GC_ACCESS_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PEM put the signing key's bytes into the
process environment, and so into any binding, unit or plan that carries
environment. The recipe never declared it and GC_ACCESS_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH
already covers the key as a file, which a binding binds through
[workload.secret_files]. The signing key is now always a file.
Idunn secret-files cut, Cut 1 (delete first).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md carried no public origin, so the
allowlist entry in src/app-profiles.ts (https://streampixels.gamecult.org)
had only ops config as a corroborating source, not a doc owner. Add the
line, corroborated by gamecult-ops/nginx/streampixels.gamecult.org.conf:14
and StreamPixels' own .env example, so all four allowlist entries have
a doc owner.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both caller-identity-soul.test.ts holes are now closed and promoted
from it.fails to a plain it (both green): the caller-chosen
completionCode is never redeemable, and an arbitrary returnTo origin
is refused. The AppCaller-literal tripwire's expected forger list moves
from ["private-command-plane.ts"] to [] now that the private plane
constructs its caller through callerFromOpenedEnvelope instead of the
literal; the "refuses to mint on refresh" test's wrongApp caller is
built the same way, since a raw { appSlug } literal no longer
satisfies the now-branded AppCaller type.
access-plugin.test.ts's ghostlight completion-code assertion is
updated: `completion.code` is minted independently of the attempt
handle now, so the test documents that the code differs from the
handle instead of asserting they match.
app-registry.test.ts drops validateAppRegistration coverage (deleted)
and seeds registered-app fixtures through InMemoryStore.seedRegisteredApp
instead of the deleted store.registerApp.
docs/service-contract.md documents the new 400 return_to_not_allowed
failure mode. state/evidence.jsonl records this pass's decisions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The doc still described the pre-cut world (Repixelizer named as the one app
allowed to send policy). Documents the actual failure mode: 401
app_auth_required from resolveAppCaller for any app, any handoff kind.
Per-app identity with a global fallback made repixelizer and streampixels one
identity in practice. Each app now needs its own
GC_ACCESS_APP_<SLUG>_SHARED_SECRET; operator mints distinct values on
Yggdrasil in the same deploy window. Doc note in service-contract.md corrected
to stop advertising the fallback.
R1: no GC service calls this route. Its shape (caller-supplied facts handed
straight to issueAccessClaim) is a second entitlement authority even when
gated, so authenticating it would preserve the oracle behind a password.
Deletion-only commit: route, discovery advertisement, mapper, contract type,
positive test, and doc mentions in architecture.md/service-contract.md/
fresh-workspace-handoff.md.
Spotiverse was lost with the E: drive and has no repository in the swarm,
but /v1/oauth/spotify/start stayed publicly reachable and
GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_SPOTIFY_CLIENT_ID/_SECRET stayed configured on
yggdrasil. That path would have run a real OAuth handshake against a real
secret and taken custody of a user's Spotify refresh token for a consumer
that could not use it.
The seam is supportsProvider(profile, provider): a provider with no app
behind it is unreachable. So the registry entry is what had to go, not the
provider.
Removed: spotiverseProfile and its registry entry, the spotiverse slug
from appSlugs, the hardcoded callback arm in app.ts, and three
spotiverse-specific tests. Removed from the host: the two spotify env
vars, backed up to /root/heimdall-service.env.bak-20260906-spotify. Nine
other provider vars and the file's 0600 heimdall:heimdall ownership are
untouched.
Kept deliberately: the entire spotify provider -- the providers.ts catalog
entry, spotifyRuntime and its token/profile exchange in oauth.ts, and
"spotify" in the providers union. It is intact and unreferenced, which is
what makes restoring a registry change rather than protocol work. The
capability is wanted back; a Persona managing the queue during a stream is
the motivating case.
docs/app-profiles/spotiverse.md is now the restore spec rather than an
archive: what was removed, what was kept, the base commit 5a15f71 to
recover the profile verbatim, and the daemon's callback URL
(http://127.0.0.1:8796/auth/heimdall/callback), which existed only in a
hardcoded allowlist arm and would otherwise have been lost with it.
Before deleting the three tests I checked their routes keep coverage:
managed-credential resolve is exercised twice via streampixels, and
backend_callback handoff at three other sites. The generic
untrusted_backend_callback negative test was retargeted to bifrost rather
than deleted. 35 pass, 9 files; tsc clean.
Verified the deployed build still boots without the vars --
readProviderConfig returns an empty config rather than throwing, so the
running release fails that route at request time instead of at startup.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Deployment topology already says same-host apps reach Heimdall over
localhost or private routing and verify claims locally. The vhost never
implemented it: heimdall.gamecult.org.conf is one
`location / { proxy_pass http://heimdall_app; }`, so every route Fastify
registers is on the open web. The boundary existed in this document and
nowhere in the running system.
Proposed: public is the browser-driven OAuth pair plus JWKS; discovery,
/v1/apps, claim issuance and /healthz go internal. The private command
plane is unaffected -- it is a CultNet operation server and never touches
nginx.
JWKS stays public deliberately rather than by omission. No provider
fetches it (every adapter in src/oauth.ts uses client_secret, not
private_key_jwt) and every relying party today is mesh-reachable, so
nothing external needs it. But publishing verification keys is harmless,
and hiding it fails asymmetrically: the first externally-hosted relying
party gets integrated with a standard OIDC library, and a jwks_uri that
resolves only on the mesh fails confusingly at integration time instead of
obviously at design time.
Discovery and /v1/apps move together, since trimming discovery alone
leaves /v1/apps serving the same catalog. That catalog is a product
inventory: per app it emits identityProviders, entitlementSources,
managedConnectionProviders and capabilities, and with the command plane's
discord_role_access and patreon_membership_access record kinds the
monetization model is legible to anyone who fetches it.
Separately recorded: the spotify provider outlived its consumer.
Spotiverse was lost with the E: drive, it is the only profile naming
spotify, and GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_SPOTIFY_CLIENT_ID/_SECRET are still
configured in /srv/heimdall/env/service.env while /v1/oauth/spotify/start
stays publicly reachable. That path would run a real OAuth handshake with
a real secret and take custody of a user's refresh token for a consumer
that cannot use it. Not a compromise; a live credential and a
token-custody path kept alive for nothing. Retiring it is its own change
and should not ride along with the boundary work.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
