Four entries the native target did not have. Two for the rule that a blocking
crossing is a counted host call: the revert deletes the call scope from
`cultmesh_quic_next_event`, and the loosening keeps the scope and its refusal but
drops it at the door, before the call blocks. Two for the rule that a positive
timeout blocks until an event or the close: the revert inverts the comparison,
and the loosening waits a token millisecond. All four were green before this,
because nothing checked that the pollers were inside the library at all.
The bounded-wait loosening goes from 1 ms to 50 ms. A 1 ms bound only ever lost
a race — the margin was a few hundred lock handoffs — and the same loosening at
50 ms survived on both targets. `holdclose` holds its pollers for 500 ms, so any
bound shorter than the hold now expires with calls still inside. A bound longer
than the hold is not distinguished, which is this entry's honest limit.
A run that skips entries covered those rules with nothing, and exiting 0 let a
win32-x64 run — where every ThreadSanitizer rule is skipped — be read as a green
gate. It exits 2 and says so, with a killed/survived/skipped line.
A red control arrived as a bare colour with the child's output thrown away,
which is how a configuration that could not start at all stayed invisible. The
control now prints what the child said. On linux-x64 the sanitizer
configurations are re-executed through `setarch -R`, because ThreadSanitizer
dies before `main` on the kernel's address-space randomisation; both that and
the seccomp denial behind `personality(ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)` stop the run with the
cause and the required invocation instead of being reported as kills.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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