ts @@ -105,6 +105,18 @@ export const providerCatalog: Record = { clientIdEnv: "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_SPOTIFY_CLIENT_ID", clientSecretEnv: "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_SPOTIFY_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE", }, + joystick: { + key: "joystick", + displayName: "Joystick", + authorizationEndpoint: "https://joystick.tv/api/oauth/authorize", + tokenEndpoint: "https://api.joystick.tv/api/oauth/token", + tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_basic", + rotatesRefreshTokens: true, + defaultScopes: ["identity:read", "stream:read", "chat:read", "followers:read", "subscribers:read"], + roles: ["identity", "managed_credential"], + clientIdEnv: "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_JOYSTICK_CLIENT_ID", + clientSecretEnv: "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_JOYSTICK_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE", + }, }; export function buildAuthorizationUrl(options: { diff --git a/tests/access-plugin.test.ts b/tests/access-plugin.test.ts index b5027d0..4789bf8 100644 --- a/tests/access-plugin.test.ts +++ b/tests/access-plugin.test.ts @@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ function testConfig(): HeimdallConfig { storage: { backend: "memory", applySchemaOnStartup: true }, providers: { discord: { clientId: "discord-client", clientSecret: "discord-secret" }, - patreon: {}, github: {}, twitch: {}, youtube: {}, spotify: {}, + patreon: {}, github: {}, twitch: {}, youtube: {}, spotify: {}, joystick: {}, }, }; } diff --git a/tests/app.test.ts b/tests/app.test.ts index d938b9c..b2960fc 100644 --- a/tests/app.test.ts +++ b/tests/app.test.ts @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ function createTestConfig(): HeimdallConfig { twitch: { clientId: "twitch-client", clientSecret: "twitch-secret" }, youtube: { clientId: "youtube-client", clientSecret: "youtube-secret" }, spotify: { clientId: "spotify-client", clientSecret: "spotify-secret" }, + joystick: { clientId: "joystick-client", clientSecret: "joystick-secret" }, }, }; } @@ -974,7 +975,8 @@ describe("Heimdall service", () => { expect(profileResponse.json()).toEqual( expect.objectContaining({ slug: "streampixels", - managedConnectionProviders: ["twitch", "youtube"], + identityProviders: ["twitch", "youtube"], + managedConnectionProviders: ["twitch", "youtube", "joystick"], }) ); }); @@ -1349,6 +1351,109 @@ describe("Heimdall service", () => { expect(urls).toEqual([]); }); + describe("joystick connect", () => { + async function connect(app: FastifyInstance) { + const start = await app.inject({ + method: "POST", + url: "/v1/oauth/joystick/start", + payload: { appSlug: "streampixels", mode: "connect", returnTo: "https://streampixels.gamecult.org/auth/connect" }, + }); + return start; + } + + it("starts a streampixels connect at joystick.tv with the five scopes and the callback redirect", async () => { + const app = await buildApp({ config: createTestConfig() }); + apps.push(app); + const start = await connect(app); + expect(start.statusCode).toBe(201); + const url = new URL(start.json().authorizationUrl as string); + expect(`${url.origin}${url.pathname}`).toBe("https://joystick.tv/api/oauth/authorize"); + expect(url.searchParams.get("client_id")).toBe("joystick-client"); + expect(url.searchParams.get("scope")).toBe("identity:read stream:read chat:read followers:read subscribers:read"); + expect(url.searchParams.get("redirect_uri")).toBe("https://heimdall.gamecult.org/v1/oauth/joystick/callback"); + }); + + function stubJoystick(identity: Record) { + const calls: Array<{ url: string; headers: Record; body?: URLSearchParams }> = []; + globalThis.fetch = (async (input: string | URL, init?: RequestInit) => { + const url = String(input); + calls.push({ url, headers: (init?.headers ?? {}) as Record, body: init?.body as URLSearchParams | undefined }); + if (url === "https://api.joystick.tv/api/oauth/token") { + return new Response( + JSON.stringify({ access_token: "js-access", refresh_token: "js-refresh", token_type: "Bearer", expires_in: 864000 }), + { status: 200 } + ); + } + if (url === "https://api.joystick.tv/api/v1/me/identity") { + return new Response(JSON.stringify(identity), { status: 200 }); + } + return new Response("unexpected", { status: 500 }); + }) as typeof fetch; + return calls; + } + + it("exchanges the code with Basic client auth and links the identity by channel id", async () => { + const store = new InMemoryStore(); + const app = await buildApp({ config: createTestConfig(), store }); + apps.push(app); + const calls = stubJoystick({ channel_id: "chan-9", username: "deru", nickname: "Deru!", photo_url: "https://img/x.png" }); + const stateToken = (await connect(app)).json().stateToken as string; + + const callback = await app.inject({ + method: "GET", + url: `/v1/oauth/joystick/callback?code=the-code&state=${encodeURIComponent(stateToken)}`, + }); + expect(callback.statusCode).toBeLessThan(300); + + const exchange = calls.find((c) => c.url === "https://api.joystick.tv/api/oauth/token")!; + expect(exchange.headers.Authorization).toBe(`Basic ${Buffer.from("joystick-client:joystick-secret").toString("base64")}`); + expect(exchange.body!.get("grant_type")).toBe("authorization_code"); + expect(exchange.body!.get("code")).toBe("the-code"); + expect(exchange.body!.get("redirect_uri")).toBe("https://heimdall.gamecult.org/v1/oauth/joystick/callback"); + expect(exchange.body!.has("client_secret")).toBe(false); + const identityCall = calls.find((c) => c.url === "https://api.joystick.tv/api/v1/me/identity")!; + expect(identityCall.headers.Authorization).toBe("Bearer js-access"); + + const accountId = callback.json().account.id as string; + const row = await store.findStoredLinkedIdentityForAccount(accountId, "joystick"); + expect(row).toMatchObject({ providerUserId: "chan-9", username: "deru", displayName: "Deru!" }); + expect(row?.accessTokenEncrypted).toEqual(expect.any(String)); + expect(row?.accessTokenEncrypted).not.toContain("js-access"); + expect(row?.refreshTokenEncrypted).toEqual(expect.any(String)); + const left = Date.parse(row!.tokenExpiresAt!) - Date.now(); + expect(left).toBeGreaterThan(863_000 * 1000); + expect(left).toBeLessThanOrEqual(864_000 * 1000); + }); + + it("falls back to the username for the display name", async () => { + const store = new InMemoryStore(); + const app = await buildApp({ config: createTestConfig(), store }); + apps.push(app); + stubJoystick({ channel_id: "chan-9", username: "deru" }); + const stateToken = (await connect(app)).json().stateToken as string; + const callback = await app.inject({ + method: "GET", + url: `/v1/oauth/joystick/callback?code=c&state=${encodeURIComponent(stateToken)}`, + }); + const row = await store.findStoredLinkedIdentityForAccount(callback.json().account.id as string, "joystick"); + expect(row?.displayName).toBe("deru"); + }); + + it("fails the callback when the identity has no channel id", async () => { + const store = new InMemoryStore(); + const app = await buildApp({ config: createTestConfig(), store }); + apps.push(app); + stubJoystick({ username: "deru" }); + const stateToken = (await connect(app)).json().stateToken as string; + const callback = await app.inject({ + method: "GET", + url: `/v1/oauth/joystick/callback?code=c&state=${encodeURIComponent(stateToken)}`, + }); + expect(callback.statusCode).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400); + expect(await store.findStoredLinkedIdentity("joystick", "undefined")).toBeNull(); + }); + }); + it("no longer honors a global shared secret across apps", async () => { // A per-app identity model with a global fallback is a two-app shared // secret in practice (R6, fork 2). GC_ACCESS_APP_SHARED_SECRET alone must diff --git a/tests/caller-identity-attack-soul-r21.test.ts b/tests/caller-identity-attack-soul-r21.test.ts index 4c3df32..de959a8 100644 --- a/tests/caller-identity-attack-soul-r21.test.ts +++ b/tests/caller-identity-attack-soul-r21.test.ts @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ function testConfig(overrides: Partial = {}): HeimdallConfig { twitch: {}, youtube: {}, spotify: {}, + joystick: {}, }, ...overrides, }; diff --git a/tests/caller-identity-attack-soul.test.ts b/tests/caller-identity-attack-soul.test.ts index 9fb8e0a..8f77801 100644 --- a/tests/caller-identity-attack-soul.test.ts +++ b/tests/caller-identity-attack-soul.test.ts @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ function testConfig(): HeimdallConfig { twitch: {}, youtube: {}, spotify: {}, + joystick: {}, }, }; } diff --git a/tests/caller-identity-soul.test.ts b/tests/caller-identity-soul.test.ts index 3ebc000..b5562a7 100644 --- a/tests/caller-identity-soul.test.ts +++ b/tests/caller-identity-soul.test.ts @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ function testConfig(): HeimdallConfig { twitch: {}, youtube: {}, spotify: {}, + joystick: {}, }, }; } diff --git a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts index b0dc2a2..427b2c8 100644 --- a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts +++ b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ const rigKinds = [ { kind: "postgres two apps", live: true }, ] as const; // Providers whose refresh goes through the real shared runtime; rotation differs by descriptor. -const refreshProviders: Provider[] = ["twitch"]; +const refreshProviders: Provider[] = ["twitch", "joystick"]; for (const { kind, live } of rigKinds) describe.skipIf(live && !adminUrl)(`managed credential refresh, ${kind}`, () => { const admin = live && adminUrl ? new Pool({ connectionString: adminUrl, max: 2 }) : undefined; @@ -392,16 +392,39 @@ for (const { kind, live } of rigKinds) describe.skipIf(live && !adminUrl)(`manag expect(rig.custody.decrypt(outcome.identity.accessTokenEncrypted!)).toBe("access-1"); }); - it("a response without a refresh token keeps the old one for a non-rotating provider", timeout, async () => { - expect(providerCatalog[provider].rotatesRefreshTokens).toBe(false); - const rig = await makeRig(provider); - const endpoint = installTokenEndpoint(provider, "refresh-0"); - endpoint.mode = "no_refresh_token"; - const answer = await rig.resolve(); - expect(answer.statusCode).toBe(200); - expect(answer.json.accessToken).toBe("access-norefresh"); - expect(rig.custody.decrypt((await rig.row()).refreshTokenEncrypted!)).toBe("refresh-0"); - }); + if (providerCatalog[provider].rotatesRefreshTokens) { + it("rotation-fails-closed: a response without a refresh token revokes, 410, and the old token is never presented again", timeout, async () => { + const rig = await makeRig(provider); + const endpoint = installTokenEndpoint(provider, "refresh-0"); + endpoint.mode = "no_refresh_token"; + + const first = await rig.resolve(); + expect(first.statusCode).toBe(410); + expect(first.json).toEqual({ error: "managed_credential_revoked", provider }); + expect(first.body).not.toContain("access-norefresh"); + const row = await rig.row(); + expect(row.accessTokenEncrypted).toBeUndefined(); + expect(row.refreshTokenEncrypted).toBeUndefined(); + expect(row.tokenExpiresAt).toBeUndefined(); + + const second = await rig.resolve(); + expect(second.statusCode).toBe(410); + expect(endpoint.calls).toBe(1); + expect((await rig.audit()).filter((e) => e.eventType === "managed_credential_revoked")).toEqual([ + { eventType: "managed_credential_revoked", payload: { provider, reason: "rotation_missing" } }, + ]); + }); + } else { + it("a response without a refresh token keeps the old one for a non-rotating provider", timeout, async () => { + const rig = await makeRig(provider); + const endpoint = installTokenEndpoint(provider, "refresh-0"); + endpoint.mode = "no_refresh_token"; + const answer = await rig.resolve(); + expect(answer.statusCode).toBe(200); + expect(answer.json.accessToken).toBe("access-norefresh"); + expect(rig.custody.decrypt((await rig.row()).refreshTokenEncrypted!)).toBe("refresh-0"); + }); + } it("a row with no access token resolves as revoked (410), a missing row as not found (404)", timeout, async () => { const rig = await makeRig(provider, { accessToken: null, refreshToken: null }); diff --git a/tests/private-command-diagnostics.test.ts b/tests/private-command-diagnostics.test.ts index 41f16f1..d9d92ed 100644 --- a/tests/private-command-diagnostics.test.ts +++ b/tests/private-command-diagnostics.test.ts @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ function config(): HeimdallConfig { bootstrapSigningPrivateKeyOnMissing: false, tokenEncryptionKeyBase64: Buffer.alloc(32, 7).toString("base64"), appSharedSecrets: { ghostlight: secret }, appRuntimeIds: { ghostlight: ["yggdrasil-ghostlight"] }, appBackendCallbacks: {}, storage: { backend: "memory", applySchemaOnStartup: true }, - providers: { discord: { clientId: "discord-client", clientSecret: "discord-secret" }, patreon: {}, github: {}, twitch: {}, youtube: {}, spotify: {} }, + providers: { discord: { clientId: "discord-client", clientSecret: "discord-secret" }, patreon: {}, github: {}, twitch: {}, youtube: {}, spotify: {}, joystick: {} }, } as HeimdallConfig; } diff --git a/tests/security.test.ts b/tests/security.test.ts index 5b07c6d..4f3f39d 100644 --- a/tests/security.test.ts +++ b/tests/security.test.ts @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ function createTestConfig(overrides: Partial = {}): HeimdallConf twitch: {}, youtube: {}, spotify: {}, + joystick: {}, }, ...overrides, }; diff --git a/tests/verse-witness.test.ts b/tests/verse-witness.test.ts index acd9b89..07c141f 100644 --- a/tests/verse-witness.test.ts +++ b/tests/verse-witness.test.ts @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ describe("Heimdall Verse witness advertisement", () => { "twitch", "youtube", "spotify", + "joystick", ]); expect(advertisement.appProfiles.map((profile) => profile.slug)).toEqual([ "repixelizer", From 43b7072dfbc046ce571ca5f09c75d1fea58cd580 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 11:15:12 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 10/45] Postgres store: return token_expires_at as the ISO string the port promises pg returns a Date for TIMESTAMPTZ; a byte-identity check on a kept credential saw a Date where the port types a string. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- src/store/postgres.ts | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/store/postgres.ts b/src/store/postgres.ts index f138f06..5f0a0a1 100644 --- a/src/store/postgres.ts +++ b/src/store/postgres.ts @@ -184,7 +184,8 @@ function mapLinkedIdentityRow(row: LinkedIdentityRow): StoredLinkedIdentity { } if (row.token_expires_at) { - identity.tokenExpiresAt = row.token_expires_at; + // pg hands back a Date for TIMESTAMPTZ whatever the row type says; the port promises an ISO string. + identity.tokenExpiresAt = new Date(row.token_expires_at).toISOString(); } return identity; From 3eaa9ef2654d77b7e3e2d007c34cc46614a5db68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 11:15:42 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 11/45] Declare Joystick in the Idunn recipe and document the locked refresh Recipe optional_environment gains the Joystick client id and secret file; service-contract documents the row lock, rotation fail-closed and the 410/502 answers; the StreamPixels profile names Heimdall as sole holder of provider refresh tokens (F5). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- deployment/idunn/recipe.toml | 2 ++ docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md | 8 ++++++-- docs/service-contract.md | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++---- 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/deployment/idunn/recipe.toml b/deployment/idunn/recipe.toml index 8524451..f520258 100644 --- a/deployment/idunn/recipe.toml +++ b/deployment/idunn/recipe.toml @@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ optional_environment = [ "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_DISCORD_CLIENT_ID", "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_DISCORD_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE", "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE", + "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_JOYSTICK_CLIENT_ID", + "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_JOYSTICK_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE", "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_PATREON_CLIENT_ID", "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_PATREON_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE", "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_SPOTIFY_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE", diff --git a/docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md b/docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md index f28b40a..703dde7 100644 --- a/docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md +++ b/docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md @@ -20,7 +20,11 @@ Corroborated by `gamecult-ops/nginx/streampixels.gamecult.org.conf:14` The current StreamPixels architecture already makes useful splits: - the web app owns the remembered viewer session -- the service owns provider OAuth exchange and identity resolution +- Heimdall owns provider OAuth exchange, identity resolution and refresh-token + custody for Twitch, YouTube and Joystick; StreamPixels never calls a provider + token endpoint and holds no provider refresh token. It asks Heimdall for a + short-lived access token (`managed-credentials/resolve`) and treats `410 + managed_credential_revoked` as "the creator must reconnect" - the overlay remains auth-free - creator memberships and operator roles are separate from general viewer state @@ -38,7 +42,7 @@ In the service-first Heimdall version, the most likely reusable slice is: - provider OAuth authority - identity-linking authority -- managed Twitch/YouTube credential custody for creator connections +- managed Twitch/YouTube/Joystick credential custody for creator connections (Joystick is a managed connection only, not a viewer sign-in provider) - entitlement refresh - shared claim semantics diff --git a/docs/service-contract.md b/docs/service-contract.md index c639178..47fa7fa 100644 --- a/docs/service-contract.md +++ b/docs/service-contract.md @@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ Supported providers in the skeleton: - `twitch` - `youtube` - `spotify` +- `joystick` Request body: @@ -430,9 +431,11 @@ Important behavior: - the refresh token is signed by Heimdall and scoped to one app session - the access token remains short-lived; app backends still verify it locally -- if a stored provider access token is expired or near expiry, Heimdall uses - the stored provider refresh token and persists any rotation before - evaluating entitlements +- if a stored provider access token is expired or near expiry, Heimdall takes + a row lock on the linked identity, re-reads it, uses the stored provider + refresh token and persists any rotation before evaluating entitlements; an + identity whose grant the provider has revoked (no stored access token) + contributes no entitlement - any app authenticated via `x-heimdall-app-secret` (`resolveAppCaller`) may send `entitlementPolicies`; Heimdall matches each stored identity to the policy for that provider. Sending policy without authenticating is @@ -484,7 +487,22 @@ Important behavior: - it returns access tokens only; refresh tokens remain in Heimdall custody - when a stored managed credential is expired or within the refresh window, Heimdall refreshes it before returning the access token and persists rotated - access/refresh tokens + access/refresh tokens. The refresh runs under a row lock on the linked + identity (`SELECT ... FOR UPDATE`), so a given refresh token is presented to + the provider once across concurrent requests and across two Heimdall + processes sharing one database. The provider call is bounded at 10 seconds +- a provider whose refresh tokens rotate (Joystick) fails closed: a refresh + response without a new refresh token revokes the credential instead of + keeping the old token +- `410 {"error":"managed_credential_revoked","provider":...}`: the provider + rejected the grant (`invalid_grant`), or the identity holds no access token. + The stored tokens are cleared and an audit event `managed_credential_revoked` + is written; the owner must reconnect. `404 managed_credential_not_found` + means no linked identity exists +- `502 {"error":"managed_credential_refresh_failed","provider":...}`: the + refresh failed for any reason that is not a grant verdict (invalid client, + provider 5xx, timeout, malformed body). Stored tokens are untouched and a + later request may succeed - app-local binding, diagnostics, subscription setup, and runtime behavior stay app-owned From 7ce9588503c2a07e92d1bc74ac9a25402812bbe4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 11:18:12 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 12/45] Postgres store: return created_at and updated_at as ISO strings too The credential write returns updated_at; a Date there broke the equality the port promises against the in-memory store. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- src/store/postgres.ts | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/store/postgres.ts b/src/store/postgres.ts index 5f0a0a1..487f375 100644 --- a/src/store/postgres.ts +++ b/src/store/postgres.ts @@ -159,8 +159,8 @@ function mapLinkedIdentityRow(row: LinkedIdentityRow): StoredLinkedIdentity { providerUserId: row.provider_user_id, scopes: parseScopes(row.scopes), profileJson: row.profile_json, - createdAt: row.created_at, - updatedAt: row.updated_at, + createdAt: new Date(row.created_at).toISOString(), + updatedAt: new Date(row.updated_at).toISOString(), }; if (row.username) { @@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ function mapLinkedIdentityRow(row: LinkedIdentityRow): StoredLinkedIdentity { } if (row.token_expires_at) { - // pg hands back a Date for TIMESTAMPTZ whatever the row type says; the port promises an ISO string. + // pg hands back a Date for TIMESTAMPTZ whatever the row type says; the port promises ISO strings. identity.tokenExpiresAt = new Date(row.token_expires_at).toISOString(); } From f6baadec0c8cf1c0b10116740d174268e2219925 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 11:20:18 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 13/45] Tests: refresh failures surface as the typed ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed; seven providers Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- tests/private-command-diagnostics.test.ts | 4 ++-- tests/verse-runtime.test.ts | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/private-command-diagnostics.test.ts b/tests/private-command-diagnostics.test.ts index d9d92ed..d1801a5 100644 --- a/tests/private-command-diagnostics.test.ts +++ b/tests/private-command-diagnostics.test.ts @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ it("keeps a provider's malformed 2xx refresh body out of every plaintext part of ); expect(reply.status).toBe("denied"); - expect(reply.diagnostics).toEqual(["Heimdall denied the private command (ProviderResponseError, provider_body_not_json)."]); + expect(reply.diagnostics).toEqual(["Heimdall denied the private command (ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed, managed_credential_refresh_failed)."]); expect(plaintext(reply)).not.toContain("CANARY"); }); @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ it("keeps a provider's refusal body out of every plaintext part of the reply", a const reply = await refreshAgainst(() => new Response('CANARYrefused {"error":"invalid_grant"}', { status: 400 })); expect(reply.status).toBe("denied"); - expect(reply.diagnostics).toEqual(["Heimdall denied the private command (ProviderResponseError, provider_status)."]); + expect(reply.diagnostics).toEqual(["Heimdall denied the private command (ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed, managed_credential_refresh_failed)."]); expect(plaintext(reply)).not.toContain("CANARY"); }); diff --git a/tests/verse-runtime.test.ts b/tests/verse-runtime.test.ts index 85182dc..3196cfa 100644 --- a/tests/verse-runtime.test.ts +++ b/tests/verse-runtime.test.ts @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ describe("Heimdall verse runtime publication", () => { expect(bySchema.get("idunn.daemon_health")).toEqual([ "yggdrasil-heimdall", "active", - "Heimdall auth runtime active; storage=postgres; providers=2/6; apps=4; healthTransport=CultNet/RUDP", + "Heimdall auth runtime active; storage=postgres; providers=2/7; apps=4; healthTransport=CultNet/RUDP", "2026-06-16T17:10:00.000Z", "heimdall.cultnet-rudp-provider-health", "daemon-published", From 9b3d44f56a677bff28be23543a5cba4eb5685668 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 11:25:01 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 14/45] Tests: satisfy exactOptionalPropertyTypes in the Joystick stub Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- tests/app.test.ts | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/app.test.ts b/tests/app.test.ts index b2960fc..9677466 100644 --- a/tests/app.test.ts +++ b/tests/app.test.ts @@ -1374,7 +1374,7 @@ describe("Heimdall service", () => { }); function stubJoystick(identity: Record) { - const calls: Array<{ url: string; headers: Record; body?: URLSearchParams }> = []; + const calls: Array<{ url: string; headers: Record; body?: URLSearchParams | undefined }> = []; globalThis.fetch = (async (input: string | URL, init?: RequestInit) => { const url = String(input); calls.push({ url, headers: (init?.headers ?? {}) as Record, body: init?.body as URLSearchParams | undefined }); From 6b8c4a9c63540775d4aa3a4cfba1f4f2f592554c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 11:47:37 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 15/45] Tests: pin the refresh fast paths, boundaries and connection hygiene Added after a diff-scoped StrykerJS run left survivors: no-lock paths, the skew boundary, decision kinds, a vanished row, open-transaction hygiene on the live store, and the token request's method, signal, token type and scope handling. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- tests/managed-credential.test.ts | 171 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/provider-token-request.test.ts | 48 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 219 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts index 427b2c8..a3b6c75 100644 --- a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts +++ b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ interface Rig { custody: ReturnType; config: HeimdallConfig; provider: Provider; + databaseUrl: string | undefined; row(): Promise; audit(): Promise>; resolve(appIndex?: number): Promise<{ statusCode: number; json: Record; body: string }>; @@ -179,6 +180,7 @@ for (const { kind, live } of rigKinds) describe.skipIf(live && !adminUrl)(`manag const custody = createTokenCustody(config); const stores: HeimdallStore[] = []; let adminForDb: Pool | undefined; + let databaseUrl: string | undefined; if (!live) { stores.push(new InMemoryStore()); } else { @@ -190,6 +192,7 @@ for (const { kind, live } of rigKinds) describe.skipIf(live && !adminUrl)(`manag pool.on("error", () => undefined); stores.push(new PostgresStore(pool)); } + databaseUrl = urlFor(name); adminForDb = new Pool({ connectionString: urlFor(name), max: 1 }); adminForDb.on("error", () => undefined); cleanup.push(async () => { @@ -235,6 +238,7 @@ for (const { kind, live } of rigKinds) describe.skipIf(live && !adminUrl)(`manag custody, config, provider, + databaseUrl, async row() { const row = await stores[0]!.findStoredLinkedIdentityForAccount(account.id, provider); return row!; @@ -504,6 +508,37 @@ for (const { kind, live } of rigKinds) describe.skipIf(live && !adminUrl)(`manag expect(await rig.row()).toEqual(revoked); }); + it.runIf(live)("leaves no transaction open after a missing row or a throwing decide", timeout, async () => { + const rig = await makeRig("twitch"); + const pool = new Pool({ connectionString: rig.databaseUrl, max: 1 }); + pool.on("error", () => undefined); + try { + const store = new PostgresStore(pool); + const idle = async () => { + await sleep(10); + const result = await pool.query<{ fresh: boolean }>("SELECT now() = statement_timestamp() AS fresh"); + return result.rows[0]!.fresh; + }; + expect(await store.updateLinkedIdentityCredential(randomUUID(), async () => ({ kind: "keep" }))).toBeNull(); + expect(await idle()).toBe(true); + await expect( + store.updateLinkedIdentityCredential(rig.identityId, async () => { + throw new Error("boom"); + }) + ).rejects.toThrow("boom"); + expect(await idle()).toBe(true); + } finally { + await pool.end(); + } + }); + + it.runIf(!live)("drops a drained row's chain entry", async () => { + const rig = await makeRig("twitch"); + await Promise.all([1, 2, 3].map(() => rig.stores[0]!.updateLinkedIdentityCredential(rig.identityId, async () => ({ kind: "keep" })))); + await sleep(5); + expect((rig.stores[0] as unknown as { credentialChains: Map }).credentialChains.size).toBe(0); + }); + it("serialises deciders on one row: each sees the previous commit", timeout, async () => { const rig = await makeRig("twitch"); const order: string[] = []; @@ -531,6 +566,142 @@ for (const { kind, live } of rigKinds) describe.skipIf(live && !adminUrl)(`manag }); }); +describe("refreshManagedCredential without the lock", () => { + const config = testConfig(); + const custody = createTokenCustody(config); + const now = Date.parse("2026-10-19T12:00:00.000Z"); + + function identity(overrides: Partial = {}, provider: Provider = "twitch"): StoredLinkedIdentity { + return { + id: "id-1", + accountId: "acct-1", + provider, + providerUserId: "u1", + scopes: ["s"], + profileJson: {}, + createdAt: "2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z", + updatedAt: "2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z", + accessTokenEncrypted: custody.encrypt("access-0"), + refreshTokenEncrypted: custody.encrypt("refresh-0"), + tokenExpiresAt: new Date(now + 60 * 60 * 1000).toISOString(), + ...overrides, + }; + } + + function countingStore(locked: StoredLinkedIdentity | null) { + const log = { locks: 0, decisions: [] as unknown[], audits: [] as unknown[] }; + const store = { + async updateLinkedIdentityCredential(_id: string, decide: (row: StoredLinkedIdentity) => Promise) { + log.locks += 1; + if (locked === null) return null; + log.decisions.push(await decide(locked)); + return locked; + }, + async createAuditEvent(event: unknown) { + log.audits.push(event); + }, + }; + return { store: store as unknown as HeimdallStore, log }; + } + + const ctxFor = (store: HeimdallStore) => ({ config, store, tokenCustody: custody, oauthRuntimes: createOAuthRuntimeRegistry(), clock: () => now }); + + afterEach(() => { + globalThis.fetch = originalFetch; + }); + + it("a snapshot with no access token is revoked without a lock or a provider call", async () => { + const { store, log } = countingStore(null); + const endpoint = installTokenEndpoint("twitch", "refresh-0"); + const outcome = await refreshManagedCredential(ctxFor(store), identity({ accessTokenEncrypted: undefined as never })); + expect(outcome.kind).toBe("revoked"); + expect(log.locks).toBe(0); + expect(endpoint.calls).toBe(0); + }); + + it.each([ + ["outside the skew", {}, "twitch"], + ["without an expiry", { tokenExpiresAt: undefined as never }, "twitch"], + ["without a refresh token", { refreshTokenEncrypted: undefined as never, tokenExpiresAt: new Date(now).toISOString() }, "twitch"], + ["for a provider whose runtime cannot refresh", { tokenExpiresAt: new Date(now).toISOString() }, "github"], + ] as const)("a credential %s is current with no lock and no provider call", async (_name, overrides, provider) => { + const { store, log } = countingStore(null); + const endpoint = installTokenEndpoint("twitch", "refresh-0"); + const snapshot = identity(overrides as Partial, provider); + const outcome = await refreshManagedCredential(ctxFor(store), snapshot); + expect(outcome).toEqual({ kind: "current", identity: snapshot }); + expect(log.locks).toBe(0); + expect(endpoint.calls).toBe(0); + }); + + it("an expiry exactly one skew away is due; one millisecond further is not", async () => { + const due = identity({ tokenExpiresAt: new Date(now + MANAGED_CREDENTIAL_REFRESH_SKEW_MS).toISOString() }); + const notDue = identity({ tokenExpiresAt: new Date(now + MANAGED_CREDENTIAL_REFRESH_SKEW_MS + 1).toISOString() }); + const a = countingStore(due); + installTokenEndpoint("twitch", "refresh-0"); + await refreshManagedCredential(ctxFor(a.store), due); + expect(a.log.locks).toBe(1); + const b = countingStore(notDue); + await refreshManagedCredential(ctxFor(b.store), notDue); + expect(b.log.locks).toBe(0); + }); + + it("decides revoke for a grant verdict and for a missing rotated token, rotate otherwise", async () => { + const due = identity({ tokenExpiresAt: new Date(now).toISOString() }); + const grant = countingStore(due); + installTokenEndpoint("twitch", "refresh-0").mode = "invalid_grant"; + await refreshManagedCredential(ctxFor(grant.store), due); + expect(grant.log.decisions).toEqual([{ kind: "revoke", updatedAt: new Date(now).toISOString() }]); + expect(grant.log.audits).toEqual([ + expect.objectContaining({ eventType: "managed_credential_revoked", eventPayloadJson: { provider: "twitch", reason: "provider_revoked" } }), + ]); + + const rotating = identity({ tokenExpiresAt: new Date(now).toISOString() }, "joystick"); + const missing = countingStore(rotating); + installTokenEndpoint("joystick", "refresh-0").mode = "no_refresh_token"; + await refreshManagedCredential(ctxFor(missing.store), rotating); + expect(missing.log.decisions).toEqual([{ kind: "revoke", updatedAt: new Date(now).toISOString() }]); + + const fine = countingStore(due); + installTokenEndpoint("twitch", "refresh-0"); + await refreshManagedCredential(ctxFor(fine.store), due); + expect(fine.log.decisions).toEqual([expect.objectContaining({ kind: "rotate", refreshTokenEncrypted: expect.any(String), scopes: ["s"] })]); + expect(fine.log.audits).toEqual([]); + }); + + it("a row that vanished is revoked with its tokens cleared", async () => { + const due = identity({ tokenExpiresAt: new Date(now).toISOString() }); + const { store } = countingStore(null); + installTokenEndpoint("twitch", "refresh-0"); + const outcome = await refreshManagedCredential(ctxFor(store), due); + expect(outcome.kind).toBe("revoked"); + expect(outcome.identity.accessTokenEncrypted).toBeUndefined(); + expect(outcome.identity.refreshTokenEncrypted).toBeUndefined(); + expect(outcome.identity.tokenExpiresAt).toBeUndefined(); + expect(outcome.identity.providerUserId).toBe("u1"); + }); + + it("a row revoked by someone else between the snapshot and the lock is revoked, with no provider call", async () => { + const due = identity({ tokenExpiresAt: new Date(now).toISOString() }); + const gone = identity({ accessTokenEncrypted: undefined as never, refreshTokenEncrypted: undefined as never, tokenExpiresAt: undefined as never }); + const { store } = countingStore(gone); + const endpoint = installTokenEndpoint("twitch", "refresh-0"); + const outcome = await refreshManagedCredential(ctxFor(store), due); + expect(outcome.kind).toBe("revoked"); + expect(endpoint.calls).toBe(0); + }); + + it("names the provider in the failure and carries nothing the provider said", async () => { + const due = identity({ tokenExpiresAt: new Date(now).toISOString() }); + const { store } = countingStore(due); + installTokenEndpoint("twitch", "refresh-0").mode = "server_error"; + const failure = await refreshManagedCredential(ctxFor(store), due).catch((error: unknown) => error as ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed); + expect(failure).toBeInstanceOf(ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed); + expect((failure as Error).message).toBe("Twitch managed credential refresh failed."); + expect((failure as ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed).code).toBe("managed_credential_refresh_failed"); + }); +}); + describe("live Postgres availability", () => { it.skipIf(!!adminUrl)("is present whenever the job requires it", () => { // Local workstation runs skip the live suites; the verification job sets diff --git a/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts b/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts index ff13d72..875598e 100644 --- a/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts +++ b/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ function configFor(): HeimdallConfig { interface Captured { url: string; + method: string | undefined; headers: Record; body: URLSearchParams; } @@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ function capture(answer: () => Response): { calls: Captured[] } { globalThis.fetch = (async (input: string | URL, init?: RequestInit) => { calls.push({ url: String(input), + method: init?.method, headers: init?.headers as Record, body: init?.body as URLSearchParams, }); @@ -58,6 +60,7 @@ describe("requestProviderTokens follows the provider descriptor", () => { expect(calls).toHaveLength(1); const call = calls[0]!; expect(call.url).toBe(descriptor.tokenEndpoint); + expect(call.method).toBe("POST"); expect(call.headers["Content-Type"]).toBe("application/x-www-form-urlencoded"); expect(call.headers.Accept).toBe("application/json"); expect(call.body.get("grant_type")).toBe(grantType); @@ -108,6 +111,51 @@ describe("requestProviderTokens follows the provider descriptor", () => { ); }); + it("passes the abort signal to the provider call", async () => { + let seen: AbortSignal | null | undefined; + globalThis.fetch = (async (_input: string | URL, init?: RequestInit) => { + seen = init?.signal; + return ok(); + }) as typeof fetch; + const controller = new AbortController(); + await requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" }, controller.signal); + expect(seen).toBe(controller.signal); + }); + + it("keeps the provider's token type and defaults a missing one to Bearer", async () => { + capture(() => new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", token_type: "bearer" }), { status: 200 })); + expect((await requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" })).tokenType).toBe("bearer"); + capture(() => new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a" }), { status: 200 })); + expect((await requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" })).tokenType).toBe("Bearer"); + }); + + it("trims scope entries and drops empty ones", async () => { + capture(() => new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", scope: [" a ", "", "b"] }), { status: 200 })); + expect((await requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" })).scope).toEqual(["a", "b"]); + }); + + it("treats an empty 2xx body as an empty answer, not a malformed one", async () => { + capture(() => new Response("", { status: 200 })); + const tokens = await requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" }); + expect(tokens.accessToken).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + it("sets no refreshToken key when the provider sent none", async () => { + capture(() => new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a" }), { status: 200 })); + const tokens = await requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" }); + expect("refreshToken" in tokens).toBe(false); + }); + + it.each([ + ["only the secret missing", { clientId: "id" }], + ["only the id missing", { clientSecret: "secret" }], + ])("refuses a provider with %s", async (_n, partial) => { + const config = { providers: { twitch: partial } } as unknown as HeimdallConfig; + await expect(requestProviderTokens("twitch", config, { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" })).rejects.toThrow( + "Twitch OAuth is not fully configured." + ); + }); + it("refuses an unconfigured provider by display name", async () => { const config = { providers: { patreon: {} } } as unknown as HeimdallConfig; await expect( From 34a8c6a81d23f7468152f1ed6398ababa2254764 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 11:52:27 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 16/45] Tests: a late decider still queues behind the one waiting on the in-memory chain Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- tests/managed-credential.test.ts | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts index a3b6c75..f9a9c88 100644 --- a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts +++ b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts @@ -532,6 +532,23 @@ for (const { kind, live } of rigKinds) describe.skipIf(live && !adminUrl)(`manag } }); + it.runIf(!live)("a decider arriving after the first drains still waits for the one queued behind it", async () => { + const rig = await makeRig("twitch"); + const events: string[] = []; + const decider = (name: string, ms: number) => async (locked: StoredLinkedIdentity) => { + events.push(`start ${name}`); + await sleep(ms); + events.push(`end ${name}`); + return { kind: "keep" as const, seen: locked }; + }; + const a = rig.stores[0]!.updateLinkedIdentityCredential(rig.identityId, decider("A", 20)); + const b = rig.stores[0]!.updateLinkedIdentityCredential(rig.identityId, decider("B", 120)); + await a; + const c = rig.stores[0]!.updateLinkedIdentityCredential(rig.identityId, decider("C", 1)); + await Promise.all([b, c]); + expect(events).toEqual(["start A", "end A", "start B", "end B", "start C", "end C"]); + }); + it.runIf(!live)("drops a drained row's chain entry", async () => { const rig = await makeRig("twitch"); await Promise.all([1, 2, 3].map(() => rig.stores[0]!.updateLinkedIdentityCredential(rig.identityId, async () => ({ kind: "keep" })))); From c554c0069728bcfb11393830a93b301649651e8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 12:31:59 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 17/45] OAuth start: the profile's role lists decide which provider a mode may use sign_in and link now take only identityProviders; connect takes only managedConnectionProviders. supportsProvider(), which unioned the role lists with entitlementSources and never looked at the mode, is deleted: a Joystick sign_in for streampixels no longer starts, so a Deru sign-in cannot rewrite his managed credential row. No built-in profile had a provider reachable only through the union. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- docs/app-profiles/spotiverse.md | 2 +- docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md | 2 +- src/app-profiles.ts | 19 +++++++---- src/app.ts | 6 ++-- tests/app.test.ts | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/app-profiles/spotiverse.md b/docs/app-profiles/spotiverse.md index a10c72a..a847fba 100644 --- a/docs/app-profiles/spotiverse.md +++ b/docs/app-profiles/spotiverse.md @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ > still reports `providers=2/6`, which counts it. > > **Why it was removed anyway:** `/v1/oauth/spotify/start` is gated by -> `supportsProvider(profile, provider)`, so a provider with no app behind it is +> `admitsProviderForMode(profile, provider, mode)`, so a provider with no app behind it is > unreachable. While the profile existed, that path was publicly reachable and > would have run a real OAuth handshake against a real client secret, taking > custody of a user's Spotify refresh token on behalf of a consumer that could diff --git a/docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md b/docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md index 703dde7..9d1e23d 100644 --- a/docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md +++ b/docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ In the service-first Heimdall version, the most likely reusable slice is: - provider OAuth authority - identity-linking authority -- managed Twitch/YouTube/Joystick credential custody for creator connections (Joystick is a managed connection only, not a viewer sign-in provider) +- managed Twitch/YouTube/Joystick credential custody for creator connections (Joystick is a managed connection only, not a viewer sign-in provider: `startOAuthFlow` admits `sign_in` and `link` only for `identityProviders` and `connect` only for `managedConnectionProviders`, and refuses anything else before any redirect) - entitlement refresh - shared claim semantics diff --git a/src/app-profiles.ts b/src/app-profiles.ts index 88466d9..8ac57dd 100644 --- a/src/app-profiles.ts +++ b/src/app-profiles.ts @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { type CapabilityDefinition, type CapabilityMode, } from "./capability-rules.js"; -import { type AppSlug, type LinkedIdentityInput, type OAuthEntitlementPolicy, type Provider } from "./contracts.js"; +import { type AppSlug, type LinkedIdentityInput, type OAuthEntitlementPolicy, type OAuthMode, type Provider } from "./contracts.js"; import { entitlementFacts, grantFacts, identityFacts } from "./facts.js"; export type { CapabilityDefinition, CapabilityMode }; @@ -222,12 +222,17 @@ export function serializeAppProfile(profile: AppProfile): Record { expect(url.searchParams.get("redirect_uri")).toBe("https://heimdall.gamecult.org/v1/oauth/joystick/callback"); }); + it.each(["sign_in", "link"] as const)( + "refuses %s for joystick on streampixels before any redirect, and Deru's managed row is untouched", + async (mode) => { + const store = new InMemoryStore(); + const app = await buildApp({ config: createTestConfig(), store }); + apps.push(app); + stubJoystick({ channel_id: "deru-chan", username: "deru" }); + const stateToken = (await connect(app)).json().stateToken as string; + const connected = await app.inject({ + method: "GET", + url: `/v1/oauth/joystick/callback?code=a&state=${encodeURIComponent(stateToken)}`, + }); + const accountId = connected.json().account.id as string; + const before = await store.findStoredLinkedIdentityForAccount(accountId, "joystick"); + + const start = await app.inject({ + method: "POST", + url: "/v1/oauth/joystick/start", + payload: { appSlug: "streampixels", mode, returnTo: "https://streampixels.gamecult.org/auth/connect" }, + }); + expect(start.statusCode).toBe(400); + expect(start.json()).toMatchObject({ error: "provider_not_supported_for_app", provider: "joystick", mode }); + expect(start.json().authorizationUrl).toBeUndefined(); + expect(await store.findStoredLinkedIdentityForAccount(accountId, "joystick")).toEqual(before); + } + ); + function stubJoystick(identity: Record) { const calls: Array<{ url: string; headers: Record; body?: URLSearchParams | undefined }> = []; globalThis.fetch = (async (input: string | URL, init?: RequestInit) => { @@ -1990,3 +2018,30 @@ describe("what may be recorded about a caught error", () => { expect(errorIdentity(error)).toEqual(expected); }); }); + +describe("OAuth start admits a provider by the profile's role for the mode", () => { + const allProviders = ["discord", "patreon", "github", "twitch", "youtube", "spotify", "joystick"] as const; + const modes = ["sign_in", "link", "connect"] as const; + + it("sign_in and link take identityProviders only; connect takes managedConnectionProviders only, for every profile", async () => { + const app = await buildApp({ config: createTestConfig() }); + try { + for (const profile of Object.values(builtInAppProfiles)) { + for (const provider of allProviders) { + for (const mode of modes) { + const start = await app.inject({ + method: "POST", + url: `/v1/oauth/${provider}/start`, + payload: { appSlug: profile.slug, mode, returnTo: `${profile.allowedReturnOrigins[0]}/x` }, + }); + const roleList = mode === "connect" ? profile.managedConnectionProviders : profile.identityProviders; + const refused = start.json().error === "provider_not_supported_for_app"; + expect([profile.slug, provider, mode, refused]).toEqual([profile.slug, provider, mode, !roleList.includes(provider)]); + } + } + } + } finally { + await app.close(); + } + }); +}); From d989860163ff1e94e68fbe5a360fee2477070aba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 12:34:17 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 18/45] Refresh classification: revoke only on a 400 invalid_grant; any other answer keeps the tokens A grant verdict is read from a 400 body by exact code, never from a 401, a 5xx or a 2xx. A 2xx that is not an object with a non-empty string access_token and no error is refused as provider_body_not_token_set, so a malformed success keeps the tokens and surfaces as the typed 502 for every provider, rotating or not. A refresh answer without expires_in stores the expiry as unknown rather than keeping the already-due one; an unknown expiry is never due, so the next resolve does not refresh again. Pins Soul's three surviving mutants: substring code match, the dropped expiry rule, and the snapshot refresh token on a non-rotating provider. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- docs/service-contract.md | 10 +- src/managed-credential.ts | 5 +- src/oauth.ts | 30 +++++- tests/managed-credential.test.ts | 146 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/provider-token-request.test.ts | 37 ++++++- 5 files changed, 216 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/service-contract.md b/docs/service-contract.md index 47fa7fa..001b34b 100644 --- a/docs/service-contract.md +++ b/docs/service-contract.md @@ -495,14 +495,18 @@ Important behavior: response without a new refresh token revokes the credential instead of keeping the old token - `410 {"error":"managed_credential_revoked","provider":...}`: the provider - rejected the grant (`invalid_grant`), or the identity holds no access token. + rejected the grant (HTTP 400 whose OAuth `error` is exactly `invalid_grant`), + or the identity holds no access token. The stored tokens are cleared and an audit event `managed_credential_revoked` is written; the owner must reconnect. `404 managed_credential_not_found` means no linked identity exists - `502 {"error":"managed_credential_refresh_failed","provider":...}`: the refresh failed for any reason that is not a grant verdict (invalid client, - provider 5xx, timeout, malformed body). Stored tokens are untouched and a - later request may succeed + a 401 or 5xx whatever its body says, timeout, a 2xx without a string + `access_token` or carrying an `error`, an empty or non-JSON body). Stored + tokens are untouched and a later request may succeed. An answer without + `expires_in` stores the expiry as unknown, and an unknown expiry is never + due, so it does not trigger another refresh - app-local binding, diagnostics, subscription setup, and runtime behavior stay app-owned diff --git a/src/managed-credential.ts b/src/managed-credential.ts index 4da4b5a..6a06727 100644 --- a/src/managed-credential.ts +++ b/src/managed-credential.ts @@ -113,7 +113,10 @@ export async function refreshManagedCredential( refreshTokenEncrypted = locked.refreshTokenEncrypted!; } - const tokenExpiresAt = refreshed.expiresAt ?? locked.tokenExpiresAt; + // An answer without expires_in leaves the expiry unknown. The old expiry is + // already due, so keeping it would refresh again on every resolve; an + // unknown expiry is never due (dueForRefresh). + const tokenExpiresAt = refreshed.expiresAt; return { kind: "rotate", accessTokenEncrypted: ctx.tokenCustody.encrypt(refreshed.accessToken), diff --git a/src/oauth.ts b/src/oauth.ts index c46976e..9593b54 100644 --- a/src/oauth.ts +++ b/src/oauth.ts @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ function readOAuthErrorCode(text: string): OAuthErrorCode | undefined { */ export class ProviderResponseError extends Error { readonly status: number; - readonly code: "provider_status" | "provider_body_not_json"; + readonly code: "provider_status" | "provider_body_not_json" | "provider_body_not_token_set"; /** * The RFC 6749 section 5.2 error code of a refusal, when the provider sent * one from that closed set. The only value taken from a provider's body. @@ -109,7 +109,14 @@ export class ProviderResponseError extends Error { async function readProviderJson(response: Response, failure: string): Promise { const text = await response.text(); if (!response.ok) { - throw new ProviderResponseError(response.status, "provider_status", failure, readOAuthErrorCode(text)); + // RFC 6749 section 5.2 sends a grant verdict as 400 only. The same JSON + // behind a 401, a 5xx or a gateway page is not one. + throw new ProviderResponseError( + response.status, + "provider_status", + failure, + response.status === 400 ? readOAuthErrorCode(text) : undefined + ); } if (!text) { return {} as T; @@ -173,13 +180,28 @@ export async function requestProviderTokens( init.signal = signal; } const label = grant.grant_type === "refresh_token" ? "refresh" : "exchange"; - const tokenResponse = await fetchJson<{ + const failure = `${descriptor.displayName} token ${label} failed`; + const response = await fetch(descriptor.tokenEndpoint, init); + const answer = await readProviderJson(response, failure); + // A 2xx is a token set only when it is an object holding a string access + // token and no error. + if ( + typeof answer !== "object" || + answer === null || + Array.isArray(answer) || + typeof (answer as { access_token?: unknown }).access_token !== "string" || + !(answer as { access_token: string }).access_token || + (answer as { error?: unknown }).error !== undefined + ) { + throw new ProviderResponseError(response.status, "provider_body_not_token_set", failure); + } + const tokenResponse = answer as { access_token: string; refresh_token?: string; token_type?: string; expires_in?: number; scope?: string | string[]; - }>(descriptor.tokenEndpoint, init, `${descriptor.displayName} token ${label} failed`); + }; const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = { accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token, diff --git a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts index f9a9c88..7758534 100644 --- a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts +++ b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts @@ -719,6 +719,152 @@ describe("refreshManagedCredential without the lock", () => { }); }); +describe("refresh answer classification", () => { + const config = testConfig(); + const custody = createTokenCustody(config); + const now = Date.parse("2026-10-19T12:00:00.000Z"); + const dueAt = new Date(now).toISOString(); + + async function seedRow(store: InMemoryStore, provider: Provider) { + const created = new Date(now).toISOString(); + const account = await store.createAccount({ createdAt: created, lastSeenAt: created }); + return store.upsertLinkedIdentity({ + accountId: account.id, + provider, + providerUserId: `u-${randomUUID()}`, + scopes: ["s"], + profileJson: {}, + accessTokenEncrypted: custody.encrypt("access-0"), + refreshTokenEncrypted: custody.encrypt("refresh-0"), + tokenExpiresAt: dueAt, + createdAt: created, + updatedAt: created, + }); + } + + const ctxFor = (store: HeimdallStore, extra: { timeoutMs?: number } = {}) => ({ + config, + store, + tokenCustody: custody, + oauthRuntimes: createOAuthRuntimeRegistry(), + clock: () => now, + ...extra, + }); + + function answer(body: string, status: number) { + const calls: string[] = []; + globalThis.fetch = (async (_input: string | URL, init?: RequestInit) => { + calls.push(String((init!.body as URLSearchParams).get("refresh_token"))); + return new Response(body, { status }); + }) as typeof fetch; + return calls; + } + + afterEach(() => { + globalThis.fetch = originalFetch; + }); + + const grantVerdict = JSON.stringify({ error: "invalid_grant" }); + const keepsTokens: Array<[string, string, number]> = [ + ["an error code that only contains invalid_grant", JSON.stringify({ error: "invalid_grant_extra" }), 400], + ["an error code that is contained in a longer one", JSON.stringify({ error: "not_invalid_grant" }), 400], + ["a different error code", JSON.stringify({ error: "invalid_request" }), 400], + ["a 401 carrying invalid_grant", grantVerdict, 401], + ["a 500 carrying invalid_grant", grantVerdict, 500], + ["a 503 carrying invalid_grant", grantVerdict, 503], + ["a 2xx carrying invalid_grant", grantVerdict, 200], + ["a 2xx carrying an error beside an access token", JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", error: "server_error" }), 200], + ["a 2xx with an empty object", "{}", 200], + ["a 2xx with an empty body", "", 200], + ["a 2xx with JSON null", "null", 200], + ["a 2xx with a JSON array", "[]", 200], + ["a 2xx with a non-string access token", JSON.stringify({ access_token: 7, refresh_token: "r" }), 200], + ["a 2xx with an empty access token", JSON.stringify({ access_token: "", refresh_token: "r" }), 200], + ["a 2xx that is not JSON", "", 200], + ["a 5xx page", "upstream exploded", 502], + ]; + + describe.each(["twitch", "joystick"] as const)("%s", (provider) => { + it.each(keepsTokens)("keeps the tokens and fails typed for %s", async (_name, body, status) => { + const store = new InMemoryStore(); + const row = await seedRow(store, provider); + const calls = answer(body, status); + await expect(refreshManagedCredential(ctxFor(store), row)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed); + expect(calls).toEqual(["refresh-0"]); + const after = (await store.findStoredLinkedIdentity(provider, row.providerUserId))!; + expect(after.accessTokenEncrypted).toBe(row.accessTokenEncrypted); + expect(after.refreshTokenEncrypted).toBe(row.refreshTokenEncrypted); + expect(after.tokenExpiresAt).toBe(dueAt); + }); + + it("keeps the tokens and fails typed when the provider never answers", async () => { + const store = new InMemoryStore(); + const row = await seedRow(store, provider); + globalThis.fetch = ((_input: string | URL, init?: RequestInit) => + new Promise((_resolve, reject) => { + init!.signal?.addEventListener("abort", () => reject(new DOMException("aborted", "AbortError"))); + })) as typeof fetch; + await expect(refreshManagedCredential(ctxFor(store, { timeoutMs: 30 }), row)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed); + const after = (await store.findStoredLinkedIdentity(provider, row.providerUserId))!; + expect(after.refreshTokenEncrypted).toBe(row.refreshTokenEncrypted); + }); + + it("revokes and clears the tokens on a 400 whose error is exactly invalid_grant", async () => { + const store = new InMemoryStore(); + const row = await seedRow(store, provider); + answer(grantVerdict, 400); + const outcome = await refreshManagedCredential(ctxFor(store), row); + expect(outcome.kind).toBe("revoked"); + const after = (await store.findStoredLinkedIdentity(provider, row.providerUserId))!; + expect(after.accessTokenEncrypted).toBeUndefined(); + expect(after.refreshTokenEncrypted).toBeUndefined(); + }); + }); + + it("a rotating provider's well-formed answer without a refresh token still revokes (rotation_missing)", async () => { + const store = new InMemoryStore(); + const row = await seedRow(store, "joystick"); + answer(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", expires_in: 3600 }), 200); + expect((await refreshManagedCredential(ctxFor(store), row)).kind).toBe("revoked"); + expect((await store.findStoredLinkedIdentity("joystick", row.providerUserId))!.refreshTokenEncrypted).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + it("an answer without expires_in stores the expiry as unknown, and the next resolve does not refresh again", async () => { + const store = new InMemoryStore(); + const row = await seedRow(store, "twitch"); + const calls = answer(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "access-1", refresh_token: "refresh-1" }), 200); + const first = await refreshManagedCredential(ctxFor(store), row); + expect(first.kind).toBe("current"); + expect(first.identity.tokenExpiresAt).toBeUndefined(); + const stored = (await store.findStoredLinkedIdentity("twitch", row.providerUserId))!; + expect(stored.tokenExpiresAt).toBeUndefined(); + expect(custody.decrypt(stored.accessTokenEncrypted!)).toBe("access-1"); + + await refreshManagedCredential(ctxFor(store), stored); + expect(calls).toEqual(["refresh-0"]); + }); + + it("a non-rotating provider keeps the locked row's refresh token, not the snapshot's", async () => { + const store = new InMemoryStore(); + const snapshot = await seedRow(store, "twitch"); + // Another caller rotated the pair after the snapshot; its expiry is still due. + await store.updateLinkedIdentityCredential(snapshot.id, async () => ({ + kind: "rotate", + accessTokenEncrypted: custody.encrypt("access-1"), + refreshTokenEncrypted: custody.encrypt("refresh-1"), + tokenExpiresAt: dueAt, + scopes: ["s"], + updatedAt: dueAt, + })); + const calls = answer(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "access-2", expires_in: 3600 }), 200); + await refreshManagedCredential(ctxFor(store), snapshot); + expect(calls).toEqual(["refresh-1"]); + const after = (await store.findStoredLinkedIdentity("twitch", snapshot.providerUserId))!; + expect(custody.decrypt(after.refreshTokenEncrypted!)).toBe("refresh-1"); + expect(custody.decrypt(after.accessTokenEncrypted!)).toBe("access-2"); + }); +}); + describe("live Postgres availability", () => { it.skipIf(!!adminUrl)("is present whenever the job requires it", () => { // Local workstation runs skip the live suites; the verification job sets diff --git a/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts b/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts index 875598e..501a6e3 100644 --- a/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts +++ b/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts @@ -134,10 +134,26 @@ describe("requestProviderTokens follows the provider descriptor", () => { expect((await requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" })).scope).toEqual(["a", "b"]); }); - it("treats an empty 2xx body as an empty answer, not a malformed one", async () => { - capture(() => new Response("", { status: 200 })); - const tokens = await requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" }); - expect(tokens.accessToken).toBeUndefined(); + it.each([ + ["an empty body", ""], + ["an empty object", "{}"], + ["JSON null", "null"], + ["a JSON array", "[]"], + ["an error beside an access token", JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", error: "invalid_grant" })], + ["an empty access token", JSON.stringify({ access_token: "" })], + ["a numeric access token", JSON.stringify({ access_token: 5 })], + ])("refuses a 2xx with %s as not a token set, carrying nothing of the body", async (_name, body) => { + capture(() => new Response(body, { status: 200 })); + const error = await requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "r" }).then( + () => { + throw new Error("expected a refusal"); + }, + (e: unknown) => e as Error & { code?: string; status?: number; oauthError?: unknown } + ); + expect(error.name).toBe("ProviderResponseError"); + expect(error.code).toBe("provider_body_not_token_set"); + expect(error.status).toBe(200); + expect(error.oauthError).toBeUndefined(); }); it("sets no refreshToken key when the provider sent none", async () => { @@ -182,6 +198,19 @@ describe("oauthError is a closed set", () => { expect(`${error.message} ${error.stack} ${inspect(error, { depth: 5, showHidden: true })} ${JSON.stringify(error)}`).not.toContain("CANARY"); }); + it.each([401, 403, 429, 500, 502, 503])("takes no oauthError from a %i, whatever its body says", async (status) => { + const error = await failure(JSON.stringify({ error: "invalid_grant" }), status); + expect(error.oauthError).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + it.each(["invalid_grant_extra", "not_invalid_grant", "INVALID_GRANT", " invalid_grant", "invalid_grant "])( + "takes the code by exact match only: %j is no code", + async (code) => { + const error = await failure(JSON.stringify({ error: code })); + expect(error.oauthError).toBeUndefined(); + } + ); + it.each([ ["an error outside the RFC set", JSON.stringify({ error: "CANARY_unknown" })], ["a non-string error", JSON.stringify({ error: { code: "invalid_grant" } })], From b15bf33b21b548dda18c803fef6b2758d6cc204f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 12:34:39 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 19/45] Refresh: one attempt per identity per process; waiters share its outcome Callers that arrive while a refresh of one linked identity is in flight in this process join it and receive its success or failure, instead of queuing on the row lock and presenting the same refresh token again behind a failed holder. The entry lives as long as the attempt, so a later request retries. The store lock stays the cross-process guard; the residual risk (one presentation per process per burst) is written into the service contract. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- docs/service-contract.md | 7 +++++- src/managed-credential.ts | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- tests/managed-credential.test.ts | 25 +++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/service-contract.md b/docs/service-contract.md index 001b34b..2a8a47f 100644 --- a/docs/service-contract.md +++ b/docs/service-contract.md @@ -490,7 +490,12 @@ Important behavior: access/refresh tokens. The refresh runs under a row lock on the linked identity (`SELECT ... FOR UPDATE`), so a given refresh token is presented to the provider once across concurrent requests and across two Heimdall - processes sharing one database. The provider call is bounded at 10 seconds + processes sharing one database. Within one process, concurrent refreshes of + one identity share a single attempt and its outcome (success or failure), so + nobody re-presents a token behind a failed holder in that burst. Residual + risk, accepted: the guard is one presentation per process per burst, so N + Heimdall processes can present one token N times after a transient failure. + The provider call is bounded at 10 seconds - a provider whose refresh tokens rotate (Joystick) fails closed: a refresh response without a new refresh token revokes the credential instead of keeping the old token diff --git a/src/managed-credential.ts b/src/managed-credential.ts index 6a06727..617a897 100644 --- a/src/managed-credential.ts +++ b/src/managed-credential.ts @@ -60,18 +60,31 @@ function withoutTokens(identity: StoredLinkedIdentity): StoredLinkedIdentity { return rest; } +/** + * Refreshes in flight in this process, per store and linked identity. The row + * lock serialises processes; it cannot tell a waiter that queued behind a + * failed holder from a caller that arrived after the failure, so each waiter + * would present the same refresh token again. Callers that arrive while an + * attempt is in flight join it and receive its outcome, success or failure. + * The entry lives exactly as long as the attempt: a later request retries. + * + * Accepted residual risk (docs/service-contract.md): one presentation per + * process per burst, so N processes may present one token N times. + */ +const refreshesInFlight = new WeakMap>>(); + /** * The one refresh policy. `snapshot` is a hint: it may skip the lock when no * refresh is due and never decides one. The row's lock owns when a refresh - * token is presented; the decision is made on the row as read under it. + * token is presented across processes; this process makes one attempt per + * identity at a time; the decision is made on the row as read under the lock. */ export async function refreshManagedCredential( ctx: ManagedCredentialContext, snapshot: StoredLinkedIdentity ): Promise { const clock = ctx.clock ?? Date.now; - const provider = snapshot.provider; - const runtime = ctx.oauthRuntimes[provider]; + const runtime = ctx.oauthRuntimes[snapshot.provider]; if (!snapshot.accessTokenEncrypted) { return { kind: "revoked", identity: snapshot }; @@ -80,6 +93,30 @@ export async function refreshManagedCredential( return { kind: "current", identity: snapshot }; } + let inFlight = refreshesInFlight.get(ctx.store); + if (!inFlight) { + inFlight = new Map(); + refreshesInFlight.set(ctx.store, inFlight); + } + const joined = inFlight.get(snapshot.id); + if (joined) { + return joined; + } + const attempt = refreshUnderLock(ctx, snapshot).finally(() => { + inFlight.delete(snapshot.id); + }); + inFlight.set(snapshot.id, attempt); + return attempt; +} + +async function refreshUnderLock( + ctx: ManagedCredentialContext, + snapshot: StoredLinkedIdentity +): Promise { + const clock = ctx.clock ?? Date.now; + const provider = snapshot.provider; + const runtime = ctx.oauthRuntimes[provider]; + let revocation: ManagedCredentialRevocationReason | undefined; const decide = async (locked: StoredLinkedIdentity): Promise => { if (!locked.accessTokenEncrypted || !dueForRefresh(locked, runtime, clock())) { diff --git a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts index 7758534..36cc187 100644 --- a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts +++ b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts @@ -381,6 +381,31 @@ for (const { kind, live } of rigKinds) describe.skipIf(live && !adminUrl)(`manag expect(rig.custody.decrypt(outcome.identity.accessTokenEncrypted!)).toBe("access-1"); }); + it("single flight: concurrent refreshes against a never-answering endpoint make one provider call per process, and every caller gets the typed failure", timeout, async () => { + const rig = await makeRig(provider); + const endpoint = installTokenEndpoint(provider, "refresh-0"); + endpoint.mode = "hang"; + const snapshot = await rig.row(); + const ctxFor = (store: HeimdallStore) => ({ config: rig.config, store, tokenCustody: rig.custody, oauthRuntimes: createOAuthRuntimeRegistry(), timeoutMs: 150 }); + + const results = await Promise.allSettled( + Array.from({ length: 12 }, (_, i) => refreshManagedCredential(ctxFor(rig.stores[i % rig.stores.length]!), snapshot)) + ); + + expect(results.map((r) => r.status)).toEqual(Array(12).fill("rejected")); + for (const result of results) { + expect((result as PromiseRejectedResult).reason).toBeInstanceOf(ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed); + } + expect(endpoint.calls).toBe(rig.stores.length); + expect(rig.custody.decrypt((await rig.row()).refreshTokenEncrypted!)).toBe("refresh-0"); + + // The burst is over: a later independent request tries again. + endpoint.mode = "normal"; + const later = await refreshManagedCredential(ctxFor(rig.stores[0]!), await rig.row()); + expect(later.kind).toBe("current"); + expect(endpoint.calls).toBe(rig.stores.length + 1); + }); + it("a snapshot taken before another caller's refresh does not decide: the locked row does", timeout, async () => { const rig = await makeRig(provider); const endpoint = installTokenEndpoint(provider, "refresh-0"); From c1fbc1261a02ac57b334fafe90c909c5387a4eb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 12:38:13 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 20/45] OAuth start: connect keeps admitting identity providers, as Bifrost uses it The first gate refused connect for a provider outside managedConnectionProviders, which broke Bifrost's existing Discord connect. sign_in and link still take identityProviders only, so a managed-only provider (Joystick) can never sign anyone in or link; connect takes either list. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md | 2 +- src/app-profiles.ts | 10 ++++++---- tests/app.test.ts | 7 +++++-- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md b/docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md index 9d1e23d..cf7b602 100644 --- a/docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md +++ b/docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ In the service-first Heimdall version, the most likely reusable slice is: - provider OAuth authority - identity-linking authority -- managed Twitch/YouTube/Joystick credential custody for creator connections (Joystick is a managed connection only, not a viewer sign-in provider: `startOAuthFlow` admits `sign_in` and `link` only for `identityProviders` and `connect` only for `managedConnectionProviders`, and refuses anything else before any redirect) +- managed Twitch/YouTube/Joystick credential custody for creator connections (Joystick is a managed connection only, not a viewer sign-in provider: `startOAuthFlow` admits `sign_in` and `link` only for `identityProviders` and `connect` only for `managedConnectionProviders` or `identityProviders`, and refuses anything else before any redirect) - entitlement refresh - shared claim semantics diff --git a/src/app-profiles.ts b/src/app-profiles.ts index 8ac57dd..128b27a 100644 --- a/src/app-profiles.ts +++ b/src/app-profiles.ts @@ -225,13 +225,15 @@ export function serializeAppProfile(profile: AppProfile): Record { + it("sign_in and link take identityProviders only; connect takes managedConnectionProviders or identityProviders, for every profile", async () => { const app = await buildApp({ config: createTestConfig() }); try { for (const profile of Object.values(builtInAppProfiles)) { @@ -2034,7 +2034,10 @@ describe("OAuth start admits a provider by the profile's role for the mode", () url: `/v1/oauth/${provider}/start`, payload: { appSlug: profile.slug, mode, returnTo: `${profile.allowedReturnOrigins[0]}/x` }, }); - const roleList = mode === "connect" ? profile.managedConnectionProviders : profile.identityProviders; + const roleList = + mode === "connect" + ? [...profile.managedConnectionProviders, ...profile.identityProviders] + : profile.identityProviders; const refused = start.json().error === "provider_not_supported_for_app"; expect([profile.slug, provider, mode, refused]).toEqual([profile.slug, provider, mode, !roleList.includes(provider)]); } From 6bdaed2a9b13a0765aabe37ecbe925034e51f02f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 12:44:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 21/45] Token set check: drop the array clause the access_token check already decides A JSON array has no string access_token, so the typeof check refuses it; the separate Array.isArray clause was an equivalent mutant's worth of code. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- src/oauth.ts | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/oauth.ts b/src/oauth.ts index 9593b54..39dd2c0 100644 --- a/src/oauth.ts +++ b/src/oauth.ts @@ -188,7 +188,6 @@ export async function requestProviderTokens( if ( typeof answer !== "object" || answer === null || - Array.isArray(answer) || typeof (answer as { access_token?: unknown }).access_token !== "string" || !(answer as { access_token: string }).access_token || (answer as { error?: unknown }).error !== undefined From 79ea0007d3d6be9b19ce6a8cf192518061eba2d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 13:23:53 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 22/45] OAuth callback: mode and provider role decide what a completion mints The start gate only refused early. The callback ignored the signed state's mode, so a Joystick connect for StreamPixels redeemed into a viewer_access session. callbackMint(profile, provider, mode) now decides at the callback: identity providers keep a viewer session (Bifrost discord connect unchanged); a connect for a managed-connection-only provider stores custody and mints a claim with no facts, no capabilities and no refresh token (the refresh route would recompute viewer_access from the account); anything else is refused. StreamPixels' redeem reads only account, provider, mode, connection and claimSet.identities, so it accepts the capability-free claim unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md | 2 +- src/app-profiles.ts | 19 ++++++++ src/app.ts | 20 ++++++-- src/backend-handoff.ts | 8 +++- src/claims.ts | 28 +++++++---- tests/app.test.ts | 23 ++++++++- tests/managed-credential.test.ts | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 164 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md b/docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md index cf7b602..fe101eb 100644 --- a/docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md +++ b/docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ In the service-first Heimdall version, the most likely reusable slice is: - provider OAuth authority - identity-linking authority -- managed Twitch/YouTube/Joystick credential custody for creator connections (Joystick is a managed connection only, not a viewer sign-in provider: `startOAuthFlow` admits `sign_in` and `link` only for `identityProviders` and `connect` only for `managedConnectionProviders` or `identityProviders`, and refuses anything else before any redirect) +- managed Twitch/YouTube/Joystick credential custody for creator connections (Joystick is a managed connection only, not a viewer sign-in provider: `startOAuthFlow` admits `sign_in` and `link` only for `identityProviders` and `connect` only for `managedConnectionProviders` or `identityProviders`, and refuses anything else before any redirect. The callback decides again from the signed state's mode: a `connect` for a managed-connection-only provider stores the credential and mints a claim with no facts, no capabilities and no refresh token, so it can never be a viewer session) - entitlement refresh - shared claim semantics diff --git a/src/app-profiles.ts b/src/app-profiles.ts index 128b27a..621f3cb 100644 --- a/src/app-profiles.ts +++ b/src/app-profiles.ts @@ -250,3 +250,22 @@ export function isAllowedReturnOrigin(profile: AppProfile, returnTo: string): bo return false; } } + +/** + * What a completed OAuth callback may mint, decided at the callback from the + * signed state's mode and the provider's role in the profile (the start gate + * is only an early refusal). `viewer_session`: the provider is one of the + * profile's `identityProviders`, so the completion signs the account in with + * the profile's capabilities. `custody_only`: a `connect` for a provider that + * is only a managed connection (Joystick on StreamPixels) stores the creator + * credential and mints a claim with no capabilities and no refresh token. + * `refused`: any other combination, which the start gate never admits. + */ +export type CallbackMint = "viewer_session" | "custody_only" | "refused"; + +export function callbackMint(profile: AppProfile, provider: Provider, mode: OAuthMode): CallbackMint { + if (profile.identityProviders.includes(provider)) { + return "viewer_session"; + } + return mode === "connect" && profile.managedConnectionProviders.includes(provider) ? "custody_only" : "refused"; +} diff --git a/src/app.ts b/src/app.ts index 0a7dd60..a60e2d6 100644 --- a/src/app.ts +++ b/src/app.ts @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ import { type Provider, } from "./contracts.js"; import { issueAccessClaim, type IssueAccessClaimInput } from "./claims.js"; -import { builtInAppProfiles, getAppProfile, isAllowedReturnOrigin, serializeAppProfile, admitsProviderForMode } from "./app-profiles.js"; +import { builtInAppProfiles, getAppProfile, isAllowedReturnOrigin, serializeAppProfile, admitsProviderForMode, callbackMint } from "./app-profiles.js"; import { renderBrowserHandoffPage } from "./browser-handoff.js"; import { type HeimdallConfig, loadConfig } from "./config.js"; import { createTokenCustody, type TokenCustody } from "./custody.js"; @@ -1008,6 +1008,11 @@ export async function buildApp(options: BuildAppOptions = {}): Promise, + Partial> { status: "success"; mode: OAuthMode; account: AccountSummary; diff --git a/src/claims.ts b/src/claims.ts index 11c42ea..b762cbd 100644 --- a/src/claims.ts +++ b/src/claims.ts @@ -39,6 +39,12 @@ export interface IssueAccessClaimInput { displayName?: string; linkedIdentities: LinkedIdentityInput[]; facts: string[]; + /** + * The claim names the account and its identities and carries no facts and + * no capabilities (a managed-credential connect for a provider that is not + * an identity provider). The facts are not even `identity.authenticated`. + */ + withoutCapabilities?: boolean; sessionId?: string; accessRevision?: number; ttlSeconds?: number; @@ -80,13 +86,17 @@ export async function issueAccessClaim(options: { // would name an app no verifier can resolve a profile for. throw new Error(`Cannot issue an access claim for unknown app '${options.input.appSlug}'.`); } - const facts = normalizeFacts(options.input.accountId, options.input.linkedIdentities, options.input.facts); - const factSet = new Set(facts); - const sharedCapabilities = evaluateSharedCapabilities(profile, { - accountId: options.input.accountId, - facts: factSet, - identities: options.input.linkedIdentities, - }); + const withoutCapabilities = options.input.withoutCapabilities === true; + const facts = withoutCapabilities + ? [] + : normalizeFacts(options.input.accountId, options.input.linkedIdentities, options.input.facts); + const sharedCapabilities = withoutCapabilities + ? [] + : evaluateSharedCapabilities(profile, { + accountId: options.input.accountId, + facts: new Set(facts), + identities: options.input.linkedIdentities, + }); const issuedAt = nowEpochSeconds(); const ttlSeconds = clampTtlSeconds( @@ -176,6 +186,8 @@ export async function issueAccessClaim(options: { kid: options.keys.kid, }, sharedCapabilities, - hybridCapabilities: profile.capabilities.filter((capability) => capability.mode === "hybrid"), + hybridCapabilities: withoutCapabilities + ? [] + : profile.capabilities.filter((capability) => capability.mode === "hybrid"), }; } diff --git a/tests/app.test.ts b/tests/app.test.ts index 70ed754..b086853 100644 --- a/tests/app.test.ts +++ b/tests/app.test.ts @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import { inspect } from "node:util"; import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest"; import { type FastifyInstance } from "fastify"; import { buildApp, errorIdentity } from "../src/app.js"; -import { builtInAppProfiles } from "../src/app-profiles.js"; +import { builtInAppProfiles, callbackMint } from "../src/app-profiles.js"; import { deliverBackendHandoff, type BackendHandoffPayload } from "../src/backend-handoff.js"; import { type HeimdallConfig, loadConfig } from "../src/config.js"; import { entitlementFacts, identityFacts } from "../src/facts.js"; @@ -2048,3 +2048,24 @@ describe("OAuth start admits a provider by the profile's role for the mode", () } }); }); + +describe("callbackMint", () => { + const streampixels = builtInAppProfiles.streampixels!; + it.each([ + ["twitch", "sign_in", "viewer_session"], + ["twitch", "link", "viewer_session"], + ["youtube", "sign_in", "viewer_session"], + ["twitch", "connect", "viewer_session"], + ["joystick", "connect", "custody_only"], + ["joystick", "sign_in", "refused"], + ["joystick", "link", "refused"], + ["discord", "connect", "refused"], + ["discord", "sign_in", "refused"], + ] as const)("%s %s on streampixels is %s", (provider, mode, expected) => { + expect(callbackMint(streampixels, provider, mode)).toBe(expected); + }); + + it("keeps Bifrost's discord connect a viewer session", () => { + expect(callbackMint(builtInAppProfiles.bifrost!, "discord", "connect")).toBe("viewer_session"); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts index 36cc187..8a0d4d2 100644 --- a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts +++ b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts @@ -474,6 +474,84 @@ for (const { kind, live } of rigKinds) describe.skipIf(live && !adminUrl)(`manag }); }); + describe("what the callback mints is decided by mode and provider role", () => { + const returnTo = "https://streampixels.gamecult.org/auth/connect"; + + function stubProviders(identity: Record) { + globalThis.fetch = (async (input: string | URL) => { + const url = String(input); + const json = (body: unknown) => new Response(JSON.stringify(body), { status: 200 }); + if (url.startsWith("https://api.joystick.tv/api/oauth/token") || Object.values(providerCatalog).some((d) => d.tokenEndpoint === url)) { + return json({ access_token: "tok-access", refresh_token: "tok-refresh-CANARY", token_type: "Bearer", expires_in: 3600 }); + } + if (url === "https://api.joystick.tv/api/v1/me/identity") return json({ channel_id: identity.joystick, username: "deru" }); + if (url === "https://api.twitch.tv/helix/users") return json({ data: [{ id: identity.twitch, login: "deru", display_name: "Deru" }] }); + if (url.startsWith("https://www.googleapis.com/youtube/v3/channels")) { + return json({ items: [{ id: identity.youtube, snippet: { title: "Deru" } }] }); + } + return new Response("unexpected", { status: 500 }); + }) as typeof fetch; + } + + async function flow(rig: Rig, provider: "joystick" | "twitch" | "youtube", mode: "connect" | "sign_in") { + const app = rig.apps[0]!; + const start = await app.inject({ method: "POST", url: `/v1/oauth/${provider}/start`, payload: { appSlug: "streampixels", mode, returnTo } }); + expect(start.statusCode).toBe(201); + const callback = await app.inject({ + method: "GET", + url: `/v1/oauth/${provider}/callback?code=c&state=${encodeURIComponent(start.json().stateToken as string)}`, + }); + expect(callback.statusCode).toBe(201); + const redeem = await app.inject({ + method: "POST", + url: "/v1/apps/streampixels/auth-completions/redeem", + payload: { completionCode: callback.json().completion.code as string }, + }); + expect(redeem.statusCode).toBe(201); + return { callback, redeem }; + } + + it("a joystick connect on streampixels stores custody and yields no viewer_access, no capability and no refresh token", timeout, async () => { + const rig = await makeRig("joystick"); + stubProviders({ joystick: "channel-1", twitch: "t-1", youtube: "y-1" }); + const { callback, redeem } = await flow(rig, "joystick", "connect"); + + for (const payload of [callback.json(), redeem.json()] as Array>) { + expect(payload.mode).toBe("connect"); + expect(payload.claimSet.capabilities).toEqual([]); + expect(payload.claimSet.facts).toEqual([]); + expect(payload.sharedCapabilities).toEqual([]); + expect(payload.hybridCapabilities).toEqual([]); + expect(payload.claimSet.identities).toEqual([expect.objectContaining({ provider: "joystick", providerUserId: "channel-1" })]); + expect(payload.account.id).toBe(rig.accountId); + expect(payload.refreshToken).toBeUndefined(); + expect(payload.refresh).toBeUndefined(); + } + expect(callback.body + redeem.body).not.toContain("viewer_access"); + expect(callback.body + redeem.body).not.toContain("tok-refresh-CANARY"); + const row = await rig.row(); + expect(rig.custody.decrypt(row.accessTokenEncrypted!)).toBe("tok-access"); + expect(rig.custody.decrypt(row.refreshTokenEncrypted!)).toBe("tok-refresh-CANARY"); + }); + + it.each(["twitch", "youtube"] as const)("a %s sign_in on streampixels still yields viewer_access and a refresh token", timeout, async (provider) => { + const rig = await makeRig("joystick"); + stubProviders({ joystick: "channel-1", twitch: "t-1", youtube: "y-1" }); + const { callback, redeem } = await flow(rig, provider, "sign_in"); + for (const payload of [callback.json(), redeem.json()] as Array>) { + expect(payload.claimSet.capabilities).toContain("viewer_access"); + expect(payload.refreshToken).toEqual(expect.any(String)); + } + }); + + it("a twitch connect on streampixels keeps its current behaviour: an identity provider still signs the viewer in", timeout, async () => { + const rig = await makeRig("joystick"); + stubProviders({ joystick: "channel-1", twitch: "t-1", youtube: "y-1" }); + const { redeem } = await flow(rig, "twitch", "connect"); + expect(redeem.json().claimSet.capabilities).toContain("viewer_access"); + }); + }); + describe("updateLinkedIdentityCredential", () => { it("returns null for a missing id and does not call decide", async () => { const rig = await makeRig("twitch"); From a32be41878cee2a967f7caf7b856dc38a188e9eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 13:24:21 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 23/45] Token answers: a default lifetime replaces an unknown expiry; a malformed refresh_token is typed A token answer without a usable expires_in (absent, non-numeric, a string that is not a positive integer) now takes the descriptor's defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds (3600 for every provider), so no issued token has a NULL expiry that dueForRefresh would never refresh. A 2xx whose refresh_token is present but not a string is the typed provider_body_not_token_set (502 managed_credential_refresh_failed, tokens kept); an empty string stays a missing token, so a rotating provider still fails closed. The expiry rule is now pinned on memory and both live Postgres rigs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- docs/service-contract.md | 15 ++-- src/managed-credential.ts | 6 +- src/oauth.ts | 24 +++-- src/providers.ts | 13 +++ tests/managed-credential.test.ts | 128 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- tests/provider-token-request.test.ts | 68 ++++++++++++-- 6 files changed, 217 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/service-contract.md b/docs/service-contract.md index 2a8a47f..fdcc48f 100644 --- a/docs/service-contract.md +++ b/docs/service-contract.md @@ -493,7 +493,8 @@ Important behavior: processes sharing one database. Within one process, concurrent refreshes of one identity share a single attempt and its outcome (success or failure), so nobody re-presents a token behind a failed holder in that burst. Residual - risk, accepted: the guard is one presentation per process per burst, so N + risk, tracked as follow-up `joystick:follow_up:cross-process-failed-refresh-marker`: + the guard is one presentation per process per burst, so N Heimdall processes can present one token N times after a transient failure. The provider call is bounded at 10 seconds - a provider whose refresh tokens rotate (Joystick) fails closed: a refresh @@ -508,10 +509,14 @@ Important behavior: - `502 {"error":"managed_credential_refresh_failed","provider":...}`: the refresh failed for any reason that is not a grant verdict (invalid client, a 401 or 5xx whatever its body says, timeout, a 2xx without a string - `access_token` or carrying an `error`, an empty or non-JSON body). Stored - tokens are untouched and a later request may succeed. An answer without - `expires_in` stores the expiry as unknown, and an unknown expiry is never - due, so it does not trigger another refresh + `access_token` or carrying an `error`, a `refresh_token` that is present but + not a string, an empty or non-JSON body). Stored tokens are untouched and a + later request may succeed. An empty-string `refresh_token` counts as missing, + so a rotating provider revokes (`rotation_missing`). A token answer without a + usable `expires_in` (absent, non-numeric, or not a positive number or + positive-integer string) stores the expiry as now plus the provider's default + access-token lifetime (3600 seconds), so an expiry is never unknown and the + credential always comes due for refresh - app-local binding, diagnostics, subscription setup, and runtime behavior stay app-owned diff --git a/src/managed-credential.ts b/src/managed-credential.ts index 617a897..7d15e2c 100644 --- a/src/managed-credential.ts +++ b/src/managed-credential.ts @@ -150,9 +150,9 @@ async function refreshUnderLock( refreshTokenEncrypted = locked.refreshTokenEncrypted!; } - // An answer without expires_in leaves the expiry unknown. The old expiry is - // already due, so keeping it would refresh again on every resolve; an - // unknown expiry is never due (dueForRefresh). + // The token set always carries an expiry (the provider's, or the + // descriptor's default lifetime): the old one is already due, and an + // unknown one would never come due (dueForRefresh). const tokenExpiresAt = refreshed.expiresAt; return { kind: "rotate", diff --git a/src/oauth.ts b/src/oauth.ts index 39dd2c0..53f0f85 100644 --- a/src/oauth.ts +++ b/src/oauth.ts @@ -196,12 +196,19 @@ export async function requestProviderTokens( } const tokenResponse = answer as { access_token: string; - refresh_token?: string; + refresh_token?: unknown; token_type?: string; - expires_in?: number; + expires_in?: unknown; scope?: string | string[]; }; + // A refresh token that is present must be a string: anything else is a + // malformed grant answer, refused here as a typed failure rather than + // reaching custody as a TypeError. + if (tokenResponse.refresh_token !== undefined && typeof tokenResponse.refresh_token !== "string") { + throw new ProviderResponseError(response.status, "provider_body_not_token_set", failure); + } + const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = { accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token, tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type ?? "Bearer", @@ -211,12 +218,19 @@ export async function requestProviderTokens( if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) { tokenSet.refreshToken = tokenResponse.refresh_token; } - if (typeof tokenResponse.expires_in === "number" && tokenResponse.expires_in > 0) { - tokenSet.expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + tokenResponse.expires_in * 1000).toISOString(); - } + // Nothing issued here has an unknown expiry: an answer without a usable + // expires_in takes the descriptor's default lifetime. + const lifetimeSeconds = usableExpiresIn(tokenResponse.expires_in) ?? descriptor.defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds; + tokenSet.expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + lifetimeSeconds * 1000).toISOString(); return tokenSet; } +/** A positive finite number, or a string that is a positive integer. */ +function usableExpiresIn(value: unknown): number | undefined { + const seconds = typeof value === "string" && /^\s*\d+\s*$/.test(value) ? Number(value) : value; + return typeof seconds === "number" && Number.isFinite(seconds) && seconds > 0 ? seconds : undefined; +} + function sharedRuntimeExchange(provider: Provider): OAuthProviderRuntime["exchangeAuthorizationCode"] { return (options) => requestProviderTokens(provider, options.config, { diff --git a/src/providers.ts b/src/providers.ts index 9b139ab..77eebf4 100644 --- a/src/providers.ts +++ b/src/providers.ts @@ -11,6 +11,12 @@ export interface ProviderDescriptor { tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_basic" | "client_secret_post"; /** True when a refresh response replaces the refresh token and the old one dies. */ rotatesRefreshTokens: boolean; + /** + * Seconds an access token lives when a token answer carries no usable + * `expires_in` (RFC 6749 5.1 makes it RECOMMENDED, not required). An unknown + * expiry is never stored: the credential would never come due for refresh. + */ + defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds: number; defaultScopes: string[]; roles: ProviderRole[]; clientIdEnv: string; @@ -26,6 +32,7 @@ export const providerCatalog: Record = { tokenEndpoint: "https://discord.com/api/v10/oauth2/token", tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_basic", rotatesRefreshTokens: false, + defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds: 3600, defaultScopes: ["identify", "guilds.members.read"], roles: ["identity", "entitlement"], clientIdEnv: "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_DISCORD_CLIENT_ID", @@ -38,6 +45,7 @@ export const providerCatalog: Record = { tokenEndpoint: "https://www.patreon.com/api/oauth2/token", tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_post", rotatesRefreshTokens: false, + defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds: 3600, defaultScopes: ["identity", "identity[email]"], roles: ["identity", "entitlement"], clientIdEnv: "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_PATREON_CLIENT_ID", @@ -50,6 +58,7 @@ export const providerCatalog: Record = { tokenEndpoint: "https://github.com/login/oauth/access_token", tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_post", rotatesRefreshTokens: false, + defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds: 3600, defaultScopes: ["read:user", "user:email"], roles: ["identity", "managed_credential"], clientIdEnv: "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_GITHUB_CLIENT_ID", @@ -62,6 +71,7 @@ export const providerCatalog: Record = { tokenEndpoint: "https://id.twitch.tv/oauth2/token", tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_post", rotatesRefreshTokens: false, + defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds: 3600, defaultScopes: ["user:read:email"], roles: ["identity", "managed_credential"], clientIdEnv: "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_TWITCH_CLIENT_ID", @@ -74,6 +84,7 @@ export const providerCatalog: Record = { tokenEndpoint: "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token", tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_post", rotatesRefreshTokens: false, + defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds: 3600, defaultScopes: [ "openid", "email", @@ -96,6 +107,7 @@ export const providerCatalog: Record = { tokenEndpoint: "https://accounts.spotify.com/api/token", tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_basic", rotatesRefreshTokens: false, + defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds: 3600, defaultScopes: [ "user-read-currently-playing", "user-read-playback-state", @@ -112,6 +124,7 @@ export const providerCatalog: Record = { tokenEndpoint: "https://api.joystick.tv/api/oauth/token", tokenEndpointAuthMethod: "client_secret_basic", rotatesRefreshTokens: true, + defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds: 3600, defaultScopes: ["identity:read", "stream:read", "chat:read", "followers:read", "subscribers:read"], roles: ["identity", "managed_credential"], clientIdEnv: "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_JOYSTICK_CLIENT_ID", diff --git a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts index 8a0d4d2..931f7ef 100644 --- a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts +++ b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts @@ -53,7 +53,23 @@ function testConfig(): HeimdallConfig { } as unknown as HeimdallConfig; } -type Mode = "normal" | "invalid_grant" | "invalid_client" | "server_error" | "not_json" | "no_refresh_token" | "hang"; +type Mode = + | "normal" + | "invalid_grant" + | "invalid_client" + | "server_error" + | "not_json" + | "no_refresh_token" + | "empty_refresh_token" + | "bad_refresh_token" + | "no_expires_in" + | "unusable_expires_in" + | "string_expires_in" + | "hang"; + +function expiresInFor(mode: Mode): unknown { + return mode === "unusable_expires_in" ? "soon" : mode === "string_expires_in" ? "7200" : 3600; +} /** * A provider token endpoint with single-use refresh tokens. Presenting a @@ -95,7 +111,18 @@ function installTokenEndpoint(provider: Provider, firstRefreshToken: string) { return new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "access-norefresh", token_type: "Bearer", expires_in: 3600 }), { status: 200, }); - case "normal": { + case "empty_refresh_token": + return new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "access-empty", refresh_token: "", token_type: "Bearer", expires_in: 3600 }), { + status: 200, + }); + case "bad_refresh_token": + return new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "access-bad", refresh_token: 42, token_type: "Bearer", expires_in: 3600 }), { + status: 200, + }); + case "normal": + case "no_expires_in": + case "unusable_expires_in": + case "string_expires_in": { if (state.installationRevoked || presented !== state.live) { state.installationRevoked = true; return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: "invalid_grant", error_description: "reused CANARY" }), { status: 400 }); @@ -107,7 +134,7 @@ function installTokenEndpoint(provider: Provider, firstRefreshToken: string) { access_token: `access-${state.issued}`, refresh_token: state.live, token_type: "Bearer", - expires_in: 3600, + ...(state.mode === "no_expires_in" ? {} : { expires_in: expiresInFor(state.mode) }), }), { status: 200 } ); @@ -329,7 +356,7 @@ for (const { kind, live } of rigKinds) describe.skipIf(live && !adminUrl)(`manag expect(first.body + second.body + JSON.stringify(events)).not.toContain("CANARY"); }); - it.each(["invalid_client", "server_error", "not_json", "hang"] as const)( + it.each(["invalid_client", "server_error", "not_json", "bad_refresh_token", "hang"] as const)( "transient failure (%s) keeps custody: 502, tokens byte-identical, nothing leaked", timeout, async (mode) => { @@ -422,15 +449,16 @@ for (const { kind, live } of rigKinds) describe.skipIf(live && !adminUrl)(`manag }); if (providerCatalog[provider].rotatesRefreshTokens) { - it("rotation-fails-closed: a response without a refresh token revokes, 410, and the old token is never presented again", timeout, async () => { + it.each(["no_refresh_token", "empty_refresh_token"] as const)("rotation-fails-closed: a response with %s revokes, 410, and the old token is never presented again", timeout, async (mode) => { const rig = await makeRig(provider); const endpoint = installTokenEndpoint(provider, "refresh-0"); - endpoint.mode = "no_refresh_token"; + endpoint.mode = mode; const first = await rig.resolve(); expect(first.statusCode).toBe(410); expect(first.json).toEqual({ error: "managed_credential_revoked", provider }); expect(first.body).not.toContain("access-norefresh"); + expect(first.body).not.toContain("access-empty"); const row = await rig.row(); expect(row.accessTokenEncrypted).toBeUndefined(); expect(row.refreshTokenEncrypted).toBeUndefined(); @@ -444,17 +472,56 @@ for (const { kind, live } of rigKinds) describe.skipIf(live && !adminUrl)(`manag ]); }); } else { - it("a response without a refresh token keeps the old one for a non-rotating provider", timeout, async () => { + it.each(["no_refresh_token", "empty_refresh_token"] as const)("a response with %s keeps the old one for a non-rotating provider", timeout, async (mode) => { const rig = await makeRig(provider); const endpoint = installTokenEndpoint(provider, "refresh-0"); - endpoint.mode = "no_refresh_token"; + endpoint.mode = mode; const answer = await rig.resolve(); expect(answer.statusCode).toBe(200); - expect(answer.json.accessToken).toBe("access-norefresh"); + expect(answer.json.accessToken).toBe(mode === "no_refresh_token" ? "access-norefresh" : "access-empty"); expect(rig.custody.decrypt((await rig.row()).refreshTokenEncrypted!)).toBe("refresh-0"); }); } + it.each([ + ["no expires_in", "no_expires_in", 3600], + ["an unusable expires_in", "unusable_expires_in", 3600], + ["a numeric-string expires_in", "string_expires_in", 7200], + ] as const)( + "refresh-once-per-token: an answer with %s stores now plus %s s, not the old due expiry, and resolve refreshes again only once it passes", + timeout, + async (_name, mode, seconds) => { + const rig = await makeRig(provider); + const endpoint = installTokenEndpoint(provider, "refresh-0"); + endpoint.mode = mode; + + const before = Date.now(); + expect((await rig.resolve()).statusCode).toBe(200); + expect(endpoint.calls).toBe(1); + const stored = Date.parse((await rig.row()).tokenExpiresAt!); + expect(stored - before).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(seconds * 1000 - 1000); + expect(stored - before).toBeLessThan(seconds * 1000 + 10_000); + + expect((await rig.resolve()).statusCode).toBe(200); + expect(endpoint.calls).toBe(1); + + // The stored expiry passes: the next resolve refreshes. + const past = new Date(Date.now() - 1000).toISOString(); + await rig.stores[0]!.updateLinkedIdentityCredential(rig.identityId, async (locked) => ({ + kind: "rotate", + accessTokenEncrypted: locked.accessTokenEncrypted!, + refreshTokenEncrypted: locked.refreshTokenEncrypted!, + tokenExpiresAt: past, + scopes: locked.scopes, + updatedAt: past, + })); + expect((await rig.resolve()).statusCode).toBe(200); + expect(endpoint.calls).toBe(2); + const again = Date.parse((await rig.row()).tokenExpiresAt!); + expect(again).toBeGreaterThan(Date.now() + MANAGED_CREDENTIAL_REFRESH_SKEW_MS); + } + ); + it("a row with no access token resolves as revoked (410), a missing row as not found (404)", timeout, async () => { const rig = await makeRig(provider, { accessToken: null, refreshToken: null }); const endpoint = installTokenEndpoint(provider, "refresh-0"); @@ -882,6 +949,8 @@ describe("refresh answer classification", () => { ["a 2xx with JSON null", "null", 200], ["a 2xx with a JSON array", "[]", 200], ["a 2xx with a non-string access token", JSON.stringify({ access_token: 7, refresh_token: "r" }), 200], + ["a 2xx with a numeric refresh token", JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", refresh_token: 42 }), 200], + ["a 2xx with an object refresh token", JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", refresh_token: { r: 1 } }), 200], ["a 2xx with an empty access token", JSON.stringify({ access_token: "", refresh_token: "r" }), 200], ["a 2xx that is not JSON", "", 200], ["a 5xx page", "upstream exploded", 502], @@ -924,27 +993,50 @@ describe("refresh answer classification", () => { }); }); - it("a rotating provider's well-formed answer without a refresh token still revokes (rotation_missing)", async () => { + it.each([ + ["without a refresh token", { access_token: "a", expires_in: 3600 }], + ["with an empty refresh token", { access_token: "a", refresh_token: "", expires_in: 3600 }], + ])("a rotating provider's well-formed answer %s still revokes (rotation_missing)", async (_n, body) => { const store = new InMemoryStore(); const row = await seedRow(store, "joystick"); - answer(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", expires_in: 3600 }), 200); + answer(JSON.stringify(body), 200); expect((await refreshManagedCredential(ctxFor(store), row)).kind).toBe("revoked"); expect((await store.findStoredLinkedIdentity("joystick", row.providerUserId))!.refreshTokenEncrypted).toBeUndefined(); }); - it("an answer without expires_in stores the expiry as unknown, and the next resolve does not refresh again", async () => { + it.each([ + ["no expires_in", {}], + ["a non-numeric string expires_in", { expires_in: "soon" }], + ])("an answer with %s stores now plus the default lifetime; resolve refreshes once it passes", async (_n, extra) => { const store = new InMemoryStore(); - const row = await seedRow(store, "twitch"); - const calls = answer(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "access-1", refresh_token: "refresh-1" }), 200); - const first = await refreshManagedCredential(ctxFor(store), row); + const seeded = await seedRow(store, "twitch"); + // Due against the real clock, which the token answer's expiry is computed from. + const row = (await store.updateLinkedIdentityCredential(seeded.id, async (locked) => ({ + kind: "rotate", + accessTokenEncrypted: locked.accessTokenEncrypted!, + refreshTokenEncrypted: locked.refreshTokenEncrypted!, + tokenExpiresAt: new Date().toISOString(), + scopes: locked.scopes, + updatedAt: new Date().toISOString(), + })))!; + const calls = answer(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "access-1", refresh_token: "refresh-1", ...extra }), 200); + let skew = 0; + const ctx = { ...ctxFor(store), clock: () => Date.now() + skew }; + const before = Date.now(); + const first = await refreshManagedCredential(ctx, row); expect(first.kind).toBe("current"); - expect(first.identity.tokenExpiresAt).toBeUndefined(); const stored = (await store.findStoredLinkedIdentity("twitch", row.providerUserId))!; - expect(stored.tokenExpiresAt).toBeUndefined(); + const expiry = Date.parse(stored.tokenExpiresAt!); + expect(expiry - before).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(providerCatalog.twitch.defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds * 1000); + expect(expiry - before).toBeLessThan(providerCatalog.twitch.defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds * 1000 + 5_000); expect(custody.decrypt(stored.accessTokenEncrypted!)).toBe("access-1"); - await refreshManagedCredential(ctxFor(store), stored); + await refreshManagedCredential(ctx, stored); expect(calls).toEqual(["refresh-0"]); + + skew = providerCatalog.twitch.defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds * 1000; + await refreshManagedCredential(ctx, stored); + expect(calls).toEqual(["refresh-0", "refresh-1"]); }); it("a non-rotating provider keeps the locked row's refresh token, not the snapshot's", async () => { diff --git a/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts b/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts index 501a6e3..ff415fd 100644 --- a/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts +++ b/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts @@ -90,14 +90,70 @@ describe("requestProviderTokens follows the provider descriptor", () => { expect(calls[1]!.body.has("code")).toBe(false); }); + const everyProvider = Object.keys(providerCatalog) as Provider[]; + + it("gives every provider a default access-token lifetime of 3600 seconds", () => { + for (const provider of everyProvider) { + expect(providerCatalog[provider].defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds).toBe(3600); + } + }); + + // expires_in is RECOMMENDED (RFC 6749 5.1): unusable means the default, never an unknown expiry. it.each([ - ["no expires_in", { access_token: "a" }], - ["a zero expires_in", { access_token: "a", expires_in: 0 }], - ["a string expires_in", { access_token: "a", expires_in: "3600" }], - ])("sets no expiry and no refresh token for %s", async (_n, body) => { - capture(() => new Response(JSON.stringify(body), { status: 200 })); + ["no expires_in", undefined, 3600], + ["a zero expires_in", 0, 3600], + ["a negative expires_in", -5, 3600], + ["a null expires_in", null, 3600], + ["an object expires_in", {}, 3600], + ["a non-numeric string", "abc", 3600], + ["an empty string", "", 3600], + ["a negative string", "-1", 3600], + ["a zero string", "0", 3600], + ["a fractional string", "12.5", 3600], + ["an exponent string", "1e3", 3600], + ["a numeric string", "7200", 7200], + ["a padded numeric string", " 7200 ", 7200], + ["a number", 7200, 7200], + ])("stores now plus the right lifetime for %s, on every provider and grant", async (_n, expiresIn, seconds) => { + for (const provider of everyProvider) { + for (const grant of [ + { grant_type: "authorization_code", code: "c", redirect_uri: "u" } as const, + { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "R" } as const, + ]) { + capture(() => new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", ...(expiresIn === undefined ? {} : { expires_in: expiresIn }) }), { status: 200 })); + const before = Date.now(); + const tokens = await requestProviderTokens(provider, configFor(), grant); + const stored = Date.parse(tokens.expiresAt ?? ""); + expect(stored - before).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(seconds * 1000); + expect(stored - before).toBeLessThan(seconds * 1000 + 5_000); + expect(tokens.refreshToken).toBeUndefined(); + } + } + }); + + it("takes the default lifetime for an expires_in too large to be a date", async () => { + capture(() => new Response('{"access_token":"a","expires_in":1e999}', { status: 200 })); + const before = Date.now(); + const tokens = await requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "R" }); + expect(Date.parse(tokens.expiresAt ?? "") - before).toBeLessThan(3600 * 1000 + 5_000); + }); + + it.each([ + ["a number", 42], + ["an object", { a: 1 }], + ["an array", ["r"]], + ["true", true], + ["null", null], + ])("refuses a 2xx whose refresh_token is %s as a malformed token set", async (_n, refreshToken) => { + capture(() => new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", refresh_token: refreshToken, expires_in: 3600 }), { status: 200 })); + await expect( + requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "R" }) + ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "provider_body_not_token_set" }); + }); + + it("reads an empty-string refresh_token as no refresh token", async () => { + capture(() => new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", refresh_token: "", expires_in: 3600 }), { status: 200 })); const tokens = await requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "R" }); - expect(tokens.expiresAt).toBeUndefined(); expect(tokens.refreshToken).toBeUndefined(); }); From 32208cc8e2b2e6cf946448b1af6d46212494eed6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 13:27:28 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 24/45] Pin the callback's refusal of a signed state the provider has no role for Re-signs a joystick connect state as sign_in and link with the app's own key and shows the callback refuses before the code exchange and writes nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- tests/app.test.ts | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/app.test.ts b/tests/app.test.ts index b086853..3afe0a6 100644 --- a/tests/app.test.ts +++ b/tests/app.test.ts @@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ +import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from "node:fs"; +import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; +import { join } from "node:path"; import { inspect } from "node:util"; import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest"; import { type FastifyInstance } from "fastify"; @@ -7,7 +10,7 @@ import { deliverBackendHandoff, type BackendHandoffPayload } from "../src/backen import { type HeimdallConfig, loadConfig } from "../src/config.js"; import { entitlementFacts, identityFacts } from "../src/facts.js"; import { createOAuthRuntimeRegistry, ProviderResponseError, type OAuthProviderRuntime } from "../src/oauth.js"; -import { verifyJwt } from "../src/signing.js"; +import { createRuntimeKeyMaterial, signJwt, verifyJwt } from "../src/signing.js"; import { InMemoryStore } from "../src/store/index.js"; function createTestConfig(): HeimdallConfig { @@ -1420,6 +1423,37 @@ describe("Heimdall service", () => { return calls; } + it.each(["sign_in", "link"] as const)( + "the callback refuses a signed %s state for joystick on streampixels before the code exchange, and nothing is written", + async (mode) => { + // The start gate already refuses these words, so the state is re-signed with the app's own key. + const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "heimdall-forge-")); + try { + const config = { ...createTestConfig(), signingPrivateKeyPath: join(dir, "signing.pem"), bootstrapSigningPrivateKeyOnMissing: true }; + const store = new InMemoryStore(); + const app = await buildApp({ config, store }); + apps.push(app); + const keys = createRuntimeKeyMaterial({ ...config, bootstrapSigningPrivateKeyOnMissing: false }); + const calls = stubJoystick({ channel_id: "chan-forged", username: "deru" }); + const stateToken = (await connect(app)).json().stateToken as string; + const verified = verifyJwt(stateToken, keys.publicKey); + expect(verified.valid).toBe(true); + const forged = signJwt({ ...(verified as { payload: Record }).payload, mode }, keys); + + const callback = await app.inject({ + method: "GET", + url: `/v1/oauth/joystick/callback?code=c&state=${encodeURIComponent(forged)}`, + }); + expect(callback.statusCode).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400); + expect(callback.body).not.toContain("viewer_access"); + expect(calls).toEqual([]); + expect(await store.findStoredLinkedIdentity("joystick", "chan-forged")).toBeNull(); + } finally { + rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); + } + } + ); + it("exchanges the code with Basic client auth and links the identity by channel id", async () => { const store = new InMemoryStore(); const app = await buildApp({ config: createTestConfig(), store }); From 655fcc7d228b29c7ab55561c9bb1abcc606735a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 13:29:10 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 25/45] Credential rotate decisions carry a required expiry Refresh and exchange answers now type as ExpiringTokenSet, and a rotate decision requires tokenExpiresAt, so neither store has a no-expiry rule left to mutate: a NULL expiry can only be written by a revoke. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- src/managed-credential.ts | 5 ++--- src/oauth.ts | 17 ++++++++++------- src/store/in-memory.ts | 4 +--- src/store/types.ts | 2 +- tests/managed-credential.test.ts | 1 + 5 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/managed-credential.ts b/src/managed-credential.ts index 7d15e2c..e2fd124 100644 --- a/src/managed-credential.ts +++ b/src/managed-credential.ts @@ -150,15 +150,14 @@ async function refreshUnderLock( refreshTokenEncrypted = locked.refreshTokenEncrypted!; } - // The token set always carries an expiry (the provider's, or the + // The refreshed set always carries an expiry (the provider's, or the // descriptor's default lifetime): the old one is already due, and an // unknown one would never come due (dueForRefresh). - const tokenExpiresAt = refreshed.expiresAt; return { kind: "rotate", accessTokenEncrypted: ctx.tokenCustody.encrypt(refreshed.accessToken), refreshTokenEncrypted, - ...(tokenExpiresAt !== undefined ? { tokenExpiresAt } : {}), + tokenExpiresAt: refreshed.expiresAt, scopes: refreshed.scope.length ? refreshed.scope : locked.scopes, updatedAt, }; diff --git a/src/oauth.ts b/src/oauth.ts index 53f0f85..2ad2c76 100644 --- a/src/oauth.ts +++ b/src/oauth.ts @@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ export interface OAuthCallbackContext { entitlementPolicy: OAuthEntitlementPolicy | null; } +/** A token set whose access-token expiry is known: the provider's own, or the descriptor's default. */ +export type ExpiringTokenSet = OAuthTokenSet & { expiresAt: string }; + export interface OAuthProviderRuntime { exchangeAuthorizationCode(options: { config: HeimdallConfig; @@ -51,7 +54,7 @@ export interface OAuthProviderRuntime { config: HeimdallConfig; refreshToken: string; signal?: AbortSignal; - }): Promise; + }): Promise; resolveIdentity(options: { config: HeimdallConfig; accessToken: string }): Promise; evaluateEntitlements(options: { config: HeimdallConfig; @@ -156,7 +159,7 @@ export async function requestProviderTokens( config: HeimdallConfig, grant: TokenGrant, signal?: AbortSignal -): Promise { +): Promise { const descriptor = providerCatalog[provider]; const providerConfig = config.providers[provider]; if (!providerConfig.clientId || !providerConfig.clientSecret) { @@ -209,19 +212,19 @@ export async function requestProviderTokens( throw new ProviderResponseError(response.status, "provider_body_not_token_set", failure); } - const tokenSet: OAuthTokenSet = { + // Nothing issued here has an unknown expiry: an answer without a usable + // expires_in takes the descriptor's default lifetime. + const lifetimeSeconds = usableExpiresIn(tokenResponse.expires_in) ?? descriptor.defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds; + const tokenSet: ExpiringTokenSet = { accessToken: tokenResponse.access_token, tokenType: tokenResponse.token_type ?? "Bearer", scope: normalizeScopes(tokenResponse.scope), + expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + lifetimeSeconds * 1000).toISOString(), raw: tokenResponse as unknown as Record, }; if (tokenResponse.refresh_token) { tokenSet.refreshToken = tokenResponse.refresh_token; } - // Nothing issued here has an unknown expiry: an answer without a usable - // expires_in takes the descriptor's default lifetime. - const lifetimeSeconds = usableExpiresIn(tokenResponse.expires_in) ?? descriptor.defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds; - tokenSet.expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + lifetimeSeconds * 1000).toISOString(); return tokenSet; } diff --git a/src/store/in-memory.ts b/src/store/in-memory.ts index 0dea560..6a53dad 100644 --- a/src/store/in-memory.ts +++ b/src/store/in-memory.ts @@ -198,9 +198,7 @@ export class InMemoryStore implements HeimdallStore { if (decision.kind === "rotate") { next.accessTokenEncrypted = decision.accessTokenEncrypted; next.refreshTokenEncrypted = decision.refreshTokenEncrypted; - if (decision.tokenExpiresAt !== undefined) { - next.tokenExpiresAt = decision.tokenExpiresAt; - } + next.tokenExpiresAt = decision.tokenExpiresAt; next.scopes = [...decision.scopes]; } this.linkedIdentities.set(id, clone(next)); diff --git a/src/store/types.ts b/src/store/types.ts index 0145626..5307e1f 100644 --- a/src/store/types.ts +++ b/src/store/types.ts @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ export type CredentialDecision = kind: "rotate"; accessTokenEncrypted: string; refreshTokenEncrypted: string; - tokenExpiresAt?: string; + tokenExpiresAt: string; scopes: string[]; updatedAt: string; } diff --git a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts index 931f7ef..7f473eb 100644 --- a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts +++ b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts @@ -738,6 +738,7 @@ for (const { kind, live } of rigKinds) describe.skipIf(live && !adminUrl)(`manag kind: "rotate", accessTokenEncrypted: `A${n}`, refreshTokenEncrypted: `R${n}`, + tokenExpiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 3600_000).toISOString(), scopes: locked.scopes, updatedAt: new Date().toISOString(), }; From a911da93d8630823f24e69134f7d5c38b1baf3fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 13:34:41 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 26/45] Claims: facts are the one owner of a capability-free claim Every shared capability needs a non-empty anyOf, so an empty fact set already yields no capabilities; the explicit empty list beside it was a second owner no test could tell apart from the first. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- src/claims.ts | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/claims.ts b/src/claims.ts index b762cbd..4440ed3 100644 --- a/src/claims.ts +++ b/src/claims.ts @@ -90,13 +90,13 @@ export async function issueAccessClaim(options: { const facts = withoutCapabilities ? [] : normalizeFacts(options.input.accountId, options.input.linkedIdentities, options.input.facts); - const sharedCapabilities = withoutCapabilities - ? [] - : evaluateSharedCapabilities(profile, { - accountId: options.input.accountId, - facts: new Set(facts), - identities: options.input.linkedIdentities, - }); + // Every shared capability needs a non-empty anyOf (capability-rules), so an + // empty fact set yields no capabilities: facts are the one owner of that. + const sharedCapabilities = evaluateSharedCapabilities(profile, { + accountId: options.input.accountId, + facts: new Set(facts), + identities: options.input.linkedIdentities, + }); const issuedAt = nowEpochSeconds(); const ttlSeconds = clampTtlSeconds( From 26f264877a76fcb3f542c20d9d639ff39a7c7847 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 14:04:12 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 27/45] Pin the hybrid capability listing a viewer sign-in carries Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- tests/managed-credential.test.ts | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts index 7f473eb..da7f991 100644 --- a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts +++ b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts @@ -608,6 +608,7 @@ for (const { kind, live } of rigKinds) describe.skipIf(live && !adminUrl)(`manag for (const payload of [callback.json(), redeem.json()] as Array>) { expect(payload.claimSet.capabilities).toContain("viewer_access"); expect(payload.refreshToken).toEqual(expect.any(String)); + expect(payload.hybridCapabilities.map((c: { key: string }) => c.key)).toEqual(["creator_access", "creator_admin"]); } }); From e1ac84fb70708c3a3176709bf3621b9ee6757f13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 14:34:24 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 28/45] Joystick custody needs a creator binding, at start and at the callback callbackMint now takes the connection: custody_only is a connect for a managed-connection-only provider bound to connection.kind creator with a targetId. Anything else is refused at start with creator_connection_required before any redirect, and at the callback from the signed state before the code exchange. The streampixels profile note says what Heimdall guarantees and records the S1 rule that SP's redeem treats a non-creator Joystick completion as an error, never a sign-in. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md | 2 +- src/app-profiles.ts | 24 +++++++++--- src/app.ts | 12 +++++- tests/app.test.ts | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- tests/managed-credential.test.ts | 2 +- 5 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md b/docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md index fe101eb..dbd91f1 100644 --- a/docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md +++ b/docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ In the service-first Heimdall version, the most likely reusable slice is: - provider OAuth authority - identity-linking authority -- managed Twitch/YouTube/Joystick credential custody for creator connections (Joystick is a managed connection only, not a viewer sign-in provider: `startOAuthFlow` admits `sign_in` and `link` only for `identityProviders` and `connect` only for `managedConnectionProviders` or `identityProviders`, and refuses anything else before any redirect. The callback decides again from the signed state's mode: a `connect` for a managed-connection-only provider stores the credential and mints a claim with no facts, no capabilities and no refresh token, so it can never be a viewer session) +- managed Twitch/YouTube/Joystick credential custody for creator connections (Joystick is a managed connection only, not a viewer sign-in provider: `startOAuthFlow` admits `sign_in` and `link` only for `identityProviders` and `connect` only for `managedConnectionProviders` or `identityProviders`, and refuses anything else before any redirect. The callback decides again from the signed state's mode: a `connect` for a managed-connection-only provider is admitted only with `connection.kind` `creator` and a `targetId`, refused otherwise at start and again at the callback before the code exchange; an admitted one stores the credential and mints a claim with no facts, no capabilities and no refresh token. Heimdall's claim is therefore never a viewer session. Heimdall cannot stop an app from minting its own viewer from a completion, so StreamPixels' redeem must treat a non-creator Joystick completion as an error, never as a sign-in. This is an S1 rule, recorded for SP) - entitlement refresh - shared claim semantics diff --git a/src/app-profiles.ts b/src/app-profiles.ts index 621f3cb..3489a48 100644 --- a/src/app-profiles.ts +++ b/src/app-profiles.ts @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { type CapabilityDefinition, type CapabilityMode, } from "./capability-rules.js"; -import { type AppSlug, type LinkedIdentityInput, type OAuthEntitlementPolicy, type OAuthMode, type Provider } from "./contracts.js"; +import { type AppSlug, type LinkedIdentityInput, type OAuthConnectionBinding, type OAuthEntitlementPolicy, type OAuthMode, type Provider } from "./contracts.js"; import { entitlementFacts, grantFacts, identityFacts } from "./facts.js"; export type { CapabilityDefinition, CapabilityMode }; @@ -257,15 +257,27 @@ export function isAllowedReturnOrigin(profile: AppProfile, returnTo: string): bo * is only an early refusal). `viewer_session`: the provider is one of the * profile's `identityProviders`, so the completion signs the account in with * the profile's capabilities. `custody_only`: a `connect` for a provider that - * is only a managed connection (Joystick on StreamPixels) stores the creator - * credential and mints a claim with no capabilities and no refresh token. - * `refused`: any other combination, which the start gate never admits. + * is only a managed connection (Joystick on StreamPixels), bound to a creator + * target, stores the creator credential and mints a claim with no capabilities + * and no refresh token. Without a creator binding it is `refused`, as is any + * other combination. The start gate asks this same question, so an unbound + * connect never reaches a redirect. */ export type CallbackMint = "viewer_session" | "custody_only" | "refused"; -export function callbackMint(profile: AppProfile, provider: Provider, mode: OAuthMode): CallbackMint { +export function callbackMint( + profile: AppProfile, + provider: Provider, + mode: OAuthMode, + connection: OAuthConnectionBinding | null | undefined +): CallbackMint { if (profile.identityProviders.includes(provider)) { return "viewer_session"; } - return mode === "connect" && profile.managedConnectionProviders.includes(provider) ? "custody_only" : "refused"; + return mode === "connect" && + profile.managedConnectionProviders.includes(provider) && + connection?.kind === "creator" && + connection.targetId !== "" + ? "custody_only" + : "refused"; } diff --git a/src/app.ts b/src/app.ts index a60e2d6..40ceb20 100644 --- a/src/app.ts +++ b/src/app.ts @@ -501,6 +501,16 @@ export async function startOAuthFlow( }; } + if (callbackMint(profile, provider, input.mode, input.connection) === "refused") { + return { + statusCode: 400, + body: { + error: "creator_connection_required", + detail: `${provider} on ${profile.slug} is a managed creator connection: connect needs connection.kind creator and a targetId.`, + }, + }; + } + if (!isAllowedReturnOrigin(profile, input.returnTo)) { return { statusCode: 400, @@ -1009,7 +1019,7 @@ export async function buildApp(options: BuildAppOptions = {}): Promise { }); describe("joystick connect", () => { - async function connect(app: FastifyInstance) { + const creator = { kind: "creator", targetId: "creator-1" }; + async function connect(app: FastifyInstance, extra: Record = { connection: creator }) { const start = await app.inject({ method: "POST", url: "/v1/oauth/joystick/start", - payload: { appSlug: "streampixels", mode: "connect", returnTo: "https://streampixels.gamecult.org/auth/connect" }, + payload: { appSlug: "streampixels", mode: "connect", returnTo: "https://streampixels.gamecult.org/auth/connect", ...extra }, }); return start; } + it.each([ + ["no connection", {}], + ["an account connection", { connection: { kind: "account", targetId: "victim-1" } }], + ["an empty targetId", { connection: { kind: "creator", targetId: "" } }], + ])("refuses a joystick connect with %s at start, before any redirect", async (_name, extra) => { + const app = await buildApp({ config: createTestConfig() }); + apps.push(app); + const start = await connect(app, extra); + expect(start.statusCode).toBe(400); + expect(start.json().authorizationUrl).toBeUndefined(); + expect(start.json().stateToken).toBeUndefined(); + }); + + it.each([ + ["no connection", null], + ["an account connection", { kind: "account", targetId: "victim-1" }], + ["an empty targetId", { kind: "creator", targetId: "" }], + ])("the callback refuses a signed joystick connect with %s before the code exchange, and nothing is written", async (_name, connection) => { + const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "heimdall-forge-")); + try { + const config = { ...createTestConfig(), signingPrivateKeyPath: join(dir, "signing.pem"), bootstrapSigningPrivateKeyOnMissing: true }; + const store = new InMemoryStore(); + const app = await buildApp({ config, store }); + apps.push(app); + const keys = createRuntimeKeyMaterial({ ...config, bootstrapSigningPrivateKeyOnMissing: false }); + const calls = stubJoystick({ channel_id: "chan-forged", username: "deru" }); + const stateToken = (await connect(app)).json().stateToken as string; + const verified = verifyJwt(stateToken, keys.publicKey); + expect(verified.valid).toBe(true); + const forged = signJwt({ ...(verified as { payload: Record }).payload, connection }, keys); + + const callback = await app.inject({ + method: "GET", + url: `/v1/oauth/joystick/callback?code=c&state=${encodeURIComponent(forged)}`, + }); + expect(callback.statusCode).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400); + expect(calls).toEqual([]); + expect(await store.findStoredLinkedIdentity("joystick", "chan-forged")).toBeNull(); + } finally { + rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); + } + }); + it("starts a streampixels connect at joystick.tv with the five scopes and the callback redirect", async () => { const app = await buildApp({ config: createTestConfig() }); apps.push(app); @@ -2096,10 +2140,19 @@ describe("callbackMint", () => { ["discord", "connect", "refused"], ["discord", "sign_in", "refused"], ] as const)("%s %s on streampixels is %s", (provider, mode, expected) => { - expect(callbackMint(streampixels, provider, mode)).toBe(expected); + expect(callbackMint(streampixels, provider, mode, { kind: "creator", targetId: "creator-1" })).toBe(expected); + }); + + it.each([ + ["null", null], + ["undefined", undefined], + ["an account binding", { kind: "account", targetId: "a-1" }], + ["an empty creator targetId", { kind: "creator", targetId: "" }], + ] as const)("a joystick connect with %s is refused", (_name, connection) => { + expect(callbackMint(streampixels, "joystick", "connect", connection)).toBe("refused"); }); it("keeps Bifrost's discord connect a viewer session", () => { - expect(callbackMint(builtInAppProfiles.bifrost!, "discord", "connect")).toBe("viewer_session"); + expect(callbackMint(builtInAppProfiles.bifrost!, "discord", "connect", null)).toBe("viewer_session"); }); }); diff --git a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts index da7f991..4cd7396 100644 --- a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts +++ b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts @@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ for (const { kind, live } of rigKinds) describe.skipIf(live && !adminUrl)(`manag async function flow(rig: Rig, provider: "joystick" | "twitch" | "youtube", mode: "connect" | "sign_in") { const app = rig.apps[0]!; - const start = await app.inject({ method: "POST", url: `/v1/oauth/${provider}/start`, payload: { appSlug: "streampixels", mode, returnTo } }); + const start = await app.inject({ method: "POST", url: `/v1/oauth/${provider}/start`, payload: { appSlug: "streampixels", mode, returnTo, ...(mode === "connect" ? { connection: { kind: "creator", targetId: "creator-1" } } : {}) } }); expect(start.statusCode).toBe(201); const callback = await app.inject({ method: "GET", From 09ea233592eabf89bc94e12f22b2ca92e863c32f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 14:34:43 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 29/45] Token answers: an expires_in beyond a year is unusable, so the default lifetime applies A value like 3e11 overflowed the Date the expiry is stored as and surfaced as an untyped error. usableExpiresIn now caps a usable value at 365 days; the refresh path is pinned on memory and live Postgres. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- src/oauth.ts | 13 +++++++++++-- tests/managed-credential.test.ts | 21 +++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/oauth.ts b/src/oauth.ts index 2ad2c76..e5411ff 100644 --- a/src/oauth.ts +++ b/src/oauth.ts @@ -228,10 +228,19 @@ export async function requestProviderTokens( return tokenSet; } -/** A positive finite number, or a string that is a positive integer. */ +/** The longest access token lifetime taken at its word: a year. Anything above is not a lifetime. */ +const MAX_USABLE_EXPIRES_IN_SECONDS = 365 * 24 * 60 * 60; + +/** + * A positive finite number of seconds, or a string that is a positive integer, + * no longer than a year. A larger value would overflow the Date the expiry is + * stored as, so it is unusable and the descriptor's default lifetime applies. + */ function usableExpiresIn(value: unknown): number | undefined { const seconds = typeof value === "string" && /^\s*\d+\s*$/.test(value) ? Number(value) : value; - return typeof seconds === "number" && Number.isFinite(seconds) && seconds > 0 ? seconds : undefined; + return typeof seconds === "number" && Number.isFinite(seconds) && seconds > 0 && seconds <= MAX_USABLE_EXPIRES_IN_SECONDS + ? seconds + : undefined; } function sharedRuntimeExchange(provider: Provider): OAuthProviderRuntime["exchangeAuthorizationCode"] { diff --git a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts index 4cd7396..8a9b8de 100644 --- a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts +++ b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts @@ -65,10 +65,23 @@ type Mode = | "no_expires_in" | "unusable_expires_in" | "string_expires_in" + | "huge_expires_in" + | "huge_string_expires_in" | "hang"; function expiresInFor(mode: Mode): unknown { - return mode === "unusable_expires_in" ? "soon" : mode === "string_expires_in" ? "7200" : 3600; + switch (mode) { + case "unusable_expires_in": + return "soon"; + case "string_expires_in": + return "7200"; + case "huge_expires_in": + return 3e11; + case "huge_string_expires_in": + return "300000000000"; + default: + return 3600; + } } /** @@ -122,7 +135,9 @@ function installTokenEndpoint(provider: Provider, firstRefreshToken: string) { case "normal": case "no_expires_in": case "unusable_expires_in": - case "string_expires_in": { + case "string_expires_in": + case "huge_expires_in": + case "huge_string_expires_in": { if (state.installationRevoked || presented !== state.live) { state.installationRevoked = true; return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: "invalid_grant", error_description: "reused CANARY" }), { status: 400 }); @@ -487,6 +502,8 @@ for (const { kind, live } of rigKinds) describe.skipIf(live && !adminUrl)(`manag ["no expires_in", "no_expires_in", 3600], ["an unusable expires_in", "unusable_expires_in", 3600], ["a numeric-string expires_in", "string_expires_in", 7200], + ["a numeric expires_in beyond a year", "huge_expires_in", 3600], + ["a numeric-string expires_in beyond a year", "huge_string_expires_in", 3600], ] as const)( "refresh-once-per-token: an answer with %s stores now plus %s s, not the old due expiry, and resolve refreshes again only once it passes", timeout, From 4e312828c3cd7918c0ad08ad6754148eb70fb77b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 14:34:44 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 30/45] Pin the handoff strip: a custody-only backend_callback delivery carries no refresh token Delivers a joystick connect through a backend_callback handoff and checks the posted body has no refreshToken or refresh and empty capabilities, so the handoff spreading `issued` instead of `delivered` fails. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- tests/app.test.ts | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/app.test.ts b/tests/app.test.ts index 6aed7c6..0a061df 100644 --- a/tests/app.test.ts +++ b/tests/app.test.ts @@ -1409,6 +1409,44 @@ describe("Heimdall service", () => { } }); + it("a backend_callback delivery of a joystick connect carries no refresh token and no capabilities", async () => { + const callbackUrl = "https://streampixels.gamecult.org/api/heimdall/callback"; + const app = await buildApp({ + config: { ...createTestConfig(), appBackendCallbacks: { streampixels: [callbackUrl] } }, + }); + apps.push(app); + stubJoystick({ channel_id: "chan-hand", username: "deru" }); + const providerFetch = globalThis.fetch; + const deliveries: Array> = []; + globalThis.fetch = (async (input: string | URL, init?: RequestInit) => { + if (String(input) === callbackUrl) { + deliveries.push(JSON.parse(String(init?.body)) as Record); + return new Response(null, { status: 204 }); + } + return providerFetch(input, init); + }) as typeof fetch; + + const start = await connect(app, { + connection: creator, + handoff: { kind: "backend_callback", attemptId: "attempt-js-1", callbackUrl }, + }); + expect(start.statusCode).toBe(201); + const callback = await app.inject({ + method: "GET", + url: `/v1/oauth/joystick/callback?code=c&state=${encodeURIComponent(start.json().stateToken as string)}`, + }); + expect(callback.statusCode).toBeLessThan(300); + + expect(deliveries).toHaveLength(1); + const delivered = deliveries[0]!; + expect(delivered).toMatchObject({ status: "success", handoffKind: "backend_callback", mode: "connect", attemptId: "attempt-js-1" }); + expect(typeof delivered.accessToken).toBe("string"); + expect(delivered.refreshToken).toBeUndefined(); + expect(delivered.refresh).toBeUndefined(); + expect(delivered.claimSet.capabilities).toEqual([]); + expect(JSON.stringify(delivered)).not.toContain("js-refresh"); + }); + it("starts a streampixels connect at joystick.tv with the five scopes and the callback redirect", async () => { const app = await buildApp({ config: createTestConfig() }); apps.push(app); From 1d856ebd40118fe82eaf3afa57966ac2c516ffe9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 14:35:11 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 31/45] Code exchange: a rotating provider's grant without a refresh token fails the callback Joystick rotates refresh tokens, so a code-exchange answer whose refresh_token is absent or empty would store a credential the first refresh revokes. The shared exchange now throws a typed ProviderResponseError before the identity is resolved or anything is written. The residual-risk comment on the in-flight refresh map cites its follow-up. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- src/managed-credential.ts | 6 ++++-- src/oauth.ts | 12 ++++++++++-- tests/managed-credential.test.ts | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/managed-credential.ts b/src/managed-credential.ts index e2fd124..32e9f51 100644 --- a/src/managed-credential.ts +++ b/src/managed-credential.ts @@ -68,8 +68,10 @@ function withoutTokens(identity: StoredLinkedIdentity): StoredLinkedIdentity { * attempt is in flight join it and receive its outcome, success or failure. * The entry lives exactly as long as the attempt: a later request retries. * - * Accepted residual risk (docs/service-contract.md): one presentation per - * process per burst, so N processes may present one token N times. + * Known residual risk (docs/service-contract.md): one presentation per + * process per burst, so N processes may present one token N times. The + * cross-process failed-refresh marker that would close it is + * joystick:follow_up:cross-process-failed-refresh-marker. */ const refreshesInFlight = new WeakMap>>(); diff --git a/src/oauth.ts b/src/oauth.ts index e5411ff..b6658e8 100644 --- a/src/oauth.ts +++ b/src/oauth.ts @@ -244,12 +244,20 @@ function usableExpiresIn(value: unknown): number | undefined { } function sharedRuntimeExchange(provider: Provider): OAuthProviderRuntime["exchangeAuthorizationCode"] { - return (options) => - requestProviderTokens(provider, options.config, { + return async (options) => { + const tokenSet = await requestProviderTokens(provider, options.config, { grant_type: "authorization_code", code: options.code, redirect_uri: options.redirectUri, }); + // A rotating provider's refresh token is the only way back to the + // credential: a grant that arrives without one would be stored as a row + // the first refresh revokes, so the callback fails before it writes. + if (providerCatalog[provider].rotatesRefreshTokens && !tokenSet.refreshToken) { + throw new ProviderResponseError(200, "provider_body_not_token_set", `${providerCatalog[provider].displayName} token exchange failed`); + } + return tokenSet; + }; } function sharedRuntimeRefresh(provider: Provider): NonNullable { diff --git a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts index 8a9b8de..50ca9ba 100644 --- a/tests/managed-credential.test.ts +++ b/tests/managed-credential.test.ts @@ -561,12 +561,12 @@ for (const { kind, live } of rigKinds) describe.skipIf(live && !adminUrl)(`manag describe("what the callback mints is decided by mode and provider role", () => { const returnTo = "https://streampixels.gamecult.org/auth/connect"; - function stubProviders(identity: Record) { + function stubProviders(identity: Record, tokenAnswer: Record = { refresh_token: "tok-refresh-CANARY" }) { globalThis.fetch = (async (input: string | URL) => { const url = String(input); const json = (body: unknown) => new Response(JSON.stringify(body), { status: 200 }); if (url.startsWith("https://api.joystick.tv/api/oauth/token") || Object.values(providerCatalog).some((d) => d.tokenEndpoint === url)) { - return json({ access_token: "tok-access", refresh_token: "tok-refresh-CANARY", token_type: "Bearer", expires_in: 3600 }); + return json({ access_token: "tok-access", token_type: "Bearer", expires_in: 3600, ...tokenAnswer }); } if (url === "https://api.joystick.tv/api/v1/me/identity") return json({ channel_id: identity.joystick, username: "deru" }); if (url === "https://api.twitch.tv/helix/users") return json({ data: [{ id: identity.twitch, login: "deru", display_name: "Deru" }] }); @@ -618,6 +618,35 @@ for (const { kind, live } of rigKinds) describe.skipIf(live && !adminUrl)(`manag expect(rig.custody.decrypt(row.refreshTokenEncrypted!)).toBe("tok-refresh-CANARY"); }); + it.each([ + ["no refresh_token", {}], + ["an empty refresh_token", { refresh_token: "" }], + ])("a rotating provider's code exchange with %s fails the callback before anything is written", timeout, async (_name, tokenAnswer) => { + const rig = await makeRig("joystick"); + const before = await rig.row(); + const auditBefore = (await rig.audit()).length; + stubProviders({ joystick: "channel-new", twitch: "t-1", youtube: "y-1" }, tokenAnswer); + const app = rig.apps[0]!; + const start = await app.inject({ + method: "POST", + url: "/v1/oauth/joystick/start", + payload: { appSlug: "streampixels", mode: "connect", returnTo, connection: { kind: "creator", targetId: "creator-1" } }, + }); + expect(start.statusCode).toBe(201); + const callback = await app.inject({ + method: "GET", + url: `/v1/oauth/joystick/callback?code=c&state=${encodeURIComponent(start.json().stateToken as string)}`, + }); + expect(callback.statusCode).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(400); + expect(callback.body).not.toContain("tok-access"); + expect(await rig.row()).toEqual(before); + expect(await rig.stores[0]!.findStoredLinkedIdentity("joystick", "channel-new")).toBeNull(); + const failures = (await rig.audit()).slice(auditBefore); + expect(failures).toEqual([ + { eventType: "oauth_callback_failed", payload: expect.objectContaining({ errorClass: "ProviderResponseError", providerStatus: 200 }) }, + ]); + }); + it.each(["twitch", "youtube"] as const)("a %s sign_in on streampixels still yields viewer_access and a refresh token", timeout, async (provider) => { const rig = await makeRig("joystick"); stubProviders({ joystick: "channel-1", twitch: "t-1", youtube: "y-1" }); From 6db84bfae8a9bfa29b7a8bf09c25f6889b13b4aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 14:45:35 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 32/45] Pin the year boundary, the typed exchange failure and the start refusal's code Closes StrykerJS survivors on the diff: the cap at exactly 365 days against a second over, the rotating-exchange failure's typed code (and that a non-rotating provider is unaffected), and the start refusal's error word. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- tests/app.test.ts | 9 +++++---- tests/provider-token-request.test.ts | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/app.test.ts b/tests/app.test.ts index 0a061df..7f4d96d 100644 --- a/tests/app.test.ts +++ b/tests/app.test.ts @@ -1367,14 +1367,15 @@ describe("Heimdall service", () => { } it.each([ - ["no connection", {}], - ["an account connection", { connection: { kind: "account", targetId: "victim-1" } }], - ["an empty targetId", { connection: { kind: "creator", targetId: "" } }], - ])("refuses a joystick connect with %s at start, before any redirect", async (_name, extra) => { + ["no connection", {}, "creator_connection_required"], + ["an account connection", { connection: { kind: "account", targetId: "victim-1" } }, "creator_connection_required"], + ["an empty targetId", { connection: { kind: "creator", targetId: "" } }, "invalid_request"], + ])("refuses a joystick connect with %s at start, before any redirect", async (_name, extra, error) => { const app = await buildApp({ config: createTestConfig() }); apps.push(app); const start = await connect(app, extra); expect(start.statusCode).toBe(400); + expect(start.json().error).toBe(error); expect(start.json().authorizationUrl).toBeUndefined(); expect(start.json().stateToken).toBeUndefined(); }); diff --git a/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts b/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts index ff415fd..6a778f5 100644 --- a/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts +++ b/tests/provider-token-request.test.ts @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import { inspect } from "node:util"; import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest"; import { type HeimdallConfig } from "../src/config.js"; import { providers, type Provider } from "../src/contracts.js"; -import { requestProviderTokens } from "../src/oauth.js"; +import { createOAuthRuntimeRegistry, requestProviderTokens } from "../src/oauth.js"; import { providerCatalog } from "../src/providers.js"; const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch; @@ -138,6 +138,33 @@ describe("requestProviderTokens follows the provider descriptor", () => { expect(Date.parse(tokens.expiresAt ?? "") - before).toBeLessThan(3600 * 1000 + 5_000); }); + it.each([ + ["exactly a year", 31_536_000, 31_536_000], + ["a second over a year", 31_536_001, 3600], + ["3e11", 3e11, 3600], + ["3e11 as a string", "300000000000", 3600], + ])("takes an expires_in of %s as %i seconds' worth of lifetime", async (_n, expiresIn, seconds) => { + capture(() => new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", expires_in: expiresIn }), { status: 200 })); + const before = Date.now(); + const tokens = await requestProviderTokens("twitch", configFor(), { grant_type: "refresh_token", refresh_token: "R" }); + expect(Date.parse(tokens.expiresAt ?? "") - before).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(seconds * 1000 - 1000); + expect(Date.parse(tokens.expiresAt ?? "") - before).toBeLessThan(seconds * 1000 + 5_000); + }); + + it.each([ + ["no refresh_token", {}], + ["an empty refresh_token", { refresh_token: "" }], + ])("a rotating provider's code exchange with %s is a typed malformed token set; a non-rotating one is not", async (_n, extra) => { + capture(() => new Response(JSON.stringify({ access_token: "a", expires_in: 3600, ...extra }), { status: 200 })); + const runtimes = createOAuthRuntimeRegistry(); + const exchange = { config: configFor(), code: "c", redirectUri: "https://h/cb" }; + await expect(runtimes.joystick.exchangeAuthorizationCode(exchange)).rejects.toMatchObject({ + name: "ProviderResponseError", + code: "provider_body_not_token_set", + }); + expect((await runtimes.twitch.exchangeAuthorizationCode(exchange)).refreshToken).toBeUndefined(); + }); + it.each([ ["a number", 42], ["an object", { a: 1 }], From 778eabaedc9b662dfd13ee93d00bbc4cd459bfcc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 15:49:34 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 33/45] Docs: map managed credential custody, the callback mint and the open follow-ups architecture.md gains a Managed credential custody section: the single refresh owner, the store-port lock, per-process single flight, typed revoked and refresh-failed answers, the provider descriptor token fields and the one token request, the mode x role gates, custody-only completions, verification layer and follow-ups by id. The spotify finding now matches the removed spiverse profile; JOYSTICK joins the provider env lists. implementation-plan and service-contract lose two stale lines. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- docs/architecture.md | 184 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- docs/implementation-plan.md | 4 +- docs/service-contract.md | 2 +- 3 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/architecture.md b/docs/architecture.md index 88bfeaa..8ae5c19 100644 --- a/docs/architecture.md +++ b/docs/architecture.md @@ -305,6 +305,159 @@ Important rule: connection is tied to a user or account rather than a purely app-local secret - app-specific binding semantics and runtime behavior still stay app-owned +## Managed credential custody + +Source-grounded as of branch `eureka/joystick-h1` at 6db84bf (PR +GameCult/Heimdall#1, unmerged). Nothing here is deployed. + +### One owner: `refreshManagedCredential` + +`src/managed-credential.ts` owns every decision to present a stored refresh +token to a provider. The entitlement path (`refreshAppSession`), the Bifrost +Patreon sync and `managed-credentials/resolve` all call it; none of them reads +`tokenExpiresAt` or a provider token endpoint itself. The earlier +`refreshLinkedIdentityCredentialIfNeeded` is deleted, and callers no longer +write refreshed tokens through `upsertLinkedIdentity`: a refresh reaches the row +only through the store port below. The only other writer of credential columns +is the OAuth callback's grant write (`app.ts`, once). + +| | | +|---|---| +| Input | a `StoredLinkedIdentity` snapshot, the config, the token custody (AES-256-GCM seal), the provider runtimes, an injectable clock and timeout | +| Output | `{kind: "current" or "revoked", identity}`, or a thrown `ManagedCredentialRefreshFailed` (carries the provider and nothing the provider said) | +| Forbidden writers | any caller writing token columns or `token_expires_at` outside `updateLinkedIdentityCredential` and the callback's grant write; any caller computing "is a refresh due" | + +The snapshot is a hint. It may answer without a lock when the identity holds no +access token (`revoked`) or no refresh is due (`current`; due means a known +expiry within 5 minutes, a stored refresh token, and a runtime that refreshes). +It never decides that a refresh happens. + +### Three nested guards + +1. **Single flight, per process.** `refreshesInFlight` is keyed by store, then + linked identity id. A caller arriving while an attempt is in flight joins it + and receives its outcome, success or failure, so nobody queues behind a + failed holder and re-presents the same token. The entry ends with the + attempt; a later request retries. +2. **Store-port lock, across processes.** + `HeimdallStore.updateLinkedIdentityCredential(id, decide)` runs `decide` + against the row as read under the lock. `PostgresStore` takes + `SELECT ... FOR UPDATE` inside a transaction; `InMemoryStore` serialises per + id on a promise chain that deletes its entry only when it is still the tail. + `decide` re-checks `dueForRefresh` on the locked row, so a process that + waited finds the token already rotated and returns `keep`. The provider call + is aborted at 10 seconds (`MANAGED_CREDENTIAL_REFRESH_TIMEOUT_MS`), which + bounds how long any waiter holds a pooled connection. +3. **Decision, not mutation.** `decide` returns a `CredentialDecision`: `keep`, + `revoke`, or `rotate` with the access token, refresh token and + `tokenExpiresAt` all required. The store applies it and returns the row. The + new pair is persisted before the access token is returned. A store that + keeps the old expiry on rotate is a type error, not a test. + +### Typed answers + +- **Revoked** (`410 managed_credential_revoked`, audit + `managed_credential_revoked {provider, reason}`, all three token columns + cleared). Two reasons only: `provider_revoked`, an HTTP 400 whose OAuth + `error` is exactly `invalid_grant`; and `rotation_missing`, a well-formed + refresh answer without a refresh token from a provider whose descriptor says + `rotatesRefreshTokens`. An identity with no access token is also `revoked`. + `404` means no linked identity exists. On the entitlement path a revoked + identity is skipped; on the Bifrost sync it is `404 + patreon_identity_not_linked` with Bifrost uncalled. +- **Refresh failed** (`502 managed_credential_refresh_failed`, tokens + untouched, retry allowed): invalid client, a 401 or 5xx whatever its body, + timeout, a 2xx without a string `access_token` or carrying `error`, a + `refresh_token` present but not a string, an empty or non-JSON body. + `ProviderResponseError.oauthError` is drawn only from the closed RFC 6749 code + set and is read only from a 400; no provider body reaches a message, stack or + audit payload. +- An empty-string `refresh_token` counts as missing. + +### Provider descriptor and the one token request + +`providerCatalog` (`src/providers.ts`) is the only place a provider's token +behaviour is written down. Fields beyond the authorize side: + +- `tokenEndpoint`: where both grants go. +- `tokenEndpointAuthMethod`: `client_secret_basic` or `client_secret_post` + (RFC 7591 names); exactly one client-auth method per request. +- `rotatesRefreshTokens`: true only for Joystick. Drives fail-closed on + refresh (`rotation_missing`) and a failed callback on exchange when the grant + carries no refresh token. +- `defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds`: 3600 for all seven providers. Applied + when an answer has no usable `expires_in`; unusable means absent, non-numeric, + not a positive number or positive-integer string, or above 365 days. An + unknown expiry is therefore never stored, so every credential comes due. + +`requestProviderTokens(provider, config, grant)` in `src/oauth.ts` replaces the +ten per-provider exchange and refresh functions. Authorization-code and refresh +grants share it, it returns an `ExpiringTokenSet` (`expiresAt` required), and it +rejects a malformed 2xx typed as `provider_body_not_token_set` on both grants. +The per-provider runtimes keep only identity resolution. + +### Mode x role at the gates + +`src/app-profiles.ts` holds both questions, and the profile's role lists are +their only input: + +- `admitsProviderForMode(profile, provider, mode)`, the start gate: `sign_in` + and `link` take `identityProviders` only; `connect` takes + `managedConnectionProviders` or `identityProviders` (Bifrost connects its + identity providers). `supportsProvider` is deleted. +- `callbackMint(profile, provider, mode, connection)`, decided at the callback + from the signed state and asked again at start, so an unbound connect never + reaches a redirect: + - `viewer_session`: the provider is in `identityProviders`; a normal session + with the profile's capabilities. + - `custody_only`: a `connect` for a provider that is only a managed + connection (Joystick on StreamPixels) with `connection.kind = "creator"` and + a non-empty `targetId`. + - `refused`: everything else, before the code exchange. + +A custody-only completion stores the credential and issues a claim with no +facts, no capabilities and no hybrid capabilities (`withoutCapabilities` in +`src/claims.ts`, the one owner of a capability-free claim). The completion +payload and the `backend_callback` handoff carry no `refreshToken` or +`refresh`, because the refresh route recomputes facts from the account and would +turn that session into a viewer session. A session row still exists, and +`BackendHandoffSuccessPayload` types both fields optional for this reason. The +consumer's redeem reads only account id, provider, mode, connection and claim +identities, so the claim form is unchanged for it. + +### Verification layer + +The rules above are pinned by `tests/managed-credential.test.ts` on three rigs +(memory, Postgres with one app, Postgres with two pools), +`tests/provider-token-request.test.ts`, `tests/app.test.ts` (a matrix over all +profiles x providers x modes, callback mint, handoff strip) and +`tests/recipe-secrets.test.ts`. Evidence is the Yggdrasil `ygg-verify` run on +Linux (node:24, postgres:16, `HEIMDALL_REQUIRE_LIVE_PG=1`; 600 passed, 8 +skipped, none a live-Postgres suite), hand and StrykerJS mutants over the diff, +and Soul's pass 4 verdict `joystick:verdict:cut-h1.s4`. The deploy path's own +builder was not used. + +### Open follow-ups + +- `joystick:follow_up:cross-process-failed-refresh-marker`: single flight is per + process, so N Heimdall processes can present one token N times after a + transient failure. Needs a failed-attempt marker on the row, read under the + lock. Must land before or with Idunn onboarding. +- `joystick:follow_up:connect-start-needs-app-auth`: connect starts are + unauthenticated, so anyone can name `{creator, targetId}`; the callback + re-check proves a binding exists, not that the caller owns it. It also owns + the whitespace-only `targetId` that passes both gates and the callback's + fail-open `''` fallback for a vanished profile (finding + `joystick:finding:cut-h1.s4.whitespace-targetid-passes-custody-gate`). Must + land before the public Joystick bot or a second creator. +- `joystick:follow_up:heimdall-idunn-onboarding` (gamecult-ops): live Heimdall + is a hand-copied release under `heimdall.service`, not an Idunn-admitted + generation; the recipe's Joystick lines are declared but unproven by a + deploy. +- `joystick:follow_up:joystick-viewer-signin-public-bot`: Joystick stays out of + StreamPixels `identityProviders` until the public bot is registered; viewer + sign-in must not rewrite a creator's credential row. + ## Policy model The shared authority should not hard-code one app's access rules. It should @@ -514,24 +667,17 @@ each provider**. That URL cannot move on deploy. ### Finding: the `spotify` provider outlived its consumer -`spotiverse` is the only profile naming `spotify`, and Spotiverse was lost with -the `E:` drive — it was a small daemon exposing the Spotify API to agents, and -it no longer exists in the swarm. +`spotiverse` was the only profile naming `spotify`, and Spotiverse was lost with +the `E:` drive. The profile has since been removed from the registry +(`docs/app-profiles/spotiverse.md` is the restore spec), and +`admitsProviderForMode` refuses a provider no profile lists, so +`/v1/oauth/spotify/start` no longer reaches a handshake. -What survives it: `GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_SPOTIFY_CLIENT_ID` and -`GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_SPOTIFY_CLIENT_SECRET` are configured in -`/srv/heimdall/env/service.env`, the profile is advertised in the public -discovery document, and `/v1/oauth/spotify/start` is reachable from the open -web. That path would run a real OAuth handshake against a real client secret and -take custody of a user's Spotify refresh token on behalf of a consumer that -cannot use it. - -This is not an active compromise. It is a live credential and a token-custody -code path kept alive for nothing, which is exactly the shape that becomes an -incident later. Retire the profile and the provider config together, or record -why Spotiverse is expected back. Retiring is a change to `src/app-profiles.ts` -and the provider catalog and should be decided on its own, not folded into the -boundary change. +What survives: the `spotify` catalog entry and runtime, and, wherever an +operator env still holds them, `GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_SPOTIFY_CLIENT_ID` and +`GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_SPOTIFY_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE`. A live credential kept for a +consumer that does not exist is the shape that becomes an incident later. +Retire the provider config, or record why Spotiverse is expected back. ## Deployment modes @@ -588,14 +734,14 @@ Plain settings: - `GC_ACCESS_SIGNING_KEY_ID=...` - `GC_ACCESS_SESSION_TTL_SECONDS=3600` - `GC_ACCESS_STATE_TTL_SECONDS=600` -- `GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_{DISCORD,PATREON,GITHUB,TWITCH,YOUTUBE,SPOTIFY}_CLIENT_ID=...` +- `GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_{DISCORD,PATREON,GITHUB,TWITCH,YOUTUBE,SPOTIFY,JOYSTICK}_CLIENT_ID=...` - `GC_ACCESS_APP_{APP_SLUG}_BACKEND_CALLBACK_URLS=...` Secret files: - `GC_ACCESS_DATABASE_URL_FILE=/etc/gamecult/heimdall/credentials/GC_ACCESS_DATABASE_URL` - `GC_ACCESS_TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY_BASE64_FILE=...` -- `GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_{DISCORD,PATREON,GITHUB,TWITCH,YOUTUBE,SPOTIFY}_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE=...` +- `GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_{DISCORD,PATREON,GITHUB,TWITCH,YOUTUBE,SPOTIFY,JOYSTICK}_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE=...` - `GC_ACCESS_APP_{APP_SLUG}_SHARED_SECRET_FILE=...` - `GC_ACCESS_BIFROST_PATRON_SUPPORT_SECRET_FILE=...` diff --git a/docs/implementation-plan.md b/docs/implementation-plan.md index 9a1f84d..44bcbc7 100644 --- a/docs/implementation-plan.md +++ b/docs/implementation-plan.md @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ What exists right now is: and managed creator connections - an app-authenticated managed-credential resolve endpoint so StreamPixels can call provider APIs without storing refresh tokens locally -- managed Twitch/YouTube credentials refresh inside Heimdall before resolution +- managed Twitch/YouTube/Joystick credentials refresh inside Heimdall before resolution when they are expired or near expiry - StreamPixels now starts viewer and creator Twitch/YouTube OAuth through Heimdall, redeems one-time completion codes server-side, and keeps local @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ Landed in the first pass: Still to do in this phase: - key rotation policy instead of just stable key loading -- token custody retrieval/refresh surfaces beyond initial storage +- token custody retrieval and refresh have landed (see `docs/architecture.md`, Managed credential custody); the open pieces are the follow-ups listed there ### Phase 2: Heimdall service skeleton diff --git a/docs/service-contract.md b/docs/service-contract.md index fdcc48f..1567ae5 100644 --- a/docs/service-contract.md +++ b/docs/service-contract.md @@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ Failure modes: Launch note: - Discord and Patreon are the implemented provider runtimes for Repixelizer -- Twitch and YouTube now have generic OAuth exchange and identity runtimes for +- Twitch, YouTube and Joystick have generic OAuth exchange and identity runtimes for StreamPixels viewer auth and managed creator connections - GitHub is still catalogued for start URLs, but its callback runtime is not implemented yet From df05570ef64394b519bebc134e0c472424ebc438 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 17:56:25 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 34/45] State: Joystick H1 merged and live at d51fa6b; follow-ups recorded by id Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- notes/fresh-workspace-handoff.md | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- state/evidence.jsonl | 1 + state/map.yaml | 10 +++++----- 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/notes/fresh-workspace-handoff.md b/notes/fresh-workspace-handoff.md index 4727d7f..ad959f0 100644 --- a/notes/fresh-workspace-handoff.md +++ b/notes/fresh-workspace-handoff.md @@ -26,18 +26,23 @@ Do not trust this file for the exact live HEAD. Always check git. ## Active Work -Joystick H1 is the active, M1-critical cut (operator ruling 2026-10-18): -campaign `joystick:campaign:self`, target `joystick:target:r1`, branch -`eureka/joystick-h1`. Read the campaign and target in the typed mind; do not -re-derive them here. The Ghostlight KLTST canaries below stay open, behind H1. +Joystick H1 is merged and live (PR GameCult/Heimdall#1; campaign +`joystick:campaign:self`). Next: `joystick:follow_up:h1-live-round-trips`, then +StreamPixels S0/S1 (other sessions). Open Heimdall follow-ups, by id: +`joystick:follow_up:cross-process-failed-refresh-marker`, +`joystick:follow_up:connect-start-needs-app-auth`, +`joystick:follow_up:heimdall-idunn-onboarding`, +`joystick:follow_up:joystick-viewer-signin-public-bot`. The Ghostlight KLTST +canaries below stay open, behind them. ## Current Orientation -Deploy facts below are last-recorded, from 2026-08-22 (`1086aee`); HEAD has -moved ~100 commits past it. Check Yggdrasil, not this file, for what runs. +Yggdrasil runs Heimdall `d51fa6b`, hand-deployed 2026-10-19 15:51Z; +gamecult-ops `210a1af` records backup, rollback and provenance. Facts below +about Odin, Ghostlight and CultLib pins were verified at `1086aee` (2026-08-22) +and are not re-verified at `d51fa6b`. -- Yggdrasil runs Heimdall - `1086aee01169bf60e8a492b2740db1c6f3e8cabf` with CultLib +- At `1086aee01169bf60e8a492b2740db1c6f3e8cabf` Heimdall ran with CultLib `5cefa0db0079a8e3ee22f29d7b9e6e5aa60912a9` - Heimdall publishes four redacted access records to Odin under unique keys: `eve:provider:heimdall`, `heimdall:command-boundary`, @@ -157,8 +162,7 @@ moved ~100 commits past it. Check Yggdrasil, not this file, for what runs. over `cultnet.transport.rudp.v0` when `GC_ACCESS_IDUNN_RUDP_HEALTH` is configured; HTTP `/healthz`, JWKS, discovery, systemd, and nginx routing remain compatibility witnesses -- Yggdrasil now runs Heimdall commit - `1086aee01169bf60e8a492b2740db1c6f3e8cabf`. Heimdall persists its private +- Since `1086aee` Heimdall persists its private provider-health identity at `/srv/heimdall/keys/provider-health-identity.cc` and publishes canonical signed health independently of the slower Verse snapshot cadence. Idunn owns the exact root trust binding, authenticated @@ -180,7 +184,7 @@ moved ~100 commits past it. Check Yggdrasil, not this file, for what runs. ## Next Real Move -Joystick H1 first (see Active Work). Everything below is the standing queue. +The Active Work follow-ups first. Everything below is the standing queue. Do not continue implementation automatically from a rehydrate-only request. diff --git a/state/evidence.jsonl b/state/evidence.jsonl index 3178947..ba9a942 100644 --- a/state/evidence.jsonl +++ b/state/evidence.jsonl @@ -35,3 +35,4 @@ {"ts":"2026-08-22T02:01:00+00:00","type":"deployment","status":"accepted","note":"Yggdrasil runs Heimdall 1086aee01169bf60e8a492b2740db1c6f3e8cabf with CultLib 5cefa0db0079a8e3ee22f29d7b9e6e5aa60912a9. Odin b4f9a2e95f0b41cebdeddc49223781d1d3c7b42a returns Heimdall's provider, command boundary, Eve plugin, and transport profile under unique catalog keys. Ghostlight b515ca90c25573005a616244143803b37f2d06ec accepted canonical auth.begin through the Odin-resolved boundary; only advertised Discord and Heimdall navigation origins reached the browser."} {"ts": "2026-09-06T22:12:03+00:00", "type": "design", "status": "accepted", "note": "App slugs are no longer compile-time. AppSlug is a string; membership is a registry lookup, or isAppSlug shape validation where no store is reachable (the offline verifier). Capability rules are data (anyOf over Heimdall's own fact vocabulary), replacing a per-profile evaluateSharedCapabilities function that could not be accepted from a stranger. POST /v1/apps registers in RFC 7591 shape, gated on GC_ACCESS_APP_REGISTRATION_SECRET and closed until it is set. Built-in slugs are reserved so a registration cannot shadow a shipped app's audience. Motivation: a creator self-hosting Erycina alongside Heimdall would otherwise maintain a patched auth server to add one slug."} {"ts": "2026-09-08T12:20:12+00:00", "type": "security", "status": "accepted", "note": "epiphany/heimdall-caller-identity, second Hands pass: closed the two Soul-proven holes. (1) auth-completions redeem code is now always store-minted (never handoff.attemptId); attemptId survives only as a separate correlation field on StoredAuthCompletion/CreateAuthCompletionInput, and a new store.consumeAuthCompletionByAttempt(appSlug, attemptId, at) lets the private command plane's completeAuth redeem by the handle it already owns instead of forging an HTTP self-call with completionCode=handle. (2) startOAuthFlow now refuses any returnTo whose origin is not in AppProfile.allowedReturnOrigins (repixelizer/streampixels/bifrost -> .gamecult.org, ghostlight -> yggdrasil.gamecult.org per its docs/app-profiles doc and existing test fixtures; a registered app's allowlist is derived from its stored redirectUris origins). AppCaller is now branded with an unexported Symbol (app-caller.ts); private-command-plane.ts's two { appSlug } literals are gone, replaced by app-caller.ts's callerFromOpenedEnvelope. Deleted: validateAppRegistration, AppRegistrationRequest, RegistrationProblem, AppRegistrationError, HeimdallStore.registerApp (writer). Kept: findRegisteredApp/listRegisteredApps/resolveAppProfile fallback -- AppSlug is a plain string (contracts.ts), registered_apps is a real extension point for a slug Heimdall was never rebuilt for, and isBuiltInApp's only production call site (listAppProfiles) depends on that fallback existing; a row is now provisioned by direct SQL (or InMemoryStore.seedRegisteredApp in tests), not by any app-facing writer. Deleted the two appSlug===\"ghostlight\" branches in private-command-plane.ts; the requirement is now AppProfile.requiredEntitlementPolicyKind, checked generically through resolveAppProfile. tsc --noEmit clean; vitest 94 passed/1 pre-existing-skip, only pre-existing failure is tests/odin-publication.test.ts (Cannot find module 'cultcache-ts', present on main too).", "branch": "epiphany/heimdall-caller-identity"} +{"ts": "2026-10-19T15:56:24+00:00", "type": "design", "status": "accepted", "note": "Refresh is now one locked primitive for every provider (replaces unserialized refreshLinkedIdentityCredentialIfNeeded); Joystick is managed-only (Heimdall-held credential, no viewer sign-in until joystick:follow_up:joystick-viewer-signin-public-bot). Merged in PR #1, live at d51fa6b; campaign joystick:campaign:self.", "branch": "eureka/joystick-h1"} diff --git a/state/map.yaml b/state/map.yaml index 3f8772a..413718e 100644 --- a/state/map.yaml +++ b/state/map.yaml @@ -59,8 +59,8 @@ data_flow: - reject per-request auth round-trip chatter active_subgoals: - - ACTIVE, M1-critical (operator ruling 2026-10-18): Joystick H1, campaign joystick:campaign:self (branch eureka/joystick-h1). Joystick OAuth provider, joystick as a streampixels viewer provider, one locked refresh primitive for every provider replacing refreshLinkedIdentityCredentialIfNeeded. - - OPEN, behind H1: pressure the deployed Ghostlight gamecult.heimdall.access integration with two- and eight-account human canaries. + - Joystick H1 is merged and live (PR GameCult/Heimdall#1, d51fa6b; campaign joystick:campaign:self). Open follow-ups by id: joystick:follow_up:h1-live-round-trips (next), cross-process-failed-refresh-marker, connect-start-needs-app-auth, heimdall-idunn-onboarding, joystick-viewer-signin-public-bot. StreamPixels S0/S1 run in other sessions. + - OPEN, behind the H1 live round-trips: pressure the deployed Ghostlight gamecult.heimdall.access integration with two- and eight-account human canaries. - Keep the shared architecture explicit and separate from app profiles. - Preserve the default boundary that app-domain data remains app-owned. - Align the plan to Heimdall as a Yggdrasil-hosted authority service. @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ accepted_design: landed_baseline: - Heimdall publishes its redacted provider, command boundary, Eve plugin, and transport profile through Odin under globally unique record keys; Ghostlight resolves that boundary instead of owning a direct endpoint. - - Yggdrasil runs Heimdall 1086aee01169bf60e8a492b2740db1c6f3e8cabf with CultLib 5cefa0db0079a8e3ee22f29d7b9e6e5aa60912a9; live Ghostlight auth.begin through Odin discovery is accepted. + - Yggdrasil runs Heimdall d51fa6b (hand-deployed 2026-10-19 15:51Z; gamecult-ops 210a1af holds backup, rollback and provenance; prior 1086aee) with CultLib 5cefa0db0079a8e3ee22f29d7b9e6e5aa60912a9; live Ghostlight auth.begin through Odin discovery is accepted. - The Heimdall access plugin, persistent OAuth attempts, encrypted private CultNet commands, conformance fixtures, and browser reference adapter are implemented and locally verified. - Exact-session refresh validation and logout revocation are implemented; stale or racing refresh cannot resurrect a revoked session. - Shared architecture extracted into its own repo and renamed to Heimdall. @@ -126,5 +126,5 @@ rejected_paths: reason: reusing auth mechanics does not justify centralizing app-domain audience or product data current_status: - summary: Active work is Joystick H1 (campaign joystick:campaign:self). Last recorded Yggdrasil deploy (not verifiable from this repo; HEAD is far past it, see git): Yggdrasil runs the gamecult.heimdall.access plugin and encrypted loopback begin, complete, refresh, and logout plane at 1086aee01169bf60e8a492b2740db1c6f3e8cabf. Odin returns all four redacted discovery records, Ghostlight resolves the boundary through Odin, and live anonymous auth.begin is accepted without exposing claims or secrets. - next_action: Land Joystick H1 per campaign joystick:campaign:self and target joystick:target:r1 (worktree and branch eureka/joystick-h1). Then, still open, run separate-account KLTST completion, refresh, logout, privacy, and stale-attempt canaries through the deployed Ghostlight Eve host; keep provider credential rotation on the operator list because prior tool output exposed OAuth secrets. + summary: Yggdrasil runs Heimdall release d51fa6b (hand-deployed 2026-10-19 15:51Z, gamecult-ops 210a1af), which includes Joystick H1 (PR #1). The plugin and encrypted loopback begin, complete, refresh and logout plane, the Odin discovery records and Ghostlight resolution were verified at 1086aee (2026-08-22) and are not re-verified at d51fa6b. + next_action: Run joystick:follow_up:h1-live-round-trips, then StreamPixels S0/S1 (other sessions). Still open behind that: separate-account KLTST completion, refresh, logout, privacy, and stale-attempt canaries through the deployed Ghostlight Eve host; keep provider credential rotation on the operator list because prior tool output exposed OAuth secrets. From 30a1ace6fdfa22a7be25a7ec11a4d012b51bec7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 17:56:34 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 35/45] State: close eureka/joystick-h1 as accepted (merged, PR #1) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- state/branches.json | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/state/branches.json b/state/branches.json index 643b64f..32cd28f 100644 --- a/state/branches.json +++ b/state/branches.json @@ -16,11 +16,11 @@ { "id": "eureka/joystick-h1", "hypothesis": "One locked refresh primitive plus a Joystick OAuth provider in Heimdall lets StreamPixels ingest Joystick without ever presenting a provider refresh token.", - "status": "active", + "status": "accepted", "artifacts": [ "state/map.yaml" ], - "notes": "Campaign joystick:campaign:self, target joystick:target:r1. Hands owns code in a separate worktree." + "notes": "Merged as PR GameCult/Heimdall#1 (d51fa6b), deployed to Yggdrasil 2026-10-19 15:51Z; gamecult-ops 210a1af. Campaign joystick:campaign:self." } ] } From 5952cce8a0f52691284e34e5530c23c503b6f03b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 18:03:17 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 36/45] State: live d51fa6b proven by a human Twitch sign-in; Joystick consent remains Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- notes/fresh-workspace-handoff.md | 2 +- state/evidence.jsonl | 1 + state/map.yaml | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/notes/fresh-workspace-handoff.md b/notes/fresh-workspace-handoff.md index ad959f0..9d23cf1 100644 --- a/notes/fresh-workspace-handoff.md +++ b/notes/fresh-workspace-handoff.md @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Do not trust this file for the exact live HEAD. Always check git. ## Active Work Joystick H1 is merged and live (PR GameCult/Heimdall#1; campaign -`joystick:campaign:self`). Next: `joystick:follow_up:h1-live-round-trips`, then +`joystick:campaign:self`). Next: `joystick:follow_up:h1-joystick-consent-round-trip`, then StreamPixels S0/S1 (other sessions). Open Heimdall follow-ups, by id: `joystick:follow_up:cross-process-failed-refresh-marker`, `joystick:follow_up:connect-start-needs-app-auth`, diff --git a/state/evidence.jsonl b/state/evidence.jsonl index ba9a942..5329d5f 100644 --- a/state/evidence.jsonl +++ b/state/evidence.jsonl @@ -36,3 +36,4 @@ {"ts": "2026-09-06T22:12:03+00:00", "type": "design", "status": "accepted", "note": "App slugs are no longer compile-time. AppSlug is a string; membership is a registry lookup, or isAppSlug shape validation where no store is reachable (the offline verifier). Capability rules are data (anyOf over Heimdall's own fact vocabulary), replacing a per-profile evaluateSharedCapabilities function that could not be accepted from a stranger. POST /v1/apps registers in RFC 7591 shape, gated on GC_ACCESS_APP_REGISTRATION_SECRET and closed until it is set. Built-in slugs are reserved so a registration cannot shadow a shipped app's audience. Motivation: a creator self-hosting Erycina alongside Heimdall would otherwise maintain a patched auth server to add one slug."} {"ts": "2026-09-08T12:20:12+00:00", "type": "security", "status": "accepted", "note": "epiphany/heimdall-caller-identity, second Hands pass: closed the two Soul-proven holes. (1) auth-completions redeem code is now always store-minted (never handoff.attemptId); attemptId survives only as a separate correlation field on StoredAuthCompletion/CreateAuthCompletionInput, and a new store.consumeAuthCompletionByAttempt(appSlug, attemptId, at) lets the private command plane's completeAuth redeem by the handle it already owns instead of forging an HTTP self-call with completionCode=handle. (2) startOAuthFlow now refuses any returnTo whose origin is not in AppProfile.allowedReturnOrigins (repixelizer/streampixels/bifrost -> .gamecult.org, ghostlight -> yggdrasil.gamecult.org per its docs/app-profiles doc and existing test fixtures; a registered app's allowlist is derived from its stored redirectUris origins). AppCaller is now branded with an unexported Symbol (app-caller.ts); private-command-plane.ts's two { appSlug } literals are gone, replaced by app-caller.ts's callerFromOpenedEnvelope. Deleted: validateAppRegistration, AppRegistrationRequest, RegistrationProblem, AppRegistrationError, HeimdallStore.registerApp (writer). Kept: findRegisteredApp/listRegisteredApps/resolveAppProfile fallback -- AppSlug is a plain string (contracts.ts), registered_apps is a real extension point for a slug Heimdall was never rebuilt for, and isBuiltInApp's only production call site (listAppProfiles) depends on that fallback existing; a row is now provisioned by direct SQL (or InMemoryStore.seedRegisteredApp in tests), not by any app-facing writer. Deleted the two appSlug===\"ghostlight\" branches in private-command-plane.ts; the requirement is now AppProfile.requiredEntitlementPolicyKind, checked generically through resolveAppProfile. tsc --noEmit clean; vitest 94 passed/1 pre-existing-skip, only pre-existing failure is tests/odin-publication.test.ts (Cannot find module 'cultcache-ts', present on main too).", "branch": "epiphany/heimdall-caller-identity"} {"ts": "2026-10-19T15:56:24+00:00", "type": "design", "status": "accepted", "note": "Refresh is now one locked primitive for every provider (replaces unserialized refreshLinkedIdentityCredentialIfNeeded); Joystick is managed-only (Heimdall-held credential, no viewer sign-in until joystick:follow_up:joystick-viewer-signin-public-bot). Merged in PR #1, live at d51fa6b; campaign joystick:campaign:self.", "branch": "eureka/joystick-h1"} +{"ts": "2026-10-19T16:03:16+00:00", "type": "verification", "status": "accepted", "note": "Live d51fa6b (H1) verified by a real human sign-in: the operator's StreamPixels Twitch sign-in through Heimdall start/callback, 2026-10-19 ('Twitch auth worked fine'); a streampixels session was created 16:02:33Z, after the 15:51Z switch. Joystick consent round trip still open: joystick:follow_up:h1-joystick-consent-round-trip."} diff --git a/state/map.yaml b/state/map.yaml index 413718e..4aa4d5a 100644 --- a/state/map.yaml +++ b/state/map.yaml @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ data_flow: - reject per-request auth round-trip chatter active_subgoals: - - Joystick H1 is merged and live (PR GameCult/Heimdall#1, d51fa6b; campaign joystick:campaign:self). Open follow-ups by id: joystick:follow_up:h1-live-round-trips (next), cross-process-failed-refresh-marker, connect-start-needs-app-auth, heimdall-idunn-onboarding, joystick-viewer-signin-public-bot. StreamPixels S0/S1 run in other sessions. + - Joystick H1 is merged and live (PR GameCult/Heimdall#1, d51fa6b; campaign joystick:campaign:self). Open follow-ups by id: joystick:follow_up:h1-joystick-consent-round-trip (next), cross-process-failed-refresh-marker, connect-start-needs-app-auth, heimdall-idunn-onboarding, joystick-viewer-signin-public-bot. StreamPixels S0/S1 run in other sessions. - OPEN, behind the H1 live round-trips: pressure the deployed Ghostlight gamecult.heimdall.access integration with two- and eight-account human canaries. - Keep the shared architecture explicit and separate from app profiles. - Preserve the default boundary that app-domain data remains app-owned. @@ -127,4 +127,4 @@ rejected_paths: current_status: summary: Yggdrasil runs Heimdall release d51fa6b (hand-deployed 2026-10-19 15:51Z, gamecult-ops 210a1af), which includes Joystick H1 (PR #1). The plugin and encrypted loopback begin, complete, refresh and logout plane, the Odin discovery records and Ghostlight resolution were verified at 1086aee (2026-08-22) and are not re-verified at d51fa6b. - next_action: Run joystick:follow_up:h1-live-round-trips, then StreamPixels S0/S1 (other sessions). Still open behind that: separate-account KLTST completion, refresh, logout, privacy, and stale-attempt canaries through the deployed Ghostlight Eve host; keep provider credential rotation on the operator list because prior tool output exposed OAuth secrets. + next_action: Run joystick:follow_up:h1-joystick-consent-round-trip, then StreamPixels S0/S1 (other sessions). Still open behind that: separate-account KLTST completion, refresh, logout, privacy, and stale-attempt canaries through the deployed Ghostlight Eve host; keep provider credential rotation on the operator list because prior tool output exposed OAuth secrets. From c7cf78bbbce303f4e218ae15cbc8826fab840e1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2026 20:03:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 37/45] README: front door with value, problem, entry points, live versus planned Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- README.md | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index a34dc85..b86dbdc 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -12,6 +12,19 @@ The point is painfully simple: become "everything phones home for every request" - keep app-domain data separate so "shared auth" does not become "shared swamp" +## Front Door + +- **Value:** one shared auth authority: provider OAuth (Discord, Patreon, GitHub, Twitch, YouTube, Spotify), linked identities, grants, entitlements and session issuance, with Ed25519-signed claims that app backends verify locally. +- **Problem:** every GameCult app was rebuilding Discord/Patreon login glue. Heimdall centralizes identity authority and keeps app-domain data in the apps. +- **Entry points:** + - `src/index.ts` and `src/app.ts`: the Fastify service. `src/signing.ts` and `src/claims.ts` issue JWTs and serve `/.well-known/jwks.json`; `src/oauth.ts` and `src/providers.ts` own provider flows. + - `src/verifier.ts`: the local verifier helper an app backend imports to validate Heimdall JWTs without phoning home. + - `src/odin-publication.ts` and `plugins/gamecult.heimdall.access`: the redacted Odin/Eve provider advertisement and the `gamecult.heimdall.access` plugin (`docs/eve-access-plugin.md`). + - `docs/architecture.md`, `docs/service-contract.md`, `docs/verse-service-contract.md`, `docs/app-profiles/`: the contracts. + - `pnpm install`, `pnpm dev`, `pnpm test` (see Dev Commands). +- **Live:** a stateful first slice: signing and JWKS, OAuth state for six providers, in-memory and Postgres stores, a real Discord callback path for the Repixelizer flow, sealed provider tokens, the loopback CultNet operation boundary, Idunn health publication, and the deployed Ghostlight Eve host consuming the discovered boundary. +- **Planned:** the two-account and eight-account Ghostlight human canaries, refresh and revocation flows, admin surfaces, and broader inspection projections beyond the redacted access boundary. + ## Current Shape This repo now has a stateful first slice instead of a decorative skeleton. From c15fb97706807d9a95837b04c8bfe819ff7d180e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2026 21:00:46 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 38/45] Test: malformed URL must not reach a sibling prefix's not-found handler (GHSA-p68q-wchp-6fh7) Red on fastify 5.8.5, the live lockfile. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 --- tests/fastify-malformed-url.test.ts | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/fastify-malformed-url.test.ts diff --git a/tests/fastify-malformed-url.test.ts b/tests/fastify-malformed-url.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f515c74 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fastify-malformed-url.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +import Fastify, { type FastifyReply, type FastifyRequest } from "fastify"; +import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest"; + +// GHSA-p68q-wchp-6fh7 (fastify < 5.12.2): a malformed request target under one +// plugin prefix, with a method that has no route in the main router, was +// dispatched to the not-found handler of a sibling plugin, skipping that +// handler's preHandler. This pins the framework fix; it is not about a Heimdall +// route. +describe("fastify malformed URL under sibling not-found handlers", () => { + const apps: Array> = []; + afterEach(async () => { + await Promise.all(apps.splice(0).map((app) => app.close())); + }); + + async function build() { + const app = Fastify(); + apps.push(app); + await app.register(async (pub) => { + pub.get("/ping", async () => "pong"); + }, { prefix: "/public" }); + await app.register(async (priv) => { + priv.setNotFoundHandler( + { + preHandler: async (request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) => { + if (!request.headers.authorization) return reply.code(401).send({ error: "auth" }); + }, + }, + (_request: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply) => reply.code(404).send({ secret: "PRIVATE-TENANT-DATA" }), + ); + priv.get("/x", async () => "x"); + }, { prefix: "/private" }); + return app; + } + + it("fails closed with 400 and never reaches another prefix's not-found handler", async () => { + const app = await build(); + const response = await app.inject({ method: "DELETE", url: "/public/%zz" }); + expect(response.body).not.toContain("PRIVATE-TENANT-DATA"); + expect(response.statusCode).toBe(400); + }); + + it("still runs the authenticated not-found preHandler for a well-formed URL", async () => { + const app = await build(); + const response = await app.inject({ method: "DELETE", url: "/private/nothing" }); + expect(response.statusCode).toBe(401); + }); +}); From 899ea0b8fe59dc02ca1b3e66a0ee7f5f2e51c9d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2026 21:00:47 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 39/45] Heimdall: fastify 5.8.5 to 5.12.7, find-my-way 9.5.0 to 9.10.0 (clears 5 High advisories) GHSA-p68q-wchp-6fh7 authentication bypass via malformed URLs, header and request validation bypass, request body replacement, find-my-way HTTP/2 DoS. pnpm audit --prod: 8 vulnerabilities before, none after. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 --- package.json | 2 +- pnpm-lock.yaml | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/package.json b/package.json index 0c6cf4f..36394ef 100644 --- a/package.json +++ b/package.json @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ "@gamecult/cultcache-ts": "file:vendor/CultLib/packages/cultcache-ts", "cultmesh-ts": "file:vendor/CultLib/packages/cultmesh-ts", "cultnet-ts": "file:vendor/CultLib/packages/cultnet-ts", - "fastify": "^5.8.5", + "fastify": "^5.12.6", "pg": "^8.20.0", "zod": "^3.25.76" }, diff --git a/pnpm-lock.yaml b/pnpm-lock.yaml index 005bb26..855ad01 100644 --- a/pnpm-lock.yaml +++ b/pnpm-lock.yaml @@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ importers: specifier: file:vendor/CultLib/packages/cultnet-ts version: file:vendor/CultLib/packages/cultnet-ts fastify: - specifier: ^5.8.5 - version: 5.8.5 + specifier: ^5.12.6 + version: 5.12.7 pg: specifier: ^8.20.0 version: 8.20.0 @@ -532,17 +532,23 @@ packages: fast-json-stringify@6.3.0: resolution: {integrity: sha512-oRCntNDY/329HJPlmdNLIdogNtt6Vyjb1WuT01Soss3slIdyUp8kAcDU3saQTOquEK8KFVfwIIF7FebxUAu+yA==} + fast-json-stringify@7.1.3: + resolution: {integrity: sha512-5TDM1yOF/BDFOclKz2G6rs1RsIl5HXMCrg/npmdNIPNQCezshR5kIHjhwBNuMY67jhkTUAm9DguL8xkL/x0Wtw==} + fast-querystring@1.1.2: resolution: {integrity: sha512-g6KuKWmFXc0fID8WWH0jit4g0AGBoJhCkJMb1RmbsSEUNvQ+ZC8D6CUZ+GtF8nMzSPXnhiePyyqqipzNNEnHjg==} fast-uri@3.1.0: resolution: {integrity: sha512-iPeeDKJSWf4IEOasVVrknXpaBV0IApz/gp7S2bb7Z4Lljbl2MGJRqInZiUrQwV16cpzw/D3S5j5Julj/gT52AA==} + fast-uri@4.2.3: + resolution: {integrity: sha512-I1PXwP5eAhlNlcdpjt9CgB59op2ZvZfxw+BkqGFVIUOgNpCVTcTqp3HhTX7brxj5vsip+nSY4nTvff+eIA76hg==} + fastify-plugin@5.1.0: resolution: {integrity: sha512-FAIDA8eovSt5qcDgcBvDuX/v0Cjz0ohGhENZ/wpc3y+oZCY2afZ9Baqql3g/lC+OHRnciQol4ww7tuthOb9idw==} - fastify@5.8.5: - resolution: {integrity: sha512-Yqptv59pQzPgQUSIm87hMqHJmdkb1+GPxdE6vW6FRyVE9G86mt7rOghitiU4JHRaTyDUk9pfeKmDeu70lAwM4Q==} + fastify@5.12.7: + resolution: {integrity: sha512-v4pEPsTRPuqlDIYiQFB+BHjVN4SdHX9u0ABk0ZDUKbbdY1vsNryUd1j4Z+jQEZajvYIVk047Kimva9/AJ79GYw==} fastq@1.20.1: resolution: {integrity: sha512-GGToxJ/w1x32s/D2EKND7kTil4n8OVk/9mycTc4VDza13lOvpUZTGX3mFSCtV9ksdGBVzvsyAVLM6mHFThxXxw==} @@ -556,8 +562,8 @@ packages: picomatch: optional: true - find-my-way@9.5.0: - resolution: {integrity: sha512-VW2RfnmscZO5KgBY5XVyKREMW5nMZcxDy+buTOsL+zIPnBlbKm+00sgzoQzq1EVh4aALZLfKdwv6atBGcjvjrQ==} + find-my-way@9.10.0: + resolution: {integrity: sha512-eru+uCPQ2g+nLBkf84MHP/KyNNMar0BDy0j+i8Fb72GF9/YHBZ58q7FODUtfVV7XU9nfRUHXSmaM8NmZcIbZ4Q==} engines: {node: '>=20'} fsevents@2.3.3: @@ -853,8 +859,8 @@ packages: process-warning@4.0.1: resolution: {integrity: sha512-3c2LzQ3rY9d0hc1emcsHhfT9Jwz0cChib/QN89oME2R451w5fy3f0afAhERFZAwrbDU43wk12d0ORBpDVME50Q==} - process-warning@5.0.0: - resolution: {integrity: sha512-a39t9ApHNx2L4+HBnQKqxxHNs1r7KF+Intd8Q/g1bUh6q0WIp9voPXJ/x0j+ZL45KF1pJd9+q2jLIRMfvEshkA==} + process-warning@5.1.1: + resolution: {integrity: sha512-oCkNVj4OKnKEcocVBcDfiIugN1/cE6rgfT3nCtzeqZPA8+rIxMaQ0xXzIkGP8Gj2qUaP1UR7uhJ1VD8lUCpzCg==} quick-format-unescaped@4.0.4: resolution: {integrity: sha512-tYC1Q1hgyRuHgloV/YXs2w15unPVh8qfu/qCTfhTYamaw7fyhumKa2yGpdSo87vY32rIclj+4fWYQXUMs9EHvg==} @@ -1475,15 +1481,26 @@ snapshots: json-schema-ref-resolver: 3.0.0 rfdc: 1.4.1 + fast-json-stringify@7.1.3: + dependencies: + '@fastify/merge-json-schemas': 0.2.1 + ajv: 8.20.0 + ajv-formats: 3.0.1(ajv@8.20.0) + fast-uri: 4.2.3 + json-schema-ref-resolver: 3.0.0 + rfdc: 1.4.1 + fast-querystring@1.1.2: dependencies: fast-decode-uri-component: 1.0.1 fast-uri@3.1.0: {} + fast-uri@4.2.3: {} + fastify-plugin@5.1.0: {} - fastify@5.8.5: + fastify@5.12.7: dependencies: '@fastify/ajv-compiler': 4.0.5 '@fastify/error': 4.2.0 @@ -1491,11 +1508,11 @@ snapshots: '@fastify/proxy-addr': 5.1.0 abstract-logging: 2.0.1 avvio: 9.2.0 - fast-json-stringify: 6.3.0 - find-my-way: 9.5.0 + fast-json-stringify: 7.1.3 + find-my-way: 9.10.0 light-my-request: 6.6.0 pino: 10.3.1 - process-warning: 5.0.0 + process-warning: 5.1.1 rfdc: 1.4.1 secure-json-parse: 4.1.0 semver: 7.7.4 @@ -1509,7 +1526,7 @@ snapshots: optionalDependencies: picomatch: 4.0.4 - find-my-way@9.5.0: + find-my-way@9.10.0: dependencies: fast-deep-equal: 3.1.3 fast-querystring: 1.1.2 @@ -1733,7 +1750,7 @@ snapshots: on-exit-leak-free: 2.1.2 pino-abstract-transport: 3.0.0 pino-std-serializers: 7.1.0 - process-warning: 5.0.0 + process-warning: 5.1.1 quick-format-unescaped: 4.0.4 real-require: 0.2.0 safe-stable-stringify: 2.5.0 @@ -1758,7 +1775,7 @@ snapshots: process-warning@4.0.1: {} - process-warning@5.0.0: {} + process-warning@5.1.1: {} quick-format-unescaped@4.0.4: {} From 55732a901d8aa3944ed20697a9697fd985ddabd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 14:25:11 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 40/45] Presence: the publisher sequence is in-process, the state root keeps no owner-only file, an Idunn generation never self-enrolls nextPublisherSequence read and rewrote /runtime-presence-sequence at mode 0600, which the next generation (a fresh DynamicUser uid in the shared state group) cannot open. Odin compares publisher_sequence only within one activation and Idunn mints a new activation per start, so PublisherSequence derives it from the observation clock, never below the previous value plus one, as Muninn does. openProviderHealthIdentity under GAMECULT_IDUNN_RUNTIME_BUNDLE now refuses when the presence descriptor is absent instead of enrolling an identity Idunn does not trust. Adds the cross-generation test (root only) and the sequence, no-dataRoot and missing-descriptor tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- src/index.ts | 8 +- src/provider-health-identity.ts | 8 ++ src/runtime-presence.ts | 41 ++++----- tests/fixtures/presence-descriptors.ts | 72 +++++++++++++++ tests/fixtures/state-root-generation-child.ts | 58 +++++++++++++ tests/presence-identity-descriptor.test.ts | 28 +++++- tests/publisher-sequence.test.ts | 87 +++++++++++++++++++ tests/state-root-generations.test.ts | 81 +++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 351 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/fixtures/presence-descriptors.ts create mode 100644 tests/fixtures/state-root-generation-child.ts create mode 100644 tests/publisher-sequence.test.ts create mode 100644 tests/state-root-generations.test.ts diff --git a/src/index.ts b/src/index.ts index 4c89a70..8ee966b 100644 --- a/src/index.ts +++ b/src/index.ts @@ -1,4 +1,3 @@ -import path from "node:path"; import { resolveWriteLease, WriteLeaseNotHeldError } from "./process-write-lease.js"; import { buildApp } from "./app.js"; import { loadConfig } from "./config.js"; @@ -9,7 +8,7 @@ import type { CultNetOperationServer } from "cultnet-ts"; import { createHeimdallRuntimePulse, buildHeimdallHealthDetail, publishHeimdallVerseState } from "./verse-state.js"; import { buildPresenceStatement, - nextPublisherSequence, + PublisherSequence, readRuntimeBundleFacts, type RuntimeBundleFacts, } from "./runtime-presence.js"; @@ -76,6 +75,7 @@ async function publishVerseState(): Promise { * work that can only ever return the same answer or fail. */ let runtimeBundleFacts: RuntimeBundleFacts | undefined; +const presenceSequence = new PublisherSequence(); async function publishHealthState(): Promise { const pulse = createHeimdallRuntimePulse(config); @@ -111,9 +111,7 @@ async function publishHealthState(): Promise { // refuses the pair, and Idunn needs the warming statement to promote it. writeLeaseSha256: null, observedAtUnixMillis, - publisherSequence: await nextPublisherSequence( - path.join(config.dataRoot, "runtime-presence-sequence"), - ), + publisherSequence: presenceSequence.next(observedAtUnixMillis), providerHealthIdentityPath: config.providerHealthIdentityPath, }); diff --git a/src/provider-health-identity.ts b/src/provider-health-identity.ts index 847d39c..ad4903f 100644 --- a/src/provider-health-identity.ts +++ b/src/provider-health-identity.ts @@ -128,6 +128,14 @@ export async function openProviderHealthIdentity( ): Promise { const descriptor = passedDescriptor(PRESENCE_IDENTITY_FD_NAME, env); if (descriptor === undefined) { + if (env.GAMECULT_IDUNN_RUNTIME_BUNDLE) { + // Inside an Idunn generation a self-enrolled key is one Idunn does not + // trust, and its private store would land in a state root the next + // generation must share. The descriptor is the only identity there. + throw new Error( + `Idunn runtime bundle is set but the ${PRESENCE_IDENTITY_FD_NAME} descriptor was not passed; refusing to self-enroll` + ); + } return openOrEnrollProviderHealthIdentity(path); } diff --git a/src/runtime-presence.ts b/src/runtime-presence.ts index 8cf0615..e3ed0b1 100644 --- a/src/runtime-presence.ts +++ b/src/runtime-presence.ts @@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ import path from "node:path"; import { createHash, createPrivateKey, type KeyObject } from "node:crypto"; import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; -import { readFile, writeFile, rename } from "node:fs/promises"; import { decode } from "@msgpack/msgpack"; import { @@ -201,35 +200,25 @@ export function openActivationSigner(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): KeyO } /** - * The publisher sequence must strictly increase for the life of a signer - * identity, because Idunn treats a repeat or a regression as a replay and - * refuses the observation. + * The publisher sequence a process stamps on its presence statements. * - * An in-process counter is therefore not enough: a restart would reset it and - * every statement afterwards would be refused until the count climbed past the - * old high-water mark. It lives beside the target's state instead, and is - * advanced before use. + * Odin compares `publisher_sequence` only against stored presence of the same + * activation, and Idunn mints a fresh activation for every start, continuity + * restarts included. So the sequence need only strictly increase within this + * process; nothing has to survive a restart, and nothing is written to the + * state root. Muninn derives its sequence the same way: the observation clock, + * never below the previous value plus one. */ -export async function nextPublisherSequence(sequencePath: string): Promise { - let current = 0; - try { - const raw = (await readFile(sequencePath, "utf8")).trim(); - const parsed = Number(raw); - if (Number.isSafeInteger(parsed) && parsed > 0) { - current = parsed; - } - } catch (error) { - if ((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code !== "ENOENT") { - throw error; +export class PublisherSequence { + private last = 0; + + next(observedAtUnixMillis: number): number { + if (!Number.isSafeInteger(observedAtUnixMillis)) { + throw new Error("observedAtUnixMillis is not a safe integer"); } + this.last = Math.max(observedAtUnixMillis, this.last + 1); + return this.last; } - const next = current + 1; - // Written through a temporary file: a torn write here would look like a - // regression and cost the target every future observation. - const temporary = `${sequencePath}.next`; - await writeFile(temporary, `${next}\n`, { mode: 0o600 }); - await rename(temporary, sequencePath); - return next; } export interface PresenceStatementInputs { diff --git a/tests/fixtures/presence-descriptors.ts b/tests/fixtures/presence-descriptors.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0448330 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/presence-descriptors.ts @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +/** + * What Idunn hands a generation for runtime presence: a parent-only identity + * store and an activation seed, passed as descriptors named in LISTEN_FDNAMES. + * Every key here is generated for the test or a canary byte pattern. + */ +import { closeSync, openSync } from "node:fs"; +import { chmod, mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; +import path from "node:path"; + +import { encode } from "@msgpack/msgpack"; +import { SingleFileMessagePackBackingStore } from "@gamecult/cultcache-ts"; +import { IDUNN_RUNTIME_ACTIVATION_CREDENTIAL_NAME } from "cultnet-ts"; + +import { openOrEnrollProviderHealthIdentity } from "../../src/provider-health-identity.js"; +import type { RuntimeBundleFacts } from "../../src/runtime-presence.js"; + +export const bundleFacts: RuntimeBundleFacts = { + target: "heimdall", + planId: "plan-1", + incarnationId: "incarnation-1", + sealedReleaseId: "release-1", + runtimeId: "runtime-1", + runtimeInstanceId: "instance-1", + expectedProjectionSha256: "sha256-projection", + activationWitnessSha256: "sha256-witness", + activationSignerIdentityId: "activation-signer", + stateSchemaGeneration: null, + stateContractSha256: null, + capabilities: [], + healthContract: "health-contract", +}; + +/** Write both stores into `dir`, readable by any uid (the children run as others). */ +export async function writePresenceFixtures(dir: string): Promise { + await mkdir(dir, { recursive: true }); + await chmod(dir, 0o755); + const enrolled = path.join(dir, "enrolled.cc"); + await openOrEnrollProviderHealthIdentity(enrolled); + const [record] = await new SingleFileMessagePackBackingStore(enrolled).pullAll(); + // Re-wrapped the way cultcache-rs writes a store, which is how Idunn writes it. + await writeFile( + path.join(dir, "runtime-presence-identity.cc"), + encode([ + [ + "gamecult-provider-health-identity", + "gamecult.provider_health_identity.private.v1", + record!.payload, + "2026-09-06T00:00:00.000Z", + "gamecult.provider_health_identity.private.v1", + ], + ]), + { mode: 0o644 } + ); + await writeFile(path.join(dir, "activation-seed"), Buffer.alloc(32, 7), { mode: 0o644 }); +} + +/** Open both descriptors and name them the way systemd's LISTEN_FDNAMES does. */ +export function openPresenceDescriptors(dir: string): { env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv; close: () => void } { + const fds = [ + [openSync(path.join(dir, "runtime-presence-identity.cc"), "r"), "gamecult-runtime-presence-identity"], + [openSync(path.join(dir, "activation-seed"), "r"), IDUNN_RUNTIME_ACTIVATION_CREDENTIAL_NAME], + ] as const; + const names: string[] = []; + for (const [fd, name] of fds) { + while (names.length < fd - 3) names.push(`pad-${names.length}`); + names[fd - 3] = name; + } + return { + env: { LISTEN_FDNAMES: names.join(":") }, + close: () => fds.forEach(([fd]) => closeSync(fd)), + }; +} diff --git a/tests/fixtures/state-root-generation-child.ts b/tests/fixtures/state-root-generation-child.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e53ade --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/state-root-generation-child.ts @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/** + * One Idunn generation, as a process: it runs as the uid and gid its parent + * gave it, under UMask=0007, and does what Heimdall does to a state root on a + * pulse. The parent test spawns two of these under different uids that share + * a group. + * + * argv: + */ +import { readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; +import path from "node:path"; + +import { loadConfig } from "../../src/config.js"; +import { PublisherSequence, buildPresenceStatement } from "../../src/runtime-presence.js"; +import { bundleFacts, openPresenceDescriptors } from "./presence-descriptors.js"; +import { createHeimdallRuntimePulse, publishHeimdallVerseState } from "../../src/verse-state.js"; + +const [role, stateRoot, fixtureDir] = process.argv.slice(2) as [string, string, string]; +process.umask(0o007); + +const config = loadConfig({ + GC_ACCESS_BASE_URL: "https://heimdall.example.test", + GC_ACCESS_DATA_ROOT: stateRoot, +}); + +async function publishPresence(): Promise { + const descriptors = openPresenceDescriptors(fixtureDir); + try { + const observedAtUnixMillis = Date.now(); + await buildPresenceStatement({ + bundle: bundleFacts, + state: "warming", + detail: "generation probe", + boundEndpoint: null, + writeLeaseSha256: null, + observedAtUnixMillis, + publisherSequence: new PublisherSequence().next(observedAtUnixMillis), + providerHealthIdentityPath: path.join(stateRoot, "provider-health-identity.cc"), + env: descriptors.env, + }); + } finally { + descriptors.close(); + } +} + +if (role === "next") { + // Generation N+1 reads what N left before it replaces it. + const previous = await readFile(config.cultCachePath); + if (previous.length === 0) throw new Error("previous generation's snapshot is empty"); +} + +await publishHeimdallVerseState(config, createHeimdallRuntimePulse(config)); +await publishPresence(); + +if (role === "first") { + // The 0600 counter the 2026-09-07 generation left behind. Nothing reads it + // now; it stays as the stale fixture the next generation must live beside. + await writeFile(path.join(stateRoot, "runtime-presence-sequence"), "41\n", { mode: 0o600 }); +} diff --git a/tests/presence-identity-descriptor.test.ts b/tests/presence-identity-descriptor.test.ts index 97c5233..731d16e 100644 --- a/tests/presence-identity-descriptor.test.ts +++ b/tests/presence-identity-descriptor.test.ts @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -import { mkdtemp, readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; +import { access, mkdtemp, readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import { openSync, closeSync } from "node:fs"; import os from "node:os"; import path from "node:path"; @@ -112,3 +112,29 @@ describe("presence identity descriptor selection", () => { }); }); }); + +describe("an Idunn generation without the presence identity descriptor", () => { + it("refuses, naming the descriptor, and enrolls nothing", async () => { + const dir = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "heimdall-nodescriptor-")); + const identityPath = path.join(dir, "provider-health-identity.cc"); + + await expect( + openProviderHealthIdentity(identityPath, { + GAMECULT_IDUNN_RUNTIME_BUNDLE: "/run/idunn/bundle", + LISTEN_FDNAMES: "some-other-descriptor", + }) + ).rejects.toThrow("gamecult-runtime-presence-identity"); + + await expect(access(identityPath)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "ENOENT" }); + }); + + it("still self-enrolls outside Idunn", async () => { + if (!machineIdAvailable) return; + const dir = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "heimdall-outside-idunn-")); + const identityPath = path.join(dir, "provider-health-identity.cc"); + + await openProviderHealthIdentity(identityPath, {}); + + await expect(access(identityPath)).resolves.toBeUndefined(); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/publisher-sequence.test.ts b/tests/publisher-sequence.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9a4f147 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/publisher-sequence.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +import { mkdtemp, readdir, readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; +import os from "node:os"; +import path from "node:path"; + +import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest"; + +import { loadConfig } from "../src/config.js"; +import { PublisherSequence, buildPresenceStatement } from "../src/runtime-presence.js"; +import { bundleFacts, openPresenceDescriptors, writePresenceFixtures } from "./fixtures/presence-descriptors.js"; + +const machineIdAvailable = await readFile("/etc/machine-id", "utf8").then( + () => true, + () => false +); + +describe("PublisherSequence", () => { + it("starts at the observed millis", () => { + expect(new PublisherSequence().next(1_700_000_000_000)).toBe(1_700_000_000_000); + }); + + it("strictly increases for equal, earlier and later observations", () => { + const sequence = new PublisherSequence(); + const first = sequence.next(1_700_000_000_000); + const equal = sequence.next(1_700_000_000_000); + const earlier = sequence.next(1_699_999_990_000); + const later = sequence.next(1_700_000_050_000); + expect([first, equal, earlier, later]).toEqual([ + 1_700_000_000_000, + 1_700_000_000_001, + 1_700_000_000_002, + 1_700_000_050_000, + ]); + }); + + it("never falls below the observed millis once the clock moves ahead", () => { + const sequence = new PublisherSequence(); + sequence.next(1_700_000_000_000); + sequence.next(1_700_000_000_000); + sequence.next(1_700_000_000_000); + expect(sequence.next(1_700_000_000_002)).toBe(1_700_000_000_003); + expect(sequence.next(1_700_000_000_010)).toBe(1_700_000_000_010); + }); + + it("refuses a value that is not a safe integer and keeps its place", () => { + const sequence = new PublisherSequence(); + expect(sequence.next(10)).toBe(10); + for (const bad of [Number.NaN, Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY, 1.5, 2 ** 60]) { + expect(() => sequence.next(bad)).toThrow("observedAtUnixMillis"); + } + expect(sequence.next(5)).toBe(11); + }); +}); + +describe.skipIf(!machineIdAvailable)("presence publication and the state root", () => { + it("touches no path under dataRoot", async () => { + const dir = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "heimdall-nodataroot-")); + await writePresenceFixtures(path.join(dir, "fixtures")); + // A regular file as dataRoot: opening anything beneath it fails with + // ENOTDIR for every uid, root included. + const dataRoot = path.join(dir, "not-a-directory"); + await writeFile(dataRoot, ""); + const config = loadConfig({ + GC_ACCESS_BASE_URL: "https://heimdall.example.test", + GC_ACCESS_DATA_ROOT: dataRoot, + }); + + const descriptors = openPresenceDescriptors(path.join(dir, "fixtures")); + try { + const observedAtUnixMillis = Date.parse("2026-10-23T12:00:00.000Z"); + const statement = await buildPresenceStatement({ + bundle: bundleFacts, + state: "warming", + detail: "probe", + boundEndpoint: null, + writeLeaseSha256: null, + observedAtUnixMillis, + publisherSequence: new PublisherSequence().next(observedAtUnixMillis), + providerHealthIdentityPath: config.providerHealthIdentityPath, + env: descriptors.env, + }); + expect(statement.target).toBe("heimdall"); + } finally { + descriptors.close(); + } + expect((await readdir(dir)).sort()).toEqual(["fixtures", "not-a-directory"]); + }); +}); diff --git a/tests/state-root-generations.test.ts b/tests/state-root-generations.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7632f14 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/state-root-generations.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +import { execFile } from "node:child_process"; +import { chmod, chown, mkdir, mkdtemp, readdir, stat } from "node:fs/promises"; +import os from "node:os"; +import path from "node:path"; +import { promisify } from "node:util"; + +import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest"; + +import { writePresenceFixtures } from "./fixtures/presence-descriptors.js"; + +const run = promisify(execFile); + +const STATE_GID = 4242; +const GENERATION_N = 61184; +const GENERATION_N_PLUS_1 = 61185; + +// Creating uids and groups needs root; the stopgap's node container runs as root. +const isRoot = process.getuid?.() === 0; + +async function walk(dir: string): Promise { + const found: string[] = []; + for (const entry of await readdir(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) { + const full = path.join(dir, entry.name); + found.push(full); + if (entry.isDirectory()) found.push(...(await walk(full))); + } + return found; +} + +/** + * Idunn gives every generation a fresh DynamicUser uid and one shared group, + * UMask=0007, and a 2770 setgid state root. Generation N+1 runs beside or after + * N and must be able to read and replace everything N left there. + */ +describe.skipIf(!isRoot)("Idunn state root across generations", () => { + it("generation N+1, a different uid in the same group, reads and replaces generation N's state", async () => { + const base = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "heimdall-generations-")); + await chmod(base, 0o755); + + // The fixtures stand in for what Idunn passes as descriptors. + const fixtures = path.join(base, "fixtures"); + await writePresenceFixtures(fixtures); + + const stateRoot = path.join(base, "state"); + await mkdir(stateRoot); + await chown(stateRoot, 0, STATE_GID); + await chmod(stateRoot, 0o2770); + + const child = path.join(import.meta.dirname, "fixtures", "state-root-generation-child.ts"); + const generation = (role: "first" | "next", uid: number) => + run(process.execPath, ["--import", "tsx", child, role, stateRoot, fixtures], { + uid, + gid: STATE_GID, + cwd: path.resolve(import.meta.dirname, ".."), + env: { PATH: process.env.PATH ?? "", HOME: fixtures }, + }); + + await generation("first", GENERATION_N); + + const left = await walk(stateRoot); + expect(left.map((entry) => path.relative(stateRoot, entry)).sort()).toEqual([ + "cultcache", + path.join("cultcache", "heimdall.service.cc"), + "runtime-presence-sequence", + ]); + + await generation("next", GENERATION_N_PLUS_1); + + // Generation N+1 replaced the snapshot, and no owner-only file is left + // behind for generation N+2: everything but the stale 0600 fixture is + // readable and writable by the state group. + const snapshot = await stat(path.join(stateRoot, "cultcache", "heimdall.service.cc")); + expect(snapshot.uid).toBe(GENERATION_N_PLUS_1); + expect(snapshot.gid).toBe(STATE_GID); + for (const entry of await walk(stateRoot)) { + if (path.basename(entry) === "runtime-presence-sequence") continue; + expect((await stat(entry)).mode & 0o060, path.relative(stateRoot, entry)).toBe(0o060); + } + expect((await readdir(stateRoot)).sort()).toEqual(["cultcache", "runtime-presence-sequence"]); + }, 60_000); +}); From e8548614c8222658d46ad5e0e7bd57e34dd34cd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 14:26:13 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 41/45] Generation test: bundle the generation process so a uid that cannot read the checkout can run it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- tests/state-root-generations.test.ts | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/state-root-generations.test.ts b/tests/state-root-generations.test.ts index 7632f14..b8424f3 100644 --- a/tests/state-root-generations.test.ts +++ b/tests/state-root-generations.test.ts @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import os from "node:os"; import path from "node:path"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; +import { build } from "esbuild"; import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest"; import { writePresenceFixtures } from "./fixtures/presence-descriptors.js"; @@ -46,12 +47,28 @@ describe.skipIf(!isRoot)("Idunn state root across generations", () => { await chown(stateRoot, 0, STATE_GID); await chmod(stateRoot, 0o2770); - const child = path.join(import.meta.dirname, "fixtures", "state-root-generation-child.ts"); + // The generations run as uids that cannot read the checkout, so each runs + // one self-contained bundle built into the world-readable scratch root. + const child = path.join(base, "generation.mjs"); + await build({ + entryPoints: [path.join(import.meta.dirname, "fixtures", "state-root-generation-child.ts")], + bundle: true, + platform: "node", + format: "esm", + target: "node24", + outfile: child, + external: ["pg-native"], + banner: { + js: "import{createRequire}from'node:module';const require=createRequire(import.meta.url);", + }, + logLevel: "silent", + }); + await chmod(child, 0o644); const generation = (role: "first" | "next", uid: number) => - run(process.execPath, ["--import", "tsx", child, role, stateRoot, fixtures], { + run(process.execPath, [child, role, stateRoot, fixtures], { uid, gid: STATE_GID, - cwd: path.resolve(import.meta.dirname, ".."), + cwd: base, env: { PATH: process.env.PATH ?? "", HOME: fixtures }, }); From c0d30e80816053cd151f0789e7f4bcdf5c6c5ac1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:48:02 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 42/45] Test fixtures: the Rust owner's Idunn runtime records, and one fake Idunn RUDP endpoint tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime holds expected.cc, activation.cc, the activation seed, the presence identity credential and the machine-id it is bound to, copied from CultLib 217a9480 (Rust-written; test keys only). fake-idunn-rudp.ts is the accept server idunn-rudp-health.test.ts built inline, now keeping a session per remote and every delivered frame, so a boot test can receive several pulses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- tests/fixtures/fake-idunn-rudp.ts | 64 ++++++++++++++++++ tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/.gitattributes | 1 + tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/README.md | 11 +++ .../idunn-runtime/activation-key.seed | 1 + tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/activation.cc | Bin 0 -> 798 bytes tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/expected.cc | Bin 0 -> 1067 bytes tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/machine-id | 1 + .../provider-identity.credential | Bin 0 -> 682 bytes tests/idunn-rudp-health.test.ts | 41 ++--------- 9 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/fixtures/fake-idunn-rudp.ts create mode 100644 tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/.gitattributes create mode 100644 tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/README.md create mode 100644 tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/activation-key.seed create mode 100644 tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/activation.cc create mode 100644 tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/expected.cc create mode 100644 tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/machine-id create mode 100644 tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/provider-identity.credential diff --git a/tests/fixtures/fake-idunn-rudp.ts b/tests/fixtures/fake-idunn-rudp.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e084666 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/fake-idunn-rudp.ts @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +/** + * A stand-in for Idunn's health endpoint: it accepts each RUDP connect, acks + * the frame that follows and keeps every delivered frame. Heimdall opens a + * fresh socket and session per publication, so sessions are kept per remote. + */ +import dgram from "node:dgram"; +import { + CultNetRudpSession, + decodeRudpPacket, + encodeRudpPacket, + type CultNetTransportFrame, +} from "cultnet-ts"; + +export interface FakeIdunnRudp { + port: number; + frames: CultNetTransportFrame[]; + /** Resolves with the nth delivered frame (0-based) once it has arrived. */ + frame(index: number): Promise; + close(): void; +} + +export async function startFakeIdunnRudp(): Promise { + const server = dgram.createSocket("udp4"); + const sessions = new Map(); + const frames: CultNetTransportFrame[] = []; + const waiting: Array<{ index: number; resolve: (frame: CultNetTransportFrame) => void }> = []; + + server.on("message", (wire, remote) => { + const packet = decodeRudpPacket(wire); + const key = `${remote.address}:${remote.port}`; + if (packet.packetType === "connect") { + const session = new CultNetRudpSession({ + connectionId: 0x1d0d0001, + initialSequence: 1, + resendDelayMs: 100, + }); + sessions.set(key, session); + server.send(encodeRudpPacket(session.acceptConnect(packet, Date.now())), remote.port, remote.address); + return; + } + const session = sessions.get(key); + if (!session) return; + const result = session.receive(packet, Date.now()); + if (result.reply) server.send(encodeRudpPacket(result.reply), remote.port, remote.address); + for (const frame of result.delivered) { + frames.push(frame); + for (const waiter of waiting.filter((entry) => entry.index === frames.length - 1)) waiter.resolve(frame); + } + if (result.delivered.length > 0) { + server.send(encodeRudpPacket(session.createAck()), remote.port, remote.address); + } + }); + await new Promise((resolve) => server.bind(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve)); + + return { + port: server.address().port, + frames, + frame: (index) => + frames[index] + ? Promise.resolve(frames[index]!) + : new Promise((resolve) => waiting.push({ index, resolve })), + close: () => server.close(), + }; +} diff --git a/tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/.gitattributes b/tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fa1385d --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +* -text diff --git a/tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/README.md b/tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0f26117 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +# Idunn runtime fixtures + +Written by the Rust owner, not by Heimdall's tests. Copied byte for byte from CultLib +`217a9480`, `packages/cultnet-ts/test/fixtures/idunn-runtime/web` (`expected.cc`, +`activation.cc`, `activation-key.seed`, `provider-identity.credential`) and that directory's +`machine-id`. CultLib regenerates them with `packages/cultnet-rs/examples/idunn_runtime_fixture.rs` +(its own README has the Yggdrasil command); the provider identity is bound to `machine-id`, so a +test that decodes it supplies that machine id instead of `/etc/machine-id`. + +Every key here is a test key. `provider-identity.credential` is the shape Idunn passes on the +presence-identity descriptor: key fields are 32-integer arrays, which only the Rust owner writes. diff --git a/tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/activation-key.seed b/tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/activation-key.seed new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7b6d37f --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/activation-key.seed @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +Odfl*oFvnhLpSp \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/activation.cc b/tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/activation.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3931baf2d0ad2e084e2704913f368f46605cef11 GIT binary patch literal 798 zcmbtOOKTHR6mDrDh#<4Z?5WQE!R>{*&xdssSR4V zbL&ZLn)P~+HtTtu*fUb+aZBcLqaL)v?t0wQ^$2hBsYRLnv+Z)`CnR!ACbnEH7etkJ z{gEECY33&tt9`LIBsNiAU9O%ub+J=4Td)Hq2n(HUn~?E`v zrQVT=SzkshLmV-MA{Htw7-GnUMq0{&V5>0p?Z#@L)F{jeK!gRx%&~|=r1d>(!pOgR zqot9>_QEImdFkD^;OCBX=k(p>FZ1u=;rQC-5jfBo-g0N`M;GQE*vnrpwGSnj9X|SO R8N2`h literal 0 HcmV?d00001 diff --git a/tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/expected.cc b/tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/expected.cc new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dbf7153b5b59ff258a410787f85a7f7695945346 GIT binary patch literal 1067 zcmbtTO-jQ+6jqPm2_!2QW->EP(n(f=3wI(YE)e1)f)^cUGO+_m5dg?Mh(=t^{#J6|^nyb~)X=~rkdyrdUz(`nQ=(fk)l&1Ui|13|@W26UEflF;TLMu{#!oG2Z`Jdiz{ht`DBdRc>Yh zr{(LmA{A5=mrisugai*JbRCN4Py6VY$lxiAhn7Iq_U= zUO#QO{gh{6r(E}Z-{wuh7`GkMvQ5GWYjKCumN10?>HsAz$Ft0a*YpUpOv=2bLwztC zHfAmBtxAs4JeFYudH}p5gGm?WoEQ$@`-5sSJxy{6H-VJhhtcI42BA%a)gdlp4Lq3A Yl99UT-&d&+?}m@RDb=sJ?vcfdFMc*;F8}}l literal 0 HcmV?d00001 diff --git a/tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/machine-id b/tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/machine-id new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a71716f --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/machine-id @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +c1c1c1c1c1c1c1c1c1c1c1c1c1c1c1c1 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/provider-identity.credential b/tests/fixtures/idunn-runtime/provider-identity.credential new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2e617139cb114b951bfdc3fca179a02ff872830c GIT binary patch literal 682 zcmb7?KWG#|6vq7nT3OhrSZQLRm_2vqW@cxuvKA}?Drv%IW_BjGve`{?dv`IF61B03 zU_fkyNRSk%0zoTn1kn#{0^_E%dsB)BeWjJe_#1P3Dl_pU%bF3|5>G`JvXU1?BAFz1=zhLBGR;Ls;j^PfzHDg6y_Lowh7cQNvvhZlz%}W;`q$V%3yqs-@BU1l_84XD1uQ33Q zdRK$@uP zrFq$_by4U#ugbknP1P^6)D~6gvex7w6(N@6B1 z#^E0aO4Im_m8;mrw!!0xKDG{HZD9%T@f}~$3~?_&+`%S3;Q0+_je?J E0GWjm%m4rY literal 0 HcmV?d00001 diff --git a/tests/idunn-rudp-health.test.ts b/tests/idunn-rudp-health.test.ts index 66127d4..fa40393 100644 --- a/tests/idunn-rudp-health.test.ts +++ b/tests/idunn-rudp-health.test.ts @@ -1,18 +1,12 @@ -import dgram from "node:dgram"; import { mkdtemp } from "node:fs/promises"; import os from "node:os"; import path from "node:path"; import { decode } from "@msgpack/msgpack"; -import { - CultNetRudpSession, - decodeRudpPacket, - encodeRudpPacket, - parseCultNetMessage, - type CultNetTransportFrame, -} from "cultnet-ts"; +import { parseCultNetMessage } from "cultnet-ts"; import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest"; import { loadConfig } from "../src/config.js"; import { publishIdunnRudpHealth } from "../src/idunn-rudp-health.js"; +import { startFakeIdunnRudp } from "./fixtures/fake-idunn-rudp.js"; vi.mock("node:fs/promises", async (importOriginal) => { const original = await importOriginal(); @@ -27,37 +21,12 @@ vi.mock("node:fs/promises", async (importOriginal) => { describe("Heimdall Idunn health publication", () => { it("completes the canonical RUDP handshake before publishing its signed frame", async () => { - const server = dgram.createSocket("udp4"); - const session = new CultNetRudpSession({ - connectionId: 0x1d0d0001, - initialSequence: 1, - resendDelayMs: 100, - }); - let resolveFrame!: (frame: CultNetTransportFrame) => void; - const frameReceived = new Promise((resolve) => { - resolveFrame = resolve; - }); - - server.on("message", (wire, remote) => { - const packet = decodeRudpPacket(wire); - if (packet.packetType === "connect") { - server.send(encodeRudpPacket(session.acceptConnect(packet, Date.now())), remote.port, remote.address); - return; - } - const result = session.receive(packet, Date.now()); - if (result.reply) server.send(encodeRudpPacket(result.reply), remote.port, remote.address); - for (const frame of result.delivered) resolveFrame(frame); - if (result.delivered.length > 0) { - server.send(encodeRudpPacket(session.createAck()), remote.port, remote.address); - } - }); - await new Promise((resolve) => server.bind(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve)); + const server = await startFakeIdunnRudp(); try { const tmp = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "heimdall-idunn-rudp-")); - const address = server.address(); const config = loadConfig({ - GC_ACCESS_IDUNN_RUDP_HEALTH: `127.0.0.1:${address.port}`, + GC_ACCESS_IDUNN_RUDP_HEALTH: `127.0.0.1:${server.port}`, GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_HEALTH_IDENTITY_PATH: path.join(tmp, "provider-health-identity.cc"), }); const observedAt = "2026-08-22T00:45:00.000Z"; @@ -78,7 +47,7 @@ describe("Heimdall Idunn health publication", () => { observedAt, presence, }); - const frame = await frameReceived; + const frame = await server.frame(0); const message = parseCultNetMessage(decode(frame.payload), "cultnet.schema.v0"); expect(frame.channelId).toBe("schema"); From c0441558553e224f8fdd80d2c1124286a4a155b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:48:08 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 43/45] Heimdall opens its Idunn presence authority once, before it listens index.ts declared the presence sequence below the startup try, so the bundle's hoisted var was undefined at the first publish; decodePrivateIdentity refused the Rust owner's integer-array key fields; both descriptors were re-read every pulse and returned nothing after the first. openPresenceAuthority now reads the bundle facts and each descriptor once (whole, from offset 0, then closed), owns the one publisher sequence, and signs through them; a launch-contract fault throws before anything listens, so the process exits non-zero. decodePrivateIdentity takes the shape of its source and names the failed check, never a value. openActivationSigner and the per-pulse descriptor reads are deleted. tests/idunn-boot.test.ts boots the bundle under the Idunn launch contract and checks the signed warming frames and the fail-fast exits. The descriptor, sequence and generation tests now use the Rust-written fixtures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- src/index.ts | 43 +-- src/provider-health-identity.ts | 96 ++++-- src/runtime-presence.ts | 118 ++++--- tests/fixtures/presence-descriptors.ts | 79 ++--- tests/fixtures/state-root-generation-child.ts | 27 +- tests/idunn-boot.test.ts | 302 ++++++++++++++++++ tests/presence-identity-descriptor.test.ts | 121 ++++--- tests/publisher-sequence.test.ts | 44 ++- 8 files changed, 606 insertions(+), 224 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/idunn-boot.test.ts diff --git a/src/index.ts b/src/index.ts index 8ee966b..0bc13c3 100644 --- a/src/index.ts +++ b/src/index.ts @@ -6,14 +6,16 @@ import { publishHeimdallOdinState } from "./odin-publication.js"; import { startHeimdallPrivateCommandPlane } from "./private-command-plane.js"; import type { CultNetOperationServer } from "cultnet-ts"; import { createHeimdallRuntimePulse, buildHeimdallHealthDetail, publishHeimdallVerseState } from "./verse-state.js"; -import { - buildPresenceStatement, - PublisherSequence, - readRuntimeBundleFacts, - type RuntimeBundleFacts, -} from "./runtime-presence.js"; +import { openPresenceAuthority } from "./runtime-presence.js"; const config = loadConfig(); +// Under Idunn the launch's presence keys, bundle facts and publisher sequence +// open here, before anything listens. A launch-contract fault throws, uncaught, +// and the process exits non-zero with no listener: Idunn fails Warming in +// seconds rather than waiting on a candidate that can never sign. +const presenceAuthority = config.idunnRuntimeBundlePath + ? await openPresenceAuthority(config) + : undefined; const app = await buildApp({ config }); const versePulseIntervalMs = 60_000; const healthPulseIntervalMs = 10_000; @@ -69,14 +71,6 @@ async function publishVerseState(): Promise { await publishHeimdallOdinState(config, pulse); } -/** - * Read once and keep: the bundle is Idunn's immutable record of this launch and - * cannot change while the process lives, so re-reading it every pulse would be - * work that can only ever return the same answer or fail. - */ -let runtimeBundleFacts: RuntimeBundleFacts | undefined; -const presenceSequence = new PublisherSequence(); - async function publishHealthState(): Promise { const pulse = createHeimdallRuntimePulse(config); @@ -94,30 +88,17 @@ async function publishHealthState(): Promise { ? buildHeimdallHealthDetail(config, pulse) : `Heimdall candidate warming; ${lease.reason}`; - if (!config.idunnRuntimeBundlePath) { + if (!presenceAuthority) { // Outside Idunn there is no launch to attest and nothing that admits the // statement; publishing is simply not part of that world. return; } - runtimeBundleFacts ??= await readRuntimeBundleFacts(config.idunnRuntimeBundlePath); - - const observedAtUnixMillis = Date.parse(pulse.updatedAt); - const presence = await buildPresenceStatement({ - bundle: runtimeBundleFacts, - state: lease.mayWrite ? "active" : "warming", - detail, - boundEndpoint: `http://${config.host}:${config.port}`, - // A warming candidate holds no lease and must not claim one; the contract - // refuses the pair, and Idunn needs the warming statement to promote it. - writeLeaseSha256: null, - observedAtUnixMillis, - publisherSequence: presenceSequence.next(observedAtUnixMillis), - providerHealthIdentityPath: config.providerHealthIdentityPath, - }); + const state = lease.mayWrite ? "active" : "warming"; + const presence = presenceAuthority.sign(state, detail, Date.parse(pulse.updatedAt)); await publishIdunnRudpHealth(config, { daemonId: config.daemonId, - state: lease.mayWrite ? "active" : "warming", + state, detail, observedAt: pulse.updatedAt, presence, diff --git a/src/provider-health-identity.ts b/src/provider-health-identity.ts index ad4903f..ca89f2c 100644 --- a/src/provider-health-identity.ts +++ b/src/provider-health-identity.ts @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import { sign, type KeyObject, } from "node:crypto"; -import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; +import { closeSync, fstatSync, readSync } from "node:fs"; import { chmod, readFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import { SingleFileMessagePackBackingStore, type CultCacheEnvelope } from "@gamecult/cultcache-ts"; import { readPrivateStoreRecord } from "./idunn-store.js"; @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ export async function openOrEnrollProviderHealthIdentity(path: string): Promise< if (existing.length !== 1) { throw new Error("Provider-health identity store must contain exactly one record."); } - return decodePrivateIdentity(existing[0]!.payload, await readMachineId()); + return decodePrivateIdentity(existing[0]!.payload, await readMachineId(), "bin"); } const PRESENCE_IDENTITY_FD_NAME = "gamecult-runtime-presence-identity"; @@ -124,7 +124,8 @@ export function passedDescriptor( */ export async function openProviderHealthIdentity( path: string, - env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env + env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env, + machineId: () => Promise = readMachineId ): Promise { const descriptor = passedDescriptor(PRESENCE_IDENTITY_FD_NAME, env); if (descriptor === undefined) { @@ -140,11 +141,33 @@ export async function openProviderHealthIdentity( } const payload = readPrivateStoreRecord( - readFileSync(descriptor), + readPassedDescriptor(descriptor), "Idunn runtime presence identity" ); - return decodePrivateIdentity(payload, await readMachineId()); + // The descriptor's writer is the Rust owner, whose key fields are integer arrays. + return decodePrivateIdentity(payload, await machineId(), "int-array"); +} + +/** + * Read a passed descriptor whole, from offset 0, and close it. A descriptor is + * a one-shot input: reading it again starts at the offset the last read left, + * which is the end, so the owner reads once at open and keeps what it decoded. + */ +export function readPassedDescriptor(descriptor: number): Buffer { + try { + const size = fstatSync(descriptor).size; + const bytes = Buffer.alloc(size); + let read = 0; + while (read < size) { + const count = readSync(descriptor, bytes, read, size - read, read); + if (count === 0) break; + read += count; + } + return bytes.subarray(0, read); + } finally { + closeSync(descriptor); + } } export function signProviderHealthPayload(identity: PrivateIdentity, payload: Uint8Array): Uint8Array { @@ -176,23 +199,58 @@ export function providerHealthPublicIdentity(identity: PrivateIdentity): { return { identityId: identity.identityId, publicKeyHex: Buffer.from(identity.publicKey).toString("hex") }; } -function decodePrivateIdentity(payload: Uint8Array, machineId: string): PrivateIdentity { +/** + * Which writer produced the record. The self-enrolling store this process + * writes keeps key fields as MessagePack bin; the Rust owner (cultnet-rs + * service_identity.rs) serialises a Vec without serde_bytes, so its key + * fields are arrays of integers. Each source is read in its own shape and the + * other is refused. + */ +type KeyShape = "bin" | "int-array"; + +function keyBytes(value: unknown, shape: KeyShape, field: string): Uint8Array { + const bytes = + shape === "bin" + ? value instanceof Uint8Array + ? value + : undefined + : Array.isArray(value) && + value.every((byte) => typeof byte === "number" && Number.isInteger(byte) && byte >= 0 && byte <= 255) + ? Uint8Array.from(value as number[]) + : undefined; + if (bytes === undefined || bytes.length !== 32) { + throw new Error( + `Provider-health identity key shape check failed: ${field} is not a 32-byte ${shape === "bin" ? "binary" : "integer-array"} key field.` + ); + } + return bytes; +} + +function decodePrivateIdentity(payload: Uint8Array, machineId: string, shape: KeyShape): PrivateIdentity { const value = decode(payload); if (!Array.isArray(value) || value.length !== 10) { - throw new Error("Provider-health identity payload is malformed."); + throw new Error("Provider-health identity schema check failed: payload is not a 10-field record."); } - const [schema, identityId, publicKey, protectedSeed, protector, binding, version] = value; - if ( - schema !== PRIVATE_SCHEMA || - typeof identityId !== "string" || - !(publicKey instanceof Uint8Array) || publicKey.length !== 32 || - !(protectedSeed instanceof Uint8Array) || protectedSeed.length !== 32 || - protector !== "linux_file_mode_machine_id_binding" || - binding !== protectorBinding(machineId) || - version !== "v1" || - identityId !== deriveIdentityId(publicKey) - ) { - throw new Error("Provider-health identity does not belong to this host or profile."); + const [schema, identityId, publicKeyField, protectedSeedField, protector, binding, version] = value; + if (schema !== PRIVATE_SCHEMA) { + throw new Error("Provider-health identity schema check failed: unexpected schema id."); + } + if (typeof identityId !== "string") { + throw new Error("Provider-health identity id check failed: id is not a string."); + } + const publicKey = keyBytes(publicKeyField, shape, "public key"); + const protectedSeed = keyBytes(protectedSeedField, shape, "protected seed"); + if (protector !== "linux_file_mode_machine_id_binding") { + throw new Error("Provider-health identity protector check failed: unexpected protector."); + } + if (binding !== protectorBinding(machineId)) { + throw new Error("Provider-health identity binding check failed: not bound to this host's machine id."); + } + if (version !== "v1") { + throw new Error("Provider-health identity version check failed: unexpected version."); + } + if (identityId !== deriveIdentityId(publicKey)) { + throw new Error("Provider-health identity id check failed: id does not derive from the public key."); } const seed = xorSeed(protectedSeed, binding); const privateKey = privateKeyFromSeed(seed); diff --git a/src/runtime-presence.ts b/src/runtime-presence.ts index e3ed0b1..3c1054b 100644 --- a/src/runtime-presence.ts +++ b/src/runtime-presence.ts @@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ import path from "node:path"; import { createHash, createPrivateKey, type KeyObject } from "node:crypto"; -import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { decode } from "@msgpack/msgpack"; import { @@ -33,11 +32,14 @@ import { type RuntimePresenceState, } from "cultnet-ts"; +import type { HeimdallConfig } from "./config.js"; import { readIdunnStoreRecord } from "./idunn-store.js"; import { openProviderHealthIdentity, passedDescriptor, + readPassedDescriptor, signWithIdentity, + type PrivateIdentity, } from "./provider-health-identity.js"; const PKCS8_ED25519_SEED_PREFIX = Buffer.from("302e020100300506032b657004220420", "hex"); @@ -176,29 +178,6 @@ export async function readRuntimeBundleFacts(bundlePath: string): Promise { - const env = inputs.env ?? process.env; - const activationKey = openActivationSigner(env); - if (activationKey === undefined) { - throw new Error( - "Idunn passed no runtime activation credential, so this process cannot prove it is the " + - "incarnation Idunn started", - ); - } - const identity = await openProviderHealthIdentity(inputs.providerHealthIdentityPath, env); +export function buildPresenceStatement(inputs: PresenceStatementInputs): PresenceStatement { + const { identity } = inputs; const presence: RuntimePresenceHealth = { target: inputs.bundle.target, @@ -284,7 +253,7 @@ export async function buildPresenceStatement( const proof = runtimePresenceProofPayload(presence); const signature = signWithIdentity(identity, runtimePresenceProviderSigningMessage(proof)); const activationSignature = signWithIdentity( - { ...identity, privateKey: activationKey }, + { ...identity, privateKey: inputs.activationKey }, runtimePresenceActivationSigningMessage(proof), ); @@ -293,3 +262,72 @@ export async function buildPresenceStatement( payload: encodeRuntimePresenceHealth(presence, signature, activationSignature), }; } + +export interface PresenceAuthority { + sign( + state: RuntimePresenceState, + detail: string, + observedAtUnixMillis: number, + ): PresenceStatement; +} + +/** + * Open everything this launch's presence statements stand on, once, before the + * process listens: Idunn's bundle facts, the activation seed and the presence + * identity (each descriptor is read whole and closed), and the one publisher + * sequence. It owns them for the life of the process; a pulse supplies only its + * state, detail and observation time. + * + * A launch-contract fault (a missing or malformed bundle, descriptor or + * identity) throws here, so the process exits before it accepts a request and + * Idunn fails Warming at once, instead of a listener that can never sign. + */ +export async function openPresenceAuthority( + config: Pick, + env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env, + machineId?: () => Promise, +): Promise { + if (!config.idunnRuntimeBundlePath) { + throw new Error("no Idunn runtime bundle path: presence has no launch to attest"); + } + const bundle = await readRuntimeBundleFacts(config.idunnRuntimeBundlePath); + + const activationDescriptor = passedDescriptor(IDUNN_RUNTIME_ACTIVATION_CREDENTIAL_NAME, env); + if (activationDescriptor === undefined) { + throw new Error( + "Idunn passed no runtime activation credential, so this process cannot prove it is the " + + "incarnation Idunn started", + ); + } + const seed = readPassedDescriptor(activationDescriptor); + if (seed.length !== 32) { + throw new Error("Idunn runtime activation credential is not a 32-byte seed"); + } + const activationKey = createPrivateKey({ + key: Buffer.concat([PKCS8_ED25519_SEED_PREFIX, seed]), + format: "der", + type: "pkcs8", + }); + + const identity = await openProviderHealthIdentity(config.providerHealthIdentityPath, env, machineId); + const boundEndpoint = `http://${config.host}:${config.port}`; + const sequence = new PublisherSequence(); + + return { + sign: (state, detail, observedAtUnixMillis) => + buildPresenceStatement({ + bundle, + identity, + activationKey, + state, + detail, + boundEndpoint, + // A warming candidate holds no lease and must not claim one; the + // contract refuses the pair, and Idunn needs the warming statement to + // promote it. + writeLeaseSha256: null, + observedAtUnixMillis, + publisherSequence: sequence.next(observedAtUnixMillis), + }), + }; +} diff --git a/tests/fixtures/presence-descriptors.ts b/tests/fixtures/presence-descriptors.ts index 0448330..8e724f2 100644 --- a/tests/fixtures/presence-descriptors.ts +++ b/tests/fixtures/presence-descriptors.ts @@ -1,64 +1,45 @@ /** - * What Idunn hands a generation for runtime presence: a parent-only identity - * store and an activation seed, passed as descriptors named in LISTEN_FDNAMES. - * Every key here is generated for the test or a canary byte pattern. + * What Idunn hands a generation for runtime presence: the bundle directory, a + * parent-only identity store and an activation seed, the last two passed as + * descriptors named in LISTEN_FDNAMES. The bytes are the Rust owner's, copied + * from CultLib (see idunn-runtime/README.md); every key in them is a test key. */ import { closeSync, openSync } from "node:fs"; -import { chmod, mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; +import { chmod, copyFile, mkdir, readFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import path from "node:path"; -import { encode } from "@msgpack/msgpack"; -import { SingleFileMessagePackBackingStore } from "@gamecult/cultcache-ts"; import { IDUNN_RUNTIME_ACTIVATION_CREDENTIAL_NAME } from "cultnet-ts"; -import { openOrEnrollProviderHealthIdentity } from "../../src/provider-health-identity.js"; -import type { RuntimeBundleFacts } from "../../src/runtime-presence.js"; +export const idunnRuntimeFixtures = path.join(import.meta.dirname, "idunn-runtime"); -export const bundleFacts: RuntimeBundleFacts = { - target: "heimdall", - planId: "plan-1", - incarnationId: "incarnation-1", - sealedReleaseId: "release-1", - runtimeId: "runtime-1", - runtimeInstanceId: "instance-1", - expectedProjectionSha256: "sha256-projection", - activationWitnessSha256: "sha256-witness", - activationSignerIdentityId: "activation-signer", - stateSchemaGeneration: null, - stateContractSha256: null, - capabilities: [], - healthContract: "health-contract", -}; +const FIXTURE_FILES = [ + "expected.cc", + "activation.cc", + "activation-key.seed", + "provider-identity.credential", + "machine-id", +] as const; -/** Write both stores into `dir`, readable by any uid (the children run as others). */ +/** The machine id the fixture identity is bound to, in place of /etc/machine-id. */ +export const fixtureMachineId = async (dir: string = idunnRuntimeFixtures): Promise => + (await readFile(path.join(dir, "machine-id"), "utf8")).trim(); + +/** Copy the fixtures into `dir`, readable by any uid (the children run as others). */ export async function writePresenceFixtures(dir: string): Promise { await mkdir(dir, { recursive: true }); await chmod(dir, 0o755); - const enrolled = path.join(dir, "enrolled.cc"); - await openOrEnrollProviderHealthIdentity(enrolled); - const [record] = await new SingleFileMessagePackBackingStore(enrolled).pullAll(); - // Re-wrapped the way cultcache-rs writes a store, which is how Idunn writes it. - await writeFile( - path.join(dir, "runtime-presence-identity.cc"), - encode([ - [ - "gamecult-provider-health-identity", - "gamecult.provider_health_identity.private.v1", - record!.payload, - "2026-09-06T00:00:00.000Z", - "gamecult.provider_health_identity.private.v1", - ], - ]), - { mode: 0o644 } - ); - await writeFile(path.join(dir, "activation-seed"), Buffer.alloc(32, 7), { mode: 0o644 }); + for (const name of FIXTURE_FILES) { + const target = path.join(dir, name); + await copyFile(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, name), target); + await chmod(target, 0o644); + } } /** Open both descriptors and name them the way systemd's LISTEN_FDNAMES does. */ export function openPresenceDescriptors(dir: string): { env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv; close: () => void } { const fds = [ - [openSync(path.join(dir, "runtime-presence-identity.cc"), "r"), "gamecult-runtime-presence-identity"], - [openSync(path.join(dir, "activation-seed"), "r"), IDUNN_RUNTIME_ACTIVATION_CREDENTIAL_NAME], + [openSync(path.join(dir, "provider-identity.credential"), "r"), "gamecult-runtime-presence-identity"], + [openSync(path.join(dir, "activation-key.seed"), "r"), IDUNN_RUNTIME_ACTIVATION_CREDENTIAL_NAME], ] as const; const names: string[] = []; for (const [fd, name] of fds) { @@ -67,6 +48,14 @@ export function openPresenceDescriptors(dir: string): { env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv; } return { env: { LISTEN_FDNAMES: names.join(":") }, - close: () => fds.forEach(([fd]) => closeSync(fd)), + // The authority closes each descriptor it reads; this releases only what it did not. + close: () => + fds.forEach(([fd]) => { + try { + closeSync(fd); + } catch { + // already closed by the reader + } + }), }; } diff --git a/tests/fixtures/state-root-generation-child.ts b/tests/fixtures/state-root-generation-child.ts index 0e53ade..932d513 100644 --- a/tests/fixtures/state-root-generation-child.ts +++ b/tests/fixtures/state-root-generation-child.ts @@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ import { readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import path from "node:path"; import { loadConfig } from "../../src/config.js"; -import { PublisherSequence, buildPresenceStatement } from "../../src/runtime-presence.js"; -import { bundleFacts, openPresenceDescriptors } from "./presence-descriptors.js"; +import { openPresenceAuthority } from "../../src/runtime-presence.js"; +import { fixtureMachineId, openPresenceDescriptors } from "./presence-descriptors.js"; import { createHeimdallRuntimePulse, publishHeimdallVerseState } from "../../src/verse-state.js"; const [role, stateRoot, fixtureDir] = process.argv.slice(2) as [string, string, string]; @@ -25,18 +25,17 @@ const config = loadConfig({ async function publishPresence(): Promise { const descriptors = openPresenceDescriptors(fixtureDir); try { - const observedAtUnixMillis = Date.now(); - await buildPresenceStatement({ - bundle: bundleFacts, - state: "warming", - detail: "generation probe", - boundEndpoint: null, - writeLeaseSha256: null, - observedAtUnixMillis, - publisherSequence: new PublisherSequence().next(observedAtUnixMillis), - providerHealthIdentityPath: path.join(stateRoot, "provider-health-identity.cc"), - env: descriptors.env, - }); + const authority = await openPresenceAuthority( + { + idunnRuntimeBundlePath: fixtureDir, + host: config.host, + port: config.port, + providerHealthIdentityPath: path.join(stateRoot, "provider-health-identity.cc"), + }, + descriptors.env, + () => fixtureMachineId(fixtureDir), + ); + authority.sign("warming", "generation probe", Date.now()); } finally { descriptors.close(); } diff --git a/tests/idunn-boot.test.ts b/tests/idunn-boot.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d758910 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/idunn-boot.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,302 @@ +import { execFile, spawn, type ChildProcess } from "node:child_process"; +import { createPublicKey, createPrivateKey, verify } from "node:crypto"; +import dgram from "node:dgram"; +import { chmod, copyFile, mkdir, mkdtemp, readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; +import { closeSync, openSync } from "node:fs"; +import net from "node:net"; +import os from "node:os"; +import path from "node:path"; +import { promisify } from "node:util"; + +import { decode, encode } from "@msgpack/msgpack"; +import { + RUNTIME_PRESENCE_SLOT, + parseCultNetMessage, + runtimePresenceActivationSigningMessage, + runtimePresenceProviderSigningMessage, +} from "cultnet-ts"; +import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest"; + +import { startFakeIdunnRudp, type FakeIdunnRudp } from "./fixtures/fake-idunn-rudp.js"; +import { idunnRuntimeFixtures } from "./fixtures/presence-descriptors.js"; + +const run = promisify(execFile); + +const GENERATION_UID = 61184; +const STATE_GID = 4242; +const ED25519_SPKI_PREFIX = Buffer.from("302a300506032b6570032100", "hex"); +const PKCS8_ED25519_SEED_PREFIX = Buffer.from("302e020100300506032b657004220420", "hex"); + +// The launch needs root (to pick the uid and bind a machine-id) and a mount +// namespace (so the fixture machine-id does not replace the host's). The +// stopgap's node container has both; anywhere else the test steps aside. +const canLaunch = + process.getuid?.() === 0 && + (await run("unshare", ["--mount", "--", "true"]).then( + () => true, + () => false + )); + +/** + * The artifact under test. By default the esbuild bundle `pnpm bundle` makes, + * run by this process's node; a runbook proves a sealed release by naming its + * bundle and node here instead. + */ +const bundleOverride = process.env.HEIMDALL_BOOT_BUNDLE; +const nodeOverride = process.env.HEIMDALL_BOOT_NODE; + +async function freePort(): Promise { + return new Promise((resolve, reject) => { + const probe = net.createServer(); + probe.once("error", reject); + probe.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => { + const { port } = probe.address() as net.AddressInfo; + probe.close(() => resolve(port)); + }); + }); +} + +interface Launch { + child: ChildProcess; + stderr: () => string; + exited: Promise; + candidatePort: number; +} + +describe.skipIf(!canLaunch)("the bundle booted as Idunn launches it", () => { + let base: string; + let bundle: string; + let node: string; + let idunn: FakeIdunnRudp; + let odin: dgram.Socket; + let odinPort: number; + const launched: ChildProcess[] = []; + + beforeAll(async () => { + base = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "heimdall-boot-")); + await chmod(base, 0o755); + if (bundleOverride) { + bundle = bundleOverride; + } else { + await run("corepack", ["pnpm", "bundle"], { cwd: path.join(import.meta.dirname, "..") }); + bundle = path.join(base, "heimdall.mjs"); + await copyFile(path.join(import.meta.dirname, "..", "dist", "heimdall"), bundle); + await chmod(bundle, 0o644); + } + node = nodeOverride ?? process.execPath; + idunn = await startFakeIdunnRudp(); + odin = dgram.createSocket("udp4"); + await new Promise((resolve) => odin.bind(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve)); + odinPort = odin.address().port; + }, 120_000); + + afterAll(() => { + for (const child of launched) child.kill("SIGKILL"); + idunn?.close(); + odin?.close(); + }); + + /** Credential files as Idunn holds them: readable only by the parent. */ + async function credentials(dir: string, identity: Buffer | undefined) { + await mkdir(dir, { recursive: true }); + const seed = path.join(dir, "activation-key.seed"); + await copyFile(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, "activation-key.seed"), seed); + await chmod(seed, 0o400); + let identityFile: string | undefined; + if (identity) { + identityFile = path.join(dir, "provider-identity.credential"); + await writeFile(identityFile, identity, { mode: 0o400 }); + } + return { seed, identityFile }; + } + + /** Start the bundle as the generation unit does, with the fixture machine-id bound over the host's. */ + async function launch(label: string, identity: Buffer | undefined): Promise { + const dir = path.join(base, label); + await mkdir(dir, { recursive: true }); + await chmod(dir, 0o755); + + // Idunn's runtime bundle: the two records, read-only. + const bundleDir = path.join(dir, "bundle"); + await mkdir(bundleDir); + for (const name of ["expected.cc", "activation.cc"]) { + await copyFile(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, name), path.join(bundleDir, name)); + await chmod(path.join(bundleDir, name), 0o444); + } + await chmod(bundleDir, 0o555); + + const machineId = path.join(dir, "machine-id"); + await copyFile(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, "machine-id"), machineId); + await chmod(machineId, 0o444); + + const stateRoot = path.join(dir, "state"); + await mkdir(stateRoot); + await run("chown", [`0:${STATE_GID}`, stateRoot]); + await chmod(stateRoot, 0o2770); + + const heimdall = path.join(dir, "heimdall.mjs"); + await copyFile(bundle, heimdall); + await chmod(heimdall, 0o444); + + const files = await credentials(path.join(dir, "credentials"), identity); + const candidatePort = await freePort(); + + const fds = [openSync(files.seed, "r")]; + const names = ["gamecult-idunn-runtime-activation-key"]; + if (files.identityFile) { + fds.push(openSync(files.identityFile, "r")); + names.push("gamecult-runtime-presence-identity"); + } + + const env = { + PATH: process.env.PATH ?? "", + LISTEN_FDS: String(fds.length), + LISTEN_FDNAMES: names.join(":"), + GAMECULT_IDUNN_CANDIDATE_BIND: `127.0.0.1:${candidatePort}`, + GAMECULT_IDUNN_RUNTIME_BUNDLE: bundleDir, + GAMECULT_IDUNN_PROCESS_WRITE_LEASE: path.join(dir, "process-write-lease.cc"), + GC_ACCESS_BASE_URL: "https://heimdall.test", + GC_ACCESS_ISSUER: "https://heimdall.test", + GC_ACCESS_STORAGE_BACKEND: "memory", + GC_ACCESS_IDUNN_RUDP_HEALTH: `127.0.0.1:${idunn.port}`, + GC_ACCESS_IDUNN_HEALTH_CONTRACT: "heimdall.cultnet-rudp-provider-health", + GC_ACCESS_ODIN_CULTMESH_URI: `rudp://127.0.0.1:${odinPort}`, + CULTMESH_URI_ODIN_RUDP: `rudp://127.0.0.1:${odinPort}`, + GC_ACCESS_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_BOOTSTRAP: "1", + GC_ACCESS_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH: path.join(stateRoot, "signing.pem"), + GC_ACCESS_SIGNING_KEY_ID: "boot-test", + }; + + // uid, gid and umask as Idunn's DynamicUser unit gives them. The fixture + // machine-id is bound only inside this mount namespace. + const script = + `mount --bind ${machineId} /etc/machine-id && ` + + `exec setpriv --reuid ${GENERATION_UID} --regid ${STATE_GID} --clear-groups ` + + `sh -c 'umask 0007; cd ${dir}; exec ${node} heimdall.mjs --state-root ${stateRoot}'`; + const child = spawn("unshare", ["--mount", "--", "sh", "-c", script], { + env, + stdio: ["ignore", "ignore", "pipe", ...fds], + }); + launched.push(child); + fds.forEach((fd) => closeSync(fd)); + + let stderr = ""; + child.stderr!.on("data", (chunk: Buffer) => { + stderr += chunk.toString(); + }); + const exited = new Promise((resolve) => child.once("exit", (code) => resolve(code))); + return { child, stderr: () => stderr, exited, candidatePort }; + } + + async function answers(port: number): Promise { + return fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/.well-known/jwks.json`).then( + (response) => response.status, + () => undefined + ); + } + + it("signs warming presence on every pulse and answers HTTP", async () => { + const credential = await readFile(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, "provider-identity.credential")); + const generation = await launch("signs", credential); + + // Startup publication, then one per 10 s pulse. + await Promise.race([ + idunn.frame(2), + generation.exited.then((code) => { + throw new Error(`bundle exited ${code}; stderr: ${generation.stderr()}`); + }), + ]); + + expect(await answers(generation.candidatePort)).toBe(200); + + // Public keys of the two proofs, from the fixtures' test keys. + const store = decode(credential) as unknown[][]; + const record = decode(store[0]![2] as Uint8Array) as unknown[]; + const providerKey = createPublicKey({ + key: Buffer.concat([ED25519_SPKI_PREFIX, Buffer.from(record[2] as number[])]), + format: "der", + type: "spki", + }); + const activationKey = createPublicKey( + createPrivateKey({ + key: Buffer.concat([ + PKCS8_ED25519_SEED_PREFIX, + await readFile(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, "activation-key.seed")), + ]), + format: "der", + type: "pkcs8", + }) + ); + + let previousSequence = 0; + for (const frame of idunn.frames.slice(0, 3)) { + const message = parseCultNetMessage(decode(frame.payload), "cultnet.schema.v0"); + if (message.schemaVersion !== "cultnet.document_put_raw.v0") throw new Error("not a raw document put"); + const fields = decode(message.document.payload) as unknown[]; + expect(fields[RUNTIME_PRESENCE_SLOT.state]).toBe("warming"); + + const unsigned = [...fields]; + unsigned[RUNTIME_PRESENCE_SLOT.signature] = new Uint8Array(); + unsigned[RUNTIME_PRESENCE_SLOT.activationSignature] = new Uint8Array(); + const proof = encode(unsigned); + expect( + verify( + null, + runtimePresenceProviderSigningMessage(proof), + providerKey, + fields[RUNTIME_PRESENCE_SLOT.signature] as Uint8Array + ) + ).toBe(true); + expect( + verify( + null, + runtimePresenceActivationSigningMessage(proof), + activationKey, + fields[RUNTIME_PRESENCE_SLOT.activationSignature] as Uint8Array + ) + ).toBe(true); + + const sequence = fields[RUNTIME_PRESENCE_SLOT.publisherSequence] as number; + expect(sequence).toBeGreaterThan(previousSequence); + previousSequence = sequence; + } + + expect(generation.stderr()).not.toContain("failed on startup"); + expect(generation.stderr()).not.toContain("failed on interval"); + generation.child.kill("SIGKILL"); + }, 90_000); + + it.each([ + ["the identity descriptor is not passed", undefined, "gamecult-runtime-presence-identity"], + ["the identity is damaged", "damaged", "identity id check"], + ])("exits before listening when %s", async (_name, damage, expected) => { + const credential = await readFile(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, "provider-identity.credential")); + const store = decode(credential) as unknown[][]; + const record = decode(store[0]![2] as Uint8Array) as unknown[]; + const publicKey = [...(record[2] as number[])]; + const original = { publicKeyHex: Buffer.from(publicKey).toString("hex"), id: record[1] as string, binding: record[5] as string }; + let identity: Buffer | undefined; + if (damage) { + publicKey[0] = publicKey[0]! ^ 1; + record[2] = publicKey; + identity = Buffer.from(encode([[store[0]![0], store[0]![1], encode(record), store[0]![3], store[0]![4]]])); + } + const started = Date.now(); + const generation = await launch(damage ? "damaged" : "no-identity", identity); + + const code = await Promise.race([ + generation.exited, + new Promise<"timeout">((resolve) => setTimeout(() => resolve("timeout"), 5_000)), + ]); + + expect(code, generation.stderr()).not.toBe("timeout"); + expect(code).not.toBe(0); + expect(Date.now() - started).toBeLessThan(6_000); + expect(await answers(generation.candidatePort)).toBeUndefined(); + expect(generation.stderr()).toContain(expected); + // No byte of the credential: not the key bytes, not the id, not the binding. + expect(generation.stderr()).not.toContain(original.publicKeyHex); + expect(generation.stderr()).not.toContain(original.id.slice(0, 16)); + expect(generation.stderr()).not.toContain(original.binding.slice(-16)); + }, 30_000); +}); diff --git a/tests/presence-identity-descriptor.test.ts b/tests/presence-identity-descriptor.test.ts index 731d16e..d01797b 100644 --- a/tests/presence-identity-descriptor.test.ts +++ b/tests/presence-identity-descriptor.test.ts @@ -1,18 +1,17 @@ import { access, mkdtemp, readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; -import { openSync, closeSync } from "node:fs"; +import { openSync } from "node:fs"; import os from "node:os"; import path from "node:path"; -import { encode } from "@msgpack/msgpack"; -import { SingleFileMessagePackBackingStore } from "@gamecult/cultcache-ts"; +import { decode, encode } from "@msgpack/msgpack"; import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest"; import { - openOrEnrollProviderHealthIdentity, openProviderHealthIdentity, passedDescriptor, providerHealthPublicIdentity, } from "../src/provider-health-identity.js"; +import { fixtureMachineId, idunnRuntimeFixtures } from "./fixtures/presence-descriptors.js"; const machineIdAvailable = await readFile("/etc/machine-id", "utf8").then( () => true, @@ -23,59 +22,79 @@ const machineIdAvailable = await readFile("/etc/machine-id", "utf8").then( * The identity is machine-id bound, so enrolment only works where a machine-id * exists. These run on Linux and are skipped elsewhere. */ -describe.skipIf(!machineIdAvailable)("presence identity from a passed descriptor", () => { - it("reads an Idunn-written store, not a cultcache-ts one", async () => { +/** Name the presence descriptor so it lands on whatever fd open() returned. */ +function presenceEnv(fd: number): NodeJS.ProcessEnv { + // The lookup maps a name index onto 3 + index, so the name list is padded + // until the presence entry lands on the descriptor open() actually returned. + // Assuming it is 3 is how this passes on one machine and reads the wrong + // descriptor on another. + const names = [ + ...Array.from({ length: fd - 3 }, (_, i) => `pad-${i}`), + "gamecult-runtime-presence-identity", + ].join(":"); + return { LISTEN_FDNAMES: names, LISTEN_PID: String(process.pid) }; +} + +describe("presence identity from a passed descriptor", () => { + it("decodes the Rust owner's record, whose key fields are integer arrays", async () => { const dir = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "heimdall-presence-")); + const fd = openSync(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, "provider-identity.credential"), "r"); - // Enrol with the TypeScript client to get a genuine machine-bound payload, - // then re-wrap that payload the way cultcache-rs writes a store: a bare - // array of positional [key, type, payload, stored_at, schema_id] envelopes. - // Idunn writes with the Rust client, and cultcache-ts cannot read that - // layout, so wrapping it here is what makes this test resemble reality. - const tsStore = path.join(dir, "ts-enrolled.cc"); - const enrolled = await openOrEnrollProviderHealthIdentity(tsStore); - const records = await new SingleFileMessagePackBackingStore(tsStore).pullAll(); - expect(records).toHaveLength(1); - - const idunnStore = path.join(dir, "runtime-presence-identity.cc"); - await writeFile( - idunnStore, - encode([ - [ - "gamecult-provider-health-identity", - "gamecult.provider_health_identity.private.v1", - records[0]!.payload, - "2026-09-06T00:00:00.000Z", - "gamecult.provider_health_identity.private.v1", - ], - ]) + const opened = await openProviderHealthIdentity( + path.join(dir, "would-be-self-enrolled.cc"), + presenceEnv(fd), + fixtureMachineId ); - const fd = openSync(idunnStore, "r"); - try { - // The lookup maps a name index onto 3 + index, so the name list is padded - // until the presence entry lands on whatever descriptor open() actually - // returned. Assuming it is 3 is how this passes on one machine and reads - // the wrong descriptor on another. - const names = [ - ...Array.from({ length: fd - 3 }, (_, i) => `pad-${i}`), - "gamecult-runtime-presence-identity", - ].join(":"); + // The fixture's own public key means it came from the descriptor. A fresh + // self-enrolment would produce a different key, which is exactly the failure + // that makes Idunn refuse this daemon's health and stall promotion. + const store = decode(await readFile(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, "provider-identity.credential"))) as unknown[][]; + const record = decode(store[0]![2] as Uint8Array) as unknown[]; + expect(providerHealthPublicIdentity(opened).publicKeyHex).toBe( + Buffer.from(record[2] as number[]).toString("hex") + ); + await expect(access(path.join(dir, "would-be-self-enrolled.cc"))).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: "ENOENT" }); + }); - const opened = await openProviderHealthIdentity( - path.join(dir, "would-be-self-enrolled.cc"), - { LISTEN_FDNAMES: names, LISTEN_PID: String(process.pid) } - ); + it("refuses a bin-shaped record on the descriptor path, naming the key-shape check and no value", async () => { + const dir = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "heimdall-presence-bin-")); + const store = decode(await readFile(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, "provider-identity.credential"))) as unknown[][]; + const record = decode(store[0]![2] as Uint8Array) as unknown[]; + // What this process's own enroller writes: the same record with bin key fields. + const binRecord = record.map((field, index) => + index === 2 || index === 3 ? Uint8Array.from(field as number[]) : field + ); + const binStore = path.join(dir, "bin-shaped.cc"); + await writeFile(binStore, encode([[store[0]![0], store[0]![1], encode(binRecord), store[0]![3], store[0]![4]]])); + const fd = openSync(binStore, "r"); - // Same key means it came from the descriptor. A fresh self-enrolment - // would produce a different key -- which is exactly the failure that - // makes Idunn refuse this daemon's health and stall promotion. - expect(providerHealthPublicIdentity(opened).publicKeyHex).toBe( - providerHealthPublicIdentity(enrolled).publicKeyHex - ); - } finally { - closeSync(fd); - } + const failure = await openProviderHealthIdentity(path.join(dir, "x.cc"), presenceEnv(fd), fixtureMachineId).then( + () => undefined, + (error: Error) => error + ); + + expect(failure?.message).toContain("key shape check"); + expect(failure?.message).not.toContain((record[1] as string).slice(0, 16)); + }); + + it.each([ + ["schema", 0, "bogus", "schema check"], + ["protector", 4, "bogus", "protector check"], + ["binding", 5, "bogus", "binding check"], + ["version", 6, "v9", "version check"], + ])("a record failing only the %s check is refused by that check", async (_name, index, replacement, check) => { + const dir = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "heimdall-presence-check-")); + const store = decode(await readFile(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, "provider-identity.credential"))) as unknown[][]; + const record = decode(store[0]![2] as Uint8Array) as unknown[]; + record[index] = replacement; + const damaged = path.join(dir, "damaged.cc"); + await writeFile(damaged, encode([[store[0]![0], store[0]![1], encode(record), store[0]![3], store[0]![4]]])); + const fd = openSync(damaged, "r"); + + await expect( + openProviderHealthIdentity(path.join(dir, "x.cc"), presenceEnv(fd), fixtureMachineId) + ).rejects.toThrow(check); }); }); diff --git a/tests/publisher-sequence.test.ts b/tests/publisher-sequence.test.ts index 9a4f147..efded2c 100644 --- a/tests/publisher-sequence.test.ts +++ b/tests/publisher-sequence.test.ts @@ -1,17 +1,12 @@ -import { mkdtemp, readdir, readFile, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; +import { mkdtemp, readdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises"; import os from "node:os"; import path from "node:path"; import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest"; import { loadConfig } from "../src/config.js"; -import { PublisherSequence, buildPresenceStatement } from "../src/runtime-presence.js"; -import { bundleFacts, openPresenceDescriptors, writePresenceFixtures } from "./fixtures/presence-descriptors.js"; - -const machineIdAvailable = await readFile("/etc/machine-id", "utf8").then( - () => true, - () => false -); +import { PublisherSequence, openPresenceAuthority } from "../src/runtime-presence.js"; +import { fixtureMachineId, openPresenceDescriptors, writePresenceFixtures } from "./fixtures/presence-descriptors.js"; describe("PublisherSequence", () => { it("starts at the observed millis", () => { @@ -51,10 +46,11 @@ describe("PublisherSequence", () => { }); }); -describe.skipIf(!machineIdAvailable)("presence publication and the state root", () => { - it("touches no path under dataRoot", async () => { +describe("the presence authority", () => { + it("opens once, touches no path under dataRoot, and signs every pulse after its descriptors are gone", async () => { const dir = await mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "heimdall-nodataroot-")); - await writePresenceFixtures(path.join(dir, "fixtures")); + const fixtures = path.join(dir, "fixtures"); + await writePresenceFixtures(fixtures); // A regular file as dataRoot: opening anything beneath it fails with // ENOTDIR for every uid, root included. const dataRoot = path.join(dir, "not-a-directory"); @@ -64,21 +60,21 @@ describe.skipIf(!machineIdAvailable)("presence publication and the state root", GC_ACCESS_DATA_ROOT: dataRoot, }); - const descriptors = openPresenceDescriptors(path.join(dir, "fixtures")); + const descriptors = openPresenceDescriptors(fixtures); try { + const authority = await openPresenceAuthority( + { ...config, idunnRuntimeBundlePath: fixtures }, + descriptors.env, + fixtureMachineId, + ); + // The descriptors were read whole and closed: a second read would find + // nothing, so signing again proves the authority holds what it decoded. const observedAtUnixMillis = Date.parse("2026-10-23T12:00:00.000Z"); - const statement = await buildPresenceStatement({ - bundle: bundleFacts, - state: "warming", - detail: "probe", - boundEndpoint: null, - writeLeaseSha256: null, - observedAtUnixMillis, - publisherSequence: new PublisherSequence().next(observedAtUnixMillis), - providerHealthIdentityPath: config.providerHealthIdentityPath, - env: descriptors.env, - }); - expect(statement.target).toBe("heimdall"); + const first = authority.sign("warming", "probe", observedAtUnixMillis); + const second = authority.sign("warming", "probe", observedAtUnixMillis); + expect(first.target).toBe("heimdall"); + expect(second.target).toBe("heimdall"); + expect(Buffer.from(second.payload).equals(Buffer.from(first.payload))).toBe(false); } finally { descriptors.close(); } From 1a36175f3a0ab3b66313ae82c8b5a21d5b96c939 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:49:23 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 44/45] Presence authority test: the Rust fixture's target is the fixture's own, not heimdall Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- tests/publisher-sequence.test.ts | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/publisher-sequence.test.ts b/tests/publisher-sequence.test.ts index efded2c..cfddac2 100644 --- a/tests/publisher-sequence.test.ts +++ b/tests/publisher-sequence.test.ts @@ -72,8 +72,8 @@ describe("the presence authority", () => { const observedAtUnixMillis = Date.parse("2026-10-23T12:00:00.000Z"); const first = authority.sign("warming", "probe", observedAtUnixMillis); const second = authority.sign("warming", "probe", observedAtUnixMillis); - expect(first.target).toBe("heimdall"); - expect(second.target).toBe("heimdall"); + expect(first.target).toBe("streampixels-web"); + expect(second.target).toBe("streampixels-web"); expect(Buffer.from(second.payload).equals(Buffer.from(first.payload))).toBe(false); } finally { descriptors.close(); From 5146c722afd8c79414f06ab6b20d352fbb1c6d70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Meta Vens Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 17:50:37 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 45/45] Boot test: fail on a logged publication fault, and require presence at startup A silent early return in the startup publication would otherwise pass, the 10 s pulse loop filling in the frames later. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 --- tests/idunn-boot.test.ts | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/idunn-boot.test.ts b/tests/idunn-boot.test.ts index d758910..a645986 100644 --- a/tests/idunn-boot.test.ts +++ b/tests/idunn-boot.test.ts @@ -199,13 +199,31 @@ describe.skipIf(!canLaunch)("the bundle booted as Idunn launches it", () => { const credential = await readFile(path.join(idunnRuntimeFixtures, "provider-identity.credential")); const generation = await launch("signs", credential); - // Startup publication, then one per 10 s pulse. + // Startup publication, then one per 10 s pulse. A publication fault is + // reported as it is logged rather than after the frames never arrive. + const publicationFault = new Promise((_resolve, reject) => { + const watch = setInterval(() => { + if (generation.stderr().includes(" failed on ")) { + clearInterval(watch); + reject(new Error(`publication failed; stderr: ${generation.stderr()}`)); + } + }, 200); + void idunn.frame(2).then(() => clearInterval(watch)); + }); + const exitedEarly = generation.exited.then((code) => { + throw new Error(`bundle exited ${code}; stderr: ${generation.stderr()}`); + }); + // The first statement is the startup publication, which follows the listen + // directly; the 10 s pulse loop has not yet fired. await Promise.race([ - idunn.frame(2), - generation.exited.then((code) => { - throw new Error(`bundle exited ${code}; stderr: ${generation.stderr()}`); - }), + idunn.frame(0), + publicationFault, + exitedEarly, + new Promise((_resolve, reject) => + setTimeout(() => reject(new Error(`no presence at startup; stderr: ${generation.stderr()}`)), 8_000) + ), ]); + await Promise.race([idunn.frame(2), publicationFault, exitedEarly]); expect(await answers(generation.candidatePort)).toBe(200);