Not in the 74004bf release list. The runtime role needs GRANT SELECT, DELETE ON oauth_state_uses before this build starts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A provider that keeps its refresh token valid (Twitch) keeps it when the
rotation cannot be committed: the marker is left, the token stays, and the
next caller after the backoff presents it. Blanking stays for a revoke and
for a provider that rotates (the rotate decision now carries
consumedRefreshToken). Live-Postgres test for Twitch written first and seen
failing; the contract states the rule inline.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When the rotation or revocation the provider's answer called for cannot be
committed, the fallback write now clears refresh_token_encrypted as well as
stamping the marker, so the end of the 60 s backoff cannot replay the consumed
token. Tests (live Postgres, trigger-refused revoke) assert no replayable token
and no second provider call. Docs: the marker is a best-effort write on a
second connection after rollback, the skew cap, the blanking write's residual.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A rotating provider that answered without a new refresh token has consumed the old one; the revoke
that follows is rolled back if its UPDATE fails, and no marker remained. The fallback marker now
covers revoke as well as rotate. The residual-risk paragraph says the window opens when the request
is sent, cites the steward ruling, and ends its sentences.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The marker carried the time the attempt began, so a slow failure ate the backoff; it now carries the
time the provider's answer (or failure) was known. A throw after the provider answered (custody
encrypt) records the marker instead of rolling it back, and a rotation Postgres refuses to write
leaves the marker in a transaction of its own. A stamp from a writer's clock ahead of the reader's by
the backoff or more is treated as skew, not a fresh failure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A failed or timed-out refresh attempt now writes refresh_failed_at under the row lock; a process
that takes the lock inside a 60 s backoff answers managed_credential_refresh_failed without calling
the provider. Rotation, revocation and re-link clear the marker. Closes the cross-process residual
that refresh-once-per-token left to a follow-up, and pins it on the two-pool rig.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The consent_refused page's return link is tested for heimdall_status,
heimdall_error, heimdall_refused_by and no completion code, for both a decline
and a provider access_denied. A browser_completion refusal now carries
heimdall_attempt_id. The contract for app authors is in the consent doc.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The ask sets its own cookie and no launch binding; Continue sets the binding
and carries the exact text shown into it; the receipt stores that text and its
hash. Grants-page form tokens keep the link's expiry. Revocations are unique
per grant and revoke reports only what it wrote. access_denied's attempt
denial code is pinned for Bifrost and Repixelizer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Managed custody (callbackMint custody_only) now stops at a Heimdall page before
the provider redirect. A decline or a provider access_denied is consent_refused
(by viewer|provider), distinct from provider_error. A granted completion writes
an append-only consent receipt with the asked and granted scopes and the digest
of the wording shown. GET /v1/me/grants lists every grant and receipt of the
signed-in account; revoking one strips the credential, so the app's next token
request is refused, and writes a revocation receipt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Browsers (Accept: text/html) refused for state_not_bound, state_already_launched
or state_already_used get the handoff page linking to return_to, re-checked
against the app's allowed origins; other callers keep the JSON code. A callback
with no binding denies the attempt its signed state names (pending only).
The memory store prunes a use record at exp + 30 s, as the state itself is
accepted that long; the schema comment says the same.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Launch hop, signed per-flow cookie and one-use claims are merged with main's
link-initiator binding and Google OIDC (secrets now derived at launch).
A connect start carrying a connection target now needs the app's own secret.
Google, link and managed-credential tests go through the launch helper.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
One initiator field (initiator_account_id) replaces link_account_id: a bearer
names it for requires_link providers, the authenticated app for the rest. One
refusal class (LinkRefusal, 403) replaces AccountLinkRefused. Provider count in
the verse test is 8.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The callback records a typed pending link (short TTL, single use) and
writes no linked identity; POST /v1/apps/:appSlug/links/confirm with the
Heimdall access token of the initiating account attaches it. A victim who
completes an attacker's link URL attaches nothing. The sign-in callback
also evaluates the account's other linked identities with the start-time
policy, so a Discord-origin member returning via Google keeps app_access.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Google is a Heimdall provider behind Bifrost, with no direct upstream.
Scopes openid email profile; the callback verifies the id_token
(RS256 against Google's keys, iss, aud, exp, iat, nonce) and requires
a verified email. The identity key is sub, never the email.
PKCE verifier and nonce are derived from the state jti and Heimdall's
signing key, so nothing is stored between start and callback.
Google never mints an account. mode=link needs a Heimdall access token
for the app and attaches to that account only; sign_in signs in an
identity already linked; an unknown sub is refused, and a sub held by
another account is never moved. The six existing providers still mint
on first login.
Admitted to the bifrost profile only. The Idunn recipe declares the
Google client id and secret file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Connection targets ride only on connect and link starts, which carry
x-heimdall-app-secret. A sign_in start is open to any browser; with a
connection it now returns 400 connection_not_allowed_in_sign_in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Link start needs an authenticated app and an initiatingAccountId, carried in
the signed state. The callback refuses an identity held by another account
(link_initiator_mismatch) and attaches an unlinked one to the initiator.
auth_completions stores target_id; redeem compares it and answers
completion_target_mismatch without consuming the code. Link completions are
redeemed only by the authenticated app.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
index.ts declared the presence sequence below the startup try, so the bundle's
hoisted var was undefined at the first publish; decodePrivateIdentity refused the
Rust owner's integer-array key fields; both descriptors were re-read every pulse and
returned nothing after the first. openPresenceAuthority now reads the bundle facts and
each descriptor once (whole, from offset 0, then closed), owns the one publisher
sequence, and signs through them; a launch-contract fault throws before anything
listens, so the process exits non-zero. decodePrivateIdentity takes the shape of its
source and names the failed check, never a value. openActivationSigner and the
per-pulse descriptor reads are deleted.
tests/idunn-boot.test.ts boots the bundle under the Idunn launch contract and checks
the signed warming frames and the fail-fast exits. The descriptor, sequence and
generation tests now use the Rust-written fixtures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
nextPublisherSequence read and rewrote <dataRoot>/runtime-presence-sequence at
mode 0600, which the next generation (a fresh DynamicUser uid in the shared
state group) cannot open. Odin compares publisher_sequence only within one
activation and Idunn mints a new activation per start, so PublisherSequence
derives it from the observation clock, never below the previous value plus
one, as Muninn does. openProviderHealthIdentity under
GAMECULT_IDUNN_RUNTIME_BUNDLE now refuses when the presence descriptor is
absent instead of enrolling an identity Idunn does not trust.
Adds the cross-generation test (root only) and the sequence, no-dataRoot and
missing-descriptor tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bifrost's browser binding is the secrecy of a nonce carried readable in the signed state, so only Bifrost may mint a Bifrost state. The gate sits in startOAuthFlow beside the entitlementPolicy caller check, so HTTP and the private command plane share it. Follows the red tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Joystick rotates refresh tokens, so a code-exchange answer whose refresh_token
is absent or empty would store a credential the first refresh revokes. The
shared exchange now throws a typed ProviderResponseError before the identity
is resolved or anything is written. The residual-risk comment on the in-flight
refresh map cites its follow-up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A value like 3e11 overflowed the Date the expiry is stored as and surfaced
as an untyped error. usableExpiresIn now caps a usable value at 365 days;
the refresh path is pinned on memory and live Postgres.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
callbackMint now takes the connection: custody_only is a connect for a
managed-connection-only provider bound to connection.kind creator with a
targetId. Anything else is refused at start with creator_connection_required
before any redirect, and at the callback from the signed state before the
code exchange. The streampixels profile note says what Heimdall guarantees
and records the S1 rule that SP's redeem treats a non-creator Joystick
completion as an error, never a sign-in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every shared capability needs a non-empty anyOf, so an empty fact set already
yields no capabilities; the explicit empty list beside it was a second owner
no test could tell apart from the first.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Refresh and exchange answers now type as ExpiringTokenSet, and a rotate
decision requires tokenExpiresAt, so neither store has a no-expiry rule left
to mutate: a NULL expiry can only be written by a revoke.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A token answer without a usable expires_in (absent, non-numeric, a string that
is not a positive integer) now takes the descriptor's
defaultAccessTokenLifetimeSeconds (3600 for every provider), so no issued
token has a NULL expiry that dueForRefresh would never refresh. A 2xx whose
refresh_token is present but not a string is the typed
provider_body_not_token_set (502 managed_credential_refresh_failed, tokens
kept); an empty string stays a missing token, so a rotating provider still
fails closed. The expiry rule is now pinned on memory and both live Postgres
rigs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The start gate only refused early. The callback ignored the signed state's
mode, so a Joystick connect for StreamPixels redeemed into a viewer_access
session. callbackMint(profile, provider, mode) now decides at the callback:
identity providers keep a viewer session (Bifrost discord connect unchanged);
a connect for a managed-connection-only provider stores custody and mints a
claim with no facts, no capabilities and no refresh token (the refresh route
would recompute viewer_access from the account); anything else is refused.
StreamPixels' redeem reads only account, provider, mode, connection and
claimSet.identities, so it accepts the capability-free claim unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A JSON array has no string access_token, so the typeof check refuses it;
the separate Array.isArray clause was an equivalent mutant's worth of code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The first gate refused connect for a provider outside managedConnectionProviders,
which broke Bifrost's existing Discord connect. sign_in and link still take
identityProviders only, so a managed-only provider (Joystick) can never sign
anyone in or link; connect takes either list.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Callers that arrive while a refresh of one linked identity is in flight in
this process join it and receive its success or failure, instead of queuing
on the row lock and presenting the same refresh token again behind a failed
holder. The entry lives as long as the attempt, so a later request retries.
The store lock stays the cross-process guard; the residual risk (one
presentation per process per burst) is written into the service contract.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A grant verdict is read from a 400 body by exact code, never from a 401, a
5xx or a 2xx. A 2xx that is not an object with a non-empty string
access_token and no error is refused as provider_body_not_token_set, so a
malformed success keeps the tokens and surfaces as the typed 502 for every
provider, rotating or not. A refresh answer without expires_in stores the
expiry as unknown rather than keeping the already-due one; an unknown expiry
is never due, so the next resolve does not refresh again.
Pins Soul's three surviving mutants: substring code match, the dropped
expiry rule, and the snapshot refresh token on a non-rotating provider.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
sign_in and link now take only identityProviders; connect takes only
managedConnectionProviders. supportsProvider(), which unioned the role lists
with entitlementSources and never looked at the mode, is deleted: a Joystick
sign_in for streampixels no longer starts, so a Deru sign-in cannot rewrite
his managed credential row. No built-in profile had a provider reachable
only through the union.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The credential write returns updated_at; a Date there broke the equality the
port promises against the in-memory store.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
pg returns a Date for TIMESTAMPTZ; a byte-identity check on a kept credential
saw a Date where the port types a string.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Joystick joins the catalog (Basic client auth, rotatesRefreshTokens), resolves
identity by channel id, and is a streampixels managed-connection provider only:
it is not an identity provider for the profile (ruling signin-waits-for-public-bot).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
refreshLinkedIdentityCredentialIfNeeded is deleted. refreshManagedCredential
owns the policy; HeimdallStore.updateLinkedIdentityCredential owns the row
(SELECT ... FOR UPDATE in Postgres, a per-id chain in memory), so a refresh
token is presented once across concurrent requests and processes. invalid_grant
clears the tokens (410 managed_credential_revoked); any other failure keeps
them (502 managed_credential_refresh_failed). The "?? refreshToken" keep-old
fallback is gone; keeping it is an explicit branch for non-rotating providers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Endpoint, client-auth method (RFC 7591 names) and rotation now live on
ProviderDescriptor; requestProviderTokens is the only code that talks to a
token endpoint. Failure labels are unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Soul pass 7, S7-3 and S7-4, P7-3 and P7-5.
Columns (S7-3): every declared column must be under a deterministic
collation. A case-insensitive provider_user_id whose key index compares
under "C" passed, and the store's own lookups then matched other users'
ids.
The check becomes checkSchemaRequirements(pool, requirements), with
Heimdall's store calling it with HEIMDALL_SCHEMA_REQUIREMENTS (its tables,
columns, keys and privileges). That seam lets a live test check a
predicate Postgres prints differently from how it is written (a literal
gains its cast): the check must still pass, so comparing the raw text
instead of the printed form (P7-3's Y1) now fails.
A role that may not create temporary tables was refused with 42501 and
told to check GC_ACCESS_DATABASE_URL_FILE (P7-5). The predicate printer now
refuses it as SCHEMA_TEMP_PRIVILEGE, and startup says to grant the role
TEMPORARY on its database, in fixed text.
New fixtures (S7-4): a case-insensitive collation on a key's first column
(Y3), NOT NULL added to a nullable column of linked_identities (Y5), and
every privilege on auth_completions except on attempt_id (Y8) are refused;
a key index that INCLUDEs an undeclared case-insensitive column starts
(Y4).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Soul pass 7, S7-2. The out-of-scope list named CHECK constraints, triggers
and row-level security. It now also names unique indexes beyond or
stricter than the required keys (including leftovers of an interrupted
concurrent build, which are enforced once ready), NOT NULL columns the
schema does not declare and that have no default, and column-level SELECT
under SELECT * or RETURNING *, which needs every column of the table.
Documentation only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The mutations dropping indisvalid or indisready each survived alone,
because a failed CREATE INDEX CONCURRENTLY clears both. Postgres never
marks an index valid before it is ready (DROP INDEX CONCURRENTLY clears
validity first), so indisready adds nothing and is deleted. A fixture now
holds an index that is ready but not valid, the state an interrupted DROP
INDEX CONCURRENTLY leaves, set directly in pg_index by the admin role.
Comparing the raw declared predicate instead of Postgres's printing of it
survived too: the schema's one predicate splits into the same conditions
either way. A live test now pins printedDeclaredPredicates to the printed
predicate of the applied attempt index, so the printing itself is
checked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The store's coverage test lists every method on PostgresStore as an
operation the workload must call, and the private predicate printer
counted as one. It is a helper of checkSchema, not a store operation, so
it becomes a function of the pool.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
`collation` is reserved in Postgres, so the key check's query failed with
42601 on every database and every start refused. The live block showed it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Soul pass 6, F1-F4, F7 and F8.
Keys (F1, F2): a key is met only by a unique index that is valid and
ready, so the invalid index a failed CREATE UNIQUE INDEX CONCURRENTLY
leaves behind (every sign-in failing with 42P10, or one consume taking
two rows) is refused; and whose key columns compare under deterministic
collations, so a case-insensitive collation cannot merge two providers'
user ids into one row and move an identity between accounts.
Predicates (F3, F7): the declared predicates are printed by Postgres
itself, by indexing a temporary copy of each keyed table's declared
columns in one transaction that is rolled back, and compared with the
index's printed predicate as sets of top-level AND-ed conditions, split
by nesting and never inside quoted text. Case and structure are kept, so
((a OR b) AND c) and (a OR (b AND c)) differ, as do 'Pending' and
'pending', and an extra condition narrows the predicate and is refused.
Conditions in another order match.
F4: lookup-only indexes are no longer required (REQUIRED_RELATIONS is now
REQUIRED_TABLES; unique indexes are checked by shape in REQUIRED_KEYS), so
a renamed attempt index or a dropped lookup index starts. Privileges are
checked per column with has_column_privilege on every column the schema
declares, which a table grant satisfies; a role granted each needed
privilege column by column starts and runs every store operation, and one
holding INSERT on only one audit column is refused. On (c): a unique index
treats NULL keys as distinct unless it is NULLS NOT DISTINCT, so rows with
a NULL attempt_id never collide and `attempt_id IS NOT NULL` is redundant;
that condition may be absent from the attempt index's predicate, except on
a NULLS NOT DISTINCT index (refused). A key declared without a predicate
must have none, since ON CONFLICT cannot infer a partial arbiter.
F8: a column the schema leaves nullable must be nullable; NOT NULL added
to attempt_id is refused. CHECK constraints, triggers and row-level
security stay out of scope, as the schema comment says.
Every change is a live fixture: invalid identity key, invalid attempt
index over duplicate attempts, case-insensitive key, narrowed and
OR-widened predicates, NULLS NOT DISTINCT, NOT NULL added, partial column
grants are refused; reordered and unredundant predicates, a renamed
attempt index, dropped lookup indexes and column-by-column grants start.
The fake-pool code-mapping tests are replaced by unit tests of the
predicate comparison.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>