Harden dispatched app-server sandbox defaults

This commit is contained in:
Meta Vens 2026-06-17 10:08:16 +01:00
commit 1fdf6b8a87
5 changed files with 163 additions and 4 deletions

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@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ For the full staged roadmap, including contribution points, revenue share, patro
- set `BIFROST_BRIDGE_BASE_URL` and `BIFROST_BRIDGE_TOKEN` when `tools/bifrost-bridge.mjs` should round-trip every action through the app ledger before mutating GitHub, Discord, or Reddit
- the same bridge URL/token pair lets `tools/dispatch-agent-requests.mjs` record `/dispatch/runs/*` receipts for launched Codex work, so Bifrost keeps a live run trail even when a turn fails
- Bifrost-dispatched Codex turns also inject Bifrost-owned GitHub gates through environment config: `git` and `gh` wrappers are prepended in `PATH`, a `pre-push` hook backs up raw Git pushes, raw `git push` and mutating `gh` commands stay blocked, and only `tools/bifrost-bridge.mjs` is allowed to authorize the bridge-owned GitHub mutation path
- dispatched Codex turns now default to `workspace-write` instead of full machine access, and the app-server sandbox policy disables network access unless the operator explicitly chooses a broader sandbox
- `tools/agent-transport.mjs` also uses that bridge configuration to record `/transport/receipts` entries for queue, claim, release, and close events on the request lane
- `tools/agent-transport.mjs apply-snapshot` is also treated as a mutating import path now: it fails closed without the bridge receipt config and derives request-lane receipts from the imported state delta
- `tools/governance-threads.mjs` uses that same bridge configuration to record `/governance/receipts` entries for topic opens, comments, approvals, and promotions

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@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ The dispatcher now tags those Discord receipts with the Bifrost request id as br
Those dispatched turns also inherit Bifrost-owned GitHub gates through environment config. `git` and `gh` wrappers are prepended in `PATH`, a `pre-push` hook backs up raw Git pushes, raw `git push` stays blocked inside dispatched work even with `--no-verify`, and mutating `gh` commands are blocked too unless the bridge explicitly authorizes the GitHub mutation it owns.
Those dispatched turns also lock the local-only recovery hatches. `--allow-ungated-github`, `BIFROST_ALLOW_UNGATED_GITHUB`, `--allow-unreceipted-activity`, and `BIFROST_ALLOW_UNRECEIPTED_ACTIVITY` are refused inside dispatched work so an agent cannot quietly downgrade itself out of Bifrost's gate or receipt trail.
Those dispatched turns also scrub ambient GitHub auth state from the child environment before the worker starts. `GH_TOKEN` and `GITHUB_TOKEN` are cleared, `gh` gets an isolated config directory, `git` gets an isolated global config plus non-interactive credential settings, and terminal prompts are disabled. That does not prove every imaginable direct-HTTP escape is impossible, but it removes the normal ambient credential path from dispatched work.
Those dispatched turns now also default to the `workspace-write` sandbox instead of full machine access, and the app-server launch path now tells Codex to keep `networkAccess: false` unless the operator explicitly chooses a broader sandbox. The worker can still read the repo and do its job, but GitHub authority no longer leaks in through the default launch posture.
When that same bridge configuration is present, `tools/agent-transport.mjs` records `/transport/receipts` entries for queue, claim, release, and close operations on the request lane. The packet still lives in CultCache. The hosted receipt row is the Bifrost-side witness that an agent or dispatcher touched it.
`apply-snapshot` is treated as a mutating import path too. It now fails closed without that same bridge configuration and derives request-lane receipts from the imported state delta, so a snapshot can no longer rewrite queue or claim state behind Bifrost's back.
Those mutating scripts now fail closed without that bridge configuration. Use `--allow-unreceipted-activity true` or `BIFROST_ALLOW_UNRECEIPTED_ACTIVITY=true` only for explicit local recovery work where you are intentionally accepting a blind spot.

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@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ Current CLI wiring:
- those dispatched turns also inject Bifrost-owned GitHub gates through environment config: `git` and `gh` wrappers are prepended in `PATH`, a `pre-push` hook backs up raw Git pushes, raw `git push` stays blocked even when `--no-verify` is used, and mutating `gh` commands are blocked unless the bridge explicitly authorizes them
- those dispatched turns also lock local-only recovery hatches: `--allow-ungated-github`, `BIFROST_ALLOW_UNGATED_GITHUB`, `--allow-unreceipted-activity`, and `BIFROST_ALLOW_UNRECEIPTED_ACTIVITY` are refused inside dispatched work so a worker cannot opt itself out of Bifrost gate or receipt policy
- those dispatched turns also scrub ambient GitHub auth state from the child environment before the worker starts: `GH_TOKEN` and `GITHUB_TOKEN` are cleared, `gh` gets an isolated config directory, `git` gets an isolated global config plus non-interactive credential settings, and terminal prompts are disabled
- those dispatched turns now default to the `workspace-write` sandbox in both `codex exec` and app-server launch paths, and the non-danger app-server sandbox policy sets `networkAccess: false` so GitHub mutation authority stays with Bifrost instead of bleeding back into the child runtime by default
- the dispatcher also uses that same bridge configuration to post dispatch-run start/complete/fail receipts, including the worker pid, thread/turn ids when available, and result/log paths for the local operator trail
- the agent transport CLI uses that same bridge configuration to post request-lane receipts for queue, claim, release, and close events, so Bifrost does not go blind between intake and dispatch
- the governance threads CLI uses that same bridge configuration to post governance receipts for topic opens, comments, approvals, and promotions, so Bifrost does not lose the pre-dispatch reasoning trail

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@ -499,6 +499,143 @@ writeFileSync(process.env.DISPATCH_ENV_DUMP, JSON.stringify({
}
}
[Fact]
public async Task Dispatch_worker_uses_workspace_write_without_network_for_app_server()
{
var tempDir = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), $"bifrost-dispatch-appserver-{Guid.NewGuid():N}");
var transportStorePath = Path.Combine(RepoRoot, ".bifrost", "agent-transport.cc");
var transportStoreBackup = Path.Combine(Path.GetTempPath(), $"bifrost-agent-transport-backup-{Guid.NewGuid():N}.cc");
var hadTransportStore = File.Exists(transportStorePath);
Directory.CreateDirectory(tempDir);
var requestPath = Path.Combine(tempDir, "request.json");
var promptPath = Path.Combine(tempDir, "prompt.md");
var logPath = Path.Combine(tempDir, "codex.log");
var dumpPath = Path.Combine(tempDir, "app-server.json");
var fakeServerPath = Path.Combine(tempDir, "fake-app-server.mjs");
if (hadTransportStore)
{
File.Copy(transportStorePath, transportStoreBackup, overwrite: true);
}
try
{
await File.WriteAllTextAsync(requestPath, """
{
"id": "req_dispatch_appserver_123",
"targetRepoName": "Bifrost",
"targetRepositoryFullName": "GameCult/Bifrost",
"targetAgentIdentity": "nibu",
"title": "Dispatch app-server test",
"requestMarkdown": "## Request\n\nInspect sandbox policy.",
"priority": 50,
"status": "claimed",
"sourceKind": "manual",
"sourceChannelId": "",
"sourceMessageIds": [],
"sourcePacketPath": "",
"sourcePromptPath": "",
"createdByAgent": "tester",
"claimedByAgent": "tester",
"closeNote": "",
"createdAt": "2026-06-17T00:00:00Z",
"updatedAt": "2026-06-17T00:00:00Z",
"claimedAt": "2026-06-17T00:00:00Z",
"closedAt": ""
}
""", new UTF8Encoding(false));
await File.WriteAllTextAsync(promptPath, "Hello", new UTF8Encoding(false));
await File.WriteAllTextAsync(fakeServerPath, """
import { createInterface } from "node:readline";
import { writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
const dumpPath = process.env.DISPATCH_APP_SERVER_DUMP;
const requests = [];
const rl = createInterface({ input: process.stdin, crlfDelay: Infinity });
rl.on("line", (line) => {
const message = JSON.parse(line);
requests.push({ method: message.method, params: message.params ?? null });
if (message.method === "initialize") {
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ id: message.id, result: {} }) + "\n");
return;
}
if (message.method === "thread/start") {
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ id: message.id, result: { thread: { id: "thread_test" } } }) + "\n");
return;
}
if (message.method === "turn/start") {
writeFileSync(dumpPath, JSON.stringify({
threadStart: requests.find((entry) => entry.method === "thread/start")?.params ?? null,
turnStart: message.params ?? null,
}, null, 2));
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ id: message.id, result: { turn: { id: "turn_test" } } }) + "\n");
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ method: "turn/completed", params: { threadId: "thread_test", turn: { id: "turn_test", status: "completed" } } }) + "\n");
return;
}
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ id: message.id, result: {} }) + "\n");
});
""", Encoding.UTF8);
await RunNodeAsync([
"tools/agent-transport.mjs",
"enqueue",
"--id", "req_dispatch_appserver_123",
"--repo", "Bifrost",
"--agent", "nibu",
"--title", "Dispatch app-server seed",
"--request", "Seed the live request lane.",
"--allow-unmirrored", "true",
"--allow-unreceipted-activity", "true",
]);
var result = await RunNodeAsync([
"tools/dispatch-agent-requests.mjs",
"run-claimed",
"--request-file", requestPath,
"--repo-root", RepoRoot,
"--prompt-file", promptPath,
"--log", logPath,
"--launch-mode", "app-server",
"--codex-executable", "node",
"--codex-exec-args", fakeServerPath,
"--no-discord", "true",
], new Dictionary<string, string?>
{
["BIFROST_ALLOW_UNRECEIPTED_ACTIVITY"] = "true",
["DISPATCH_APP_SERVER_DUMP"] = dumpPath,
});
Assert.Equal(0, result.ExitCode);
Assert.True(File.Exists(dumpPath), "Fake app-server did not record dispatch policy.");
using var payload = JsonDocument.Parse(await File.ReadAllTextAsync(dumpPath, Encoding.UTF8));
var threadStart = payload.RootElement.GetProperty("threadStart");
Assert.Equal("workspace-write", threadStart.GetProperty("sandbox").GetString());
var turnStart = payload.RootElement.GetProperty("turnStart");
var sandboxPolicy = turnStart.GetProperty("sandboxPolicy");
Assert.Equal("workspaceWrite", sandboxPolicy.GetProperty("type").GetString());
Assert.False(sandboxPolicy.GetProperty("networkAccess").GetBoolean());
}
finally
{
if (hadTransportStore)
{
File.Copy(transportStoreBackup, transportStorePath, overwrite: true);
File.Delete(transportStoreBackup);
}
else if (File.Exists(transportStorePath))
{
File.Delete(transportStorePath);
}
}
}
[Fact]
public async Task Dispatched_turn_git_hook_blocks_raw_git_push()
{

View file

@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ async function runClaimedViaCodexExec(request, repoRoot, promptPath, logPath, op
async function runClaimedViaAppServer(request, repoRoot, promptPath, logPath, options) {
const model = options.model ?? process.env.CODEX_MODEL ?? "gpt-5.4";
const reasoningEffort = options["reasoning-effort"] ?? process.env.CODEX_MODEL_REASONING_EFFORT ?? "medium";
const sandbox = options.sandbox ?? "danger-full-access";
const sandbox = options.sandbox ?? "workspace-write";
const startedAt = new Date().toISOString();
const prompt = await readFile(promptPath, "utf8");
const resultPath = resolve(dirname(logPath), "result.json");
@ -631,6 +631,7 @@ class CodexAppServerClient {
this.buffer = "";
this.pending = new Map();
this.turnWaiters = [];
this.completedTurns = new Map();
}
async start() {
@ -656,12 +657,18 @@ class CodexAppServerClient {
waiter.reject(error);
}
this.turnWaiters = [];
this.completedTurns.clear();
});
this.child.on("error", (error) => {
for (const waiter of this.pending.values()) {
waiter.reject(error);
}
this.pending.clear();
for (const waiter of this.turnWaiters) {
waiter.reject(error);
}
this.turnWaiters = [];
this.completedTurns.clear();
});
}
@ -673,7 +680,6 @@ class CodexAppServerClient {
const id = this.nextId;
this.nextId += 1;
appendLog(this.logPath, `client-request ${method}#${id}`);
this.child.stdin.write(`${JSON.stringify({ id, method, params })}\n`);
return new Promise((resolvePromise, reject) => {
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
this.pending.delete(id);
@ -689,10 +695,17 @@ class CodexAppServerClient {
reject(error);
},
});
this.child.stdin.write(`${JSON.stringify({ id, method, params })}\n`);
});
}
waitForTurnCompleted(threadId, turnId) {
const key = `${threadId}:${turnId}`;
const completed = this.completedTurns.get(key);
if (completed) {
this.completedTurns.delete(key);
return Promise.resolve(completed);
}
return new Promise((resolvePromise, reject) => {
this.turnWaiters.push({ threadId, turnId, resolve: resolvePromise, reject });
});
@ -741,15 +754,21 @@ class CodexAppServerClient {
if (message.method === "turn/completed") {
const params = message.params ?? {};
const completedTurnId = params.turn?.id;
const key = `${params.threadId ?? ""}:${completedTurnId ?? ""}`;
const remaining = [];
let resolved = false;
for (const waiter of this.turnWaiters) {
if (waiter.threadId === params.threadId && waiter.turnId === completedTurnId) {
waiter.resolve(params);
resolved = true;
} else {
remaining.push(waiter);
}
}
this.turnWaiters = remaining;
if (!resolved && params.threadId && completedTurnId) {
this.completedTurns.set(key, params);
}
}
}
@ -778,13 +797,13 @@ function sandboxPolicyFromMode(mode) {
return { type: "dangerFullAccess" };
}
if (mode === "read-only") {
return { type: "readOnly", access: { type: "fullAccess" }, networkAccess: true };
return { type: "readOnly", access: { type: "fullAccess" }, networkAccess: false };
}
return {
type: "workspaceWrite",
writableRoots: [],
readOnlyAccess: { type: "fullAccess" },
networkAccess: true,
networkAccess: false,
excludeTmpdirEnvVar: false,
excludeSlashTmp: false,
};