Validate runtime receipt linkage
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8 changed files with 467 additions and 14 deletions
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@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ node .\tools\agent-transport.mjs apply-snapshot --in E:\tmp\bifrost-agent-transp
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Dispatch receipts should use Bifrost's own public persona in the Bifrost governance channel. `tools/dispatch-agent-requests.mjs` reads `BIFROST_DISCORD_CHANNEL_ID` or `DISCORD_BIFROST_CHANNEL_ID` for the receipt target, uses persona name `Bifrost`, and defaults the persona avatar to the public `src/Bifrost.Web/wwwroot/img/bifrost-profile.png` raw GitHub URL unless `BIFROST_DISCORD_PERSONA_AVATAR_URL` or `DISCORD_PERSONA_AVATAR_URL_BIFROST` overrides it. Receipt text must lead with the concrete repo and work title, not a generic "recent consensus" summary, and must not expose request ids, workspace paths, log paths, or other debugging debris in Discord.
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The dispatcher now tags those Discord receipts with the Bifrost request id as bridge provenance, and dispatched Codex turns inherit default bridge provenance environment variables so any explicit `tools/bifrost-bridge.mjs` crossing inside the turn can land on the same request trail without hand-carried flags. When `BIFROST_BRIDGE_BASE_URL` and `BIFROST_BRIDGE_TOKEN` are configured, the dispatcher also records `/dispatch/runs/*` receipts in the hosted app so Bifrost keeps a first-class run ledger for launch, completion, cancellation, and failure.
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Those hosted runtime receipt endpoints are owned by the local bridge token, not by ordinary member sessions. A signed-in member can govern work and request crossings, but they cannot POST `/dispatch/runs/*`, `/transport/receipts`, or `/governance/receipts` without the configured bridge token and pretend to be the worker runtime.
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Those hosted receipt endpoints now also cross-check each other. Dispatch starts require an existing request-lane receipt for the same request id, governance promotions that cite `dispatchRequestId` must point at a known request-lane request, and additional request-lane receipts for one request id cannot drift onto a different repo or agent identity. The ledger is still transitional, but it has stopped politely accepting shape-shifting runtime history.
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Those dispatched turns also inherit Bifrost-owned GitHub gates through environment config. `git` and `gh` wrappers are prepended in `PATH`, a `pre-push` hook backs up raw Git pushes, raw `git push` stays blocked inside dispatched work even with `--no-verify`, and direct `gh` usage is limited to explicit read-only commands unless the bridge explicitly authorizes the GitHub mutation it owns.
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Those dispatched turns also lock the local-only recovery hatches. `--allow-ungated-github`, `BIFROST_ALLOW_UNGATED_GITHUB`, `--allow-unreceipted-activity`, and `BIFROST_ALLOW_UNRECEIPTED_ACTIVITY` are refused inside dispatched work so an agent cannot quietly downgrade itself out of Bifrost's gate or receipt trail.
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Those dispatched turns also scrub ambient GitHub auth state from the child environment before the worker starts. `GH_TOKEN` and `GITHUB_TOKEN` are cleared, `gh` gets an isolated config directory, `git` gets an isolated global config plus non-interactive credential settings, and terminal prompts are disabled. That does not prove every imaginable direct-HTTP escape is impossible, but it removes the normal ambient credential path from dispatched work.
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@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ The hosted app also exposes a governance activity receipt ledger:
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This covers the other side of the swarm's work: topic opens, comments, approvals, and promotions to dispatch. The topic and comment documents are still the governance substrate. The hosted receipt row is the Bifrost-side witness that an agent or operator performed the governance action.
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These runtime receipt lanes are not generic member write surfaces. In the current machine, `/dispatch/runs/*`, `/transport/receipts`, and `/governance/receipts` are owned by the configured local bridge token. Active members may govern and request bridge actions through the app, but they may not mint worker-history rows directly through a browser session and impersonate runtime activity.
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They also now validate linkage across the hosted ledger instead of accepting isolated claims. A dispatch run must point at an already-seen request-lane receipt for the same request id. A governance promotion receipt that cites `dispatchRequestId` must point at a known request-lane request. Repeated request-lane rows for one request id may add activity, but they may not quietly change the repo or agent identity the request belongs to.
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Current gate behavior:
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