Declare Joystick in the Idunn recipe and document the locked refresh

Recipe optional_environment gains the Joystick client id and secret file;
service-contract documents the row lock, rotation fail-closed and the 410/502
answers; the StreamPixels profile names Heimdall as sole holder of provider
refresh tokens (F5).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

deployment/idunn/recipe.toml

@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ optional_environment = [
   "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_DISCORD_CLIENT_ID",
   "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_DISCORD_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE",
   "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE",
+  "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_JOYSTICK_CLIENT_ID",
+  "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_JOYSTICK_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE",
   "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_PATREON_CLIENT_ID",
   "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_PATREON_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE",
   "GC_ACCESS_PROVIDER_SPOTIFY_CLIENT_SECRET_FILE",

docs/app-profiles/streampixels.md

@@ -20,7 +20,11 @@ Corroborated by `gamecult-ops/nginx/streampixels.gamecult.org.conf:14`
 The current StreamPixels architecture already makes useful splits:
 
 - the web app owns the remembered viewer session
-- the service owns provider OAuth exchange and identity resolution
+- Heimdall owns provider OAuth exchange, identity resolution and refresh-token
+  custody for Twitch, YouTube and Joystick; StreamPixels never calls a provider
+  token endpoint and holds no provider refresh token. It asks Heimdall for a
+  short-lived access token (`managed-credentials/resolve`) and treats `410
+  managed_credential_revoked` as "the creator must reconnect"
 - the overlay remains auth-free
 - creator memberships and operator roles are separate from general viewer state
 
@@ -38,7 +42,7 @@ In the service-first Heimdall version, the most likely reusable slice is:
 
 - provider OAuth authority
 - identity-linking authority
-- managed Twitch/YouTube credential custody for creator connections
+- managed Twitch/YouTube/Joystick credential custody for creator connections (Joystick is a managed connection only, not a viewer sign-in provider)
 - entitlement refresh
 - shared claim semantics
 

docs/service-contract.md

@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ Supported providers in the skeleton:
 - `twitch`
 - `youtube`
 - `spotify`
+- `joystick`
 
 Request body:
 
@@ -430,9 +431,11 @@ Important behavior:
 
 - the refresh token is signed by Heimdall and scoped to one app session
 - the access token remains short-lived; app backends still verify it locally
-- if a stored provider access token is expired or near expiry, Heimdall uses
+- if a stored provider access token is expired or near expiry, Heimdall takes
-  the stored provider refresh token and persists any rotation before
+  a row lock on the linked identity, re-reads it, uses the stored provider
-  evaluating entitlements
+  refresh token and persists any rotation before evaluating entitlements; an
+  identity whose grant the provider has revoked (no stored access token)
+  contributes no entitlement
 - any app authenticated via `x-heimdall-app-secret` (`resolveAppCaller`) may
   send `entitlementPolicies`; Heimdall matches each stored identity to the
   policy for that provider. Sending policy without authenticating is
@@ -484,7 +487,22 @@ Important behavior:
 - it returns access tokens only; refresh tokens remain in Heimdall custody
 - when a stored managed credential is expired or within the refresh window,
   Heimdall refreshes it before returning the access token and persists rotated
-  access/refresh tokens
+  access/refresh tokens. The refresh runs under a row lock on the linked
+  identity (`SELECT ... FOR UPDATE`), so a given refresh token is presented to
+  the provider once across concurrent requests and across two Heimdall
+  processes sharing one database. The provider call is bounded at 10 seconds
+- a provider whose refresh tokens rotate (Joystick) fails closed: a refresh
+  response without a new refresh token revokes the credential instead of
+  keeping the old token
+- `410 {"error":"managed_credential_revoked","provider":...}`: the provider
+  rejected the grant (`invalid_grant`), or the identity holds no access token.
+  The stored tokens are cleared and an audit event `managed_credential_revoked`
+  is written; the owner must reconnect. `404 managed_credential_not_found`
+  means no linked identity exists
+- `502 {"error":"managed_credential_refresh_failed","provider":...}`: the
+  refresh failed for any reason that is not a grant verdict (invalid client,
+  provider 5xx, timeout, malformed body). Stored tokens are untouched and a
+  later request may succeed
 - app-local binding, diagnostics, subscription setup, and runtime behavior stay
   app-owned