README: state the two suite prerequisites (real .NET 8, built CultLib)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

README.md

@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ For the full staged roadmap, including contribution points, revenue share, patro
 - set `Heimdall:PatronSupportIntakeSecret` before enabling Heimdall patron support intake in production
 - default connection string points at local PostgreSQL
 - build with `dotnet build Bifrost.slnx`
-- test with `DOTNET_ROLL_FORWARD=Major dotnet test Bifrost.slnx` if the machine only has the .NET 10 runtime installed
+- test with `dotnet test Bifrost.slnx`; the suite needs a real .NET 8 runtime (`DOTNET_ROOT`, with a runsettings `DotNetHostPath` if the SDK is newer; .NET 10 roll-forward makes Mvc.Testing 8.0.0 return 500 on every JSON response) and a built CultLib TypeScript runtime (`dist/` and `node_modules`) at `$VOIDBOT_CULTLIB_ROOT`
 - dry-run a Reddit organizing thread with `node tools/bifrost-bridge.mjs reddit-post --title "Thread title" --persona-name Bifrost --content "Thread body" --dry-run true`
 - print the Eve provider advertisement with `node tools/provider-advertisement.mjs print`
 - export the Eve provider store with `node tools/provider-advertisement.mjs export --out .bifrost/provider-store.cc`

tests/Bifrost.Web.Tests/ConceptRankedExportTests.cs

@@ -210,7 +210,8 @@ public sealed class ConceptRankedExportTests : IClassFixture<ConceptRankedExport
         yield return ["not base64!"];
         yield return ["AAAA"];
         yield return [new string('A', 201)];
-        yield return [new string('A', 100_000)];
+        // 50,000 chars is the longest the client Uri (65,519 cap on Unix) can carry with the path; far past the 200-char RankCursor.MaxLength.
+        yield return [new string('A', 50_000)];
         yield return [B64("")];
         yield return [B64("1|0|0|5")];
         yield return [B64("1|0|0|5|alpha|extra")];

tests/path-within.test.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+import test from "node:test";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { isWithin } from "../tools/path-within.mjs";
+
+const flavours = [
+  { name: "posix", pathApi: path.posix, root: "/srv/repo", sep: "/", inside: "/srv/repo/src/a.txt", sibling: "/srv/repo-evil/a.txt", other: "/etc/passwd" },
+  { name: "win32", pathApi: path.win32, root: "C:\\Work\\Repo", sep: "\\", inside: "C:\\Work\\Repo\\src\\a.txt", sibling: "C:\\Work\\Repo-evil\\a.txt", other: "D:\\Work\\Repo\\a.txt" },
+];
+
+for (const f of flavours) {
+  const opts = { pathApi: f.pathApi };
+  test(`${f.name}: a path inside the root, and the root itself, are within`, () => {
+    assert.equal(isWithin(f.root, f.inside, opts), true);
+    assert.equal(isWithin(f.root, f.root, opts), true);
+    assert.equal(isWithin(f.root, f.root + f.sep, opts), true);
+  });
+
+  test(`${f.name}: a sibling sharing the root as a name prefix is refused`, () => {
+    assert.equal(isWithin(f.root, f.sibling, opts), false);
+  });
+
+  test(`${f.name}: a dot-dot escape and an unrelated absolute path are refused`, () => {
+    assert.equal(isWithin(f.root, f.root + f.sep + ["..", "x"].join(f.sep), opts), false);
+    assert.equal(isWithin(f.root, f.other, opts), false);
+    assert.equal(isWithin(f.root, f.root + f.sep + "..", opts), false);
+  });
+
+  test(`${f.name}: a name that merely starts with two dots is inside`, () => {
+    assert.equal(isWithin(f.root, f.root + f.sep + "..cache" + f.sep + "x", opts), true);
+  });
+
+  test(`${f.name}: excluded dir, strictly beneath it vs not`, () => {
+    const excluded = f.root + f.sep + "tools" + f.sep + "git-gate";
+    const strict = { ...opts, allowSelf: false };
+    assert.equal(isWithin(excluded, excluded + f.sep + "git.cmd", strict), true);
+    assert.equal(isWithin(excluded, excluded, strict), false);
+    assert.equal(isWithin(excluded, excluded + "-other" + f.sep + "git", strict), false);
+    assert.equal(isWithin(excluded, f.root + f.sep + "bin" + f.sep + "git", strict), false);
+  });
+}
+
+test("win32: comparison ignores case, as Windows paths do", () => {
+  assert.equal(isWithin("C:\\Work\\Repo", "c:\\work\\repo\\SRC\\a.txt", { pathApi: path.win32 }), true);
+  assert.equal(isWithin("C:\\Work\\Repo", "c:\\work\\repo-evil\\a.txt", { pathApi: path.win32 }), false);
+});
+
+test("posix: comparison is case-sensitive", () => {
+  assert.equal(isWithin("/srv/repo", "/srv/Repo/a.txt", { pathApi: path.posix }), false);
+});

tools/bifrost-bridge.mjs

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import { mkdir, readFile, unlink, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
 import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
 import { dirname, resolve } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import { isWithin } from "./path-within.mjs";
 import {
   beginCrossingReceipt,
   crossingProvenanceFromOptions,
@@ -182,7 +183,7 @@ async function createGitHubDraftPr(options) {
   }
 
   const targetPath = resolve(repoRoot, relativePath);
-  if (!targetPath.toLowerCase().startsWith(`${repoRoot.toLowerCase()}\\`) && targetPath.toLowerCase() !== repoRoot.toLowerCase()) {
+  if (!isWithin(repoRoot, targetPath)) {
     throw new Error(`Target path escapes repo root: ${relativePath}`);
   }
 

tools/git-gate/gh-proxy.mjs

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
 import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
-import { dirname, resolve } from "node:path";
+import { dirname } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import { isWithin } from "../path-within.mjs";
 
 const args = process.argv.slice(2);
 const wrapperDir = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
@@ -90,9 +91,7 @@ function resolveExecutable(command, excludedDir) {
 }
 
 function isWithinExcludedDir(candidate, excludedDir) {
-  const normalizedCandidate = resolve(candidate).toLowerCase();
-  const normalizedExcludedDir = `${resolve(excludedDir).toLowerCase()}\\`;
-  return normalizedCandidate.startsWith(normalizedExcludedDir);
+  return isWithin(excludedDir, candidate, { allowSelf: false });
 }
 
 function isWindowsCommandScript(command) {

tools/git-gate/git-proxy.mjs

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env node
 import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
-import { dirname, resolve } from "node:path";
+import { dirname } from "node:path";
 import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+import { isWithin } from "../path-within.mjs";
 
 const args = process.argv.slice(2);
 const wrapperDir = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
@@ -59,9 +60,7 @@ function resolveExecutable(command, excludedDir) {
 }
 
 function isWithinExcludedDir(candidate, excludedDir) {
-  const normalizedCandidate = resolve(candidate).toLowerCase();
-  const normalizedExcludedDir = `${resolve(excludedDir).toLowerCase()}\\`;
-  return normalizedCandidate.startsWith(normalizedExcludedDir);
+  return isWithin(excludedDir, candidate, { allowSelf: false });
 }
 
 function findGitSubcommand(input) {

tools/path-within.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+import path from "node:path";
+
+// True when `candidate` is `root` itself (only if allowSelf) or lies beneath it.
+// Containment is path.relative-based, so it follows the host's separator and
+// case rules; pass path.win32 or path.posix to pin a flavour.
+export function isWithin(root, candidate, { pathApi = path, allowSelf = true } = {}) {
+  const relative = pathApi.relative(pathApi.resolve(root), pathApi.resolve(candidate));
+  if (relative === "") {
+    return allowSelf;
+  }
+  if (pathApi.isAbsolute(relative) || relative === ".." || relative.startsWith(`..${pathApi.sep}`)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}